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Abstract 
	
Tourism	is	expanding	in	many	developing	countries,	in	contexts	where	states	struggle	
to	effectively	manage	local	economic	development	processes.	This	thesis	aims	to	bridge	
a	gap	between	the	literature	on	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	and	scholarship	pertaining	
to	the	politics	and	governance	of	local	development	planning,	by	examining	how	
governing	interactions	shape	the	planning	and	use	of	tourism	for	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction.	A	key	contribution	of	this	thesis	is	the	
development	of	an	interactive	tourism	governance	framework	built	on	the	three	key	
concepts	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity,	institutional	thickness	and	political	
cycles.	The	research	is	framed	as	an	embedded	case	study	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	
in	Ghana.	A	mainly	qualitative	research	approach	was	adopted	involving	interviews,	
observations	and	documentary	analysis.		
The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	sought	to	leverage	tourism	as	a	catalyst	for	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction	through	an	integrated	planning	approach	led	by	
the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	(KEEA).	The	thesis	identified	
that	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	insufficiently	embedded	within	existing	institutional	
structures.	Through	a	process‐tracing	analysis,	it	was	found	that	cycles	of	national	
elections	and	local	government	politics	resulted	in	the	loss	of	institutional	memory	and	
knowledge	at	the	KEEA.	This	constrained	the	governing	capacity	of	the	KEEA	in	
steering	project	implementation.	This	thesis	shows	that	the	state	and	the	internal	
power	dynamics	between	key	players	within	it	remain	crucial	in	setting	and	
implementing	policy	agendas.	The	thesis	therefore	seeks	to	make	a	contribution	
towards	debates	on	the	significance	of	the	state	in	tourism	governance	and	argues	that	
the	state	ought	to	be	brought	back	into	any	conceptualisation	of	tourism	governance,	
especially	as	it	relates	to	the	governing	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	development.	As	
local	governments	take	a	more	active	role	in	tourism	development	planning,	the	issue	
of	their	capacity	needs	to	be	addressed.		
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Chapter 1 
Defining the research agenda 
The	historic	city	of	Elmina	is	the	capital	of	the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	(KEEA)	
Municipality	in	the	Central	Region	of	Ghana.	With	a	2012	population	of	just	over	23,000	
(GSS,	2014b),	Elmina	is	the	biggest	settlement	in,	and	the	capital	of	the	Komenda‐
Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	(KEEA)	Municipality	of	the	Central	Region	of	Ghana,	headed	by	
the	Municipal	Chief	Executive.	The	KEEA	Municipality	is	made	up	of	six	zonal	councils,	
54	electoral	areas	and	15	decentralised	departments.		There	are	four	overlapping	
traditional	areas/councils	within	the	municipality	–	these	being	Komenda,	Edina	
(Elmina),	Eguafo	and	Abrem	traditional	areas.	The	population	of	these	areas	are	largely	
Fanti	in	ethnicity.	Thus,	as	well	as	being	the	seat	of	the	Elmina	Urban	Council	as	per	the	
decentralisation	policies	in	place,	Elmina	also	doubles	up	as	the	capital	of	the	Edinaman	
Traditional	Council	which	is	headed	by	the	Paramount	Chief.	This	dual	system	of	
governance	within	Elmina	requires	cooperation	and	dialogue	between	the	political	
system	and	the	traditional	system	in	many	areas	of	socio‐economic	policy	making.	This	
is	because	both	the	political	administrative	structures	and	the	traditional	structures	
have	responsibility	for	the	overall	development	of	the	area	under	their	jurisdiction.		It	
is	estimated	that	60%	of	employment	in	Elmina	is	in	the	informal	sector	while	the	
remaining	40%	of	formal	sector	employment	is	found	in	teaching,	nursing	and	
government	jobs	at	the	KEEA	Municipal	offices	(KEEA,	2002).	The	informal	sector	
includes	activities	such	as	fishing,	ship	building,	fish	processing,	salt	mining,	artisanal	
self‐employment,	agriculture	and	petty	trading.		
Poverty	incidence	is	widespread	in	Elmina	and	is	manifested	in	a	number	of	indicators.	
These	include	high	rates	of	unemployment,	high	school	dropout	rates,	high	rates	of	
child	delinquency,	low	school	enrolment	rates,	high	rates	of	teenage	pregnancy	among	
others.	For	instance,	the	results	of	the	2010	Ghana	Population	and	Housing	Census	
shows	that	“at	least	three	in	every	ten	persons	[in	the	KEEA	municipality]	are	
economically	not	active	(32.4%)”	and	that	“one	key	finding	of	important	social	and	
health	implication	is	the	poor	nature	of	housing	condition	in	the	Municipality	which	
confirms	the	relative	poverty	of	the	residents”	(GSS,	2014:70).	As	the	KEEA	Municipal	
Coordinating	Director	concedes,	“…yes	we	have	poverty,	the	bulk	of	people	are	poor	so	
to	speak	and	if	you	go	into	the	hinterland	you	see	people	depend	on	seasonal	cropping	
and	they	are	peasant	farmers,	from	hand	to	mouth.	This	is	how	they’ve	survived	all	the	
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way”1.	The	Municipal	Assembly	identifies	the	key	development	challenges	in	Elmina	
and	its	environs	as	found	in	education,	agriculture,	WASH	(water,	sanitation	and	
hygiene),	health	and	local	economic	development2.	Improvements	in	these	areas	are	
considered	as	essential	for	improving	socio‐economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction.	It	is	in	this	regard	that	beginning	in	the	mid‐1990s,	tourism	came	to	be	seen	
as	a	potential	‘third	sector’	growth	pole	in	Elmina		‐	after	fishing	and	salt	mining	‐	which	
could	serve	as	a	catalyst	for	local	economic	development	(Holden	et	al.,	2011).		
Elmina	is	endowed	with	a	number	of	cultural	heritage	tourism	resources	and	assets	
that	is	based	on	its	long	association	with	European	explorers	and	settlers.	In	1470,	
Portuguese	explorers	first	made	contact	with	the	people	of	Elmina.	The	Portuguese	
King	Alfonso	renamed	the	city	el	Mina	(“the	Mine”)	due	to	the	city’s	strategic	access	to	
the	gold	fields	in	the	surrounding	areas.	Soon	afterwards	trade	relations	between	the	
people	of	Elmina	and	the	Portuguese	(and	other	Europeans)	became	established	and	by	
1482	the	Portuguese	had	built	St.	George’s	Castle	–	commonly	known	as	the	Elmina	
Castle.	The	castle	was	later	captured	and	controlled	by	the	Dutch	in	1637	and	then	by	
the	British	in	1872.	Prior	to	its	conversion	into	a	slave	dungeon	and	auction	site	at	the	
start	of	the	infamous	slave	trade	era	in	the	early	16th	century,	St.	George’s	Castle	was	a	
centre	for	trading	in	goods	(Bruner,	1996;	Essah,	2001).	As	the	oldest	European	
building	on	the	African	continent,	St.	George’s	Castle	and	the	smaller	Fort	St.	Jago	in	
Elmina	along	with	the	many	forts	and	castles	along	the	coast	of	Ghana	have	been	
recognised	as	UNESCO	World	Heritage	Sites	since	1979	(Adu‐Ampong,	2010).	These	
sites	and	the	existence	of	a	number	of	European‐style	churches	and	cemeteries,	old	
merchant	houses	and	Dutch	street	names	as	well	as	the	rich	cultural	heritage	of	the	
people	of	Elmina	serve	as	significant	tourist	attractions.	On	average	about	75,000	
domestic	and	international	tourist	visits	are	recorded	at	St.	George’s	Castle	alone	on	an	
annual	basis,	with	the	year	ending	2014	recording	just	over	58,000	visitors.3	In	the	past	
attempts	have	been	made	to	leverage	this	rich	cultural	heritage‐based	tourism	to	
catalyse	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	in	Elmina	through	
																																																								
1	Interview	with	Alhaji	Musah,	Municipal	Coordinating	Director,	KEEA,	Elmina	04.11.2014	
2	Interview	with	Labaran	Fuseini,	Municipal	Planning	Officer,	KEEA,	Elmina	23.07.2015:	KEEA	
Medium	Term	Development	Plan	2014‐2017	
3	Calculations	based	on	raw	figures	from	the	Ghana	Museum	and	Monuments	Board	monthly	
record	notebooks.	The	dip	in	visitors	in	2014	compared	to	the	yearly	average	is	the	result	of	the	
Ebola	epidemic	that	scared	visitors	from	coming	to	Ghana.	
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programmes	and	projects.	The	most	recent	of	such	attempts	is	what	became	known	as	
the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	which	began	in	the	early	2000s.		
On	April	15th,	2002	Prince	Willem	Alexander	(currently	King	Willem	Alexander)	and	
Princess	Maxima	of	the	Netherlands	were	present	in	Elmina	for	the	official	opening	of	
the	Elmina	Town	Consultation	under	the	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	Management	
Programme	(ECHMP)	which	was	an	attempt	to	leverage	the	heritage	tourism	assets	for	
local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	The	ECHMP	was	developed	by	the	
KEEA	Municipal	Assembly	and	sought	to	integrate	efforts	at	stimulating	local	economic	
development	in	the	city	of	Elmina	“as	a	means	to	alleviate	poverty	an[d]	improve	the	
living	standard	of	the	Elmina	people”	(KEEA,	2002:11).	It	was	through	the	ECHMP	that	
the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	developed	which	envisaged	heritage	tourism	as	a	
catalyst	for	stimulating	local	economic	development.	The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	
comprised	of	three	key	reports:	1)	Sector	Strategy	and	Vision;	2)	Project	Portfolios	and;	
3)	Elmina	Profile	and	Summary	Profile.	The	Elmina	Profile	was	a	report	on	the	socio‐
economic	development	and	political	situation	of	Elmina.	This	served	as	basis	for	
developing	the	Sector	Strategy	and	Vision	as	well	as	the	Project	Portfolios.	The	Elmina	
Profile	also	served	as	a	baseline	against	which	to	evaluate	its	outcomes.	Out	of	the	three	
reports,	it	is	the	Sector	Strategy	and	Vision	report	that	offers	an	insight	into	how	
stakeholders	arrived	at	an	image	of	how	tourism,	local	economic	development	and	
poverty	reduction	were	related	in	Elmina.	Thus	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	set	out	a	
tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	strategy	that	went	beyond	simple	
heritage	conservation.	In	summary,	the	argument	was	this;	
The	Elmina	2015	strategy	goes	beyond	restoring	monuments.	It	believes	that	with	
improved	tourist	infrastructure,	the	revitalisation	of	the	existing	monuments	and	
the	development	of	other	important	cultural	sites,	tourism	can	become	a	major	
economic	activity	in	Elmina	and	serve	to	improve	the	general	standard	of	living	in	
the	town.	The	strategy	identifies	tourism	as	an	entry	point	in	facilitating	
sustainable	development	through	an	integrated	development	approach.	Thus	
mutual	cultural	heritage	and	monuments	serve	as	a	springboard	in	working	
towards	improvement	of	living	standards.	At	the	same	time,	the	improvements	to	
the	other	sectors	such	as	health,	education	and	waste	management	will	enhance	
the	touristic	potential	of	Elmina,	thereby	allowing	for	a	synergistic	development	
framework.		
KEEA	(2002a:10)		
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In	effect,	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	positioned	as	the	culmination	of	a	tourism‐led	
local	economic	development	planning	process	that	began	in	the	year	2000	by	the	KEEA	
Municipal	Assembly	in	collaboration	with	the	Institute	of	Housing	and	Urban	Studies	of	
the	Erasmus	University	of	Rotterdam	in	the	Netherlands.	This	process	was	also	
initiated	in	close	collaboration	with	the	Ghana	Museums	and	Monuments	Board	
(GMMB),	Ghana	Institute	of	Local	Government	Studies	(ILGS)	and	the	Department	of	
International	Relations	and	International	Organisations	at	the	University	of	Groningen	
in	the	Netherlands.	
A	number	of	projects	outlined	in	the	Project	Portfolio	document	under	the	Elmina	2015	
strategy	were	implemented	between	2003	and	2007	(see	Chapter	5,	section	5.2	for	
more	details).		These	projects	were	part	of	a	shared	vision	that	was	mapped	out	for	the	
future	socio‐economic	development	of	Elmina.	This	shared	vision	was	arrived	at	
through	rounds	of	stakeholder	and	community	consultations	lead	by	the	KEEA.		These	
projects	ranged	from	the	rehabilitation	of	St.	George’s	Castle,	Fort	St.	Jago,	the	Dutch	
Cemetery,	old	merchant	houses	and	the	dredging	of	the	fishing	harbour,	as	well	as	
training	of	artisans	and	the	construction	of	the	Elmina	Craft	Market.	The	funding	
sources	for	these	projects	included	the	Dutch	Culture	Fund,	the	EU’s	9th	European	
Development	Fund	and	Government	of	Ghana	funding	through	the	KEEA	Municipal	
Assembly.	These	projects	were	agreed	upon	through	a	number	of	stakeholder	
consultations	and	public	workshops.	The	implementation	of	these	and	other	projects	
aimed	to	ensure	that	by	2015	Elmina’s	socio‐economic	development	fortunes	would	be	
flourishing	through	increased	tourism.	The	ultimate	expectation	was	that	by	the	end	of	
2015,	Elmina	would	become	‘the	engine	of	equitable	socio‐economic	development	that	
impacts	on	the	wealth	creation,	poverty	reduction	and	improved	local	governance	on	a	
sustainable	basis’	(Arthur	and	Mensah,	2006:310).		
At	the	end	of	the	year	2015	however,	the	outcomes	on	the	ground	show	a	remarkable	
difference	from	the	objectives	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	as	originally	outlined.	
Epitomising	this	mismatch	between	objectives	and	outcome	is	the	state	of	the	Elmina	
Castle	as	shown	in	figures	1	and	2	below.	Figure	1	represents	the	Elmina	St.	George’s	
Castle	immediately	after	renovation	in	2007	while	figure	2	represents	the	neglect	
experienced	by	the	Castle	as	at	November,	2014.	This	neglect	in	maintaining	the	
renovated	Castle	is	a	reflection	of	the	implementation	failures	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy.	
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Figure	1	The	Elmina	Castle	after	renovation	in	2007				
Figure	2	The	Elmina	Castle	in	November,	2014	
In	Elmina	today,	the	expected	integration	of	tourism	to	foster	local	economic	
development	has	yet	to	be	realised.	Collaboration	and	coordination	between	various	
tourism‐related	and	development‐related	agencies	has	broken	down	and	many	of	the	
completed	projects	are	beginning	to	fall	apart	again.	The	tourism	products	on	offer	
have	not	been	diversified	and	the	Elmina	St.	George’s	Castle	continues	to	remain	the	
centrepiece	attraction	without	linkages	being	created	to	other	existing	and	potential	
attractions	in	the	locality.	The	rehabilitated	St.	George	Castle,	Dutch	cemetery,	old	
merchant	houses	and	tourist	signage	are	all	in	various	stages	of	disrepair	and	neglect.	
Many	of	the	business	enterprises	that	were	set	up	at	the	start	of	the	ECHMP	process	to	
benefit	from	and	attract	increased	number	of	tourists	into	the	larger	community	have	
closed	down	because	of	the	failure	of	institutional	collaboration	and	coordination.		
The	Elmina	Arts	and	Craft	Market	which	was	to	offer	revenue	creation	opportunities	
for	local	artisans	is	non‐existent	(see	figure	3	below),	and	the	grounds	are	currently	
used	by	sellers	of	foodstuff	and	children	learning	to	ride	bicycles.	The	Elmina	Tourism	
Office	set	up	to	provide	information	to	tourists	and	to	collect	funds	for	the	Tourism	
Development	Fund	is	no	longer	functional,	with	allegations	that	poor	oversight	and	
accountability	monitoring	led	to	the	embezzlement	of	funds.	Tourists	continue	to	visit	
the	Elmina	Castle	in	buses	parked	right	in	front	of	the	Castle,	and	usually	as	part	of	an	
intensive	day’s	itinerary.	This	means	that	tourists	have	little	to	no	interaction	with	the	
larger	Elmina	community	(Adu‐Ampong,	2016).	The	KEEA	Municipal	Assembly	as	the	
highest	political	and	administrative	body	with	responsibility	for	overall	development	of	
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the	locality	no	longer	shows	any	interest	in	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	Other	institutions	
that	were	involved	in	the	planning	process	appear	to	have	recoiled	back	into	a	narrow	
focus	on	their	own	respective	mandates.	Governance	and	management	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	appears	to	have	fallen	through	the	cracks.			
	Figure	3	The	current	state	of	the	Elmina	Arts	and	Crafts	Market	
The	divergence	of	objectives	and	outcomes	of	the	Elmina	2015	strategy	while	common	
to	many	development	plans	and	projects	raises	a	number	of	important	questions	about	
tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	processes	more	generally	and	the	
particular	case	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	specifically.	The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	can	
be	considered	as	a	failure	inasmuch	as	not	all	policy	objectives	were	achieved.	Part	of	
the	empirical	question	that	needs	to	be	answered	is	about	what	kind	of	failure	it	is.	An	
important	starting	point	is	to	question	whether	the	case	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	is	
an	example	of	a	policy	fiasco	(Bovens	and	‘t	Hart,	1998),	the	result	of	poor	policy	design	
(Howlett,	2011),		an	implementation	failure	(Hill	and	Hupe,	2002,	2008)	or	a	case	of	
state	fragility	and	failure	(Torres	and	Anderson,	2004).		The	literature	on	policy	design	
and	policy	implementation	offers	a	number	of	interesting	perspectives	within	which	to	
assess	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	and	its	outcomes.	Nonetheless,	as	Hill	and	Hupe	
(2008:4)	has	rightly	pointed	out,	questions	of	implementation	presuppose	a	prior	act	of	
policy	formulation	of	“what	needs	to	be	done	and	making	a	decision	on	it”.	Therefore,	it	
is	important	to	firstly	clarify	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	as	a	policy	and	the	processes	
through	which	it	was	developed.		
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Thus	in	this	research	I	locate	the	explanation	of	the	gap	between	policy	intention	and	
policy	outcome	not	necessarily	in	problems	of	implementation	but	rather	in	the	
overriding	governance	environment	that	shaped	the	policy	planning	process.	In	a	
recent	paper,	Peters	(2015)	demonstrates	the	need	to	consider	policy	failure	in	a	
broader	context	of	the	systemic	conditions	relating	to	the	characteristics	of	governance	
arrangements	and	political	variables	that	altogether	shape	the	policy	formulation	
process.	A	big	majority	of	the	causes	of	policy	failures	identified	in	the	literature	tend	to	
be	related	to	the	characteristics	of	the	policies	themselves	with	little	regard	to	the	
overarching	socio‐economic	and	political	environment.	It	is	this	larger	governance	
environment	that	Peters	sees	as	a	more	encompassing	approach	to	understanding	why	
policies	fail.	This	forms	one	departure	point	for	this	thesis	vis‐à‐vis	the	literature	on	
public	policy,	policy	implementation	and	policy	failure.	
Given	the	wide	range	of	stakeholders	involved	in	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	an	
examination	of	the	larger	context	of	governance	interactions	and	the	institutional	
structures	within	which	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	took	place	becomes	key.	This	is	the	
focus	of	this	thesis,	which	investigates	the	institutional	and	political	arrangements,	and	
stakeholder	capacities	within	which	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	
takes	place.	The	research	aims	to	closely	examine	the	particular	ways	in	which	the	
dynamics	of	governance	interactions	shape	the	use	of	tourism	for	local	economic	
development.	In	focusing	on	the	dynamics	of	governance	interactions,	this	thesis	places	
a	strong	emphasis	on	the	important	role	of	politics.	It	does	so	in	order	to	address	the	
lacuna	in	the	literature	on	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	where	there	is	insufficient	
attention	given	to	the	political	and	governance	dimensions	of	tourism’s	role	in	local	
economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	While	this	thesis	deals	with	policy	and	
in	part	questions	of	implementation,	it	is	fundamentally	a	research	about	tourism	
governance	vis‐à‐vis	tourism’s	role	in	local	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction.		
The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	based	on	a	technocratic	understanding	of	governance	
and	the	institutional	arrangements	under	which	implementation	was	to	take	place.	This	
technocratic	understanding	of	governance	interactions	in	the	locality	meant	that	the	
strategy	proceeded	on	the	assumption	that	once	the	consultations	had	been	completed,	
plans	agreed,	and	the	project	had	begun,	things	would	fall	into	place	to	ensure	that	
tourism	lead	to	local	economic	development.	This	did	not	happen	due	to	a	number	of	
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reasons.	The	inadequate	attention	given	to	the	political	dimensions	of	governance	in	
the	design	of	the	strategy	appears	to	be	key.	The	fact	that	the	governance	system	is	
based	on	a	political	cycle	that	ushers	in	new	political	and	governance	agents	through	
elections	conducted	every	four	years	was	clearly	not	factored	into	the	design	of	the	
strategy	and	plans	for	its	sustainable	implementation.	What	is	clear	is	that	within	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	there	has	been	a	failure	in	the	governance	of	tourism	planning	
and	hence	of	creating	effective	linkages	between	tourism	and	local	economic	
development.	It	becomes	clear	that	what	is	needed	is	a	new	understanding	of	the	
governance	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	that	is	sensitive	to	and	
grounded	in	the	political	context	in	which	it	takes	place.	Such	a	politically	informed	
understanding	of	governance	can	provide	a	basis	for	developing	a	more	resilient	
governance	framework	for	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning.		
The	rest	of	this	introductory	chapter	outlines	the	research	objectives	and	questions,	
situates	the	research	in	its	academic	context,	introduces	the	interactive	governance	
framework	and	summarises	the	contribution	and	structure	of	the	thesis	and	the	
conclusions	drawn.		
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1.1 Research objectives and questions 
The	overall	objective	of	this	research	is	to	understand,	explain	and	analyse	how	
governance	interactions	shape	the	planning	and	use	of	tourism	for	local	economic	
development.	Governance	interactions	in	this	thesis	are	conceptualised	as	comprising	
of	stakeholder	governance	capacity,	institutional	thickness	and	political	cycles.	These	
are	detailed	in	Chapter	2.	To	this	end	the	overriding	research	question	is	stated	as:	
 How	do	stakeholder	governance	capacity,	institutional	thickness	and	political	
cycles	shape	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	in	a	tourism	
destination?	
The	answer	to	this	main	question	will	be	arrived	at	through	an	empirical	examination	
of	the	case	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	process.	As	such,	the	specific	research	questions	
for	this	thesis	are	the	following:	
1. How	did	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	conceptualise	the	relationship	between	
tourism,	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction?	
2. To	what	extent	did	the	level	of	governance	capacity	held	by	key	stakeholders	
shape	the	planning	process	and	outcomes	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy?	
3. To	what	extent	was	the	Elmina	2015	strategy	embedded	within	the	institutional	
arrangements	for	local	economic	development	planning	of	the	Komenda‐Edina‐
Eguafo	Abrem	Municipal	Assembly?	
4. How	did	local	government	politics	and	cycles	of	national	elections	shape	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy?	
5. To	what	extent	does	an	interactive	tourism	governance	framework	allow	for	a	
nuanced	understanding	of	the	governing	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	
development	planning?	
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1.2 The tourism-poverty nexus and the need for a governance 
perspective 
Poverty	remains	one	of	the	greatest	challenges	in	modern	times.	Indeed	one	of	the	main	
goals	of	increasing	economic	development	is	to	combat	poverty	whether	in	‘developed’	
or	‘developing’	countries.	Within	this	challenge	of	poverty	reduction,	tourism	is	often	
promoted	as	having	the	potential	to	make	a	significant	contribution	to	the	development	
process	(Ashley	et	al.,	2000;	Sofield	et	al.,	2004;	Scheyvens,	2011;	Holden,	2013;	
Novelli,	2016).	The	continuous	growth	of	the	tourism	sector	globally	has	been	the	basis	
on	which	tourism	has	come	to	be	regarded	as	a	means	to	development.	This	is	
especially	the	case	in	many	African	countries,	where	there	was	a	6%	increase	in	
international	tourism	demand	in	2013	(UNWTO,	2014).	Many	of	these	African	
countries	possess	a	wide	variety	of	natural,	cultural,	and	man‐made	tourism	assets	like	
beaches,	wildlife	parks,	cultural	festivals	and	World	Heritage	Sites.	Consequently,	
tourism	has	been	seen	as	having	the	potential	to	improve	livelihoods	through	foreign	
exchange	earnings,	job	creation,	income	generation	and	biodiversity	conservation	
(Ashley	et	al.,	2000;	Meyer,	2007;	Adu‐Ampong,	2014;	Christie	et	al.,	2014;	Novelli,	
2016).	As	such,	throughout	this	thesis,	I	use	the	term	tourism‐poverty	nexus	to	refer	to	
tourism’s	potential	impact	on	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	and	
to	the	projects,	programmes,	plans	and	policies	that	are	based	on	and/or	geared	
towards	achieving	this.		
In	recent	decades,	extensive	research	has	been	undertaken	into	the	positive	and	
negative	impacts	of	tourism	on	development	(Bryden,	1973;	Turner,	1976;	Britton,	
1982;	Lea,	1988;	Sinclair	and	Tsegaye,	1990;	Pleumaron,	1994;	Ashley	et	al.,	2000;	
Schilcher,	2007;	Mowforth	and	Munt,	2009;	Scheyvens,	2011;	Holden,	2013).	It	has	
been	noted	by	both	de	Kadt	(1979)	and	Britton	(1982)	that	from	the	late	1960s	to	the	
early	1980s	much	of	the	research	on	tourism’s	role	in	economic	development	and	the	
resulting	discussions	were	divorced	from	the	historical	and	political	processes	that	
shape	development	in	any	given	country.	The	mid‐1980s	and	the	1990s	therefore	saw	
critical	reflections	on	the	role	of	tourism	in	development	which	placed	tourism	within	
the	political	economy	of	international	development.	This	period	saw	a	number	of	
studies	that	critiqued	the	overly	positive	tone	of	earlier	research	on	tourism’s	role	in	
development.	This	new	set	of	studies	highlighted	the	negative	impacts	of	tourism	and	
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insisted	on	a	cautious	approach	to	using	tourism	as	a	tool	for	economic	development	
(Britton,	1982;	Pleumaron,	1994;	Brohman,	1996;	Mowforth	and	Munt,	1998).		
On	the	cusp	of	the	millennium,	the	debate	moved	from	tourism’s	role	in	economic	
development	to	a	more	direct	focus	on	how	tourism	contributes	to	poverty	reduction	
with	the	publications	of	Bennett	et	al.	(1999)	and	Ashley	et	al.	(2000).	This	precipitated	
the	burgeoning	of	a	number	of	‘pro‐poor	tourism’	studies	published	in	the	‘grey	
literature’	on	how	to	leverage	tourism’s	potential	for	poverty	reduction	(this	is	
discussed	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	2).	Since	the	first	two	publications	were	made,	
there	have	been	a	number	of	critiques	and	counter‐critiques	about	the	contributions	
made	by	‘pro‐poor	tourism’	studies	to	our	understanding	of	tourism’s	role	in	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction	(Chok	et	al.,	2007;	Schilcher,	2007;	Scheyvens,	
2007;	Harrison,	2008;	Goodwin,	2008;	Spenceley	and	Meyer,	2012).	Thus	throughout	
the	2000s	the	literature	on	tourism’s	role	in	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction	featured	both	optimistic	and	the	cautious	studies	existing	side	by	side	
without	a	clear	consensus.	It	is	within	this	context	that	Sharpley	and	Telfer	(2002)	note	
that	a	conceptual	leap	was	being	made	between	tourism	and	development.	They	argue	
that	many	studies	of	this	period	failed	to	situate	tourism’s	role	in	economic	
development	within	the	socioeconomic	processes	of	other	sectors	that	altogether	shape	
development	outcomes	in	a	given	country.	In	a	sense,	this	conceptual	leap	related	to	the	
insufficient	attention	within	tourism	studies	to	insights	from	the	field	of	development	
studies.	
Increasingly	however,	attention	is	now	being	focused	on	the	dynamic	relationship	
between	tourism	and	the	development	process	more	generally	(Telfer	and	Sharpley,	
2008;	Mowforth	and	Munt,	2009;	Scheyvens,	2011;	Spenceley	and	Meyer,	2012;	
Sharpley	and	Telfer,	2015).	It	has	been	noted	by	Spenceley	and	Meyer	(2012:301)	(see	
also	Scheyvens,	2011)	that	the	“new	poverty”	agenda	that	came	to	underline	research	
into	tourism’s	role	in	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	brought	a	new	
focus	on	the	need	to	enhance	state	institutions	and	governance.	They	argue	that	this	
new	focus	moved	the	debate	away	from	reductionist	conclusions	of	seeing	tourism	
simply	as	a	force	for	good	or	for	evil.	Rather,	the	new	focus	calls	for	tourism	to	be	seen	
as	“a	powerful	social	force	that	needs	to	be	better	understood	in	order	to	connect	it	
more	effectively	to	development	agendas	that	go	beyond	purely	economic	
considerations”.	This	is	to	an	extent	a	manifestation	of	the	‘institutional	turn’	and	‘good	
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governance’	agenda	that	came	to	engulf	the	development	studies	field	since	the	1990s.	
Thus	to	effectively	connect	tourism	to	development	agendas	that	extend	beyond	
economic	considerations,	it	is	imperative	that	the	larger	governance	context	in	which	
tourism	development	takes	place	is	better	understood.		
The	overall	purpose	of	this	thesis	is	to	address	some	of	the	issues	associated	within	the	
larger	governance	context	in	tourist	destinations	by	exploring	the	governance	of	
tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	process	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	
It	is	worth	noting	here	that	this	thesis	has	its	genesis	in	earlier	research	I	carried	out	in	
2012	(Adu‐Ampong,	2012,	2014).	One	of	the	key	findings	from	that	research	was	that	
policy	development	and	implementation	in	the	tourism	sector	of	Ghana’s	Central	
Region	was	failing	because	of	an	absence	of	open	communication	between	
stakeholders.	Although	stakeholders	in	the	sector	held	a	similar	vision	of	tourism’s	
potential	for	economic	development,	the	necessary	collaborative	efforts	to	achieve	such	
a	vision	were	lacking.	I	concluded	that	a	collaborative	approach	to	tourism	planning	
and	development	was	needed	if	tourism	was	to	make	any	significant	contribution	to	
local	socio‐economic	development	ambitions.	A	key	issue	that	my	earlier	research	
identified	but	could	not	follow	up	on	was	the	extent	to	which	collaborative	efforts	in	
tourism	planning	are	enhanced	and/or	constrained	by	existing	governance	and	
political	structures.		
An	intuition	from	this	earlier	research	was	that	the	political	relations	that	underpinned	
governance	structures	in	Ghana	and	in	the	Central	Region	in	particular,	had	a	formative	
influence	on	the	tourism	sector.	This	realisation	made	clear	the	fact	that	politics	matter	
in	governance	and	that	it	was	important	to	move	beyond	a	technocratic	understanding	
of	governance	to	a	more	dynamic	analytical	framework	of	governance.	Such	an	
analytical	governance	framework	would	need	to	take	into	account	the	effects	of	party	
politics	on	tourism	policy‐making	processes.	For	instance,	while	it	is	generally	known	
that	a	change	from	one	political	party	to	another	party	leads	to	changes	in	government	
policy,	what	is	less	understood	is	how	leadership	changes	within	the	same	political	
party	in	government	tend	to	lead	to	changes	in	the	pace	of	implementation	of	policies	
and	projects.		This	thesis	therefore	picks	up	where	Adu‐Ampong	(2014)	left	off	by	
examining	ongoing	governance	interactions	in	the	tourism	sector	of	Ghana	generally	
and	in	the	particular	case	of	the	Elmina	2015	strategy.	
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The	importance	of	governance	in	enhancing	tourism’s	contribution	to	poverty	
reduction	has	been	readily	highlighted	in	the	literature	(Brohman,	1996;	Konadu‐
Agyemang,	2001;	Scheyvens,	2007;	Holden,	2013;	Rogerson,	2014).	For	example,	
Holden	(2013)	maintains	that	the	effective	future	use	of	tourism	for	poverty	reduction	
will	depend	on	good	governance	which	is	characterised	by	“increased	citizen	
participation	and	improved	accountability	of	public	officials”	(pg.	155)	in	
contradistinction	to	‘bad/poor	governance’	in	which	“corruption	and	the	abuse	of	
public	office	for	private	gain…undermines	the	legitimacy	of	government	and	reduces	
the	availability	and	quality	of	public	services”	(pg.	156).	This	is	an	echo	of	an	earlier	
assertion	by	Scheyvens	(2007:248)	that	“there	is	a	need	for	effective	governance	
structures	if	tourism	is	to	maximise	benefits	for	the	poor”.	While	these	theoretical	
insistence	on	understanding	the	governance	context	is	a	welcome	development,	there	
are	still	a	number	of	salient	and	fundamental	questions	that	can	only	be	answered	
through	empirical	studies.	The	dearth	of	such	empirical	studies	means	that	there	has	
been	an	implicit	acceptance	of	how	governance	might	affect	tourism’s	contribution	to	
development.		
Following	the	advent	of	the	pro‐poor	tourism	agenda,	the	debate	on	the	tourism‐
poverty	nexus	has	been	energised	with	talks	about	the	crucial	role	of	national	
government	policies	and	interventions.	Recently,	Rogerson	has	also	conceded	that	
“…the	prospects	for	strengthened	tourism‐poverty	linkages	will	be	enhanced	if	tourism	
planning	can	be	embedded	as	part	of	wider	strategic	initiatives	for	place‐based	
interventions	and	active	local	and	regional	economic	development	planning	across	the	
Global	South”	(2014:	607).	This	awareness	is	a	positive	step	towards	understanding	
how	tourism	can	contribute	to	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	This	
raises	a	number	of	key	empirical	questions	including	how	the	process	of	embedding	
tourism	planning	within	local	economic	development	planning	is	shaped	by	
governance	structures	and	the	resulting	effects	on	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus.	These	
empirical	dimensions	of	how	governance	structures	are	shaping	tourism‐poverty	nexus	
outcomes	are	currently	under	researched.	Moreover	there	is	as	yet	not	much	research	
into	the	process	of	embedding	tourism	planning	as	part	of	wider	local	economic	
development	planning	initiatives	in	Sub	Saharan	Africa.	The	exception	has	been	in	
South	Africa	where	a	number	of	studies	on	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	
process	have	been	undertaken	(Rogerson,	2002,	2007,	2014;	Binns	and	Nel,	2002).	
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There	is	a	need	for	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	in	order	to	
move	the	debates	forward.		I	argue	that	this	requires	analyses	of	the	governance	of	
tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	processes	that	incorporate	rigorous	
political	analysis.	Tourism	is	embedded	in	various	place‐based	socio‐economic	
interventions	and	hence	the	focus	also	needs	to	be	on	the	governance	mechanisms	
through	which	overall	socio‐economic	development	takes	place	at	the	destination	level.	
Addressing	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	should	go	beyond	simply	looking	at	the	figures	
of	specific	tourism‐poverty	nexus	projects	and	the	idea	of	‘getting	the	policies	right’.	It	
is	well	known	that	governments’	choice	of	particular	plans	or	policies	does	not	only	
serve	developmental	goals	but	also	political	goals	(Kelsall,	2011).	Importantly	the	
extent	to	which	plans	and	policies	get	implemented	–	given	changing	governments	and	
even	changes	within	governments	that	comes	through	ministerial	reshuffles	–	also	
becomes	a	deeply	political	process.	Surprisingly	there	is	a	silence	in	the	tourism	
literature	when	it	comes	to	the	specific	issues	of	stakeholder	capacity	and	the	political	
aspects	of	governance	that	influence	tourism’s	role	in	local	economic	development	and	
poverty	reduction.	Given	this	silence,	I	draw	on	analytic	and	theoretical	concepts	and	
ideas	from	political	science,	governance	studies,	planning	and	policy	studies	as	well	as	
from	international	development	studies	especially	in	relation	to	work	on	the	political	
economy	of	public	good	provision	in	developing	countries.			
The	premise	of	this	thesis	is	that	gaining	a	deeper	understanding	of	the	tourism‐
poverty	nexus	require	a	reconceptualisation	of	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	within	a	
governance	framework.	Existing	governance	frameworks	in	the	tourism	planning	and	
policy	literature	tend	to	be	generic	and	based	on	a	technocratic	theorising	of	
governance.	For	instance,	Holden’s	(2013)	assertion	and	treatment	of	governance	and	
its	role	in	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	appears	to	assume	that	the	mere	presence	of	such	
variables	as	citizen	participation	and	accountability	of	public	officials	will	automatically	
lead	to	good	governance	for	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus.	What	is	missing	is	an	analytical	
understanding	of	the	governance	of	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	that	highlights	how	
different	scales	of	governance	have	an	impact	at	the	destination	level.	A	more	analytical	
and	systematic	governance	framework	is	required	in	order	to	undertake	a	holistic	
assessment	of	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus,	which	is	to	be	seen	as	a	system	of	
interrelated	and	interdependent	components.	Consequently	I	develop	an	interactive	
tourism	governance	framework	building	on	the	interactive	governance	perspective	
(Kooiman,	1999,	2000,	2003;	Kooiman	et	al.,	2005;	Kooiman	et	al.,	2008;	Slocum	and	
Backman,	2011;	Bavinck	et	al.,	2013),	institutionalist	perspectives	in	the	local	economic	
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development	planning	literature	(Amin	and	Thrift,	1995;	Raco,	1998;	Blakely	and	
Bradshaw,	2002;	Helmsing,	2003;	Pike	et	al.,	2006)	and	work	on	development	politics	
relating	to	political	business	cycles	(Keefer	and	Khemani,	2005)	and	the	political	
economy	of	public	good	provision	and	unfinished	development	projects	(Kelsall,	2012;	
Williams,	2016).			
	
1.3 The interactive tourism governance framework 
Since	the	turn	of	the	millennium,	governance	has	been	in	vogue	across	much	of	the	
social	sciences.	Seen	as	signifying	the	changing	nature	of	the	state	in	governing	society,	
governance	is	variously	defined	(see	Chapter	2	for	more	details).	This	variation	
notwithstanding,	Stoker	(1998:17)	identifies	a	consensus	on	how	governance	is	seen	as	
changing	and	explains	this	to	be	“the	development	of	governing	styles	in	which	the	
boundaries	between	and	within	public	and	private	sectors	have	become	blurred”.	Thus	
in	a	broad	sense	governance	is	simply	about	the	process	in	which	government	
coordinates	the	activities	of	(non‐)	state	actors	in	solving	collective	action	problems.	
Within	the	tourism	literature	however	and	especially	the	literature	on	the	tourism‐
poverty	nexus,	discussions	of	governance	are	yet	to	be	fully	established	(Erkuş‐Öztürk,	
2011).	Indeed	the	term	governance	is	used	much	less	frequently	in	tourism	research	
relative	to	related	terms	such	as	policy	and	planning	(Bramwell	and	Lane,	2011).	This	
is	a	baffling	situation	because	the	tourism	sector	is	characterised	by	high	fragmentation	
and	interdependencies	across	wide	geographical	spaces	that	call	for	greater	interaction	
between	the	different	actors	and	stakeholders	in	tourism	planning	(Waayers	et	al.,	
2012)	making	it	ideal	for	understanding	governance	as	interactions.		
Governance	offers	a	prism	through	which	to	view	the	interaction	of	actors	and	
stakeholders	in	the	highly	fragmented	tourism	sector.	Ruhanen	et	al.,	(2010)	point	out	
that	tourism	is	a	most	interesting	context	within	which	to	study	governance	because	it	
sits	at	the	intersection	of	public,	private,	civil	society	and	community	interests.	
Recently,	it	has	been	argued	that	“…much	of	the	work	related	to	governance	in	tourism	
has	managed	to	define	the	state	out	of	governance	processes	or	at	least	minimise	its	
role	in	comparison	to	emphasising	markets	(business),	network	(voluntary	self‐
organisation)	or	community	(local)	approaches”	(Amore	and	Hall,	2016:6).	The	
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literature	on	governance	in	tourism	research	therefore	remains	skewed	towards	work	
on	public‐private	partnerships	(Bramwell	and	Sharman,	1999;	Zapata	and	Hall,	2012);	
policy	networks	(Dredge,	2006;	Scott	et	al.,	2008;	Cooper	et	al.,	2009);	sustainable	
tourism	development	(Bramwell,	2011;	Sofield	and	Li,	2011)	and	destination	
competitiveness	(Ritchie	and	Crouch,	2003;	d’Angella	et	al.,	2010).	In	order	to	fully	
understand	the	governance	of	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	as	exemplified	through	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy,	a	governance	framework	is	needed	that	makes	interaction	
between	and	within	the	public,	private	and	civil	society	sectors	central	to	its	
conceptualisation.	Such	a	framework	needs	to	(re)define	the	state	back	into	the	
governance	process.		
There	are	as	many	definitions	of	governance	as	there	are	authors	writing	about	it.	The	
varied	definitions	of	governance	found	in	the	literature	include,	“governance	refers	to	
governing	with	and	through	networks”	(Rhodes,	2007:	1246);	“the	tools,	strategies	and	
relationship	used	by	governments	to	help	govern”	(Bell	and	Hindmoor,	2009:2)	and	
governance	as	“the	processes	and	institutions,	both	formal	and	informal,	that	guide	and	
restrain	the	collective	activities	of	a	group”	(Keohane	and	Nye,	2000:12).	The	emphasis	
in	the	various	definitions	of	governance	(see	Chapter	2	for	more	details)	is	the	fact	that	
governance	involves	a	process	in	which	a	multitude	of	actors	come	together	with	the	
aim	of	achieving	some	collective	goals.		Recently,	Grindle	(2017:17)	argues	that	
governance	when	applied	to	the	public	sector	“encompasses	notions	of	how	political	
and	administrative	decisions	get	made,	how	governmental	systems	work,	and	why	both	
formal	and	informal	institutions	matter	in	how	things	get	done	and	how	states	relate	to	
societies”.	Governance	then	is	essentially	about	interactions	between	actors.	This	is	
where	the	interactive	governance	perspective	(Kooiman,	1999,	2000,	2003;	Kooiman	et	
al.,	2005;	Kooiman	et	al.,	2008;	Bavinck	et	al.,	2013)	–	formerly	known	as	socio‐political	
governance	–	provides	a	starting	point	for	the	interactive	tourism	governance	
framework	developed	for	this	thesis.		
Interactive	governance	(discussed	in	detail	in	Chapter	2)	according	to	this	perspective	
refers	to	“the	whole	of	public	as	well	as	private	interactions	taken	to	solve	societal	
problems	and	create	societal	opportunities;	including	the	formulation	and	application	of	
principles	guiding	those	interactions	and	care	for	institutions	that	enable	them”	
(Kooiman	et	al.,	2005:17).	This	definition	offers	a	most	useful	framework	and	starting	
point	for	exploring	and	explaining	the	governing	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	
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development	planning	processes	as	exemplified	in	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.		It	has	
been	noted	that	such	a	conceptual	framework	acts	to	“provide	a	language	and	frame	of	
reference	through	which	reality	can	be	examined	and	lead	theorists	to	ask	questions	
that	might	not	otherwise	occur”	(Judge	et	al.,	1995:	3).	The	value	of	the	interactive	
governance	perspective	is	that	it	offers	an	organising	framework	for	understanding	
changing	processes	of	governing	and	helps	to	identify	important	questions	(Stoker,	
1998).		
At	a	foundational	level,	the	interactive	governance	perspective	distinguishes	between	
three	subsystems:	i)	a	system‐to‐be	governed	made	up	of	a	set	of	available	resources;	
ii)	a	governing	system	consisting	of	actors	responsible	for	governing	the	set	of	
resources	and	iii)	a	governance	interaction	which	refers	to	the	interactions	between	
the	two.	It	is	on	the	basis	of	Kooiman’s	work	that	I	develop	the	concept	of	stakeholder	
governance	capacity	as	the	first	building	block	of	the	interactive	tourism	governance	
framework.	This	allows	for	disaggregating	the	capacity	of	various	actors	and	their	
actions	in	order	to	clearly	highlight	and	undertake	a	holistic	assessment	of	how	
governance	interactions	shaped	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	This	helps	to	fill	a	key	gap	in	
the	tourism	governance	and	the	tourism	policy	and	planning	literature	by	providing	a	
systematic	approach	to	understanding	governance	interactions.	
Building	on	aspects	of	Kooiman’s	governing	system,	I	bring	in	insights	from	the	concept	
of	institutional	thickness	as	the	second	conceptual	building	block	of	the	interactive	
tourism	governance	framework.	Institutions	represent	the	main	mechanisms	through	
which	stakeholder	governance	capacity	is	developed	and	deployed.	Thus	it	is	important	
to	consider	how	institutions	that	support	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	get	
formed	and	multiply,	how	they	are	positioned	vis‐à‐vis	other	institutions	and	the	extent	
to	which	they	are	becoming	integrated	within	each	other	based	on	a	shared	vision	of	
working	towards	the	same	goal.	A	focus	on	these	issues	creates	room	for	redefining	the	
state	and	politics	back	into	the	discussion	of	tourism	governance	and	development	
processes.	To	this	end,	I	introduce	the	idea	of	political	cycles	as	the	third	conceptual	
building	block.	Through	this	concept	of	political	cycles	I	explore	the	effects	of	changes	
and	transitions	in	political	parties	and	governments	on	development	projects.	
Moreover,	I	focus	on	how	party	politics	influence	local	government	staff	transfers	and	
the	resultant	loss	of	institutional	memory	and	capacity	at	the	local	level.	This	will	allow	
for	a	politically	informed	analysis	of	how	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	
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planning	processes	are	governed	in	two	key	ways.	First,	it	enables	questions	to	be	
asked	of	how	governance	structures	shape	overall	development	planning	processes	in	a	
given	country.	This	can	then	lead	to	an	analysis	of	how	these	governance	structures	
specifically	shape	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	(i.e.	the	
embedding	and	implementation	of	tourism	plans	within	local	and	regional	economic	
development	planning	processes).		
In	many	ways	the	interactive	governance	perspective	adopted	for	this	thesis	offers	a	
nuanced	way	of	understanding	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	through	its	
conceptualisation	of	governance	with	both	theoretical	and	normative	implications.	The	
interactive	governance	perspective	offers	what	Peters	and	Pierre	(2016:	vii)	call	a	
functionalist	approach	to	governance	that	enables	this	research	to	“identify	processes	
as	well	as	actors	involved	in	governance”	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	Importantly,	the	
functionalist	approach	of	the	interactive	governance	perspective	makes	it	possible	to	
“identify	more	readily	the	interaction	among	social	actors	and	the	state,	emphasising	
the	manner	in	which	these	potential	sources	of	governance	interact[ed]”	in	shaping	the	
processes	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	Thus	governance	and	governance	structures	as	
used	here	are	seen	as	being	political	in	nature	and	not	just	an	apolitical	techno‐
managerial	set	up.	Problematising	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	as	essentially	a	problem	
of	governance	frees	the	debate	from	the	overemphasis	on	the	narrower	cost‐benefit	
analysis	of	economic	considerations	to	a	more	nuanced	political	analysis	and	
understanding.	Thus	by	bringing	politics	back	into	the	discussion	of	the	governance	of	
the	tourism‐poverty	nexus,	this	thesis	provides	a	carefully	traced	historical	perspective	
on	the	political	economy	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	
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1.4 Contribution of the thesis  
This	research	makes	a	theoretical	and	conceptual	contribution	alongside	the	value	of	
its	empirical	work.	The	theoretical	and	conceptual	contribution	of	this	thesis	lies	in	the	
interdisciplinary	approach	that	combines	insights	from	tourism	studies,	international	
development	studies,	political	science,	governance	studies,	local	government	studies,	
public	administration	and	regional	and	local	economic	development	studies.	These	
insights	are	then	integrated	to	offer	a	new	view	of	tourism	governance	processes	and	
how	they	influence	the	use	of	tourism	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction.	This	contribution	to	knowledge	is	achieved	through	a	focus	on	an	in‐depth	
case	study	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	Significantly,	my	research	identifies	a	
conceptual	gap	with	regards	to	the	role	of	governance	on	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus.	
Consequently,	there	is	an	explicit	development	and	application	of	concepts	such	as	
stakeholder	governance	capacity,	institutional	thickness	and	political	cycles	in	this	
thesis	that	offers	new	insights	into	the	debates	on	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus.	This	
thesis	contributes	to	bridging	the	conceptual	gaps	identified.	Empirically,	the	research	
offers	fresh	data	and	an	in‐depth	examination	of	micro‐processes	of	local	economic	
development	planning	and	tourism	planning	in	Ghana	using	the	case	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy.	In	particular,	the	richness	of	the	data	enables	an	understanding	of	the	
ways	tourism‐poverty	nexus	policies	are	understood	by	various	actors	and	the	
contestations	that	surround	implementation	efforts	at	different	levels	of	state	hierarchy	
as	well	as	between	the	state	and	other	societal	actors.		
 
1.5 Structure of the thesis 
This	introductory	chapter	has	sketched	out	the	research	focus	of	this	thesis	by	
identifying	the	gaps	in	knowledge	it	addresses	and	explaining	how	this	thesis	
contributes	to	filling	those	gaps.	Following	from	this,	this	section	outlines	how	the	
remaining	seven	chapters	of	this	thesis	are	arranged.	
Chapter	2	outlines	and	develops	the	interactive	tourism	governance	framework	as	a	
conceptual	and	analytical	tool	for	assessing	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	
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planning.	It	first	starts	by	highlighting	relevant	debates	and	existing	gaps	within	the	
tourism‐poverty	nexus	and	tourism	governance	literatures.	Drawing	on	perspectives	
from	public	administration	and	governance	studies	literature,	institutionalist	
perspectives	in	the	local	economic	development	planning	literature,	research	on	
international	development	politics	relating	to	political	business	cycles	and	the	political	
economy	of	public	good	provision	and	unfinished	development	projects,	I	reemphasise	
the	role	of	the	state	and	its	institutions	and	the	political	aspects	that	underline	tourism	
development	governance	processes.	It	is	here	that	I	develop	the	three	conceptual	
building	blocks	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity,	institutional	thickness	and	political	
cycles.		These	conceptual	building	blocks	allow	me	to	raise	a	number	of	questions	that	
are	later	on	addressed	in	the	empirical	chapters.		
Chapter	3	presents	an	account	and	justification	for	the	research	methodology	and	
methods	adopted	for	this	research	which	is	that	of	an	embedded	case	study	research	
design.	Some	of	the	philosophical	assumptions	underlining	the	choice	of	methods	are	
discussed	before	a	description	of	the	processes	of	data	collection	and	analysis.	The	goal	
of	such	a	description	is	to	show	the	consistency	between	research	questions,	
conceptual	framework	and	data	analysis.	In	the	final	section	of	this	chapter	I	offer	a	
reflexive	account	of	the	ethical	considerations	made	at	different	stages	of	the	research	
process.	I	also	reflect	on	my	positionality	as	a	UK‐based	Ghanaian	researcher.	
Chapter	4	is	the	first	of	four	chapters	rooted	in	the	empirical	field	research.	This	
chapter	is	devoted	to	questions	of	national	level	governance	of	tourism	planning	and	
local	economic	development	planning	in	Ghana.	Beginning	with	a	brief	account	of	the	
historical,	political	and	economic	development	history	of	Ghana,	it	moves	on	to	a	
detailed	look	at	how	local	economic	development	planning	is	governed	from	the	
national	level	to	the	local	level.	This	chapter	identifies	some	of	the	contradictions	and	
challenges	involved	in	embedding	tourism	development	as	part	of	strategic	district	
level	planning.	This	chapter	also	considers	how	tourism	has	been	conceptualised	within	
national	economic	development	policy	and	planning	over	the	years	and	its	impact	on	
long	term	national	tourism	development	plans.	In	the	final	section,	the	tourism	sector	
in	Ghana	is	explored	in	depth,	focusing	on	resources,	key	institutional	actors	and	their	
governing	interactions.	
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Chapter	5	offers	an	analysis	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	using	the	theoretical	and	
analytical	framework	developed	in	Chapter	Two.	The	chapter	starts	with	an	overview	
of	the	socio‐economic	conditions	of	Elmina	before	focusing	on	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	as	a	policy	and	planning	document	that	sought	to	transform	the	fortunes	of	the	
city.	In	particular	this	chapter	explores	the	antecedents	of	the	plan	and	the	processes	
that	led	to	its	final	development.	The	second	part	of	this	chapter	empirically	examines	
the	concept	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity	upon	which	the	delivery	and	
implementation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	anchored.	Using	the	three	key	
elements	of	images,	instruments	and	action	potential,	I	consider	the	many	particular	
ways	in	which	stakeholder	governance	capacity	shaped	the	process	and	outcomes	of	
the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.		
Chapter	6	focuses	on	the	empirical	manifestations	of	the	concept	of	institutional	
thickness	within	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	development	and	implementation.		This	
chapter	explores	the	depth	and	extent	of	thickening	experienced	by	the	organisational	
and	institutional	structures	within	which	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	evolved.	It	starts	by	
first	analysing	how	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	aligned	with	national	economic	
development	policy	and	national	tourism	development	plans.	This	analysis	aims	to	
ascertain	the	extent	to	which	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	aligned	with	national	
institutional	and	organisational	structures	for	economic	as	well	as	tourism	
development.	This	chapter	in	particular	discusses	the	planning	process	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	in	relation	to	the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	Municipality	Assembly	
(KEEA)	in	order	to	identify	the	extent	to	which	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	became	
embedded	within	KEEA’s	structures.	This	discussion	is	anchored	on	the	two	examples	
of	the	Elmina	Tourism	Office	and	the	Elmina	Arts	and	Craft	Market	that	were	set	up	as	
part	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.		
Chapter	7	considers	some	of	the	key	political	elements	that	shaped	the	governance	of	
the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	as	a	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	initiative.	The	
organising	logic	to	this	chapter	is	the	idea	of	cycles	or	cyclical	transitions	and	change	
that	take	place	regarding	international	development	donor	policy	and	funding,	national	
and	local	elections	and	transfer	of	local	government	staff.	The	analytic	focus	however,	is	
on	the	politics	and	political	contestations	that	underline	these	cycles.	The	chapter	
therefore	starts	by	assessing	the	prevailing	international	development	donor	policy	
and	funding	environment	that	made	the	start	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	possible.	It	
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then	follows	up	with	a	close	examination	of	the	national	and	local	election	cycles	that	
spanned	the	duration	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	and	their	political	implications	for	
the	implementation	and	sustainability	of	the	project.	A	final	section	in	this	chapter	then	
considers	how	the	transfer	system	of	local	government	service	staff	was	hijacked	by	
political	elements	at	the	municipal	level.	Specifically,	close	attention	is	paid	to	the	key	
role	played	by	District/Municipal	Development	Planning	Officers	and	how	their	
administrative	transfers	shaped	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.			
Chapter	8	concludes	the	thesis	by	reflecting	back	on	the	empirical	evidence	set	out	in	
the	previous	four	empirical	chapters.	The	first	section	highlights	the	key	research	
findings	by	addressing	and	providing	answers	to	the	research	questions	that	were	set	
out	in	Chapter	1.	This	is	followed	by	setting	out	the	theoretical,	conceptual	and	
empirical	findings	of	this	thesis	in	the	context	of	existing	knowledge.	The	chapter	
provides	a	review	of	the	key	research	findings	and	highlights	their	wider	significance	
and	implications	for	both	the	theory	and	practice	of	planning	for	tourism’s	role	as	a	
catalyst	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	in	destinations	around	
the	world.	Finally,	the	chapter	offers	reflection	on	the	research	process	before	
assessing	the	implications	of	the	research	and	then	outlining	avenues	for	future	
research	that	can	extend	and	consolidate	the	contributions	of	this	thesis.	
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Chapter 2 
An interactive tourism governance framework for 
tourism-led local economic development planning 
Since	the	turn	of	the	millennium,	“governance”,	viewed	as	both	an	empirical	
phenomenon	and	the	set	of	theories	used	to	describe	it,	has	been	in	vogue	across	most	
of	the	social	sciences	(Rhodes,	1996;	Stoker,	1998;	Pierre	and	Peters,	2000;	Pierre,	
2000;	Bang,	2003:	Kjaer,	2004;	Torfing	et	al.,	2012).	A	fundamental	reason	for	the	
increased	interest	in	governance	has	been	the	acknowledged	growth	of	internal	and	
external	challenges	to	the	legitimacy	and	institutional	capacity	of	nation	states	to	
manage	their	own	affairs.	The	authority	of	the	nation	state	has	been	eroded	due	to	
international	financial	market	deregulation,	the	growing	assertiveness	of	subnational	
(regional,	local	and	city	level)	governments	and	the	emergence	of	cohesive	policy	
networks	among	other	factors	(Pierre,	2000).	In	a	recent	treatise	on	governance,	Peters	
and	Pierre	(2016)	consider	that	in	spite	of	the	vogue	in	using	governance,	the	concept	
is	often	misunderstood,	used	in	different	ways	and	can	sometimes	be	contradictory	in	
usage.	A	common	sense	definition	of	governance	is	that	it	is	about	“bringing	together	a	
multitude	of	actors	of	different	types	toward	some	collective	goal”	(Peters	and	Pierre,	
2016:	3).	
In	tourism	studies,	despite	increasing	interest	in	governance	(Ruhanen	et	al.,	2010;	
Bramwell,	2011;	Hall,	2011a,	2011b;	Wan	and	Bramwell,	2015;	Amore	and	Hall,	2016),	
the	discussion	of	governance	is	yet	to	be	fully	integrated	within	the	tourism	literature	
(Erkuş‐Öztürk,	2011).	It	has	been	estimated	by	Amore	and	Hall	(2016)	that	as	at	late	
2015,	about	75%	of	research	on	tourism	and	governance	was	written	from	2008	
onwards.	Given	that	tourism	is	considered	to	be	an	interesting	context	in	which	to	
study	governance	(Ruhanen	et	al,	2010),	the	inadequate	attention	accorded	to	
theorising	tourism	and	governance	is	particularly	curious.	This	is	the	more	so	when	it	
comes	to	discussions	on	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	where	the	importance	of	
governance	in	enhancing	outcomes	has	been	readily	acknowledged	(Brohman	1996;	
Scheyvens,	2007;	Sharpley	and	Ussi,	2012;	Holden,	2013;	Rogerson,	2014).	Nonetheless	
few	systematic	attempts	have	been	made	at	developing	a	governance	framework	that	
captures	the	dynamics	of	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus.	
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In	this	chapter	I	develop	an	interactive	tourism	governance	framework	as	a	conceptual	
and	analytic	tool	for	assessing	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning.	There	
are	three	conceptual	building	blocks	to	the	framework	developed	here	–	stakeholder	
governance	capacity,	institutional	thickness	and	political	cycles.		These	are	linked	
through	processes	of	communication,	collaboration	and	coordination.	This	interactive	
tourism	governance	framework	owes	much	to,	and	draws	heavily	from	the	work	of	
Kooiman	(1993,	1999,	2000,	and	2003)	and	his	colleagues	(Kooiman	et	al.,	2005;	
Kooiman	et	al.,	2008;	Bavinck	et	al.,	2013)	on	governing,	governance	and	governability.	
Moreover,	I	draw	on	insights	from	the	larger	literature	on	governance	(Peters	and	
Pierre,	2016;	Torfing	et	al.,	2012;	Boven’s	et	al.,	2002;	Rhodes,	1996,	2000).	In	other	
respects	the	framework	has	drawn	lessons	from	institutionalist	perspectives	in	the	
local	economic	development	planning	literature	(Blakely	and	Bradshaw,	2002;	
Helmsing,	2003;	Pike	et	al.,	2006),	the	communicative	turn	in	planning	theory	(Healey,	
2006),	research	on	international	development	politics	relating	to	political	business	
cycles	(Keefer	and	Khemani,	2005)	and	the	political	economy	of	public	good	provision	
and	unfinished	development	projects	(Kelsall,	2012;	Williams,	2016).		Drawing	on	
these	ideas,	I	bring	back	and	make	explicit	the	role	of	the	state	and	its	institutions	and	
the	political	aspects	that	underline	tourism	development	governance	processes.	An	
explicit	focus	on	political	contestations	throws	a	spot	light	on	the	dynamic	relationship	
between	structure	and	agency	in	the	governance	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	
development	planning.		
The	following	chapter,	which	is	structured	around	four	main	sections,	explores	how	the	
three	building	blocks	are	conceptualised	through	a	review	of	the	relevant	literature.	
The	first	three	sections	deal	with	stakeholder	governance	capacity,	institutional	
thickness	and	political	cycles.	I	also	explore	how	these	concepts	are	translated	into	
empirical	variables.	In	the	final	section	I	show	how	the	processes	of	communication,	
collaboration	and	coordination	serve	as	the	mortar	that	holds	these	building	blocks	
together.		
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2.1 Stakeholder capacity for governing the tourism-poverty 
nexus 
In	its	most	basic	sense,	stakeholder	capacity	concerns	the	extent	to	which	a	given	
stakeholder	or	set	of	stakeholders	have	at	their	disposal	the	tools	and	the	ability	to	
effect	desired	change.	Given	that	the	mandate	of	stakeholders	tends	to	differ,	it	
becomes	crucial	that	they	are	able	to	aggregate	and	pool	together	their	resources.	In	a	
fragmented	sector	such	as	tourism,	this	aggregation	and	pooling	together	of	resources	
is	key	to	effective	stakeholder	collaboration.	In	this	section,	I	develop	the	concept	of	
stakeholder	governance	capacity	from	Kooiman’s	work	on	interactive	governance.	This	
section	begins	with	an	exploration	of	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	and	the	literature	on	
tourism	governance.	This	exploration	allows	me	to	clearly	identify	the	gaps	in	the	
current	literature	which	I	aim	to	contribute	to	filling	by	borrowing	insights	from	the	
political	science	and	governance	theory	literature.	This	leads	to	the	development	of	the	
stakeholder	governance	capacity	concept	in	the	second	half	of	this	section.	
	
The tourism sector and the tourism-poverty nexus  
The	tourism	sector	–	however	defined	–	is	commonly	regarded	as	the	largest	industry	
in	the	world.	This	sector	currently	contributes	more	than	9%	to	global	GDP	(Christie	et	
al,	2014).	The	year	2012	was	historic	as	the	billion	mark	was	surpassed	with	1.035	
billion	international	tourist	arrivals	and	US$	1.075	billion	tourist	receipts	worldwide	
(UNWTO,	2013).	The	continued	growth	in	international	tourism	and	associated	
revenue	has	witnessed	two	reactions	among	academics,	policy	makers	and	
practitioners.	On	one	hand,	there	are	those	who	maintain	that	tourism	has	the	potential	
to	bring	about	more	equitable,	sustainable	and	net	benefits	to	local	people	(Ashley	et	
al.,	2000;	2001;	Goodwin,	2008;	Mitchell	and	Ashley,	2010;	Spenceley	and	Meyer,	
2012).	Many	others	are	however	cautious	and	note	that	increased	tourist	arrivals	do	
not	always	translate	into	increased	economic	opportunities	and	participation	for	local	
people	in	the	tourist	destination.	The	tourism	industry,	they	argue,	tends	to	entail	
exploitation	of	the	resources	of	developing	countries	which	in	the	end	can	lead	to	the	
increased	entrenchment	of	poverty	and	inequality	(Pleumarom,	1994;	Schilcher,	2007;	
Mowforth	and	Munt,	2009;	Cole,	2012).	These	two	views	are	not	necessarily	mutually	
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exclusive	but	should	be	considered	as	the	ends	of	a	continuum	with	regards	to	the	
tourism‐poverty	nexus.	
The	two	views	at	the	end	of	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	continuum	tend	to	analyse	
issues	at	either	the	very	micro	(community)	level	or	the	macro	(global)	level.	However,	
both	levels	need	to	be	seen	as	being	in	a	dynamic	constitutive	relationship	and	analysed	
as	such	across	a	range	of	geographical	scales.	One	of	the	myths	surrounding	the	
relationship	between	tourism	and	development	has	been	the	assumption	that	
“initiatives,	projects,	and	investments	in	this	activity	systematically	result	in	strong	and	
sustainable	development	effects	for	the	countries	and	regions	involved”	(Fayos‐Sola	et	
al.,	2014:	ix	emphasis	mine).	In	fact,	outcomes	are	anything	but	systematically	
guaranteed	as	tourism	as	a	social	force	depends	on	the	interactions	of	various	
stakeholders	in	the	planning	process.	Sharpley	and	Telfer	(2002)	have	noted	that	up	to	
the	early	2000s,	there	was	a	conceptual	leap	with	research	on	the	tourism‐poverty	
nexus.	This	was	because	the	research	during	this	period	focused	on	the	tourism‐
poverty	nexus	in	isolation	from	and	without	recourse	to	the	core	debates	in	the	field	of	
development	studies,	theory	and	thought.	Building	on	the	third	way	approach	of	
Giddens	(1998),	it	has	been	argued	by	Burns	(2004)	that	a	similar	approach	is	needed	
in	tourism	planning.	Such	an	approach	to	research	on	tourism	planning	is	to	take	into	
account	local	political	particularities.	This	approach	is	in	contrast	with	a	first	way	
approach	which	overemphasises	strong	state‐led	planning,	or	a	second	way	approach	
which	overemphasises	free	market‐led	planning.	A	politically	informed	governance	
approach	to	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	represents	one	way	of	addressing	these	
political	particularities	and	providing	a	dynamic	analysis	the	effects	of	local	and	global	
forces.	Previous	studies	in	Kenya	(Akama	and	Kieti,	2007)	and	the	Gambia	(Sharpley,	
2009)	have	outlined	some	of	these	structural	challenges	in	utilising	tourism	as	a	tool	
for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	
Tourism	as	a	socio‐economic	and	political	activity	is	recognized	as	being	a	highly	
complex	and	dynamic	system	that	comprises	a	multitude	of	actors	and	stakeholders	
(Britton,	1982;	Ioannides	and	Debbage,	1998;	Hall,	1998;	Mosedale,	2011).	How	
stakeholders	interact	is	not	always	necessarily	compatible	and	this	raises	key	
governance	issues	such	as	the	application	and	allocation	of	resources,	rules	and	
decision‐making	power	(Bramwell,	2011).	This	is	especially	so	when	it	comes	to	how	
stakeholders	interact	in	leveraging	tourism	for	poverty	reduction	purposes	(Slocum	
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and	Backman,	2011).	The	tourism‐poverty	nexus	therefore	has	governing	needs	that	
stakeholders	have	to	address	through	their	interactions.	It	is	through	interactions	that	
conflicting	interests	are	negotiated,	coalitions	built	and	activities	coordinated	between	
stakeholders	across	multiple	governance	levels.		
Within	tourism	studies,	the	term	governance	is	used	much	less	frequently	compared	to	
other	related	terms	like	policy	and	planning	(Bramwell	and	Lane,	2011).	In	the	majority	
of	cases	where	tourism	governance	is	studied,	it	is	done	from	the	perspective	of	
sustainable	tourism	development	(Bramwell,	2011;	Sofield	and	Li,	2011),	public‐
private	partnerships	(Bramwell	and	Sharman,	1999;	Zapata	and	Hall,	2012),	policy	
networks	(Dredge,	2006;	Scott	et	al.,	2008;	Cooper	et	al.,	2009)	and	destination	
competitiveness	(Ritchie	and	Crouch,	2003;	d’Angella	et	al.,	2010).	Currently	there	is	a	
research	gap	in	terms	of	how	governance	shapes	tourism’s	role	in	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction.	In	particular,	there	has	been	a	lack	of	detailed	
exploration	into	the	specifics	of	governance	such	as	institutional	presence,	politics	and	
the	internal	power	dynamics	of	the	state	apparatus	at	the	local	level,	and	how	these	
interact	with	the	planning	and	use	of	tourism	for	local	economic	development	and	
poverty	reduction.	It	is	this	gap	that	this	thesis	contributes	to	filling,	firstly	through	
conceptualising	the	capacity	of	tourism	stakeholders	in	the	governance	process.	
Current	discussions	on	tourism	governance	whilst	rarely	focused	on	the	tourism‐
poverty	nexus	do	provide	a	number	of	insights	that	can	be	built	on.		One	strand	of	
tourism	governance	focuses	on	destinations	management	from	a	corporate/business	
management	perspective	(Buhalis,	2000;	Pechlaner	and	Tschurtschenthaler,	2003;	
Pechlaner	et	al.,	2009).	Increasingly,	research	in	this	area	is	focused	away	from	
organisations	and	institutions	to	the	impact	of	individual	elites	like	managers	of	
destination	management	organisations	(DMOs)	and	how	their	leadership	styles	affect	
destination	management	in	terms	of	competitiveness	(Pechlaner	et	al.,	2014;	Beritelli	
and	Bieger,	2014;	Valente	et	al.,	2015).	This	focus	on	the	creativity	and	innovation	of	
individual	leadership	styles	does	not,	however	offer	any	sustained	analysis	of	how	
existing	power	relations	and	structures	constrain	the	success	of	DMO	leadership	
(Bianchi,	2002).	Research	from	this	strand	of	tourism	governance	has	nonetheless	
shown	the	importance	of	encouraging	full	stakeholder	participation	in	destination	
management.	However,	the	difficulties	in	establishing	collaborative	efforts	(Jamal	and	
Getz,	1995;	Lovelock	2001)	and	the	differences	in	performance	outcomes	of	destination	
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management	organisations	(DMOs)	(d’Angella	and	Go,	2009)	have	led	to	calls	for	this	
strand	of	tourism	governance	to	critically	engage	with	the	concepts	of	stakeholders	and	
their	collaboration	and	coordination.	This	is	because	while	it	is	important	to	get	all	
stakeholders	involved	in	destination	management,	consideration	needs	to	be	given	to	
the	capacity	of	each	stakeholder.		It	is	this	call	that	I	respond	to	in	developing	the	
concept	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity.	
A	second	strand	of	research	on	governance	in	tourism	which	draws	on	political	science	
theories	(Goymen,	2000:	Erkuş‐Öztürk,	2011;	Bramwell,	2011:	Hall,	2011a,	2011b),	
informs	my	concept	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity.		This	strand	of	research	is	
premised	on	the	assumption	that	“tailored	and	effective	governance	is	a	key	
requirement	for	implementing	sustainable	tourism”	(Bramwell	and	Lane,	2011:411).	In	
this	sense,	governance	is	understood	as	opening	up	tourism	planning	and	decision‐
making	processes	to	the	participation	of	various	actors	as	well	as	the	use	of	appropriate	
policy	instruments	to	achieve	sustainable	tourism	development	outcomes.	This	
research	argues	that	one	has	to	pay	attention	to	issues	of	social	relations	of	power	in	
the	tourism	development	process	(Bianchi,	2002:226)	and	the	significant	influence	of	
the	state	(Bramwell,	2011)	in	setting	tourism	development	priorities.	Further	
developments	in	this	strand	of	research	on	governance	in	tourism	from	a	political	
economy	perspective	(Dieke,	2000;	Bianchi,	2002;	Mosedale,	2011;	Wang	and	
Bramwell,	2012;	Wan	and	Bramwell,	2015)	have	also	highlighted	the	importance	of	
focusing	on	how	structural	processes	and	contingent	forces	shape	the	actions	of	
stakeholders	and	ultimately	the	governance	of	tourism.	Crucially,	there	has	been	a	call	
for	a	close	examination	of	the	relationship	between	formal	institutional	arrangements,	
informal	cultural	practices	and	major	structural	socio‐economic	changes	like	change	in	
political	party	governments	(Pastras	and	Bramwell,	2013).	To	contribute	to	this	call,	
this	thesis	integrates	ideas	from	the	general	governance	literature	and	from	public	
administration	and	management.	Within	these	literatures	the	key	role	of	governance	
variables	in	explaining	development	and	poverty	reduction	outcomes,	especially	in	
developing	countries,	is	well	established.	
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Governing, governance and governability 
Governance	is	considered	as	both	a	theory	and	a	science,	a	structure	and	a	process	that	
describes	public	administration	and	management,	public‐private	partnerships,	and	
coordination	of	mechanisms	geared	towards	collective	interests	(Pierre	and	Peters,	
2000).	There	are	two	dual	meanings	commonly	attached	to	governance:	i)	as	the	
“empirical	manifestations	of	state	adaptation	to	its	external	environment	as	it	emerges	
in	the	late	twentieth	century”	and;	ii)	as	a	“conceptual	or	theoretical	representation	of	
co‐ordination	of	social	systems	and	...	the	role	of	the	state	in	that	process”	(Pierre,	
2000:3).	Thus,	however	defined,	governance	calls	into	view	the	role	of	the	state	in	
balancing	collective	interests.	The	term	governance	has	therefore	come	to	be	used	in	
distinction	to	the	term	government	which	many	perceive	to	be	a	narrow.	For	Gamble	
(2000),	the	popularity	of	the	term	governance	in	academic	and	policy	circles	is	due	to	
the	decoupling	of	governing	as	a	separate	process	from	government.	Where	once	
government	went	hand‐in‐hand	with	governance,	governance	is	no	longer	used	as	a	
synonym	for	government	but	rather	to	signify	a	change	in	the	way	society	is	governed	
(Rhodes,	1996)	–	what	Rhodes	(1994)	famously	referred	to	as	the	‘hollowing	out	of	the	
state’.	However,	others	have	argued	that	the	changing	nature	of	the	state	attests	more	
to	its	adaptation	to	contemporary	challenges	rather	that	a	decline	of	the	state.	For	
Kooiman	(2000),	there	is	a	noticeable	shifting	of	state	roles	rather	than	a	shrinking	of	
roles.	
A	wide	variety	of	definitions	of	governance	has	been	offered	in	the	literature	(see	Kjaer,	
2004	for	an	extensive	overview)	but	the	term	remains	slippery	as	there	is	neither	a	
consensus	on	a	comprehensive	theory	of	governance	nor	of	its	definition.	In	its	usage,	
governance	as	a	concept	covers	the	range	of	public,	private	and	civil	society	sector	
institutions	and	relationships	involved	in	the	process	of	steering	society	and	achieving	
collective	goals	(Pierre	and	Peters,	2000).	While	there	are	some	basic	core	features	
common	to	various	definitions	of	governance	found	in	the	literature,	there	are	large	
differences	as	each	definition	may	well	refer	to	different	debates.	Kjaer	(2004)	argues	
that	the	many	definitions	of	governance	can	be	placed	under	three	disciplinary	
subfields	of	political	science	namely;	public	administration	and	policy,	international	
relations	and	comparative	politics	(see	table	1	below	for	examples	of	ideal‐typical	
definitions).	Governance	as	used	within	public	administration	and	policy	refers	to	the	
changes	in	the	tasks,	organisation	and	management	structure	of	the	public	sector.	
Within	international	relations	governance	is	connotes	the	transnational	nature	of	
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governing	activities	due	to	globalisation.	Finally,	governance	when	used	in	comparative	
politics	tends	to	focus	on	state‐society	interactions.	
Table	1	Ideal‐typical	definition	of	governance	per	the	three	subfields	of	political	science	(based	
on	Kjaer,	2004:3)	
Public	Administration	and	Policy
Governance	refers	to	self‐organizing,	interorganizational	networks	characterized	by	
interdependence,	resource‐exchange,	rules	of	the	game,	and	significant	autonomy	
from	the	state	(Rhodes,	1997:	15).	
	
International	Relations	
Global	governance	is	conceived	to	include	systems	of	rule	at	all	levels	of	human	
activity‐	from	the	family	to	the	international	organization	‐	in	which	the	pursuit	of	
goals	through	the	exercise	of	control	has	transnational	repercussions	(Rosenau,	
1995:	13).	
	
Comparative	Politics	
Governance	is	the	stewardship	of	formal	and	informal	political	rules	of	the	game.	
Governance	refers	to	those	measures	that	involve	setting	the	rules	for	the	exercise	of	
power	and	settling	conflicts	over	such	rules.	(Hyden,	1999:	185)	
These	three	subfields	of	political	science	are	not	entirely	separate	and	hence	there	is	
frequent	blurring	of	research.		Consequently,	the	use	of	governance	definitions	
becomes	blurred	and	fluid	in	research.	Such	fluidity	in	subfields	and	definitions	add	to	
the	slipperiness	of	governance	as	a	term.	The	slipperiness	notwithstanding,	governance	
is	considered	as	having	a	dual	meaning	attached	to	it.	On	one	hand	it	is	seen	as	the	
“empirical	manifestations	of	state	adaptation	to	its	external	environment	as	it	emerges	
in	the	late	twentieth	century”	while	on	the	other	hand	it	is	seen	as	a	“conceptual	or	
theoretical	representation	of	co‐ordination	of	social	systems	and	...	the	role	of	the	state	
in	that	process”	(Pierre,	2000:3).	While	earlier	definitions	of	governance	tended	to	
conflate	these	two	meanings,	current	work	on	governance,	especially	in	political	
science	and	policy	studies	mainly	focus	on	the	latter.	Governance	as	a	conceptual	
representation	of	how	society	is	coordinated	and	the	state’s	role	in	this	process	is	
further	categorised	into	“traditional	old	governance”	and	“new	governance”	(Peters,	
2000).	Traditional	old	governance	focuses	on	the	question	of	state	capacity	to	exercise	
control	over	the	rest	of	government,	the	economy	and	society.	New	governance	
according	to	Peters,	asks	the	question	of	how	the	state	interacts	with	the	economy	and	
society	in	order	to	make	policy	decisions	that	are	acceptable	to	all	actors	in	the	society.	
Interaction	is	therefore	an	important	aspect	of	new	understandings	of	governance.	
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A	nuanced	understanding	of	contemporary	governance	is	about	an	understanding	of	
the	transformation	of	the	state	in	the	interaction	processes	through	which	policy	
decisions	are	made	and	sectors	of	the	society	and	the	economy	are	governed	(Peters	
and	Pierre,	2016;	Torfing	et	al.,	2012;	Bell	and	Hindmoor,	2009;	Bovens	et	al.,	2001;	
Pierre	and	Peters,	2000).	In	contrast	to	other	scholars	who	sees	the	state	as	becoming	
less	powerful	due	to	the	increasing	governing	interaction	in	society,	it	is	argued	here	
that	the	state	still	maintains	a	central	role	in	new	forms	of	governance.	As	Pierre	and	
Peters	(2000;	2005)	have	shown,	the	state	maintains	control	over	key	resources	that	
put	it	at	the	centre	of	any	form	of	governing	interactions.	Consequently,	the	interesting	
research	questions	to	ask	are	about	how	the	interplay	between	state	and	societal	actors	
makes	the	steering	of	society	possible	given	the	increasing	complexity	and	incoherence	
in	public	policy	processes.	To	this	end,	Gamble’s	(2000)	differentiation	of	two	levels	of	
understanding	of	the	governing	of	a	social	order	is	useful.	Gamble	identifies	a	first	level	
of	often	non‐formalised	but	implicit	rules	of	the	game	that	create	a	constitutional	
framework	for	governing	and	a	second	level	that	comprises	the	peculiar	ways	through	
which	[state	and	societal]	institutions	and	agencies	govern	–	i.e.	the	techniques,	tools,	
practices	and	ethos	particular	to	each	institution	and	agency.	The	central	idea	
underlying	the	centrality	of	the	state	in	new	forms	of	governance	and	Gamble’s	
differentiation	is	that	of	interaction	–	of	different	actors	at	different	scales	in	a	complex	
environment.	It	is	this	emphasis	on	the	centrality	of	the	state	that	provides	the	basis	for	
justifying	the	use	of	interactive	governance	approach	as	the	overall	analytic	framework.	
	
Interactive governance 
Interactive	governance	as	a	mode	of	analysis	is	gaining	traction	within	political	science	
and	its	subfields	as	well	as	in	more	cognate	fields	given	the	acknowledge	shift	from	
government	to	governance.	There	is	increasing	appreciation	of	the	mutual	
interdependence	of	a	variety	of	stakeholders	in	the	public	policy	making	process.	It	is	
these	processes	of	stakeholder	involvement	in	policy	making	that	have	given	rise	to	the	
idea	of	interactive	governance	–	i.e.	governance	achieved	through	the	interaction	of	a	
variety	of	stakeholders	in	the	public,	private	and	civil	society	sectors.	A	basic	concern	of	
interactive	governance	is	how	the	state	steers	the	economy	and	society	in	collaboration	
with	other	actors.	While	there	has	been	a	shift	from	governments	to	governance,	the	
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state	still	remains	at	the	centre	of	(interactive)	governance.	In	many	cases,	especially	in	
developing	countries	like	Ghana,	the	locus	of	political	power	has	not	shifted	away	from	
the	state.	It	is	the	state	that	leads	the	steering	of	governance	activities	by	initiating	and	
encouraging	interactive	forms	of	decision	making	and	policy	making.		
In	a	2012	book	co‐authored	by	Torfing,	Peters,	Pierre	and	Sorensen,	attempts	are	made	
at	advancing	the	paradigm	of	interactive	governance	as	an	analytic	approach	to	
research	inquiry.	They	define	interactive	governance	as	“the	complex	process	through	
which	a	plurality	of	social	and	political	actors	with	diverging	interests	interact	in	order	
to	formulate,	promote,	and	achieve	common	objectives	by	means	of	mobilizing,	
exchanging,	and	deploying	a	range	of	ideas,	rules	and	resources”	(Torfing	et	al,	2012:2).	
The	interactive	governance	paradigm	they	argue,	provides	a	balanced	count	of	how	
governmental	and	nongovernmental	actors	engage	in	interactions.	The	emphasis	is	
then	placed	on	the	horizontal	interaction	of	public	and	private	actors	as	well	as	on	the	
interdependency	and	independence	of	the	actors	(see	also	Kooiman,	2003).	As	new	
forms	of	interactive	governance	processes	emerge,	it	is	important	to	consider	the	
institutional	implications	of	such	process	(Edelenboas,	2005)	by	developing	a	
framework	that	can	guide	the	research	process.	The	work	of	Kooiman	(1993,	2000,	
2003,	2008)	provides	one	such	analytic	framework.	Insights	from	their	work	of	Torfing	
et	al	(2012),	Peters	and	Pierre	(2016)	among	others	will	be	used	here	to	support	that	
development	of	the	concept	of	stakeholder	capacity	building	on	the	work	of		Kooiman	
and	his	colleagues	who	have	developed	a	nuanced	view	of	governance	stemming	from	a	
background	in	public	administration	and	management.		
Informed	by	systems	theory,	Kooiman’s	socio‐political	governance	theory,	as	it	was	
initially	called	in	1993,	is	understood	as	the	patterns	of	interactions	amongst	different	
societal	and	political	stakeholders	aimed	at	solving	societal	problems,	creating	societal	
opportunities,	or	the	care	of	societal	institutions	within	which	these	governing	
interactions	occur.	Socio‐political	governing	was	considered	in	terms	of	a	continuous	
process	in	which	there	is	interaction	between	a	wide	range	of	social	actors,	groups,	
organisations	and	institutions.	This	idea	has	been	refined	through	both	theoretical	and	
empirical	application	into	what	is	now	referred	to	as	interactive	governance.	
Interactive	governance	is	defined	as	“the	whole	of	public	as	well	as	private	interactions	
taken	to	solve	societal	problems	and	create	societal	opportunities;	including	the	
formulation	and	application	of	principles	guiding	those	interactions	and	care	for	
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institutions	that	enable	them”	(Kooiman	et	al.,	2005:17).	This	definition	offers	a	viable	
approach	to	systematically	conceptualising	the	ongoing	interactive	processes	aimed	at	
solving	societal	problems	and	creating	societal	opportunities.	Such	systematic	
conceptualisation	is	needed	to	evaluate,	analyse	and	explain	the	forms	of	governing	
interactions	taking	place	and	the	key	factors	that	shape	governing	outcomes.		
As	a	mutually	influencing	relationship	between	two	or	more	entities,	interactions	can	
also	be	seen	as	the	specific	form	of	actions	undertaken	in	order	to	solve	societal	
problems	or	create	societal	opportunities	(Kooiman,	1999,	2008a;	Kooiman	et	al.,	
2008).	Thus	the	potential	to	use	tourism	as	a	poverty	reduction	tool	through	tourism‐
led	LED	can	be	considered	as	a	societal	opportunity.	Since	what	constitutes	a	societal	
problem	or	societal	opportunity	is	context	specific,	it	is	only	through	public	and	private	
sector	interactions	that	tourism’s	potential	can	be	realised.	The	interactive	governance	
approach	includes	theoretical	and	normative	elements.	On	the	theoretical	level,	the	
interactive	governance	approach	suggests	that	there	are	a	large	number	of	governance	
actors	who	make	up	society	and	that	the	actions	of	these	actors	are	constrained	and/or	
enabled	by	structures	(Edelenbos,	2005;	Torfing	et	al.,	2012).	This	is	generally	in	line	
with	the	acknowledged	nature	of	the	tourism	sector	as	having	high	fragmentation	and	
interdependencies	across	geographical	spaces	with	a	need	for	coordination	and	
collaboration	between	the	different	actors	in	tourism	governance	and	planning	in	
tourist	destinations	(Waayers	et	al.,	2011).		
Within	this	approach,	an	actor	is	basically	any	social	unit	with	agency	or	power	of	
action	and	can	include	individuals,	associations,	leaders,	interest	groups	and	
international	bodies.	Structures	on	the	other	hand	relate	to	the	frameworks	such	as	
policies,	politics,	culture,	norms,	laws	and	material	possibilities	within	which	actors	
operate	and	which	both	limit	and	widen	the	reach	of	their	action	potentials.	In	terms	of	
its	normative	aspects,	the	interactive	governance	approach	argues	that	broad	societal	
participation	in	governance	is	desirable.	This	is	because	any	governance	arrangement	
without	such	a	normative	basis	will	in	the	long	run	experience	ineffectiveness	and	
illegitimacy	(Kooiman	et	al.,	2008:	Kooiman,	2003).	
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Governability  
The	interactive	governance	perspective	is	analytically	and	empirically	operationalized	
through	the	concept	of	governability.	Governability	relates	to	the	qualities	of	the	object	
of	governance	(the	tourism‐led	LED	planning	process),	to	the	subjects	of	governance	
(public,	private,	community	and	civil	sector	actors)	and	to	the	relation	(communication,	
collaboration	and	coordination)	between	the	object	and	subjects	of	governance	given	
multiple	internal	and	external	influences	(Kooiman,	2000;	2003;	Kooiman	et	al.,	2005;	
Kooiman	et	al.,	2008;	Bavinck	et	al.,	2013).	Governability	is	also	founded	on	systemic	
thinking	which	allows	for	a	systematic	operationalisation	of	the	concept.	Thus	to	talk	of	
the	governability	of	tourism‐led	LED	initiatives	raises	the	question	of	how	the	planning	
process	evolves	and	the	extent	to	which	emergent	institutions	are	compatible	with	
existing	structures.	Answering	this	question	reveals	the	factors	that	shape	the	process	
and	outcomes	of	tourism‐led	LED.		
By	definition	governability	is	“the	overall	capacity	for	governance	of	any	societal	entity	
or	system”	Kooiman	(2008a:173).	The	interactive	governance	perspective	and	the	
related	concept	of	governability	distinguishes	between	a	system‐to‐be‐governed,	a	
governing	system	and	governance	interactions	(see	figure	4	below).	‘Systems’	as	used	
here	is	a	heuristic	conceptual	tool	and	not	a	taxonomy,	nor	with	functional	or	
teleological	connotations	(Kooiman,	2008).	The	system‐to‐be‐governed	comprises	of	a	
natural	sub‐system	(an	ecosystem,	its	resources	and	other	tangible	cultural	heritage	
resources)	and	a	socio‐economic	sub‐system	(made	up	of	users	and	stakeholders	of	the	
natural	system	who	form	institutions	and	political	coalitions)	(Jentoft,	2007;	Jentoft	
and	Chuenpagdee,	2009).		
	
	
37	
	
Figure	4	Components	of	the	Interactive	Governance	and	their	linkages	to	Governability	
(Chuenpagdee	et	al.,	2008:	3)	
The	boundaries	within	any	given	system‐to‐be‐governed	are	socially	determined	based	
on	the	positions	and	perspectives	of	stakeholders.	Nonetheless	the	perspective	of	a	
researcher	is	also	critical	in	defining	boundaries	for	the	purpose	of	empirical	research.	
A	governing	system	on	the	other	hand,	is	constituted	by	institutions	and	steering	
mechanisms	–	states,	markets,	civil	society	and	hybrids	–	through	which	governing	
activities	are	carried	out	(Kooiman,	2008).	Finally,	governance	interactions	reflect	the	
relationships	between	a	governing	system	and	a	system‐to‐be‐governed,	and	are	
concerned	with	the	mechanisms	of	interaction	between	and	within	these	two	systems.	
The	most	common	mechanisms	of	interaction	are	communication,	collaboration	and	
coordination4	on	the	positive	side,	while	the	negative	side	of	interaction	includes	
conflict,	tension	and	disagreements.	The	interactive	governance	perspective	postulates	
that	any	societal	system	such	as	tourism	is	constituted	by	a	system‐to‐be‐governed,	a	
governing	system	and	a	system	of	governance	interactions.	To	solve	problems	or	create	
																																																								
4	These	three	set	of	interaction	mechanisms	(communication,	collaboration	and	coordination)	
are	used	throughout	the	thesis	in	terms	of	their	common	(sense)	definition	without	any	attempt	
at	theorising	them.		I	am	nonetheless	aware	that	these	are	also	often	used	in	conceptual	terms	
that	in	many	academic	work	are	theorised.	
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opportunities	within	the	system	–	for	example	leveraging	the	benefits	of	tourism	for	
local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	–	one	depends	on	all	three	systems	
functioning	in	complementarity.	Thus	these	three	systems	need	to	be	thought	of	as	an	
integrated	whole	that	is	greater	than	the	sum	of	its	parts.		
All	three	systems5	are	recognised	as	being	characterised	by	diversity,	complexity,	
dynamics	and	scale	(Kooiman,	2000).	Diversity	deals	with	the	nature	and	degree	to	
which	stakeholders	and	their	qualities	differ	from	one	another	in	terms	of	interests,	
values,	visions	and	perspectives	on	the	future	(Jentoft,	2007;	Kooiman	et	al.,	2008).	
Complexity	in	terms	of	the	system‐to‐be‐governed	highlights	the	issue	of	the	systemic	
and	institutional	structures	that	condition	the	interrelations	and	interdependencies	
between	stakeholders,	actors	and	components.	It	is	the	presence	of	complexity	that	
tends	to	result	in	conflicts.	Complexity	thus	refers	to	“the	number,	intensity	and	spread	
of	interrelations	between	its	[a	system’s]	components”	(Kooiman,	2013:355).	Dynamics	
refers	to	the	tensions	within	and	between	systems	which	lead	to	fluctuations	in	
outcomes.	Thus	dynamics	also	present	the	potential	for	change	in	stakeholder	
interactions	(Kooiman,	2000;	Jentoft,	2007).	These	tensions	may	be	due	to	conflicting	
interests	of	stakeholders	in	the	system.	Scale	is	a	dimension	of	spatiality	and	
temporality	and	represents	the	level(s)	at	which	the	effects	of	diversity,	complexity	and	
dynamics	within	the	system‐to‐be‐governed	can	be	observed	and	analysed	(Kooiman,	
2008).	Scale	therefore	indicates	an	important	structuring	aspect	of	the	relationship	
between	stakeholders	at	the	national,	regional	and	district	levels	as	well	as	across	time.		
The	characteristic	features	of	diversity,	complexity,	dynamics	and	scale	serve	as	an	
operational	basis	on	which	to	assess	the	governance	interactions	of	a	societal	system	
such	as	tourism.	In	a	tourism	destination	therefore,	diversity	relates	to	whether	
stakeholders	and	actors	within	a	given	system	share	the	same	interests	and	aspiration	
as	to	how	the	sector	should	operate.	Complexity	points	to	the	institutions	and	
structures	in	which	tourism	actors	communicate,	collaborate	and	coordinate	their	
interests	and	visions.	The	institutions	and	structures	that	give	rise	to	complexity	in	the	
tourism	sector	also	provide	the	interface	for	the	dynamics	and	potential	for	change.	In	
the	face	of	tensions	between	stakeholders	and	institutions,	opportunities	for	
cooperation	and/or	conflicts	arise.	These	issues	are	further	compounded	by	how	actors	
interact	over	time	and	across	differing	governing	scales	of	national,	regional	and	
																																																								
5	See	section	1.3	in	Chapter	1				
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district	tourism	agencies	and	private	sector	trade	associations.	Within	the	planning	
process	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	some	key	stakeholders	did	not	share	the	same	
aspirations	and	had	differing	organisation	structures	and	chains	of	command.	For	
example,	the	Ghana	Museums	and	Monuments	Board	(GMMB)	had	sole	governing	
responsibility	over	the	Elmina	Castle	and	report	directly	to	its	head	office	in	Accra.	The	
Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	(KEEA)	with	overall	responsibility	
for	the	socio‐economic	development	of	the	Elmina	area	did	not	have	access	to	revenue	
accruing	from	visitor	fees	at	the	Elmina	Castle.	These	features	of	the	key	stakeholders	
shaped	the	form	and	extent	of	communication,	collaboration	and	coordination	between	
them.	In	the	earlier	phase	of	the	project,	there	was	a	high	level	of	interaction	between	
the	GMMB	and	the	KEEA	due	to	the	informal	revenue	arrangements	that	were	put	in	
place.	Once	this	informal	revenue	sharing	arrangement	ceased,	the	level	of	interaction	
went	down.	Thus	for	the	tourism	sector,	the	success	of	meeting	goals	depends	on	how	
well	the	characteristic	features	of	diversity,	complexity,	dynamics	and	scale	are	handled	
and	addressed	by	stakeholders.		
In	its	operationalization,	the	interactive	governance	perspective	differentiates	between	
governing,	governance	and	governability.	While	governing	is	seen	as	a	process	of	
coordination,	steering,	balancing,	regulating,	integrating,	and	generating	goal‐oriented	
interventions,	governance	is	considered	as	the	overall	effects	that	are	the	outcome	of	
the	governing	process.	Governability	as	the	overall	capacity	of	a	societal	system	to	
govern	itself,	is	defined	in	terms	of	the	ability	to	meet	governance	needs	given	
governance	capacities	(Kooiman,	1993;	Jobbins,	2003).	Governability	as	balancing	
needs	with	capacities	is	thus	central	to	exploring	the	governance	of	the	tourism‐
poverty	nexus	in	general	and	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	in	particular.	Needs	are	
manifestations	of	problems	and	opportunities	faced	by	individuals,	groups	and	
institutions	while	capacities	are	the	abilities	of	actors	and	stakeholders	to	meet	their	
governance	needs.	However,	needs	are	not	neutrally	defined	but	are	infused	with	
political	contestations.	It	is	therefore	important	to	make	explicit	the	political	
contestations	within	which	needs	are	defined	and	met	(see	discussion	in	section	2.2	
and	2.3).	For	instance,	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	highlighted	a	number	of	needs	–	i.e.	
both	problems	and	opportunities	for	using	heritage	tourism	for	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction	–	that	required	adequate	capacities	of	
stakeholders	to	govern	the	process.	Given	that	no	single	stakeholder	will	have	the	
required	capacity	on	their	own,	there	is	need	for	increased	interdependence	between	
stakeholders	and	the	pooling	of	resources	and	capacities.	As	Kooiman	has	rightly	noted,	
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“no	single	actor,	public	or	private,	has	all	the	knowledge	and	information	required	to	
solve	complex,	dynamic	and	diversified	problems;	no	single	actor	has	sufficient	
overview	to	make	to	application	of	needed	instruments	effective;	no	single	actor	has	
sufficient	action	potential		to	dominate	uni‐laterally…”	(Kooiman,	1993:4).	These	ideas	
suggest	new	ways	of	understanding	and	assessing	tourism	governance	and	its	effects	
on	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	by	looking	at	the	individual	and	collective	capacity	of	
stakeholders.	
	
Stakeholder governance capacity for the tourism-poverty nexus 
The	concept	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity	developed	here	as	one	of	the	building	
blocks	of	the	interactive	tourism	governance	framework	draws	further	from	two	
aspects	of	Kooiman’s	work	–	the	concepts	of	governance	capacities	and	stakeholder	
interactions	as	shown	in	the	table	2	below.6		Both	concepts	operate	at	an	
intentional/action	level	and	a	structural/conditional	level.	Stakeholder	interactions	are	
the	actions	emanating	from	the	values,	goals,	visions	and	purposes	of	stakeholders	at	
the	intentional	level.	The	intentional	level	simply	refers	to	the	choice	or	agency	
available	to	stakeholders	to	choose	how	they	act	or	interact	with	others.	At	the	
structural	level	it	refers	to	institutions,	rules	and	patterns	of	communication	which	
enable	and/or	constrain	actions	at	the	intentional	level.	I	further	develop	this	aspect	of	
Kooiman’s	work	in	the	next	section	on	thickening	institutions	for	tourism‐led	local	
economic	development	planning.	The	key	point	of	stakeholder	interaction	is	that	the	
less	constraining	the	structures,	the	more	flexibility	and	freedom	available	to	
stakeholders	to	choose	their	goals	and	interests	(Kooiman,	2000;	Caffyn	and	Jobbins,	
2003).	Governance	capacities	are	the	capabilities	stakeholders	and	actors	are	able	to	
derive	from	within	the	governance	system.	Governance	capacities	are	constituted	by	
three	components	operating	at	the	intentional	level	but	embedded	within	structures:	
images	(as	part	of	culture),	instruments	(as	part	of	resources)	and	action	potential	(as	
																																																								
6	While	there	is	a	wider	depth	to	Kooiman’s	work	(see	Appendix	A),	it	is	the	work	on	governance	
capacities	and	stakeholder	interactions	that	enables	this	current	research	to	progress	towards	
developing	a	governance	framework	for	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	
initiatives.		
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part	of	institutional	power	relations)	(Kooiman,	1999,	2000;	Caffyn	and	Jobbins,	2003;	
Slocum	and	Backman,	2011).	
Table	2	Stakeholder	governance	capacity	
	
	
	
	
Governance	Capacity	
	
	
	
Intentional/Action	level Structural/Conditional	level	
Images	
	
Instruments		
	
Action	potential	
Culture,	data	collection	
	
Resources	
	
Institutions,	power	relations	
	
Images	at	the	intentional	level	represent	the	guiding	lights	for	governing	activities	and	
are	the	mental	portraits	or	constructs	held	by	stakeholders	concerning	both	current	
and	future	governance	situations.	At	the	structural	level	images	typically	consist	of	
visions,	judgements,	ways	of	data	collection	and	analysis,	presuppositions	and	
convictions	that	serve	as	filters	or	background	to	images	held	by	stakeholders.	Images	
not	only	speak	to	specific	issues	at	hand	but	may	involve	fundamental	assumptions	
about	the	role	of	the	state	vis‐à‐vis	other	actors	and	of	the	relationship	between	society	
and	nature	(Kooiman	and	Bavinck,	2005;	Kooiman,	2008;	Mahon,	2008).	Given	that	
everyone	possesses	an	image,	the	key	question	is	whether	stakeholders	make	them	
explicit	in	their	governing	interactions	at	both	intentional	and	structural	levels.		
Instruments	are	the	tools	that	link	images	to	action.	The	range	of	instruments	available	
to	stakeholders	in	translating	their	held	images	into	tangible	actions	vary	from	‘soft’	to	
‘hard’	ones	–	licences,	standards,	taxes,	educational	forums,	peer	pressure	and	physical	
force	among	others.	The	choice	of	instruments	available	to	and	deployed	by	
stakeholders	is	not	neutrally	given	but	depends	on	their	power	positions	in	society	and	
within	the	governance	system.	Consequently	the	choice,	design	and	use	of	instruments	
frequently	involves	competing	interests	and	tensions	(Kooiman,	2008).	At	the	
structural	level,	instruments	are	seen	as	resources	–	material,	human,	technical,	social	
capital	‐	that	need	to	be	developed	and	implemented.	Thus	given	the	range	of	possible	
resources	and	instruments,	the	critical	question	to	ask	is;	how	are	new	instruments	
chosen	and	developed,	and	do	the	deployed	instruments	achieve	their	stated	goals?			
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The	concept	of	action	potential	refers	to	the	socio‐political	room	for	action	within	
which	stakeholders	operate,	and	the	extent	to	which	they	are	able	to	put	an	instrument	
into	effect	in	order	to	translate	images	into	societal	outcomes.	At	the	structural	level	
action	potential	is	embedded	in	power	relations.	These	can	be	political,	as	in	the	
willingness	of	a	government	to	encourage	or	constrain	tourism	revenue	sharing	
between	stakeholders.	Thus	an	action	potential	which	may	include	a	simple	task	of	
implementing	a	set	of	policy	guidelines	often	requires	the	mobilisation	of	support	and	
adequate	socio‐political	will	among	other	stakeholders.	Central	to	action	potential	are	
questions	and	issues	of	legitimacy	and	authority	and	the	ability	of	stakeholders	to	
achieve	their	goals	through	the	enabling	and	constraining	structural	contexts	of	power	
relations	with	others	(Kooiman,	2000).	In	terms	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	this	raises	
the	question	of	which	stakeholders	had	the	authority	and	legitimacy	to	sanction	the	
sharing	of	revenue	from	the	Elmina	Castle.	There	is	also	a	question	of	how	the	sharing	
of	revenue	contributed	to	widening	the	socio‐political	room	for	action	of	stakeholders.	
The	action	potential	available	to	stakeholders	is	sometimes	a	matter	of	power	and	to	an	
extent	the	strength	or	fragility	of	the	state	in	meeting	governing	needs.		
Within	the	international	development	literature,	and	especially	in	the	literature	on	
state	failure	and	fragility,	state	strength	and	capacity	tends	to	be	conceived	of	in	
technical	and	‘objective’	terms	(Hameiri,	2007).	The	tendency	is	to	conflate	state	
strength	and	capacity	in	terms	of	state	fragility	and	state	failure.		A	common	definition	
of	state	fragility	is	that	offered	by	the	OECD	who	state	that	“states	are	fragile	when	state	
structures	lack	political	will	and/or	capacity	to	provide	the	basic	functions	needed	for	
poverty	reduction,	development	and	to	safeguard	the	security	and	human	rights	of	
their	populations”	(OCED,	2007).	The	converse	of	this	is	that	strong	states	are	those	are	
able	to	meet	poverty	reduction	needs.	However,	most	states	irrespective	of	their	level	
of	economic	development	are	characterised	by	some	level	of	enduring	relative	poverty	
among	their	populace.	This	definition	therefore	fails	to	recognise	that	the	general	
conditions	of	underdevelopment	in	many	poor	countries	relates	to	the	structural	
difficulties	in	attaining	poverty	reduction	goals	at	both	international,	regional	and	
national	levels.	Such	difficulties	are	therefore	not	always	related	to	the	fragility	of	the	
state.	State	fragility	is	now	used	as	catch‐all	phrase	for	conflict,	post‐conflict,	
humanitarian	crisis‐prone	or	chronically	poverty	stricken	states	(Torres	and	Anderson,	
2004;	Putzel,	2010)	which	makes	the	concept	debateable	and	at	times	of	little	analytic	
value	(Ikpe,	2007;	Call,	2008;	Di	John,	2010)	in	countries	not	experiencing	conflicts	
and/or	humanitarian	crisis.	Perhaps,	a	useful	way	to	approach	this	is	to	examine	the	
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factors	that	shape	a	given	state’s	capacity	to	meet	poverty	reduction	goals	(see	Chapter	
5,	section	5.5).		
In	the	context	of	this	research,	the	questions	raised	by	the	fragile	state	literature	about	
the	political	will	and	capacity	of	the	state	in	Ghana	to	provide	functions	needed	for	
poverty	reduction	do	not	offer	a	strong	basis	to	frame	the	research.	The	Ghanaian	state	
cannot	be	considered	a	fragile	state	because	there	is	state	legitimacy,	a	political	will	and	
a	capacity	in	providing	basic	development	functions.	Although	there	are	limits	to	the	
capacity	of	the	state	to	meet	all	needs,	this	is	not	due	to	the	fragility	of	the	state.	There	
are	a	number	of	internal	and	external	political	conditions	that	shape	the	extent	of	the	
state’s	ability	to	meet	basic	development	needs.	Framing	the	concept	of	governance	
capacity	in	terms	of	fragility	therefore	deflects	the	analysis	from	the	key	issue	of	
examining	the	specific	ways	in	which	state	capacity	is	deployed.	Development	
outcomes	are	only	partly	explained	by	structural	factors	(Ikpe,	2007)	and	hence	there	
is	a	need	to	consider	human	agency,	role	of	external	donor	countries	and	the	
interactions	between	the	state	and	other	stakeholders	in	the	development	process.	
Putzel	(2010:4)	has	succinctly	noted	that	“at	the	core	of	the	problematic	definition	of	
state	fragility	used	by	the	international	development	community	is	a	misguided	belief	
that	the	institutional	practices	of	advanced	democracies	and	developed	economies	
need	to	be	transferred	all	at	once	to	the	poorest	countries”.	To	overcome	this	
misguided	belief,	this	research	focuses	on	the	governing	interactions	through	which	
images,	instruments	and	actions	potentials	became	(mis)aligned	in	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	planning	process.	
As	a	result	of	the	interconnectedness	between	images,	instruments	and	action	
potential,	and	the	interactive	nature	of	the	governance	process,	these	elements	are	not	
always	distinguishable,	nor	are	they	always	linear	in	conceptualisation	(Kooiman	and	
Bavinck,	2005;	Chuenpagdee	et	al.,	2008).	Recognition	of	the	interconnection	of	these	
elements	is	therefore	critical	to	governability	since	the	structural	aspect	of	these	
elements	may	have	important	implications	(Kooiman,	2008).	Consequently,	I	deploy	
the	concept	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity	as	the	capabilities	available	to	
stakeholders	to	interact	with	others,	form	images	and	select	appropriate	tools	in	order	
to	express	their	values	and	goals	while	being	embedded	in	the	institutional	structures	
that	proscribe	their	socio‐political	room	for	action.	Within	this	conceptualisation	of	
governance	capacity,	the	issue	of	power	is	acknowledged	as	being	an	important	
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element.	The	idea	of	the	‘two	faces	of	power’	(Bachrach	and	Baratz,	1962)	for	instances	
shows	that	the	second	face	of	power	–	the	restrictive	face	of	power	–	offers	a	
foundation	for	understanding	the	dynamics	of	non‐decision	making	in	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy.	In	the	context	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	it	was	Urban	Solutions	as	
consultants	for	example,	who	strongly	shaped	the	image	of	tourism‐poverty	nexus	held	
by	stakeholders.	The	initial	image	of	conserving	the	Elmina	Castle	came	to	be	widened	
to	the	overall	socio‐economic	development	of	the	area	without	much	assessment	of	the	
capacity	of	stakeholders.	Due	to	its	access	to	financial	instruments,	Urban	Solutions	
held	more	power	over	other	stakeholders.	In	the	end,	the	restrictive	face	of	this	power	
became	evident	when	Urban	Solutions	left	the	scene	without	adequate	planning	for	the	
long	term	sustainability	of	the	project.			
Some	of	the	insights	on	power	are	embedded	within	the	conceptualisation	of	the	
stakeholder	governance	capacity	put	forward	here.	It	is	worth	also	acknowledging	that	
this	research	does	not	seek	to	analyse	power	structures	but	to	primarily	outline	the	
various	stakeholders	involved	in	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	Nonetheless,	where	
appropriate	in	the	analysis	of	the	case,	the	relation	between	power	and	capacity	will	be	
highlighted.	Thus	for	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning,	the	elements	
to	consider	include	the	images	held	by	stakeholders	with	regards	to	the	role	of	tourism	
in	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction,	the	instruments	available	to	
translate	such	visions	into	achievable	objectives	and	the	actions	taken	to	meet	these	
objectives.	Moreover,	questions	concerning	what	are	the	sources	of	the	images	held	by	
tourism	stakeholders,	and	how	do	the	images	travel	across	governance	scales	and	
through	which	mechanisms	do	such	images	get	filtered,	are	key.	Finally,	the	resources	
out	of	which	instruments	are	shaped,	the	politico‐cultural	context	of	action	and	the	
power	relations	that	constrain	and/or	enable	action	are	important	considerations.		
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2.2 Thickening institutions for tourism and locality 
development 
Institutions,	what	they	are	and	their	role	in	social,	economic,	and	political	life	is	a	
subject	of	widespread	debate.	This	ranges	from	the	old,	new	and	varieties	of	
institutionalisms	in	institutional	economics	(March	and	Olsen,	1983;	Rutherford,	1996;	
Morgan	et	al.,	2010)	through	to	the	use	of	institution	in	economic	sociology	
(Granovetter	and	Swedberg,	1992),	politics	(Rhodes	et	al.,	2008)	and,	geography	and	
planning	(Wood	and	Valler,	2004).	There	is	not	enough	space	in	this	thesis	to	fully	
engage	with	this	burgeoning	literature	on	institutions	and	the	related	issue	of	how	to	
differentiate	institutions	from	organisations.	Nonetheless,	it	is	worth	pointing	out	that	
the	most	commonly	cited	definition	of	institutions	is	as	the	“rules	of	the	game”	North	
(1990).	Recent	work	on	institutions	however,	shows	that	there	are	two	common	
approaches	to	defining	institutions.	First,	from	a	classical	sociological	perspective	that	
sees	institutions	as	a	set	of	ideal	types	–	the	family,	the	community,	religion,	among	
others.	The	second	approach	define	institutions	in	reference	to	rules,	norms,	practices,	
and	shared	strategies,	both	formal	and	informal,	which	structure	individual	actions	in	
their	social	context	(Giddens,	1984;	Jessop,	2001;	González	and	Healey,	2005).		
In	this	thesis,	the	second	approach	to	defining	institutions	is	adopted	to	refer	to	rules,	
norms,	practices,	and	shared	strategies.	As	Hodgson	(20006:18)	puts	it,	“institutions	
are	systems	of	established	and	embedded	social	rules	that	structure	social	
interactions”.	Moreover,	following	Bouma	(1998:243),	I	considered	organisations	as	
“deliberate	arrangements	of	norms,	values	and	roles	to	achieve	a	particular	end”.	In	
essence,	the	institutions	of	governing	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	include	
general	norms	and	expectations	about	managing	resources,	participation,	collective	
decision‐making,	and	the	outcomes	of	participating	in	organisations	engaged	in	
steering,	leading	and	managing	societal	needs,	and	meeting	those	needs.	These	norms	
about	institutions,	to	an	extent,	exist	separately	from	such	formal	organisations	such	as	
the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	Municipal	Assembly,	national	political	parties,	and	
the	civil	service	authority	among	other	organisations.	Whilst	institutions	provide	the	
normative	context	that	shapes	organisations,	it	is	organisations	that	reproduce	
institutions	(Bouma,	1998).	Thus	the	two	can	be	considered	as	mutually	constituted.	
Consequently,	the	use	of	institutions	in	this	thesis	also	denotes	organisational	forms.	
Where	necessary,	and	to	achieve	analytic	clarity,	a	distinction	is	made	between	the	two.		
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Institutions,	and	organisations	are	the	main	mechanisms	through	which	stakeholder	
governance	capacity	is	deployed	within	the	tourism	sector.	However,	a	number	of	these	
institutions	are	not	necessarily	focused	on	tourism	even	though	their	activities	
intersect	with	the	central	tourism	institutions	and	agencies.	This	calls	for	high	levels	of	
communication,	collaboration	and	coordination	between	stakeholders	and	institutions	
in	order	to	move	towards	desired	outcomes.	Within	tourism‐led	local	economic	
development	planning,	policies	are	required	to	strengthen	existing	institutions	and	to	
give	backing	to	newly	emerging	ones.	In	this	section	I	draw	on	the	local	economic	
development	and	planning	literature	to	build	up	the	concept	of	institutional	thickness	
as	a	building	block	for	the	interactive	tourism	governance	framework.	I	start	this	
exploration	by	building	on	insights	from	the	tourism	policy	and	planning	literature.	
Tourism policy and planning as a social and political process 
It	has	been	recognised	that	tourism	policy	and	planning	is	a	social	and	political	process	
and	not	simply	a	technocratic	one	(Dredge	and	Jenkins,	2007,	2011;	Stevenson	et	al.,	
2008).	Tourism	policy	and	planning	is	seen	as	“…being	a	position,	strategy,	action	or	
product	adopted	by	government	and	arising	from	contests	between	different	ideas,	
values	and	interests”	(Dredge	and	Jenkins,	2007:7).	Given	that	it	is	a	social	and	political	
process	shaped	by	government	actions	and	inactions,	the	importance	of	systematic	
planning	cannot	be	overemphasized.	This	is	especially	the	case	when	it	comes	to	the	
explicit	policy	goal	of	ensuring	that	tourism	contributes	to	local	economic	development	
and	poverty	reduction.	Brohman	(1996:59)	for	instance	was	of	the	view	that	the	
equitable	distribution	of	the	costs	and	benefits	of	tourism	in	a	country	is	achievable	
only	when	tourism	development	processes	are	appropriately	planned.	Thus	tourism	
public	policy‐making	must	go	hand‐in‐hand	with	planning	in	order	to	reap	the	full	
benefits	of	tourism.	As	Inskeep	already	noted,	“tourism	requires	systematic	planning	so	
that	it	is	developed	properly,	responsive	to	market	demands,	and	integrated	into	the	
total	development	pattern	of	an	area”	(1988:361).	To	integrate	tourism	development	
into	the	total	development	pattern	of	an	area	means	that	tourism	public	policy	needs	to	
be	embedded	into	the	local	economic	development	planning	processes	of	an	area.	This	
is	an	issue	that	extend	to	the	wider	issue	of	public	policy	as	a	whole.	
The	literature	on	public	policy	offers	a	number	of	insights	into	questions	of	why	
policies	are	enacted	by	governments,	who	participate	in	that	process,	how	the	policies	
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are	agreed	on	and	implemented	and	subsequently	what	the	impacts	of	such	policies	are	
on	society	(Howlett,	2011;	Hill	and	Hupe,	2008;	Hajer	and	Wagenaar,	2003;	Bovens	et	
al.,	2002;	Sabatier,	1991).	The	study	of	public	policy	is	however	a	complex	endeavour.	
Four	of	such	key	complexities	have	been	identified	by	Peters	and	Pierre	(2006).	In	a	
study	of	public	policy	that	focuses	on	a	single	policy	area	like	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	
the	first	complexity	has	to	do	with	overcoming	the	tendency	to	oversimply	the	ways	
that	multiple	policies	interact	to	shape	outcomes	in	the	policy	domain	under	study.	
Secondly,	the	need	to	examine	policy	issues	and	questions	from	a	range	of	theoretical	
perspectives	present	a	complexity.	A	third	complexity	concern	the	overemphasis	on	the	
role	of	the	public	sector	and	official	actors	in	analysing	the	policy	making	process	at	the	
expense	of	understanding	how	other	private	sector	and	civil	society	actors	are	
involved.	The	fourth	complexity	of	studying	public	policy	relates	to	the	question	of	
what	to	study	when	studying	public	policy.	This	is	a	very	important	point	since	it	
determines	whether	one	is	focusing	only	on	the	processes	leading	up	to	the	policy	
decisions	made,	examining	the	policy	programmes	developed	by	governments	or	
focusing	on	the	tools	of	implementation.	This	last	point	offers	a	number	of	interesting	
perspective	with	regards	to	the	outcome	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.		
It	is	undeniable	that	there	is	a	noticeable	gap	between	the	objectives	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	and	the	eventual	outcomes.	Given	the	number	of	stakeholders	involved,	
one	way	to	look	at	it	will	be	to	focus	on	how	the	implementation	process	was	shaped	by	
the	interaction	between	the	various	stakeholders.	Such	questions	have	been	the	basis	
through	which	the	sub‐discipline	of	‘implementation	studies’	flourished	from	the	early	
1970s	onwards	(Pressman	and	Wildavsky,	1984;	Sabatier,	1991;	Bovens	et	al.,	2002;	
Hill	and	Hupe,	2002,	2008).		The	small	literature	on	policy	implementation	studies	
provide	useful	ways	to	fill	some	of	the	gaps	identified	in	terms	of	the	governing	of	
tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	initiatives.	For	instance,	the	
literature	raises	questions	about	the	degree	to	which	one	can	think	of	implementation	
as	operating	in	a	linear	process	from	decision	making	and	then	progressing	into	
translated	outcomes	The	implementation	literature	highlights	that	it	is	important	to	
approach	public	policy	analysis	in	ways	that	take	as	starting	point,	the	range	of	actors	
involved	in	the	policy	process	and	the	interactions	between	them	(Peters	and	Pierre,	
2006;	Howlett	et	al.,	2015).	“It	is	only	when	we	start	wondering	what	might	have	been	
that	we	fully	realise	that	what	in	fact	has	happened	need	not	have…the	more	one	knows	
about	the	intricacies	of	the	actions	and	events	that	shaped	a	particular	policy’s	fate,	the	
more	important	small	details	seem	to	be	in	determining	collective	appreciation	of	it”	
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(Bovens	and	‘t	Hart,	1996:	6‐7).	Thus	a	key	insight	for	example	from	the	work	on	policy	
fiascos	and	policy	failures	(Bovens	and	‘t	Hart,	1996;	McConnell,	2015)	is	the	use	of	
counterfactuals	–	wondering	about	the	‘what	ifs’	–	as	a	way	of	overcoming	
oversimplified	accounts	about	the	gaps	between	policy	objectives	and	outcomes.		
Nonetheless,	there	are	limitations	to	the	usefulness	of	this	literature	to	the	current	
research.	Although	the	attention	given	to	interactions,	‘bottom‐up’	as	well	as	‘top‐down’	
aspects	of	implementation	remains	relevant	to	this	research,	its	general	focus	is	on	
processes	of	bargaining	in	the	formally‐constituted	state	and	private	sector	
organisations	that	make	up	the	implementation	structures	(Hill	and	Hupe,	2002,	2008;	
Howlett,	2011).	In	this	regard,	the	implementation	studies	literature	offers	limited	
potential	in	analysing	the	highly	complex	mix	of	formal	and	informal	institutional	
bargaining	that	goes	into	public	policy	making	in	a	developing	country	like	Ghana.	
Much	of	the	literature	is	based	on	and	limited	to	liberal‐democratic	political	
administrative	systems	(Bovens	and	‘t	Hart,	1996)	and	thus	can	only	offer	partial	
insights	in	the	current	case	study	that	does	not	tick	all	the	boxes	of	a	liberal‐democratic	
political	administrative	system.	The	Ghanaian	context	challenges	the	assumptions	
within	this	literature	regarding	a	clear	cut	separation	between	formal	and	informal	
institutions.	In	the	Ghanaian	context	informal	politics	and	formal	processes	tend	to	be	
inseparable	creating	complexities	in	the	policy	process.	This	is	in	addition	to	the	role	
played	by	traditional	authorities	in	governing	local	development.			
Moreover,	the	attempt	at	creating	a	distinct	field	of	study	that	separate	implementation	
from	the	other	aspects	of	the	public	policy	process	is	now	considered	to	have	‘largely	
failed’	especially	in	regards	to	a	formal	modelling	of	implementation	(John	2012:23).	It	
has	been	pointed	out	that	implementation	and	policy	failure	cannot	be	studied	in	
isolation	from	the	larger	governance	context	(Howlett,	2011:20),	nor	from	the	broader	
context	of	the	systemic	conditions	characteristic	of	the	governance	arrangements	and	
political	variables	(Peters,	2015;	Howlett	et	al.,	2015)	that	altogether	shape	policy	
formulation.	Given	this,	the	literature	on	policy	implementation	is	considered	less	
suitable	to	serve	as	a	foundational	anchor	of	analysing	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	This	
notwithstanding,	some	of	the	insights	from	this	literature	will	be	integrated	in	the	
analytic	questions	raised	about	the	empirical	data.	The	analysis	will	also	highlight	the	
ways	in	which	the	empirical	observations	from	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	differ	from	
those	expected	by	the	policy	implementation	failure	literature.				
	
	
49	
	
Insights	from	the	tourism	development	policy	and	planning	literature	highlight	the	fact	
that	the	ability	of	tourism	to	deliver	pro‐poor	benefits	is	dependent	most	crucially	on	
state	policy	directives	that	span	a	multitude	of	institutions	across	different	governance	
levels	(Scheyvens,	2007;	Slocum	and	Backman,	2011;	Spenceley	and	Meyer,	2012;	
Rogerson,	2014).	Indeed	Harrison	(2008:863)	has	succinctly	summarized	the	point	that	
“as	in	development	matters	generally,	the	impact	of	any	PPT	[pro‐poor	tourism]	
projects,	even	if	on	a	large	scale,	is	likely	to	be	limited	unless	a	state’s	entire	tourism	
strategy	is	constructed	around	the	aim	of	poverty	alleviation.	In	effect,	PPT	requires	a	
developmental	state”.	Thus	poverty	alleviation	needs	to	be	central	to	state	strategy	for	
each	economic	sector	from	industrial	policy	to	tourism	policy.	The	state	needs	to	play	a	
key	role	if	tourism	policy	is	to	be	integrated	into	local	economic	development	planning	
processes	in	ways	that	systematically	address	poverty	alleviation.	Importantly,	the	
tourism	development	policy	and	planning	literature	posit	a	need	to	reconsider	the	
tourism‐poverty	nexus	in	light	of	local	economic	development	planning	and	the	
institutions	involved	in	this	process.	This	provides	a	focused	lens	with	which	to	explore	
the	issues	of	institutional	design,	stakeholder	governance	capacity,	participation,	
communication,	collaboration	and	coordination	in	the	policy	and	planning	process.	For	
instance	a	decentralised	approach	to	tourism	policy	making	might	result	in	the	
establishment	of	regional	and	local	destination	management	organisations	that	allow	
local	people	to	assume	direct	responsibility	for	tourism	development	and	the	benefits	
accruing	from	it.	
Planning for local economic development  
The	local	level	is	key	to	understanding	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	and	how	to	
systematically	address	poverty	alleviation	through	tourism.	However,	it	must	be	
analysed	vis‐a‐vis	what	goes	on	at	the	regional,	national	and	even	global	levels.	This	is	
because	the	local	level	is	where	tourism	resources	are	located	and	where	local	
resources	are	used	or	have	the	potential	to	be	used	to	provide	and	maintain	the	
infrastructures	upon	which	tourism	development	thrives.	At	the	local	or	destination	
level,	the	role	of	institutional	structures,	local	agency	and	other	factors	that	shape	
development	outcomes	can	be	analysed	while	paying	due	attention	to	the	impacts	of	
regional,	national	and	global	level	factors.	Such	an	integrated	analysis	recognises	the	
interrelatedness	of	economic,	social	and	political	dimensions.	In	the	end,	development	
however	defined	has	a	concrete	geographical	dimension.	Consequently,	to	better	
understand	the	governance	of	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus,	one	needs	to	appreciate	the	
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local	and/or	regional	economic	development	planning	context.	This	is	especially	
important	when	tourism	is	identified	as	a	lead	sector	to	drive	overall	local	economic	
development.	
In	many	countries	of	the	Global	North,	local	economic	development	(LED)	as	a	
development	strategy	has	been	practised	since	about	the	1960s.	Indeed	Western	
Europe	is	seen	as	“the	cradle	of	LED	approaches”	(Rodriguez‐Pose,	2009	quoted	in	
Rogerson	and	Rogerson,	2010:466).	Although	certain	elements	of	LED	such	as	place‐
marketing	and	boosterism	have	long	been	practised	in	the	North,	it	is	perhaps	in	the	
last	30‐40	years	that	the	literature	on	and	activities	associated	with	LED	have	really	
blossomed	(Nel,	2001).	In	contrast	to	the	North,	LED	in	the	Global	South	is	a	relatively	
recent	phenomenon,	the	emergence	of	which	is	the	result	of	reasons	not	too	dissimilar	
to	those	found	in	the	North.	In	one	sense,	LED	can	be	considered	as	a	response	to	the	
impasse	in	development	theory	and	practice	around	the	1970s	and	1980s.	This	
impasse	stemmed	from	a	sense	of	disillusionment	with	mainstream	development	
theory	and	practice,	especially	as	it	relates	to	the	failure	of	top‐down	economic	
development	planning	and	policy	to	bring	about	desired	outcomes.	This	led	to	the	
search	for	alternative	approaches	to	development.		
In	addition,	there	are	a	number	of	other	critical	factors	that	have	shaped	the	emergence	
of	LED	in	the	South.	These	include	slow	economic	growth,	the	failure	of	trickle‐down	
effect	when	growth	did	occur	and	the	persistence	of	poverty	in	many	countries	of	the	
South.	These	issues	have	been	compounded	by	imposed	structural	adjustments,	debt	
crises	and	ineffective	state	intervention	at	the	local	level	(Nel,	2001:1004).	Moreover,	
alongside	increasing	globalisation,	the	spread	of	decentralisation,	and	rapid	
urbanisation	across	the	South	has	come	the	diffusion	of	LED	ideas	from	the	North	
(Rogerson	and	Rogerson,	2010).	It	is	within	this	context	that	many	regions	and	
localities	are	actively	planning	for	and	implementing	a	range	of	LED	strategies	across	
Latin	America,	Asia	and	Sub‐Saharan	Africa	(SSA).	For	much	of	SSA,	LED	has	gained	
ground	in	intellectual	circles	over	the	last	15	years	but	with	limited	implementation	as	
national	authorities	have	been	slow	to	adopt	LED	approaches.	The	exception	is	South	
Africa,	where	LED	strategies	were	initiated	in	the	early	1990s	in	the	immediate	post‐
Apartheid	period	as	a	way	of	overcoming	structural	development	inequalities	between	
regions	and	localities	(Nel,	2001;	Rogerson	and	Rogerson,	2010).	
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In	general	terms,	LED	is	differentiated	from	other	development	strategies	in	terms	of	
territory	and	management	(Rodriguez‐Pose,	2002:	Pike	et	al.,	2006).	The	key	issues	of	
LED	are	that	it	is	confined	to	a	well‐defined	territory	or	locality,	makes	use	of	existing	
resources	available	in	that	locality	and	the	process	is	controlled	by	local	actors	and	
stakeholders.	Following	Helmsing	(2003:69),	I	define	tourism‐led	LED	as	“a	process	in	
which	partnerships	between	local	governments,	community	and	civic	groups	and	the	
private	sector	are	established	to	manage	existing	[tourism]	resources	to	create	jobs	and	
stimulate	the	economy	of	a	well‐defined	area”.	The	emphasis	here	is	on	local	control	
and	the	utilisation	of	an	area’s	existing	potential	in	terms	of	human,	institutional	and	
physical	resources.	As	these	resources	tend	to	be	controlled	by	different	groups	of	
governors,	actors	and	stakeholders,	LED	initiatives	rely	on	the	mobilisation	of	actors,	
organisations	and	resources	in	order	to	develop	local	systems	and	new	institutions.	
This	is	accomplished	through	a	process	of	dialogue	and	strategic	actions	within	the	
well‐defined	area.	The	focus	on	a	local	level	‘bottom‐up’	approach	to	development	is	
predicated	on	the	recognition	that	national	level	macroeconomic	policies	are	
insufficient	in	themselves	to	bring	about	sustained	growth	that	tackles	poverty	at	the	
local	level	and	that	increasingly,	localities	and	wider	city‐regions	are	becoming	the	
drivers	of	national	economic	development	and	growth	(Nel,	2001;	Pike	et	al.,	2006;	
Rogerson	and	Rogerson,	2010).	Thus	LED	initiatives	focus	on	building	networks	of	
people,	institutions	and	resources	in	order	to	bring	about	local	development.	
There	are	three	categories	of	LED	that	provide	an	avenue	to	situate	tourism‐led	LED.	
These	are	community	economic	development,	enterprise	development,	and	locality	
development	(Helmsing,	2003;	Blakely	and	Bradshaw,	2002).	Community	economic	
development	is	essentially	about	improving	livelihoods	and	reducing	the	poverty	and	
vulnerability	of	people	in	both	rural	and	urban	settings	through	encouraging	household	
diversification	of	economic	activities.	Enterprise	development	focuses	on	policies	that	
remove	barriers	towards	specialisation	in	a	locality.	Enterprise	development	initiatives	
are	directly	focused	on	developing	cluster(s)	of	enterprises	with	a	core	aim	of	
expanding,	restructuring	or	creating	anew	the	economic	base	of	an	area.	The	economic	
base	of	an	area	refers	to	the	“activities	that	involve	exporting	their	products	and	
services	outside	of	the	area.	The	local	economic	base	may	consist	of	one	or	several	
agricultural	or	manufacturing	products	or	service	activities	(e.g.	trading	or	tourism)”	
(Helmsing,	2003:72).	Finally,	locality	development	initiatives	relate	to	the	holistic	
management	of	the	entire	local	territory	with	conscious	efforts	made	to	achieve	
integrated	spatial	planning.	Locality	development	is	therefore	about	the	planning	and	
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timely	development	of	specific	physical	and	socio‐economic	infrastructures	that	
stimulate	complementary	private	infrastructures	which	altogether	improve	the	local	
economic	base	to	remain	competitive.	Successful	tourism‐led	LED	planning	must	
therefore	pay	attention	to	these	three	categories.	
Using tourism in local economic development planning 
It	has	only	been	since	the	late	1990s	that	tourism‐led	LED	initiatives	began	to	emerge	
in	various	African	countries	with	the	majority	of	these	situated	in	South	African	cities	
(Binns	and	Nel,	2002;	Rogerson,	2002).	While	the	initial	spread	of	interest	in	tourism‐
led	LED	coincided	with	the	emergence	of	the	concept	of	‘pro‐poor	tourism’	the	two	
ideas	have	operated	side‐by‐side	rather	than	in	an	integrated	manner.	This	is,	perhaps,	
due	to	the	fact	that	the	bulk	of	tourism‐led	LED	studies	being	focused	on	developed	
countries	whilst	the	bulk	of	research	into	‘pro	poor	tourism’	is	carried	out	in	
developing	countries.	An	aim	of	this	thesis	is	to	build	a	bridge	between	these	two	
approaches	given	that	earlier	works	on	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus,	notably	Goodwin	
(1998),	already	acknowledged	that	developing	strong	linkages	between	tourism	and	
the	local	economy	is	fundamental	to	maximising	tourism	benefits.	Tourism‐led	LED	is	
about	ensuring	an	integrated	development	of	tourism	spaces	in	a	locality	as	a	means	of	
enhancing	the	economic	base	of	that	area	in	a	way	that	creates	new	employment	and	
business	opportunities	for	local	people.	For	the	long	term	sustainability	of	tourism‐led	
LED	initiatives,	the	creation	of	new	employment	and	business	opportunities	must	
complement	existing	livelihood	options.		
In	order	to	ensure	project	sustainability,	tourism‐led	LED	planning	initiatives	need	to	
align	with	the	idea	of	locality	development,	and	should	involve	a	number	of	
components.	These	components	include:	(a)	participatory	LED	planning	through	which	
overall	development	priorities	are	established	and	appropriate	strategies	are	devised;	
(b)	physical	planning	and	development	controls	that	are	transparent	in	order	to	
prevent	rent‐seeking;	(c)	urban	planning	and	design	that	improves	commercial	centres	
in	a	bid	to	improve	economic	performance;	(d)	infrastructure	provision	in	basic	
services	like	access	roads,	electricity	and	street	lighting	and	water	and	sewage	systems,	
and:	(e)	socio‐economic	overhead	capital	provision	in	the	form	of	institutions	in	
education	and	training	among	others	(Helmsing,	2003:74).	These	components	ensure	
that	LED	initiatives	are	embedded	into	the	overall	local	planning	and	governance	
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systems.	In	terms	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	this	raises	questions	as	to	how	it	
engaged	with	some	of	these	components	of	locality	development	and	importantly,	the	
question	of	the	depth	of	institutional	support.	The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	shows	
evidence	of	having	engaged	with	some	of	these	components	(see	Chapter	5	and	6	for	
more	details).	However,	the	institutional	depth	surrounding	its	implementation	run	to	
problems.	
Tourism	policy	and	planning	can	have	a	greater	impact	on	poverty	alleviation	if	it	is	
embedded	within	place‐based	strategic	initiatives	and	as	part	of	local	and	regional	
economic	development	(Rogerson,	2014:106).	This	emphasis	on	place‐based	
interventions	is	critical	since	tourism	resources	and	their	potential	to	contribute	to	job	
creation	and	income	generation	have	concrete	geographical	dimensions.	To	focus	on	
tourism‐led	LED	planning	is	to	recognise	the	interrelatedness	of	economic,	social	and	
political	dimensions	of	development.	In	order	to	leverage	their	tourism	assets	for	LED,	
localities	need	to	be	first	of	all	recognised	as	tourism	spaces.	In	practice,	places	are	
recognised	as	tourism	spaces	in	at	least	three	different	ways.	The	first	process	is	when	
developers	and	entrepreneurs	identify	development	opportunities	in	localities	and	
begin	to	provide	accommodation	and	other	recreational	facilities.	The	appeal	of	these	
developed	tourist	attractions	also	partly	depend	on	the	attractiveness	of	the	locality	
(Rogerson,	2002).	Secondly,	localities	may	become	tourism	spaces	when	they	become	
accessible	due	to	improved	mobility	and	the	search	of	new	experiences	by	tourists.	
Thus	in	this	process	some	tourism	spaces	are	created	by	default	which	can	sometimes	
even	be	against	the	desires	of	residents	in	the	locality	and	without	their	active	
participation.	The	imperative	of	finding	new	sources	of	economic	activities	is	the	final	
way	in	which	localities	may	become	tourism	spaces.	Thus	out	of	economic	necessity	
such	tourism	spaces	emerge	as	a	way	of	enhancing	the	local	economic	base	of	an	area	
(Davidson	and	Maitland,	1997).		
The	emergence	of	tourism	spaces	in	any	locality	does	not	in	any	way	guarantee	
successful	tourism‐led	LED	initiatives.	This	is	achieved	through	effective	planning	and	
management	of	tourism	activities	(Inskeep,	1988;	Dredge	and	Jenkins,	2007;	Hall,	
2008).	The	planning	and	management	of	tourism	activities	in	a	locality	is	an	important	
function	that	requires	collaboration	and	partnership	between	the	public	sector,	the	
private	sector	and	civil	society	(Bramwell	and	Sharman,	1999;	Tosun,	2000;	Adu‐
Ampong,	2014).	Given	their	responsibility	for	overall	socio‐economic	development	and	
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governance,	public	sector	institutions	may	be	best	placed	to	play	a	steering	role	in	the	
planning	process.	Such	destination	management	activities	require	“the	institutional	
thickness	of	a	successful	tourism	system”	in	a	destination	(Geerts,	2000:120‐124	
quoted	in	Rogerson,	2002:100).	Institutional	thickness	in	turn	depends	on	
organisational	structures	that	enable	high	levels	of	communication,	collaboration	and	
coordination.			
Conceptualising institutional thickness in tourism-led LED planning 
Institutions	are	key	to	understanding	the	governance	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	
development	planning.	It	is	through	institutions	that	stakeholder	governance	capacities	
are	shaped	and	given	meaning.	Successful	tourism‐led	LED	planning	initiatives	require	
the	establishment	of	new	local	institutions	through	the	identification,	recognition	and	
participation	of	key	stakeholders.	Such	new	local	institutions	might	include	a	chamber	
of	commerce,	an	information	office	or	a	visitor	reception	office.	This	ultimately	calls	for	
new	forms	of	local	governance	of	local	economic	development	processes	in	which	the	
state	and	local	government	play	a	key	role.	In	this	context,	the	role	of	the	state	through	
local	governments	includes	“facilitating,	supporting,	part‐financing	and	devolving	
control”	(Nel,	2001:1006)	to	the	partnerships	set	up	to	drive	the	LED	strategies.	The	
provision	of	the	right	mix	of	local	public	goods	and	services	by	local	government	is	also	
important	in	enabling	other	stakeholders	to	make	their	most	productive	contribution.	
This	then	becomes	the	platform	on	which	institutional	thickness	can	be	built.	
The	concept	of	‘institutional	thickness’,	coined	by	Amin	and	Thrift	(1994),	was	
introduced	in	an	attempt	to	synthesise	theoretical	debates	and	empirical	evidence	on	
how	regions	and	localities	can	grow	and	develop	in	the	face	of	global	competition.	
Institutional	thickness	was	a	way	of	explaining	the	local	conditions	that	are	favourable	
to	local	and	regional	economic	growth	and	development.	These	local	conditions	were	
found	to	be	centred	on	institutions	and	how	their	arrangements	influence	the	capacity	
of	a	given	locality	to	economically	grow	and	develop	(MacLeod,	1997;	Raco,	1998;	
Coulson	and	Ferrario,	2007).		In	their	conceptualisation,	Amin	and	Thrift	(1994)	
identify	four	elements	or	factors	that	contribute	to	institutional	thickness	in	a	locality.	
These	are;	1)	strong	institutional	presence;	2)	high	levels	of	mutual	interaction;	3)	
structures	of	domination	and/or	patterns	of	coalition	and;	4)	mutual	awareness	of	
being	involved	in	a	common	enterprise.	
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Strong	institutional	presence	relates	to	the	existence,	within	a	locality,	of	a	multiplicity	
and	variety	of	institutions	and	organisations	that	perform	a	diverse	range	of	social,	
political	and	economic	functions.	These	include	financial	bodies,	local	and	regional	
authorities,	central	government	agencies,	marketing	boards	and	agencies,	development	
agencies,	educational	establishments	and	voluntary	organisations	involved	in	providing	
both	material	services	and	collective	representation	(MacLeod,	1997).	A	strong	
presence	of	this	plethora	of	institutions	provides	the	infrastructure	for	local	coalition‐
building	and	represents	the	building	blocks	of	institutional	thickness	(Raco,	1998).	
Within	the	context	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning,	strong	
institutional	presence	can	be	examined	by	investigating	the	range	and	diversity	of	
institutions	directly	and	indirectly	involved	in	tourism	development	and	local	economic	
development	within	a	tourism	space.	In	the	case	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	the	
presence	of	institutions	can	be	measured	by	asking	a	series	of	practical	questions:	how	
many	different	institutions	were	involved	in	the	planning	and	implementation	of	the	
project?;	what	was	the	mix	of	public	sector,	private	sector	and	civil	society	
organisations	involved?;	on	which	spatial	scales	(locally,	regionally	or	nationally)	were	
these	institutions	operating?;	what	were	the	lines	of	accountability	of	the	institutions	
involved	in	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy?	For	instance,	the	Elmina	Tourism	Office	and	the	
Elmina	Arts	and	Craft	Market	as	new	institutions	were	placed	under	the	oversight	of	
the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguago‐Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	but	the	embedding	process	
remained	incomplete.	This	meant	that	the	oversight	responsibilities	could	not	be	
effectively	carried	out.		As	has	been	noted	in	the	literature,	a	strong	institutional	
presence,	while	a	necessary	condition	is	not	sufficient	in	itself	for	the	development	of	
institutional	thickness	(Amin	and	Thrift,	1995,	emphasis	mine).	
The	second	element	to	conceptualising	institutional	thickness	concerns	the	level	of	
mutual	interaction	between	local	institutions	and	organisations.	In	this	regard,	an	
empirical	analysis	of	institutional	thickness	revolves	around	questions	of	the	nature	of	
contacts	between	local	institutions,	the	form	and	regularity	of	both	formal	and	informal	
contacts	at	various	institutional	levels.	The	extent	of	mutual	interaction	provides	a	way	
of	understanding	the	level	of	information	flows	and	exchanges	that	facilitate	reflexive	
networking	and	cooperation	which	over	time	could	lead	to	a	degree	of	‘mutual	
isomorphism’	(MacLeod,	1997:300).	Mutual	isomorphism	implies	that	institutions	co‐
evolve	and	map	on	to	each	other	in	a	stable	and	predictable	manner	that	offers	both	
benefits	and	risks.	Moreover,	forms	of	institutional	interaction	can	lead	to	the	creation	
of	specific	social	norms	and	habits	(Coulson	and	Ferrario,	2007:593)	and	“the	
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establishment	of	trust	relations	and	mutual	cooperation	(Raco,	1998:978	emphasis	in	
original).	For	this	thesis,	examining	the	level	of	mutual	interaction	in	the	context	of	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	is	about	analysing	the	information	flows	and	contacts	between	
institutions	and	the	extent	to	which	these	made	it	possible	for	the	institutions	in	
question	to	move	beyond	their	individual	remits	of	action	towards	collaborative	action.	
The	indicators	of	mutual	interaction	that	will	be	examined	include;	the	issues	around	
which	collaboration	was	developed,	the	number	of	formal	partnerships	between	
organisations	and	the	intensity	of	other	forms	of	collaboration	and	interactions.		
The	interactions	between	institutions	within	a	given	locality	take	places	within	
structures	of	domination,	control	and	power.	It	is	these	structures	that	represent	the	
third	element	of	institutional	thickness.		Since	institutions	draw	on	different	resources	
and	have	different	power	bases,	the	structure	of	institutional	relationships	will	reflect	
these	differentials.	While	some	institutions	are	locally	accountable,	others	have	upward	
accountability	to	the	central	government,	and	other	institutions	may	have	fixed	
short/long‐term	budgets	and	lifespans	(Coulson	and	Ferrario,	2007).	Moreover,	and	of	
great	significance	to	this	thesis,	some	institutions,	depending	on	their	local	significance	
and	organisational	independence	from	external	actors,	are	empowered	or	
disempowered	with	changes	in	national	and/or	local	level	politics	(Raco,	1998).	Given	
all	this,	how	institutional	interactions	take	place	will	reflect	structural	differentials	with	
more	powerful	institutions	having	a	dominant	influence.	Such	a	dominating	influence	
can	contribute	to	coalition‐building	and	collective	representation	in	ways	that	
minimize	divisions	and	bring	rogue	behaviour	under	control	(MacLeod,	1997).	
However,	it	can	also	lead	to	some	institutions	disengaging	from	interactions.	The	key	
questions	that	this	raises	for	the	study	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	involve	the	
institutional	sources	of	power	and	how	changes	in	national	and	local	level	politics	
result	in	the	empowerment	of	some	institutions	and	the	disempowerment	of	others.	
These	will	be	assessed	through	local	actors’	perception	of	the	relative	power	of	
different	institutions	and	an	examination	of	the	formal	competencies	of	institutions.	
Moreover,	given	the	three	cycles	of	national	political	elections	that	took	place	over	the	
course	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	an	interesting	issue	to	consider	is	the	changes	to	
the	form	of	structures	of	domination	after	each	electoral	cycle	(see	section	2.3	for	a	
more	detailed	conceptualisation	of	political	cycles).	
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The	final	element	of	institutional	thickness	is	the	development	of	a	mutual	awareness	
of	being	involved	in	a	common	local	enterprise	–	i.e.	the	coming	into	existence	of	a	
shared	vision	of	growth	and	development	by	institutions.	It	is	this	common	agenda	that	
local	institutions	both	develop	and	depend	upon	to	ensure	collaboration	(MacLeod,	
1997;	Coulson	and	Ferrario,	2007).	The	existence	of	a	common	local	vision	or	agenda	is	
important	in	developing	institutional	thickness	because	it	is	a	“widely	held	common	
project	which	serves	to	mobilise	the	region	with	speed	and	efficiency”	(Amin	and	
Thrift,	1994:15).	The	development	of	this	common	local	vision	or	agenda	is	“influenced	
by	the	specific	patterns	of	domination	and	relative	power”	(Coulson	and	Ferrario,	
2007:593)	of	institutions	and	this	in	turn	establishes	“local	legitimacy	and	relations	of	
trust”	(Raco,	1998:978)	in	the	locality.	In	the	context	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	this	
final	element	of	institutional	thickness	points	to	the	importance	of	exploring	how	
stakeholders	understood	their	roles	vis‐à‐vis	the	ultimate	goals	of	the	project.	There	
are	also	questions	of	whether	there	was	a	clear	and	shared	local	identity,	clear	and	
shared	local	priorities	and	a	sense	of	a	shared	awareness	and	stewardship	about	the	
common	enterprise	regarding	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.			
The	concept	of	institutional	thickness	as	conceptualised	provides	a	framework	for	
identifying	a	set	of	taxonomies	to	interpret	local	governance	(MacLeod,	1997:307).	
However,	the	concept	of	institutional	thickness	is	sometimes	seen	as	resting	on	a	
conflation	of	institution	and	organisation	(Jessop,	2001).	This	is	a	common	critique	
against	a	number	of	other	institutional	approaches.	In	such	approaches,	formal	
organisations	tend	to	be	defined	as	institutions.	In	the	empirical	analysis	for	this	thesis	
an	awareness	of	the	danger	of	conflation	is	addressed	through	a	clear	distinction	
between	institutions	and	organisations	where	necessary.	Due	to	its	emphasis	on	the	
dynamics	of	globalisation’s	effects	at	the	local	level,	the	concept	of	institutional	
thickness	has	the	tendency,	at	the	theoretical	level,	to	downplay	the	significance	of	the	
governance	practices	of	the	nation‐state.	A	further	critique	of	the	institutional	thickness	
concept	is	that	it	appears	not	to	‘see’	how	the	process	of	arriving	at	a	common	agenda	
in	the	locality	involves	some	forms	of	political	and	social	exclusion	(Raco,	1998;	
MacLeod,	1997).	Notwithstanding	these	issues,	the	strength	of	the	concept	of	
institutional	thickness	lies	in	the	framework	it	provides	for	an	empirical	and	analytic	
study	of	the	process	of	institutionalisation	at	the	local	level.	It	provides	not	only	a	
means	to	classify	institutions	but	importantly	a	way	to	consider	their	interactions.	
However,	in	applying	the	concept	of	institutional	thickness,	it	is	important	to	adopt	a	
more	broad	view	of	the	political	economy	of	a	given	locality.	This	enables	one	to	
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identify	the	social,	political	and	economic	forces	that	shape	the	processes	of	
institutionalisation	(Raco,	1998)	and	therefore	throws	a	light	on	the	role	of	the	state.		
Traditionally,	the	role	of	the	state	in	fostering	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction	from	the	national	to	the	regional	and	local	levels	has	tended	to	proceed	from	
a	top‐down	centralised	approach.	Although	there	is	much	to	be	said	about	the	positive	
aspects	of	such	approaches,	centralised	or	top‐down	development	interventions	have	
generally	being	criticised	for	failing	to	reduce	inter‐local	disparities	and	close	the	gap	
between	prosperous	and	less	prosperous	areas	in	a	country	(Pike	et	al.,	2006).	Such	
failures	are	usually	also	tied	to	the	inability	of	national	planning	and	development	
authorities	to	achieve	their	mandates.	Coupled	with	the	opportunities	and	challenges	of	
globalisation,	there	is	now	a	clamouring	for	bottom‐up	approaches	to	local	and	regional	
development	(Nel,	2001;	Rodriguez‐Pose	and	Tijmstra,	2007).	This	is	also	the	case	
when	it	comes	to	the	utilisation	of	tourism	for	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction	(Binns	and	Nel,	2002;	Rogerson,	2002).	For	such	bottom‐up	development	
interventions	to	work	however,	they	“require	strong	institutions	of	local	and	regional	
governance	and	to	be	based	on	local	and	regional	participation	and	dialogue”	(Pike	et	
al.,	2006:	123).	This	raises	questions	as	to	the	nature	and	role	of	the	state	as	well	as	
how	best	to	develop	those	strong	institutions	required	for	successful	tourism‐led	LED	
planning.		
In	contrast	to	traditional	development	approaches,	LED	initiatives	are	based	on	local	
and	regional	institutions	and	systems	that	are	specifically	geared	towards	local	needs.	
For	Rodriguez‐Pose	and	Tijmstra	(2007:525)	“the	success	of	LED	strategies	depends	to	
a	large	degree	on	the	existence	of	appropriate	local	and	regional	institutional	systems	
and	on	the	availability	of	the	necessary	frameworks	and	skill	levels	at	all	government	
tiers”.	This	means	that	the	capacity	and	competence	of	local	institutions	need	to	be	
developed,	if	not	already	developed.	The	measure	of	institutional	thickness	and	
competence	therefore	becomes	a	key	aspect	of	governing	the	tourism‐led	LED	planning	
process.	This	is	especially	critical	because	of	the	highly	fragmented	nature	of	the	
tourism	sector.	Moreover,	the	tourism	sector	is	a	net	policy‐taker	in	the	sense	that	a	
number	of	policies	–	visa	issues,	environmental	standards,	air	traffic	regulation	and	the	
like	–	that	(in‐)	directly	affect	tourism	are	made	in	other	sectors	with	little,	if	any	
participation	from	tourism	stakeholders	(Jenkins,	2015).	It	therefore	becomes	
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imperative	that	attention	is	paid	to	local	institutional	politics	within	the	governance	
process.		
The	governance	of	tourism‐led	LED	initiatives	must	start	with	the	participation	of	
various	stakeholders	including	community	members.	It	is	through	the	participation	and	
interaction	of	stakeholders	that	new	local	institutions	are	developed	which	will	be	
responsible	for	the	planning,	design,	implementation	and	monitoring	of	the	LED	
strategies.	This	involves	the	communication,	collaboration	and	coordination	of	
stakeholders	at	both	vertical	and	horizontal	levels	and	across	different	scales	of	
governments.	As	has	been	noted	by	Pike	et	al.	(2006:123)	LED	is	increasingly	being	
subjected	to	complex	governance	systems	that	can	empower	communities,	foster	civil	
society	mobilisation,	and	promote	networks	that	provide	a	basis	for	communities	to	
self‐determine	an	appropriate	form	of	LED.	For	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	this	raises	
questions	about	what	happened	to	the	trained	group	of	Elmina	Tour	Guides	and	the	
Elmina	Tourism	Office	which	were	established	as	new	institutional	and	organisational	
structures	to	provide	services	and	accrue	revenue	that	was	to	be	reinvested	for	
community	development.	Within	tourism‐led	LED	planning	initiatives,	newly	emerging	
forms	of	institution	do	not	always	replace	existing	ones	but	may	operate	alongside	
them,	or	be	superimposed	on	and/or	subsumed	under	existing	institutional	governance	
structures.	The	resulting	configuration	of	institutional	and	organisation	arrangements	
depends	on	local	political	dynamics.	An	analytical	task,	in	terms	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy,	is	to	find	out	what	oversight	responsibility	the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguago‐
Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	had	over	the	Elmina	Tourism	Office	and	the	Elmina	Tour	
Guides	and	whether	such	responsibilities	were	effectively	carried	out.		
The	concept	of	institutional	thickness,	as	conceptualised	for	this	thesis	and	the	
interactive	tourism	governance	framework	being	developed	here	(see	figure	5	below),	
are	about	exploring	local	institutional	political	economy	within	which	old	and	newly	
emerging	institutions	for	tourism‐led	LED	planning	are	situated.	Institutional	thickness	
is	about	how	the	many	institutions	directly	and	indirectly	involved	in	tourism	and	local	
economic	development	mesh	together	to	create	depth	for	embedding	tourism‐led	LED	
initiatives.	Institutional	thickness	raises	questions	about	the	set	of	new	institutions	that	
emerge,	the	extent	of	their	embeddedness	within	existing	institutional	structures,	their	
durability	over	time	and	the	ways	in	which	they	shape	tourism‐led	LED	planning	
processes	and	ultimately	outcomes.	Specifically,	institutional	thickness	raises	questions	
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about	leadership,	collective	representation,	inter‐organisational	communication,	
collaboration	and	coordination	and	whether	there	exists	a	common	goal	that	is	being	
pursued	by	all	stakeholders.	Within	the	interactive	tourism	governance	framework,	an	
institutional	political	economy	approach	is	seen	as	essential	to	understanding	the	
governance	of	tourism‐led	LED	planning.	Using	the	metaphor	of	a	dance	to	characterise	
local	governance	problems	in	Sub	Saharan	Africa,	Helmsing	(2005)	argues	that,	there	
are	relatively	few	dancers	(stakeholders)	on	the	dance	floor	of	local	governance	and	
that	the	few	present	tend	to	dance	according	to	their	own	scripts	and	rhythms.	
Successful	local	governance	of	tourism‐led	LED	planning	therefore	requires	more	
dancers	on	the	dance	floor	who	are	swaying	to	the	same	rhythm	of	leveraging	tourism	
assets	for	socio‐economic	development.	
Figure	5	Interactive	Tourism	Governance	Framework	
Source:	Authors	own	design	
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2.3 Changing cycles of politics, governance and development 
outcomes 
In	what	is	considered	a	seminal	article	in	tourism	studies,	Britton’s	work	on	the	
political	economy	of	tourism	in	the	South	Pacific	found	that	up	to	that	point,	“discussion	
of	tourism	[was]	typically	divorced	from	the	historical	and	political	processes	that	
determine	development”	(1982:332).		Over	three	decades	later,	this	assertion	still	
largely	holds	true	despite	the	progress	that	has	been	made	toward	historically	and	
politically	informed	discussions	of	tourism.	There	have	been	relatively	few	attempts	in	
the	tourism	literature	to	situate	discussions	of	tourism’s	potential	as	a	vehicle	for	
economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	within	the	larger	context	of	the	
evolution	of	development	theory	and	thought	(Sharpley,	2000).	There	have	of	course	
been	some	very	notable	exceptions,	such	as	the	application	of	dependency	theory	
concepts	of	core	and	periphery	in	the	work	of	Britton	(1982).		Lea’s	(1988)	book	on	
tourism	and	development	in	the	Third	World	situated	tourism’s	role	in	development	
from	a	political	economy	perspective	to	show	the	distortions	and	imbalances	in	
international	tourism	and	the	consequent	effects	on	developing	countries.	The	
relationships	between	tourism	development	and	the	structural	adjustment	
programmes	introduced	in	African	countries	in	the	1980s	have	also	been	analysed	by	
Dieke	(1995),	Harrison	(2001)	and	Konadu‐Agyemang	(2001).	These	works	and	others	
such	as	Milne	and	Ateljevic	(2001),	Sharpley	(2003),	Scheyvens	(2007,	2011)	and	
Holden	(2013)	have	helped	to	develop	the	subfield	of	tourism	and	development	more	
generally	and	have	informed	tourism‐poverty	nexus	debates.	
To	assess	tourism’s	potential	role	as	a	vehicle	for	development	and	especially	as	a	
catalyst	for	local	economic	development,	it	has	to	be	examined	in	the	light	of	the	
broader	developmental	context	in	which	it	occurs,	and	by	which	it	is	in	turn	
conditioned.	Bearing	this	in	mind,	political	cycles	become	important	in	terms	of	
development	outcomes	generally	and	the	outcomes	of	tourism‐led	LED	initiatives	
specifically.	In	this	section,	I	develop	the	concept	of	political	cycles	as	the	third	leg	of	
the	interactive	tourism	governance	framework.	This	conceptual	exploration	has	
benefitted	greatly	from	the	literature	on	the	political	economy	and	governance	of	
public	goods	(service)	provision	in	developing	countries.	The	discussion	here	is	
structured	around	three	subsections	–	international	development	policy	and	funding	
cycles,	national	and	local	political	electoral	and	party	cycles,	and	finally,	local	
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government	service	cycles.	To	start	each	subsection,	I	first	outline	the	relevant	tourism	
literature	in	order	to	identify	the	gaps	that	are	to	be	filled	by	my	conceptual	
development.	
International development policy and funding cycles 
Tourism’s	perceived	role	in	economic	development	(and	later	poverty	reduction)	has	
been	shown	to	have	evolved	in	tandem	with	the	changes	and	evolution	of	international	
development	thought,	policy	and	funding	(Telfer,	2015:	Scheyvens,	2011).	Tourism	
research	has	drawn	on	development	ideas	ranging	from	liberal,	critical,	alternative,	
neoliberal	and	post‐development	perspectives	but	mostly	in	an	implicit	rather	than	
explicit	fashion.	In	the	1960s	and	1970s,	a	number	of	tourism	researchers	explicitly	
drew	on	the	prevailing	liberal	perspectives	in	development	studies,	specifically	the	
modernisation	ideas	of	Rostow	(1960),	to	argue	that	“tourism	cannot	be	considered	
outside	the	context	of	the	different	stages	of	development	countries	have	reached”	(Van	
Doorn,1979,	cited	in	Pearce,	1989:12).	More	recently,	Sharpley	in	his	study	of	tourism	
development	in	Cyprus,	provides	evidence	that	shows	that	“tourism	has	proved	to	be	
an	effective	growth	pole,	underpinning	both	dramatic	economic	growth	and	also	the	
fundamental	structural	modernisation	of	the	economy”	(2003:254,	emphasis	mine).	
Tourism	was,	and	is	still	largely	seen	as	being	functional	for	the	socio‐economic	
development	of	countries.		
It	was	generally	believed	that	the	benefits	of	tourism	would	result	in	a	greater	
multiplier	effect	that	would	stimulate	local	economies.	Boissevain	(1977)	has	noted	
that	up	to	the	1970s,	the	economic	case	for	tourism	was	overstated	and	the	socio‐
cultural	costs	almost	completely	neglected.	However,	as	the	anticipated	trickle‐down	
effect	failed	to	materialise,	tourism	researchers	began	to	draw	on	work	from	critical	
and	alternative	perspectives	in	development	studies	to	direct	attention	to	the	questions	
of	the	value	of	tourism	with	its	associated	environmental	issues	(de	Kadt,	1979;	Britton,	
1982;	Brohman,	1996).	In	the	1980s	and	early	1990s,	studies	began	to	focus	on	how	
the	implementation	of	the	IMF	and	World	Bank	backed	Structural	Adjustment	
Programmes	(SAPs)	affected	tourism	development	in	developing	countries.	For	
instance,	Dieke	(1995)	shows	that	the	liberalisation	of	the	economy	through	the	SAPs	
made	way	for	local	private	sector	and	foreign	investment	in	the	tourism	sector.	The	
impact	of	the	SAPs	was	to	consign	the	role	of	the	state	to	that	of	an	enabler	rather	than	
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an	operator	for	the	tourism	sector.	This	situation	therefore	limited	the	extent	to	which	
tourism	could	be	directly	utilised	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction.		
Furthermore,	Konadu‐Agyemang	(2000,	2001)	contends	that	the	implementation	of	
SAPs	in	Ghana	resulted	in	higher	leakages	of	tourism	revenues	due	to	increased	rates	of	
foreign	and	private	sector	involvement.	Moreover,	SAPs	brought	about	increased	and	
entrenched	socio‐economic	and	spatial	disparities	some	of	which	persist	to	date.	This	is	
because	tourism	development	for	instance	focused	on	areas	in	the	south	of	the	country	
that	had	the	potential	for	a	quick	return	on	investment	at	the	expense	of	areas	with	
sufficient	tourist	attraction	but	lacking	needed	infrastructure.	Thus	while	the	SAPs	
enabled	tourism	to	be	positioned	as	a	development	strategy,	the	lack	of	active	state	
control	resulted	in	uneven	development	and	sharing	of	benefits.	The	existing	literature	
on	tourism’s	role	in	economic	development	has	been	right	in	showing	how	changes	in	
the	international	development	context	are	reflected	on	tourism’s	perceived	role	in	
development.	There	is	awareness	within	the	tourism‐development	literature	about	
paying	attention	to	the	overarching	development	milieu	within	which	tourism	
development	and	promotion	initiatives	take	place.	
The	idea	of	‘pro	poor	tourism’	(PPT)	offers	the	clearest	example	of	the	intricately	linked	
relationship	between	tourism’s	perceived	role	in	development	and	the	wider	evolution	
of	international	development	policy.	The	mid	to	late	1990s	saw	a	new	poverty	
consensus	emerge	with	the	introduction	of	the	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	Papers	
(PRSPs)	of	the	World	Bank	in	1999	and	the	coming	into	being	of	the	Millennium	
Development	Goals	in	2000.	The	focus	on	pro‐poor	policies	was	a	direct	response	to	the	
effects	of	the	Structural	Adjustment	Programmes	(SAPs)	of	the	preceding	period.	The	
SAPs	as	major	economic	restructuring	projects	had	encouraged	developing	countries	to	
diversify	their	economies	and	to	expand	their	exports	offerings	to	include	areas	such	as	
tourism.		This	move	within	the	international	development	industry	to	make	poverty	a	
top	priority	broadly	inspired	the	concept	of	PPT	(Scheyvens,	2007).	PPT	came	to	be	
seen	as	“tourism	that	generates	net	benefits	for	the	poor	(benefits	greater	than	costs)”	
(Bennett	et	al.,	1999:	iii,	emphasis	in	original).	With	the	advent	of	PPT,	a	number	of	
alternative	initiatives	have	emerged	linking	tourism	with	poverty	alleviation	and	in	
some	cases	providing	funding	for	projects	and	initiatives	in	developing	countries.	The	
idea	of	PPT	has	attracted	critiques,	not	least	for	the	insistence	of	proponents	of	PPT	
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that	it	is	not	a	theory	or	a	model	nor	is	it	tied	to	any	particular	underlying	theory	or	
model	(Roe	and	Urquhart,	2004;	Goodwin,	2008a).	This	position	is	however	
questionable	because	while	PPT	may	not	be	a	theory	per	se,	the	idea	is	founded	upon	
certain	initial	assumptions	about	society,	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction	efforts	which	are	not	always	made	clear	or	explicit	in	research.		A	
fundamental	weakness	with	PPT	therefore	lies	in	its	dislocation	from	a	theory	of	
poverty	(Scheyvens,	2011:19)	and	also	stems	from	the	failure	to	account	for	how	
international	development	policy	and	funding	cycles	shape	PPT	initiatives.			
As	international	development	policy	shifts	from	one	perspective	to	another,	funding	for	
projects	tends	to	follow	suit.	Thus,	tourism’s	role	in	economic	development	is	subject	
not	only	to	changes	in	international	development	policy	but	also	to	fluctuations	in	
funding	for	tourism	initiatives.	This	issue	has	partly	been	addressed	to	some	extent,	
within	the	current	literature	on	the	role	of	international	development	agencies	in	
tourism‐poverty	nexus	projects	(Hawkins	and	Mann,	2007;	Scheyvens,	2011;	Hummels	
and	van	der	Duim,	2012).	The	current	focus	within	international	development	for	
instance	appears	to	be	on	providing	donor	support	to	the	private	sector	in	developing	
countries	(Rodrik,	2006).	The	poverty	consensus	and	agenda	is	now	seen	as	best	
addressed	through	private	sector	capacity	building	and	entrepreneurism	(Mair	and	
Marti,	2009;	Naude,	2010).	Funding	for	international	(tourism)	development	projects	
and	initiatives	is	therefore	increasingly	being	channelled	through	private	sector	
institutions	and	NGOs	(Lewis	and	Sobhan,	1999;	Parks,	2008;	Richey	and	Ponte,	2014).		
The	importance	of	international	donor	funding	and	foreign	aid	cannot	be	overstated	
when	it	comes	to	different	socio‐economic	sectors	of	many	developing	countries	(see	
Pronk,	2004;	Lahiri,	2007	for	a	detailed	discussion).	This	is	certainly	the	case	in	the	
tourism	sector	and	in	the	use	of	tourism	as	a	tool	for	local	economic	development	and	
poverty	reduction	(Hummel	and	van	der	Duim,	2012).	However,	the	issue	of	aid	
effectiveness	is	often	assessed	from	the	view	of	a	recipient	country’s	performance	in	
meeting	project	and	programme	objectives.	There	is	less	focus	on	the	performance	of	
donor	countries	who	supply	the	aid	and	that	of	the	international	consultants	and	
experts	involved	in	project	implementation.	This	is	a	biased	approach	to	assessing	aid	
effectiveness	because	it	places	the	burden	of	effectiveness	on	recipient	countries.	
Donor	countries	and	the	various	other	actors	in	the	value	chain	of	aid	delivery	are	
consequently	absorbed	of	all	responsibility	(Martens	et	al.,	2002).		There	is	a	need	to	
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move	beyond	this	bias	because	the	effectiveness	of	development	aid	depends	not	only	
on	the	internal	conditions	of	recipient	countries	but	also	the	internal	incentives	of	aid	
donors,	aid	agencies	and	related	consultants	and	experts.	
This	research	therefore	pays	attention	to	the	incentive	mechanisms	in	the	aid	delivery	
process	that	are	available	to	donor	countries	and	the	experts	and	consultants	involved	
in	aid	delivery	(see	Chapter	7,	section	7.1).	This	helps	to	address	the	bias	of	only	
focusing	on	the	performance	of	the	recipient	country	institution.	It	has	been	noted	by	
AbouAssi	(2013)	that	the	volatile	nature	of	donor	funding	through	NGOs	can	affect	the	
full	implementation	of	projects	and	programmes.	This	situation	shapes	the	
sustainability	and	long	term	impacts	of	initiatives	that	seek	to	use	tourism	to	address	
development	and	poverty	issues.	If	funding	for	such	initiatives	is	now	being	channelled	
through	the	private	sector,	then	what	happens	to	government	institutions	that	are	
responsible	for	overall	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	in	terms	of	
their	capacity	to	ensure	that	objectives	are	achieved?	These	are	key	questions	that	are	
yet	to	be	fully	addressed	in	the	literature,	not	least	questions	about	the	role	of	external	
NGOs,	and	the	influence	of	funders,	international	experts	and	consultants	as	well	as	the	
effectiveness	of	international	donor	assistance.	
Tourism	research	informed	by	post‐development	thinking	offers	a	number	of	insights	
into	exploring	the	effects	of	international	donor	policy	and	funding	fluctuations	on	the	
tourism‐poverty	nexus.		Tourism	is	seen	neither	as	a	panacea	nor	the	source	of	all	
negative	issues	in	a	destination	(Scheyvens,	2010:43)	but	rather	as	a	social	force	
shaped	by	a	system	of	actors	(public	sector,	private	sector	and	civil	society)	across	
multiple	and	varying	scales	(Hall,	2008;	Dredge	and	Jamal,	2015)	that	can	be	harnessed	
for	multiple	objectives.	Post‐development	thinking	in	tourism	research	is	interested	in	
understanding	how	tourism	systems	and	processes	work	and	how	these	shape	the	
interactions	between	people	and	places	(Cornelissen,	2005).	Questioning	and	
examining	actors	–	local	and	international	–	in	the	tourism	process,	their	power	
differentials	and	how	these	shape	interactions	and	outcomes	becomes	important.	In	a	
sense,	a	post‐developmentalist	view	of	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	–	which	sees	tourism	
as	neither	a	panacea	nor	the	source	of	all	negative	issues	in	a	tourism	destination	–	calls	
for	a	close	examination	of	the	governance	interactions	at	the	international,	national,	
regional	and	local	levels	through	which	tourism	policies	and	planning	take	place.	This	
raises	questions	about	the	(dis)continuities	of	tourism	planning	and	development	
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initiatives	when	there	are	changes	in	international	development	policy	and	funding	
cycles.	An	awareness	of	these	contextual	issues	provides	a	means	of	thickening	the	
account	of	tourism‐poverty	nexus	research.	If	tourism	is	a	social	force,	then	the	social	
interactions	that	govern	its	development	have	a	formative	role	to	play	in	whether	it	is	
used	for	poverty	reduction	or	not.		
The	starting	point	of	operationalisation	is	to	inquire	into	how	international	
development	policy	impacts	on	the	trajectory,	success	and	long	term	sustainability	of	
tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	initiatives.	The	issues	discussed	in	
the	preceding	paragraphs	highlight	ways	of	operationalising	the	idea	of	international	
development	policy	and	funding	cycles	as	part	of	an	interactive	tourism	governance	
framework.	For	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	key	questions	to	ask	are,	what	was	the	
prevailing	state	of	international	development	policy	and	practice	at	the	start	of	the	
project	in	2000,	and	how	did	this	shape	the	financing	and	governance	of	the	project?	
Arguably,	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	can	be	seen	as	situated	within	an	international	
development	policy	milieu	characterised	by	the	MDGs,	the	Monterrey	Consensus	of	
2002,	the	Paris	Declaration	on	Aid	Effectiveness	in	2005	and	the	Accra	Agenda	for	
Action	on	Aid	Effectiveness	in	2008.	Given	that	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	largely	
funded	by	international	development	donors	–	the	EU,	and	the	Dutch,	Belgian	and	
Canadian	governments	–	an	understanding	of	the	international	political	economy	at	the	
time	provides	insights	into	the	particular	ways	the	financing	of	the	project	shaped	the	
governing	interactions	between	stakeholders.		This	is	because	a	given	international	
political	economy	with	regards	to	international	development	policy	comes	with	
prescriptions	as	to	how	projects	are	to	be	funded	and	how	they	are	to	be	governed	and	
the	role	of	state	and	non‐state	actors	in	this	process.		
The role and nature of national and local electoral cycles 
Tourism	tends	to	be	considered	as	a	largely	private	sector	business	activity	but	
research	has	shown	that	national	government	policies	play	a	key	role	in	shaping	
tourism	development	in	a	given	destination	(Adu‐Ampong,	2015;	Jeffries,	2001).	In	
terms	of	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus,	Harrison	(2008)	argues	that	a	state’s	entire	
apparatus	needs	to	be	geared	towards	the	goal	of	sustainable	tourism	development	in	
order	to	maximise	the	benefits	of	tourism	for	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction.	States	however,	are	not	static	but	are	made	up	of	governments	that	are	
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voted	into	power	in	line	with	a	country’s	national	and	local	electoral	cycles.	National	
and	local	electoral	cycles	present	both	positive	and	negative	incentives	that	shape	the	
socio‐economic	and	political	behaviours	of	governments.	For	instance,	it	is	commonly	
known	that	incumbent	governments	often	engage	in	increased	government	spending	
and/or	decreased	taxation	in	the	year	leading	up	to	national,	regional	and	local	
elections.	Such	increased	government	spending	close	to	elections	puts	the	incumbent	
government	in	a	position	to	be	re‐elected.	The	result	is	a	cycle	of	high	spending	during	
elections	and	low	spending	in	between.	Within	the	political	economy	literature,	this	
situation	is	known	as	the	political	business	cycle	(PBC).		
Empirical	research	has	established	the	existence	of	PBC	in	both	developed	and	
developing	countries	(Drazen	and	Eslava,	2010;	Keefer	and	Khemani,	2005;	Brender	
and	Drazen,	2005;	Khemani,	2004;	Franzese,	2002;	Drazen,	2001).	Incumbent	
governments	engages	in	such	expansionary	economic	policy	prior	to	elections	in	order	
to	increase	their	chance	of	re‐election.	A	key	insight	from	this	set	of	literature	is	that	
incumbents	have	a	preference	for	“pork	barrel”	or	targeted	spending.	In	the	run	up	to	
elections,	incumbents	are	shown	to	reallocate	the	bulk	of	government	expenditure	to	
high	visibility	projects	that	make	an	immediate	impression	on	voters	(Rogoff,	1990).	A	
conclusion	to	be	drawn	from	the	PBC	literature	is	that	politicians	with	an	eye	on	re‐
election	take	deliberate	steps	in	the	allocation	and	timing	of	government	resources,	
which	is	usually	in	favour	of	big	development	projects	at	key	stages	of	the	electoral	
cycle.	The	more	visible	the	projects,	such	as	extension	of	electricity,	road	upgrades	and	
other	building	projects,	the	more	likely	electorates	are	predisposed	to	vote	for	the	
government.	In	many	cases,	these	projects	need	only	to	be	started	and	not	be	
completed	by	election	time.	In	such	situations	the	question	of	project	(dis)continuity	
becomes	an	important	consideration.	
Within	the	existing	PBC	literature,	it	appears	that	there	is	less	focus	on	the	issue	of	
project	(dis)continuity	after	elections	(Drazen,	2001).	The	key	focus	in	this	literature	is	
on	establishing	the	existence	of	PBC	in	a	given	country.	But	what	happens	to	the	high	
visibility	projects	and	programmes	once	the	electoral	cycle	is	over	and	the	incumbent	is	
re‐elected?	Do	the	incumbents	see	these	projects	through	to	full	implementation	or	do	
they	let	such	projects	lie	idle	until	the	next	electoral	cycle	is	on	the	horizon?	
Importantly,	what	happens	to	the	(dis)continuity	of	projects	if	and	when	an	incumbent	
government	is	voted	out	of	power	and	a	new	government	is	elected?	In	a	highly	
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contested	political	landscape	what	happens	to	uncompleted	projects	when	a	new	
political	party	assumes	power?	Answers	to	these	questions	are	important	in	helping	to	
understand	how	a	long	term	project	like	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	unfolded	within	a	
context	of	changing	party	governments.	
To	fully	comprehend	what	happens	to	projects	after	elections,	a	set	of	literature	on	the	
political	economy	of	public	good	provision	offers	a	number	of	insights.	Research	from	
this	area	has	shown	how	national	and	local	electoral	cycles	impact	on	project	
implementation	and	development	outcomes	(Williams,	2016;	Hirvi	and	Whitfield,	
2015;	Batley	et	al.,	2012;	Turner,	2012;	Kelsall,	2012;	Whitfield,	2009;	Lindberg,	2003).	
Thus	while	a	given	government	might	initiate	tourism	development	policies	and	
projects,	the	(dis)continuity	and	full	implementation	of	such	projects	is	dependent	on	
underlying	political	economic	conditions	in	a	given	destination	–	of	which	national	and	
local	electoral	cycles	are	a	prime	example.		Clearly	then,	tourism	planning	and	the	
tourism‐poverty	nexus	projects	are	bound	to	be	affected	with	changes	in	government.	
The	different	set	of	incentives	available	to	politicians	and	policy	makers	in	the	lead‐up	
to	elections	may	shape	their	decision	to	start	high	visibility	projects	and	to	
(dis)continue	such	projects	once	electoral	victory	has	been	sealed.	
There	is	an	overlap	between	national	and	local	electoral	cycles	and	the	time	it	takes	to	
see	the	benefits	of	tourism	development	projects.	There	is	an	inherent	tension	between	
the	technical	demands	of	project	implementation	and	the	structural	political	processes	
such	as	elections	and	electoral	competition.	The	temporal	dimension	of	project	
implementation	interacts	with	governmental	time	consistency	problems	in	order	to	
shape	eventual	outcomes	of	policies	and	projects	(Williams,	2016).	This	means	that	the	
time	it	takes	to	complete	a	project	or	fully	implement	a	policy	might	extend	beyond	the	
electoral	time	limit	of	the	initiating	government.	The	underlying	process	of	national	and	
local	electoral	cycles	and	its	attendant	incentives	play	a	key	role	as	to	whether	a	project	
will	be	seen	through	to	full	implementation	if	there	is	a	change	of	government.	The	
question	then	is	whether	successive	governments	are	committed	to	continuing	the	
projects	they	come	to	meet	in	office.	This	becomes	an	empirical	question	because	such	
commitment	is	not	a	given,	especially	in	a	winner‐takes‐all	political	environment.		
Furthermore,	it	has	also	been	shown	that	in	many	instances	politicians	tend	to	devote	
resources	to	starting	new	projects	rather	than	completing	existing	ones	in	order	to	
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appease	distributive	pressures	from	constituents	(Williams,	2016).	This	is	especially	
the	case	in	countries	like	Ghana	where	there	is	a	highly	intensive	political	competition	
which	tends	to	constrain	economic	progress	(Kelsall,	2012;	Whitfield,	2011,	2009)	due	
to	a	lack	of	policy	and	project	continuity.	Thus	to	understand	tourism‐led	LED	policy	
and	implementation	like	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	one	must	consider	the	political	and	
administrative	processes	–	i.e.	the	national	and	electoral	cycles	–		within	which	it	is	
situated.	Key	questions	to	ask	about	this	include:	what	was	the	number	of	electoral	
cycles	over	the	span	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy?	In	which	ways	did	these	electoral	
cycles	lead	to	administrative	changes	in	local	governments?	Answers	to	these	questions	
will	provide	insight	into	how	electoral	cycles	lead	to	administrative	changes	in	local	
governments	which	may	have	shaped	the	course	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	
The effects of local government service and transfer cycles 
Local	governments	play	an	important	role	in	tourism	planning	and	development.	As	the	
third	tier	(after	national	and	regional	governments)	of	public	sector	in	tourism,	they	
bear	the	biggest	responsibility	for	ensuring	that	the	tourism	product	remains	
competitive	(McKercher	and	Ritchie,	1997).	It	has	also	been	shown	that	local	
governments	are	key	to	achieving	sustainable	tourism	development	(Dredge,	2001;	
Ruhanen,	2013).	However,	the	assessment	of	local	government	capacity	in	tourism	
governance	and	development	has	been	relatively	less	studied	(Churugsa	et	al.,	2007;	
Slocum	and	Backman,	2011).	Decentralisation	and	other	public	sector	reforms	in	many	
countries	have	resulted	in	a	downward	shift	in	a	number	of	key	socio‐economic	
development	responsibilities	to	local	governments.	It	was	envisaged	that	these	reforms	
would	strengthen	the	capacity	of	local	governments,	reduce	central	government	control	
and	increase	the	managerial	autonomy	of	local	government	authorities	and	personnel	
(Manning,	2001;	Crook,	2003;	Smoke,	2003;	Awortwi,	2010).	Given	that	local	
governments	can	either	facilitate	or	inhibit	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	
planning	initiatives,	it	is	important	to	fully	understand	their	capacity	and	the	political	
processes	of	local	government	management	and	administration	in	a	destination.		
In	many	cases,	decentralisation	has	only	been	partially	implemented	and	so	local	
government	authorities	lack	complete	autonomy	in	managing	the	governing	process	at	
the	local	level.	In	addition	to	waiting	on	the	central	government	for	funding,	the	
capacity	of	local	government	authorities	is	hampered	by	their	lack	of	control	over	staff	
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and	human	resourcing	(Silver,	2003).	In	many	developing	countries	where	
decentralisation	has	only	been	partially	implemented,	local	government	authorities	do	
not	directly	employ	their	key	management	staff.	The	hiring,	posting,	reposting	and	
firing	of	staff	in	local	government	institutions	is	often	centrally	managed	at	the	national	
level	(Ayee,	2008).	Indeed,	the	heads	of	local	government	authorities	tend	to	be	
nominated	or	appointed	by	the	central	government.	This	means	that	accountability	is	
upwards	towards	the	centre	instead	of	downwards	towards	the	community.	In	a	study	
of	decentralisation	in	Ghana	and	Uganda,	Awortwi	(2010)	found	that	central	
governments	in	both	countries	are	taking	some	of	the	powers	of	local	governments	in	a	
process	of	recentralisation.	This	has	an	impact	on	policy	and	project	development	and	
implementation	at	the	local	level.	For	instance	staff	can	be	transferred	from	their	post	
at	one	local	government	authority	to	another	at	any	point	in	time,	often	at	very	short	
notice.	For	key	staff	such	as	planning	officers,	such	sudden	transfers	have	
repercussions	on	policy	development	and	implementation.	It	usually	leads	to	a	loss	of	
institutional	memory	and	project	continuity.	This	raises	questions	with	regards	to	the	
governance	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	projects	initiated	by	
local	government	authorities	who	are	subjected	to	the	sudden	loss	of	staff	through	
transfers.	
The	literature	on	local	government	and	administration	has	highlighted	the	important	
role	of	organisational	memory	in	improving	the	performance	of	local	governments,	
especially	in	terms	of	project	implementation	(El	Sawy	et	al.,	1986;	Pollitt,	2000,	2009;	
Haque,	2001;	Barrados	and	Mayne,	2003;	Cain	et	al.,	2004;	Zakaria	and	Mamman,	
2015).	The	retention	of	organisational	learning	is	important	in	achieving	policy	
objectives	especially	in	local	tiers	of	governments	where	the	nitty‐gritty	of	policy	and	
project	implementation	takes	place.	Organisational	learning	and	the	memory	that	is	
derived	from	it	reside	in	the	members	or	staff	of	a	given	organisation	(Pollitt,	2000).	It	
is	through	this	organisational	memory	that	desired	outcomes	in	decision	making,	
productivity,	innovation	and	organisational	learning	are	achieved.	Thus	it	is	important	
that	an	organisation	is	able	to	influence	the	movement	of	its	members	in	order	to	
preserve	institutional	memory	and	improve	organisational	performance.		
While	organisational	memory	is	partly	constituted	by	documents	and	practices,	it	is	the	
staff	that	keeps	records	of	organisational	practices.	Thus,	if	an	organisation	does	not	
have	much	influence	over	staff	transfers	and	movements	then	it	loses	its	memory	and	
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consequently	its	ability	to	effectively	achieve	desired	outcomes.	The	lack	of	autonomy	
of	local	government	authorities	in	directly	hiring	staff	can	hinder	their	capacity	when	it	
comes	to	policy	and	project	implementation.	For	an	already	highly	fragmented	sector	
like	tourism,	tourism‐led	LED	planning	initiatives	require	the	building	up	of	trust	and	
open	communication	between	stakeholders	based	on	the	stability	of	key	personnel.	
This	is	because	“stability	preserves	trust,	while	instability	creates	
uncertainty…turnover	in	key	roles	is	[therefore]	postulated	as	a	factor	that	can	erode	
trust…”	(Cain	et	al.,	2004:559).	If	personnel	of	local	government	authorities	are	key	
stakeholders	in	the	tourism	planning	process	then	the	question	that	arises	is	how	this	
cycle	of	personnel	transfer	and	turnover	affects	the	trust	needed	to	ensure	project	
completion.		
In	Ghana	for	example,	research	has	shown	that	the	unpredictability	of	local	government	
staff	transfer,	in	part	the	result	of	political	interference,	affects	organisational	memory	
and	the	operations	of	local	government	authorities	(Zakaria	and	Mamman,	2015).	The	
sudden	departure	of	usually	experienced	staff	in	the	middle	of	policy	and	project	
implementation	significantly	affects	the	operations	of	such	projects	and	their	successful	
implementation.	In	addition,	it	has	been	well	established	that	the	assumption	of	office	
of	new	political	heads	coincide	with	a	surge	in	local	government	staff	transfer	cycles.	
This	is	due	to	the	tensions	in	the	relationship	between	politicians	and	civil	servants	in	
local	government	authorities	(Stocker	and	Thompson‐Fawcett,	2014).		
Since	chief	executives	of	local	government	authorities	and	regional	ministers	are	
central	government	appointees	and	belong	to	the	same	ruling	party,	they	can	easily	
instigate	the	transfer	of	staff	that	they	perceive	to	be	loyal	to	a	previous	government	
and	critical	of	the	current	government’s	development	priorities	and	spending.	This	
means	that	inherited	policy	and	projects	from	the	old	government	might	not	be	seen	
through	to	full	implementation	due	to	organisational	memory	loss	that	arises	from	the	
transfer	of	old	staff.	This	situation	indeed	happened	over	the	course	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	following	a	national	electoral	cycle	that	ushered	in	a	new	party	government.	
Thus	the	unpredictability	of	local	government	staff	transfer	cycles	raises	important	
questions	with	regards	to	the	governance	of	tourism‐led	LED	planning	initiatives.	
These	questions,	such	as	what	happens	with	project	implementation	when	staff	are	
transferred,	are	key	because	it	is	the	local	government	authorities	that	are	
constitutionally	mandated	to	see	to	overall	local	economic	development.	They	
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therefore	play	leading	roles	in	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	initiatives	and	
hence	their	capacity	or	the	lack	of	it	in	project	implementation	and	governance	has	a	
direct	bearing	on	project	outcomes.	
As	an	illustration,	there	were	four	national	electoral	cycles	–	2000,	2004,	2008	and	
2012	–	over	the	course	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	The	electoral	cycle	in	2000	
ushered	in	a	change	of	ruling	party	for	the	first	time	since	(re)democratisation	in	
1990s.	The	same	government	was	re‐elected	in	2004	before	a	second	change	of	ruling	
party	in	2008.	These	electoral	cycles	were	accompanied	by	changes	in	the	
administrative	governance	of	municipalities	symbolised	by	the	(re)appointments	of	
Municipal	Chief	Executives	at	the	KEEA.	These	cycles	and	changes	had	a	profound	
impact	on	the	trajectory	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	The	loss	of	institutional	memory	
that	comes	from	political	cycles	and	staff	transfers	resulted	in	low	governance	capacity	
and	challenges	by	the	KEEA	for	instance	in	effectively	overseeing	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	process.	Thus	the	interactive	tourism	governance	framework	pays	attention	to	
the	role	of	national	and	local	electoral	cycles.		
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2.4 Tying up the interactive tourism governance framework: 
communication, collaboration and coordination 
There	are	two	meanings	that	are	commonly	attached	to	governance.	Firstly,	it	is	
defined	as	the	“empirical	manifestations	of	state	adaptation	to	its	external	environment	
as	it	emerges	in	the	late	twentieth	century”	and	secondly	as	a	“conceptual	or	theoretical	
representation	of	co‐ordination	of	social	systems	and	...	the	role	of	the	state	in	that	
process”	(Pierre,	2000:3).	Current	research	on	governance	tends	to	focus	on	the	later	
meaning	of	how	society	is	coordinated	and	the	role	of	the	state	in	this	process.	This	
understanding	of	governance	is	further	categorised	by	Peters	(2000)	into	“traditional	
old	governance”	and	“new	governance”.	Traditional	old	governance	focuses	on	the	
question	of	the	capacity	of	the	state	to	exercise	control	over	the	rest	of	government,	the	
economy	and	society	in	a	hierarchical	fashion.	New	governance	on	the	other	hand	is	
concerned	with	the	question	of	how	the	state	interacts	with	the	economy	and	society	in	
order	to	make	policy	decisions	that	are	acceptable	to	all	actors	in	the	society.	A	key	
feature	that	underlines	this	understanding	of	new	governance	is	interaction	–	
interaction	between	state,	the	economy	and	society.		
In	recent	times	governance	has	been	seen	as	political	and	social	communication	(Bang,	
2003)	through	which	decisions	and	actions	are	arrived	at	through	negotiation	and	
dialogue	between	representatives	of	different	sectors	of	society	in	a	collaborative	
fashion.	This	contrasts	with	the	traditional	view	of	governance,	in	which	hierarchy	
rules,	and	in	which	policy	decisions	are	made	by	the	state	in	a	top‐down	manner.	In	
such	cases,	other	societal	stakeholders	have	little	input	into	the	policy	making	process	
but	must	still	comply	with	policy	implementation	directives.	The	communicative	turn	
in	governance	and	in	planning	has	highlighted	the	need	for	increased	interaction	
between	the	state	and	other	stakeholders	in	the	policy	making	process	(Allmendinger	
&	Tewdwr‐Jones,	2002;	Healey,	2006).	Indeed	just	two	decades	ago,	the	idea	of	a	
network	society	was	put	forward	by	Castells	(1996).	When	new	networks	emerge	
around	governing	process,	they	erode	and/or	shift	the	location	of	power	away	from	
previous	institutional	configurations.	This	opens	up	the	governance	arena	making	it	
possible	for	new	stakeholders	at	the	very	local	level	as	well	as	at	the	regional	and	
national	levels	to	have	a	say	in	processes	and	outcomes	which	tend	not	to	be	possible	
under	a	traditional	hierarchical	top‐down	governance	system.	This	situation	brings	
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about	new	dynamics	in	which	the	authority	of	the	state	is	not	necessarily	ended	but	is	
rather	redefined	(Rhodes,	2000).		
Underlying	the	interactive	tourism	governance	framework	developed	in	this	chapter,	
lies	the	issues	of	interactions.	If	we	are	in	an	increasingly	networked	society	then	the	
importance	of	continuous	interaction	in	the	governing	process	cannot	be	
overemphasised.	Interactions	within	the	governing	process	can	have	many	forms.	
However,	three	key	forms	of	interactions	are	considered	pertinent	to	this	research	and	
the	conceptual	framework	developed.		These	three	‐		communication,	collaboration	and	
coordination	–are	the	very	basic	building	blocks	of	any	governance	interaction	and	
represent	a	way	of	addressing	the	empirical	issues	of	how	policymakers	communicate	
with	other	actors	within	the	tourism‐led	LED	planning	process	and	the	form	and	extent	
of	coordination	and	collaboration	between	the	various	governance	agencies.		
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Chapter 3 
Research design and methods 
	
This	thesis	examines	the	governance	interactions	between	stakeholders	involved	in	
tourism‐led	LED	planning	initiatives	and	the	institutional	structures	within	which	these	
interactions	take	place	which	are	underlined	by	politics.	The	selection	and	framing	of	
this	research	has	been	guided	by	curiosity	and	fascination	about	the	cause‐and‐effect	
relationship	between	development	outcomes	and	specific	forms	of	governance	
interactions.	Although	for	most	of	the	research	enterprise	emotions	tend	to	be	kept	in	
the	background,	“one	place	it	should	remain	is	in	the	choosing	of	research	
topics…[since]…the	emotional	aspects	of	choosing	research	topics…[ensures	
that]…these	emotions	contribute	to	the	intense	commitment	to	finding	out	what	really	
causes	things	to	happen	that	leads	to	good	research	(Geddes,	2003:28‐30).	Thus	it	is	
through	curiosity,	fascination	and	intuitiveness	over	the	past	five	years,	including	the	
years	before	I	embarked	on	the	PhD	programme	in	2013	that	I	arrived	at	the	broad	
contours	of	this	research.	This	process	was	further	underpinned	by	systematic	
interaction	of	observations	based	on	reading	existing	literature	and	conjectures	of	
possible	cause‐and‐effect	relationships	based	on	first‐hand	experience.	This	research	is	
therefore	framed	as	an	embedded	case	study	because	it	offers	unique	insights	into	the	
causal	mechanism	between	governance	interactions	and	outcomes	of	tourism‐led	LED	
planning	initiatives.		
In	this	chapter,	I	provide	an	account	and	justification	for	the	particulars	of	the	
embedded	case	study	research	design	adopted	for	this	research.	In	the	first	section,	I	
discuss	the	philosophical	assumptions	that	underpin	the	approach	to	the	research	
enquiry,	methods	of	collecting	data	and	the	analysis.	The	specifics	of	the	research	
methodology	and	methods	adopted	for	this	study	are	then	addressed	in	the	second	
section	where	I	also	provide	a	description	of	the	processes	of	data	collection,	the	kinds	
of	data	acquired	and	how	the	data	is	analysed	and	written	up.	The	goal	of	such	
description	is	to	show	the	consistency	between	research	questions,	conceptual	
framework	and	data	analysis.	The	final	section	is	a	reflexive	account	of	my	positionality	
as	a	UK‐based	Ghanaian	researcher	undertaking	fieldwork	(research)	in	Ghana	and	the	
ethical	considerations	made.	
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3.1 Philosophical foundations 
The	overall	objective	of	this	research	is	to	understand,	explain	and	analyse	how	
governance	interactions	shape	the	planning	and	use	of	tourism	for	local	economic	
development.	Meeting	this	objective	involves	understanding	governance	interactions	
between	different	structures	of	governance	in	the	tourism	sector	of	Ghana.		
Consequently,	this	research	proceeds	on	the	basis	that	society	is	made	up	of	actors	and	
their	interactions.	Actors	are	used	here	to	refer	to	both	individuals	and	collectivities	
such	as	organisations.	These	actors	often	represent	and	constitute	enduring	features	of	
society.	The	world	is	therefore	a	socially	constructed	‘reality’	in	which	actors	both	
influence	and	are	influenced	by	the	very	institutions	and	structures	they	operate	
through.	Thus	“economic	[social]	action	is	socially	situated	and	cannot	be	explained	by	
reference	to	individual	motives	alone.	It	is	embedded	in	ongoing	networks	of	personal	
relationships	rather	than	being	carried	out	by	atomised	actors”	(Swedberg	and	
Granovetter,	1992:9).	
The	philosophical	starting	point	of	this	research	is	based	on	the	assumption	that	the	
governance	interactions	that	give	rise	to	and	shape	tourism‐led	LED	planning	are	
socially	constructed	through	the	relations	of	actors.	These	actor‐relations	are	
influential	in	how	institutional	arrangements	are	produced	and	reproduced	and	how	
these	in	turn	proscribe	the	processes	of	actor‐relations.			As	actors	become	engaged	in	
interactions	through	social	relations	they	begin	to	shape	institutional	processes	but	are	
simultaneously	constrained	in	their	choice	of	actions	and	strategies	by	these	very	
institutional	processes	(Giddens,	1984;	Scott,	1995).	Nonetheless,	actors	are	considered	
as	being	innovative	and	capable	of	learning	through	their	interactions	and	being	able	to	
then	change	the	very	structures	that	guide	their	interactions	(Healey,	1999,	2003).		
On	the	basis	of	the	communicative	turn	in	planning	theory,	Healey	(1999)	has	argued	
that	social	interactions	represent	an	important	mechanism	through	which	policy	
initiatives	and	ideas	become	solidified,	instruments	chosen	and	action	taken.	These	
processes	are	continuously	changing	as	actors	develop	new	ideas,	new	relations	and	
mobilise	critical	resources	in	new	ways.	A	study	of	the	interaction	between	actors	is	
therefore	important	in	understanding	how	new	governance	ideas	become	
institutionalised.	Consequently,	to	understand	how	governance	interactions	in	the	
tourism	sector	of	Ghana	gave	rise	to	and	shaped	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	as	a	process	
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of	tourism‐led	LED	planning	initiative,	this	research	considers	how	actors	understand,	
perceive	and	aim	to	implement	tourism‐poverty	nexus	policy	conceptualisations.	This	
research	will	therefore	seek	to	let	actors	self‐reflect	on	how	they	perceive	their	roles,	
their	relations	with	others	and	how	such	perception	gets	formed	and	shaped	through	
interactions	and	institutional	context.	Importantly,	the	focus	is	on	the	ways	actors	are	
able	to	get	their	work	done		within	a	given	institutional	context	and	their	interactions	
with	others.	
There	are	a	number	of	important	points	regarding	agency	and	structures	that	provide	a	
basis	for	the	approach	adopted	for	this	research.	These	points	as	highlighted	by	Marsh	
and	Furlong	(2010)	are:	i)	social	structures	and	institutional	arrangements	tend	to	
shape	actions.	In	this	action‐shaping	process,	actors’	experiences	affect	how	they	can	
come	to	understand	the	social	structures	that	are	influencing	their	actions;	ii)	social	
structures	are	not	independent	from	actors’	views	of	their	behaviour	and	how	they	
interact	with	others	and;	iii)	social	structures	change	as	a	result	of	the	action	of	actors	
in	social	interactions.	These	points	are	important	in	understanding	and	accounting	for	
the	variations	in	actors’	perceptions	and	behaviour	across	time	and	space.	This	is	
achieved	by	accessing	the	views	of	actors	who	have	the	lived	experiences	of	social	
interactions	and	the	construction	of	meanings	attached	to	these	interactions.	Thus	
while	actors	may	be	considered	to	be	conscious,	self‐reflexive	and	strategic	in	their	
actions	(Marsh,	2010),	it	is	also	important	to	bear	in	mind	that	actors	also	rely	on	
implicit,	tacit	and	non‐reflexive	behaviours	(Cook	and	Wagenaar,	2011).	
Given	that	the	main	interest	of	this	research	is	to	understand	how	processes	of	
governance	interactions	affect	policy	outcomes,	a	quantitative	approach	to	the	research	
is	inadequate	on	both	theoretical	and	practical	consideration.	Theoretically,	since	these	
governance	interactions	are	not	given	constants	but	are	continuously	changing,	
quantitative	methods	are	unlikely	to	produce	a	nuanced	picture.	On	a	practical	level,	
there	is	a	lack	of	availability	of	data	on	governance	interactions	that	will	aid	a	
quantitative	approach	to	the	research.		A	qualitative	approach	is	therefore	considered	
adequate	and	appropriate	for	this	research	in	order	to	understand,	explain	and	analyse	
how	governance	interactions	shape	the	planning	and	use	of	tourism	for	local	economic	
development.	A	qualitative	approach	through	interviews,	documentary	analysis	and	
observations	is	the	most	viable	approach	for	establishing	and	interpreting	actors	lived	
experiences	and	for	understanding	the	‘how’	of	social	constructions	that	shape	choices.	
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3.2 Approach to research inquiry 
Considering	the	aim	and	research	questions,	the	approach	to	qualitative	research	
adopted	for	this	research	is	that	of	an	embedded	single	case	study.	An	embedded	case	
study	is	one	that	involves	more	than	one	unit	of	analysis	and	is	embedded	within	a	
larger	case	study	(Yin,	2009).	Thus	the	focus	on	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	is	embedded	
within	the	larger	case	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	in	Ghana	as	
a	whole.		Odell	(2001)	has	highlighted	how		on	the	basis	of	basic	epistemological	
disagreement,	the	terms	“qualitative”	and	“case	study”	are	used	with	diverse	
understanding	by	different	scholars.	This	research	proceeds	on	the	basis	that	the	case	
study	is	but	one	of	the	several	different	ways	social	science	research	is	conducted.	
According	to	Yin,	the	case	study	approach	is	appropriate	in	research	where:	i)	“how”	or	
“why”	questions	are	being	asked,	ii)	the	researcher	has	little	control	over	the	research	
events,	and	iii)	a	contemporary	phenomenon	in	its	real‐life	setting	is	being	researched	
(Ibid:	2).	Why	questions	according	to	(Hempel,	1965	quoted	in	Morgan,	2012:676)	can	
be	distinguished	into	‘explanation‐seeking	why	questions’	and	‘reason‐seeking	or	
epistemic	why‐questions’.	“The	latter	ask	for	grounds	(epistemic	reasons)	for	believing	
something	is	true;	the	former	take	something	to	be	true	and	ask	for	the	explanation	
(substantive	reasons)	why	it	is	so”.	Case	study	research	deals	head‐on	with	both	
questions	together.	My	research	therefore	deals	with	the	question	of;	how	can	we	know	
that	governance	interactions	fundamentally	shaped	the	process	and	outcomes	of	
tourism‐led	LED	planning?	If	it	is	true	that	governance	interactions	shape	outcomes	
then	what	are	the	features	of	such	governance	interactions?	
The	underlying	rationale	for	selecting	an	embedded	single	case	study	for	this	research	
is	that	a	tourism‐led	LED	planning	initiatives	as	illustrated	through	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	is	a	critical	case	(Flyvberg,	2006;	Yin,	2009)	through	which	the	correctness	of	
the	propositions	implicit	in	the	interactive	tourism	governance	framework	can	be	
determined.	A	critical	case	is	one	that	has	“strategic	importance	in	relation	to	the	
general	problem”	(Flyvberg,	2006:229).	The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	is	considered	as	a	
critical	case	study	of	the	general	problem	of	how	to	leverage	tourism	for	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction.	Consequently,	an	understanding	of	how	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	governed	will	provide	insights	to	a	number	of	other	similar	
initiatives.	Furthermore,	an	embedded	single	case	study	allows	a	look	at	multiple	units	
of	analysis	within	the	research.	The	multiple	units	of	analysis	include	conceptual	units	
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and	scalar	units.	Conceptually,	the	units	of	analysis	are;	stakeholder	governance	
capacity,	institutional	thickness	and	political	cycles	(see	Chapter	2).	In	terms	of	scale,	
the	units	of	analysis	are	focused	on	the	national	level,	the	regional	level	and	the	district	
level.	The	use	of	multiple	units	of	analysis	provides	analytic	focus	to	this	research	
inquiry	and	helps	to	make	the	research	empirically	grounded.		The	use	of	multiple	units	
of	analysis	also	provides	opportunities	for	extensive	analysis	that	enhances	the	insights	
from	the	research	inquiry	making	it	possible	to	generalise	from	a	single	case	to	a	larger	
population.		
A	case	study	defined	by	Gerring	(2004:342)	“as	the	intensive	study	of	a	single	unit	for	
the	purpose	of	understanding	a	larger	class	of	(similar)	units”	focuses	on	‘rare’	events	
that	are	instances	of	substantial	and	relative	quick	change.	The	case	study	method	
therefore	“allows	investigators	to	retain	the	holistic	and	meaningful	characteristics	of	
real‐life	events”	(Yin,	2009:4).	This	thesis	designed	as	an	embedded	single	case	
involves	the	intensive	study	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	for	the	purpose	of	
understanding	the	governance	interactions	that	shape	tourism‐led	LED	planning	
initiatives	(larger	class	of	similar	units)	more	generally.		The	intensive	study	of	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	can	therefore	provide	insights	into	tourism‐led	LED	in	other	
destinations	with	similar	characteristics.		Thus	my	research	serves	a	double	function	of	
meeting	my	wish	to	know	what	is	particular	about	the	governability	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	and	at	the	same	time	my	wish	to	know	what	is	general	about	the	governability	
of	tourism‐led	LED	planning	initiatives.	
An	embedded	single	case	study	is	by	definition	a	single	case	study	design	that	involves	
more	than	one	unit	of	analysis	and	where	a	unit	of	analysis	can	include	persons,	groups,	
situations	and/or	events	that	all	together	speak	to	the	larger	case	under	study	(Yin,	
2009).	Thus	in	the	context	of	this	thesis,	the	case	under	consideration	which	is	
illustrated	through	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	is	how	tourism‐led	LED	planning	
initiatives	are	shaped	by	governance	interactions.	The	use	of	an	embedded	case	study	is	
essential	because	the	research	is	concerned	with	the	‘how’	of	governance	interactions	
as	it	occurs	in	its	real‐life	setting	over	which	I	have	little	to	no	control.	Moreover	the	
specificities	of	governance	interactions	at	the	various	scales	of	the	tourism	system	in	
Ghana	can	be	captured	and	understood	in	relation	to	how	they	shape	interactions	at	the	
locality	level.		
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While	the	case	study	method	generally	and	an	embedded	single	case	study	specifically	
have	their	strengths,	there	are	potential	pitfalls	that	need	to	be	highlighted.	The	major	
potential	pitfall	which	can	occur	is	when	there	is	an	over‐focus	and	overemphasis	on	
the	units	of	analysis	leading	to	a	failure	to	return	to	the	larger	unit	of	analysis.	Thus	
throughout	the	research	process	I	held	in	check	the	propensity	to	present	an	
assessment	of	the	governance	implications	of	each	unit	of	analysis	–	stakeholder	
governance	capacity,	institutional	thickness	and	political	cycles	–	in	such	great	detail	
that	it	would	become	removed	from	and	would	not	analytically	connect	to	the	larger	
tourism	governance	conceptual	framework	that	seeks	to	explore	how	these	
interactions	shape	tourism‐led	LED	planning.	This	research	therefore	proceeded	in	an	
iterative	fashion	in	which	the	units	of	analysis	were	constantly	being	reflected	back	to	
the	context	of	the	tourism	sector	and	national	development	planning	in	Ghana.	This	
accords	with	the	defense	of	the	case	study	method	by	Morgan	(2012:672)	who	argues	
that	a	key	strength	of	the	case	study	method	lies	in	the	importance	given	to	both	
description	and	conceptualization	in	the	process	of	distinguishing	a	phenomenon	from	
its	context.	
Notwithstanding	the	potential	pitfalls,	the	lacuna	in	current	literature	that	this	research	
seeks	to	contribute	to	filling	makes	the	use	of	the	embedded	single	case	study	design	
approach	not	only	appropriate	but	also	indispensable.	Much	of	current	research	on	the	
tourism‐poverty	nexus	and	tourism‐led	LED	planning	point	out	the	importance	of	
governance	variables.	However,	there	has	at	yet	not	been	a	detailed	study	of	the	causal	
mechanisms	through	which	governance	shapes	tourism‐led	LED	planning	outcomes.	
This	is	precisely	where	my	research	fits	in	and	offers	new	insights.	My	thesis	provides	
in‐depth	description,	analysis	and	explanation	of	how	governance	interactions	shape	
tourism‐led	LED	planning	through	the	illustrative	case	of	the	Elmina	2015	strategy.	The	
research	approach	adopted	for	this	research	has	allowed	me	to	make	a	choice	to	‘know	
more	about	less’	than	to	‘know	less	about	more’.		Such	a	choice	faced	by	all	research	
designs	is	both	a	strength	and	a	weakness,	and	the	embedded	single	case	study	
approach	adopted	for	this	research	can	be	defended	and	criticized	for	knowing	more	
about	less	(Gerring,	2004).			
A	comparative	advantage	of	the	embedded	single	case	study	approach	used	in	this	
research	over	other	research	designs	such	as	multiple	case	studies	and	/or	quantitative	
designs	is	that	it	allows	for	the	identification	of	causal	mechanisms.	My	thesis	therefore	
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sheds	light	on	the	causal	mechanisms	of	governance	interactions	and	the	outcomes	of	
tourism‐led	LED	planning.		The	research	allows	me	to	look	into	the	box	of	causality	
(governance	interactions	and	its	shaping	effects	on	the	Elmina	2015	strategy)	and	
through	process‐tracing	see	the	intermediate	and	proximate	causal	mechanisms.	This	
is	accomplished	when	the	general	academic	knowledge	of	the	world	(that	governance	
is	essential	in	shaping	outcomes)	is	put	together	with	the	empirical	knowledge	of	how	
the	Elmina	2015	strategy	unfolded.	As	succinctly	noted	by	Roberts	(1996	cited	in	
Gerring,	2004:348),	process‐tracing	is	“the	minute	tracing	of	the	explanatory	narrative	
to	the	point	where	the	events	to	be	explained	are	microscopic	and	the	covering	laws	
correspondingly	more	certain".	
	
3.3 Research strategy 
A	key	advantage	of	the	use	of	a	case	study	methodology	is	that	it	allows	the	collection,	
use	and	analysis	of	multiple	sources	of	evidence	or	data	(Mason,	2002;	Yin,	2009;	
Blaikie,	2010).	These	multiple	sources	include	documents,	archival	records,	direct	
observation,	participant‐observation,	physical	artefacts	and	interviews	(Yin,	2009).	In	
view	of	the	philosophical	approach	and	assumptions	underpinning	this	research	and	
given	the	adoption	of	an	embedded	single	case	study	as	a	methodological	approach	(see	
section	3.1	and	3.2),	interviews	and	documents	represented	an	essential	and	central	
means	of	data	collection	for	this	research.	In	addition	I	made	use	of	both	participant	
and	non‐participant	observation	with	accompanying	notes	as	well	as	photographic	
evidence.	The	choice	of	methods	for	data	collection	and	analysis	adopted	for	the	study	
were	also	shaped	by	the	research	questions	that	were	set	out	in	Chapter	1.	The	guiding	
research	questions	of	this	thesis	are:	
1. How	did	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	conceptualise	the	relationship	between	
tourism,	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction?	
2. To	what	extent	did	the	level	of	governance	capacity	held	by	key	stakeholders	
shape	the	planning	process	and	outcomes	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy?	
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3. To	what	extent	was	the	Elmina	2015	strategy	embedded	within	the	institutional	
arrangements	for	local	economic	development	planning	of	the	Komenda‐Edina‐
Eguafo	Abrem	Municipal	Assembly?	
4. How	did	local	government	politics	and	cycles	of	national	elections	shape	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy?	
5. To	what	extent	does	an	interactive	tourism	governance	framework	allow	for	a	
nuanced	understanding	of	the	governing	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	
development	planning?	
It	is	instructive	to	point	out	at	this	point,	before	a	description	of	the	various	data	
collection	techniques	used,	that	qualitative	research	designs	cannot	be	tightly	
prescribed	in	advance.	It	has	been	noted	by	Mason	(2002)	and	Creswell	(2007)	that	in	
many	cases	qualitative	research	designs	are	emergent	and	that	elements	of	the	design	
are	amenable	to	changes	as	a	result	of	the	very	ongoing	and	unfolding	process	of	the	
research	itself.	In	the	table	below,	I	present	a	mapping	of	the	research	question‐data	
sources	and	methods‐justification	that	guided	the	fieldwork.	
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Table	3	Research	Questions	–	Data	Sources	–	Justification	Matrix	
Research	Questions	 Data	Sources	and	Methods	 Justification	
1. How	did	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	
conceptualise	the	relationship	
between	tourism,	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	
reduction?	
	
Documentary	Analysis:	The	key	documents	
that	were	consulted	and	analysed	include:	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	Part	I:	Sector	Strategy	
and	Vision,	Progress	Reports	of	project	
implementation,	the	draft	of	the	final	project	
report,	government	archival	materials,	public	
news	archives.	
	
Interviews:	Interviews	with	former	and	
current	bureaucrats	at	the	Komenda‐Edina‐
Eguafo‐Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	such	as	
the	Municipal	Chief	Executive,	the	Municipal	
Development	Planning	Officer,	the	Municipal	
Coordinating	Director	and	the	Member	of	
Parliament	for	the	municipality.	In	addition,	
interviews	were	conducted	with	key	
informants	outside	of	the	municipal	assembly	
but	who	were	centrally	involved	in	the	
planning	and	implementation	of	the	strategy.		
	
How the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	conceptualised	the	
relationship	between	tourism,	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction	is	investigated	
through	the	analysis	of	the	strategy	documents	and	the	
various	progress	report	on	project	implementation.	The	
information	held	in	the	official	documents	provides	the	
state’s	position	on	how	the	tourism	sector	is	understood	
and	conceptualised.	The	analysis	of	such	documents	
available	through	secondary	sources	reveals	the	‘official’	
position	which	is	compared	with	the	position	found	in	
the	interviews.			
	
The	conducted	interviews	were	then	analysed	in	order	to	
understand	the	perspective	of	stakeholders	regarding	
how	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	conceptualised	the	
relationship	between	tourism,	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction.	
	
	
	
2. To	what	extent	did	the	level	of	
governance	capacity	held	by	key	
stakeholders	shape	the	planning	
Documentary	Analysis:	National	Tourism	
Development	Policies	and	Plans,	Technical	
Reports,	Elmina	2015	Strategy	Part	I:	Sector	
Strategy	and	Vision,	Progress	Reports,	
Municipal	Medium	Term	Development	Plans.	
The	question	of	how	governance	capacity	shapes
outcome	is	best	addressed	through	analysis	of	
documents	especially	progress	reports.	It	is	however	
important	in	the	first	place	to	first	ascertain	the	
governance	capacity	of	each	stakeholder,	which	is	
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process	and	outcomes	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy?	
	
	
Interviews:	These	were	mainly	conducted	
with	bureaucrats	and	policy	makers	at	the	
national,	regional	and	district	levels	in	order	
to	assess	their	governance	capacity	and	
identify	the	main	constraints	on	this.		These	
interviews	were	conducted	within	public	
sector	(state)	institutions,	private	sector	
institutions	and	civil	society	institutions	who	
are	all	involved	in	the	governance	of	the	
tourism	sector.	
established	through	interviews	with	bureaucrats.	
Moreover,	the	use	of	documentary	sources	provides	a	
means	to	identify	the	official	functions	and	capacity	
afforded	to	each	stakeholder.		
3. How	did	local	government	politics	
and	cycles	of	national	elections	
shape	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy?	
	
	
Documentary	Analysis:
Successive	Medium	Term	Development	Plans	
of	the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo	Abrem	
Municipal	Assembly,	the	Ghana	Poverty	
Reduction	Strategy	I,	the	Growth	and	Poverty	
Reduction	Strategy	II	and	the	Ghana	Shared	
Growth	and	Development	Agenda	I	&II.		
Key	documents	are	the	various	progress	
reports	on	the	implementation	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	as	well	as	the	draft	final	report.		
Interviews:	All	the	interviews	conducted	at	
the	national,	regional	and	local	district	levels	
within	public	sector	(state)	institutions,	
private	sector	institutions	and	civil	society	
institutions	explored	the	issue	of	local	
government	politics	and	effects	of	political	
cycles.	
An	analysis	of	the	progress	report	taking	particular	
notice	of	the	period	of	government	transitions	provides	
insights	into	whether	and	how	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	
was	shaped	by	local	government	politics.	This	helps	to	
identify	trends	regarding	progress	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	vis‐à‐vis	cycles	of	national	and	local	government	
transitions.	The	documentary	analysis	is	complemented	
with	key	informant	interviews	that	provide	a	more	in	
depth	insight	as	to	the	particular	ways	in	which	changes	
in	governments	affect	project	continuity.		
4. To	what	extent	was	the	Elmina	
2015	strategy	embedded	into	the	
institutional	arrangements	for	local	
Documentary	Analysis:	Successive	Medium	
Term	Development	Plans	of	the	Komenda‐
Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	Municipal	Assembly,	the	
Ghana	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	I,	the	
Growth	and	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	II	and	
As	this	question	relates to the process	tracing	of	whether	
and	how	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	got	embedded	in	local	
economic	development	planning	institutions,	it	is	
investigated	through	interviews	with	both	current	and	
former	bureaucrats.	Importantly,	it	was	key	that	former	
	
	
86	
	
	
economic	development	planning	of	
the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	
Municipal	Assembly?	
	
	
the	Ghana	Shared	Growth	and	Development	
Agenda	I	&II.	
	
Interviews:	These	were	conducted	mainly	
with	bureaucrats	at	the	Komenda‐Edina‐
Eguafo‐Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	involved	
in	local	economic	development	planning	and	
the	development	of	the	Medium	Term	
Development	Plans	–	especially	the	Municipal	
Development	Planning	Officer.		
bureaucrats	who	were	involved	in	developing	successive	
Medium	Term	Development	Planning	were	interviewed.	
This	provided	a	perspective	within	which	the	
documentary	analysis	was	carried	out	on	the	subsequent	
Medium	Term	Development	Plans.	These	plans	and	other	
documents	provided	insights	on	the	extent	to	which	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	got	embedded	in	the	institutional	
arrangement	for	local	economic	development	planning.	
5. To	what	extent	does	an	interactive	
tourism	governance	framework	
allow	for	a	nuanced	understanding	
of	the	governing	of	tourism‐led	
local	economic	development	
planning?	
	
	
	
The	data	sources	and	methods	as	discussed	
under	the	first	four	questions	together	form	
the	basis	to	answering	this	question.		
This	entailed	a	reflective	and	reflexive	
analyses	of	the	answers	to	the	first	four	
questions	in	relation	to	the	existing	literature	
on	tourism	governance	and	tourism‐led	local	
economic	development	planning.			
	
		
While	building	on	the	empirical	data	collected,	
answering	this	question	also	required	conceptual	
analysis	based	on	existing	literature.	Assessing	the	
interactive	tourism	governance	framework	developed	
here	and	its	contribution	to	understanding	the	governing	
of	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	
proceeds	in	a	reflective	and	reflexive	way	taking	into	
consideration	both	empirical	data	and	also	theoretical	
literature.	
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The interviewing process 
Interviews	represent	an	essential	source	of	information	for	this	research.	The	use	of	
interviews	allow	for	the	views,	understandings,	interpretations	and	interactions	of	
people	to	be	explored	in	much	detail	through	asking	questions	and	gaining	access	to	
their	articulations	(Mason,	2002).	However,	the	information	from	interviews	does	not	
necessarily	represent	‘factual’	accounts	of	the	lived	experiences	of	people	but	
(re)constructions	of	people’s	views	that	take	place	during	the	interviewing	process.	
Since	knowledge	is	situated,	contextual	and	interactional,	the	use	of	interviews	enabled	
the	exploration	of	the	policy	process	of	the	Elmina	2015	strategy	in	as	great	depth	as	
possible.	This	means	that	questions	asked	during	the	interview	were	focused	and	
specific	enough	to	allow	each	interviewee	to	fully	express	their	contextual	knowledge	
about	issues.	
In	view	of	the	central	concerns	of	the	research,	the	use	of	a	structured	survey	with	‘one‐
size‐fits‐all’	type	of	questions	was	neither	appropriate	nor	adequate.	The	use	of	
interviews	on	the	other	hand	provided	an	avenue	for	understanding	and	interpreting	
the	contextual	knowledge	(re)constructed	with	each	interviewee.	As	Mason	(2002:64)	
aptly	notes,	“the	interview	is	just	as	much	a	social	situation	as	is	any	other	interaction”.	
The	interviews	conducted	for	this	research	therefore	consisted	of	a	fluid	set	of	
conversational	questions	that	still	focused	on	a	consistent	line	of	inquiry	rather	than	
rigid	and	structured	queries	(Yin,	2009).	
Before, during and after interviews 
Prior	to	the	start	of	the	fieldwork	phase	of	this	research,	a	case	study	protocol	was	
drawn	up	to	guide	fieldwork	activities	including	the	interview	process.	The	case	study	
protocol	contained	a	list	of	potential	interviewees,	a	set	of	questions	and	issues	to	be	
discussed	as	well	as	a	listing	of	fieldwork	procedures	and	procedural	reminders.	I	drew	
up	a	list	of	the	contact	details	of	all	the	institutions	and	agencies	within	which	there	
were	potential	interviewees.	Through	the	searching	and	compiling	of	the	contact	
details,	I	got	to	know	of	the	names	of	the	people	occupying	the	specific	
managerial/administrative	positions	that	I	needed	to	talk	to.		For	some	agencies	and	
institutions	it	was	not	possible	to	get	their	complete	contact	details	online.	
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For	the	majority	of	interviewees	my	first	contact	with	them	was	by	phone.	At	the	
beginning	of	each	week,	I	called	the	potential	interviewees	in	my	planned	interview	
schedule	and	arranged	appointments	with	them	for	that	week	or	the	following	week.	
The	initial	phone	call	comprised	of	me	briefly	introducing	myself	as	a	PhD	student	
doing	research	on	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	in	Ghana	and	asking	if	it	was	possible	to	
get	to	speak	with	them.	I	also	summarised	the	contents	of	the	research	information	
sheet	that	received	ethical	clearance	from	the	University	of	Sheffield	Ethics	Committee.	
In	general	national	level	interviews	were	arranged	by	phone	while	most	of	the	regional	
and	district	level	interviews	were	arranged	in	person.	After	agreeing	on	a	date,	time	
and	location	for	an	interview	by	phone,	I	usually	called	interviewees	again	a	day	to	the	
appointment	to	confirm	that	we	were	still	having	the	interview.	
Access	to	interviewees	was	not	an	issue	(except	for	the	multiple	cancellations	of	my	
appointment	with	the	Deputy	and	substantive	Minister	of	the	Ministry	of	Tourism,	
Culture	and	Creative	Arts	and	the	Central	Regional	Minister).	Interviews	were	
conducted	in	the	offices	of	potential	interviewees	and	in	few	instances	in	a	mutually	
agreed	upon	neutral	location	that	was	comfortable	and	relaxed	for	interviewees.	
Interviewees	were	provided	with	an	information	sheet	concerning	the	research	which	
they	had	time	to	read	and	ask	for	clarification	before	signing	the	consent	form.	During	
the	interviews,	extensive	notes	were	taken	and	wherever	possible	and	consent	given,	a	
digital	recorder	was	used	as	a	backup	to	the	notes	taken.	Interviews	were	usually	
scheduled	to	last	not	more	than	an	hour.	At	the	end	of	each	interview	I	spent	an	extra	
30	minutes	to	an	hour	to	write	up	and	flesh	out	in	more	details	the	handwritten	notes	
as	well	as	begin	initial	analysis	of	the	information	collected.		
In	total	and	over	the	course	of	two	separate	periods	of	fieldwork,	59	individual	
interviewees	were	conducted	in	addition	to	9	community	interviews,	three	of	which	
ended	up	becoming	a	form	of	focus	group	with	between	two	–	five	persons.	These	
individuals	included	past	and	present	KEEA	officers,	Directors	at	the	Ministry	of	
Tourism,	Culture	and	Creative	Arts,	Ghana	Museums	and	Monuments	Board,	Ghana	
Heritage	Conservation	Trust,	community	members	and	homeowners	who	benefitted	
from	the	building	projects	of	the	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	Management	Programme	
and	private	sector	organisations	that	come	under	the	Ghana	Tourism	Federation	
among	others	(a	list	of	interviewees	with	dates	of	interview	is	provided	in	appendix	A).	
Aside	from	these	formal	interviews	I	also	had	a	number	of	informal	conversations	and	
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chats	with	people	that	provided	background	information	for	this	research.	Interviews	
were	conducted	in	English	which	is	the	official	language	of	Ghana,	hence	the	dynamics	
of	the	interview	process	were	not	affected	by	language	issues.	Nonetheless	in	the	few	
cases	where	interviewees	were	more	comfortable	speaking	a	local	language	like	Twi	or	
Fanti	rather	than	English,	the	interview	was	conducted	in	that	language.	In	order	to	
maintain	similar	interview	dynamics	in	both	those	conducted	in	English	and	those	in	
local	languages,	the	interview	schedule	was	translated	into	the	local	languages	in	
advance.	This	allowed	me	time	to	think	through	how	to	translate	English	concepts	in	
ways	that	were	understandable	in	the	local	language	while	maintaining	the	underlying	
essence.	At	other	times	the	challenge	was	to	translate	Twi/Fanta	expressions	with	
dense	layered	meanings	into	English.	In	many	instances	there	are	no	equivalent	single	
words	in	English	which	meant	that	I	transcribed	a	Twi/Fanti	word	as	an	expression	in	
English.	I	transcribed	all	recorded	interviews	in	full	with	no	need	for	an	interpreter,	as	I	
am	fluent	and	competent	in	these	local	languages.		
Given	that	one	of	the	potential	pitfalls	of	interviews	is	the	possibility	of	deliberate	
collusion	by	interviewees	from	the	same	organisation,	extra	caution	was	exercised	so	
that	“when	different	interviewees	appear	to	be	echoing	the	same	thoughts	–	
corroborating	each	other	but	in	a	conspiratorial	way”	(Yin,	2009:107)	further	probing	
and	the	interviewing	of	other	people	was	undertaken.	In	view	of	the	embedded	single	
case	study	design	adopted	for	this	research,	the	potential	pitfalls	of	interviews	were	
overcome	by	using	additional	sources	of	data	collection.	The	interviews	were	used	to	
confirm	evidence	from	other	sources	but	also	led	to	and	opened	up	new	lines	of	inquiry	
that	took	me	back	to	a	(re)analysis	of	documents	and	other	pieces	of	evidence.	The	
iterative	process	of	using	documentary	analysis	and	interviews	to	confirm,	corroborate	
and	highlight	differences	ensured	a	robust	data	collection	process.	
Documentary Sources 
In	answering	the	research	questions	and	achieving	the	research	objectives,	
documentary	analysis	served	two	crucial	functions.	Firstly,	documents	were	analysed	
to	understand	how	state	policies	and	the	Elmina	2015	strategy	specifically	
conceptualise	the	relationship	between	tourism,	local	economic	development	and	
poverty	reduction.	This	helped	in	the	process	of	arriving	at	the	research	questions	and	
in	the	design	of	the	interview	guides.	The	second	function	of	documentary	analysis	was	
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to	provide	information	invaluable	to	corroborating,	verifying	and	extending	data	
collected	from	other	sources	such	as	interviews	and	observations	(Yin,	2009)	within	
the	iterative	process	noted	above.	Documents	were	analysed	on	the	acknowledged	
basis	that	there	are	some	that	may	have	been	‘constructed’	in	a	specific	socio‐political	
context	by	specific	people	with	particular	purposes.	Documents	used	in	this	research	
are	therefore	considered	to	be	constitutive	of	the	social	and	institutional	relations	that	
give	rise	to	them.	Consequently,	information	contained	in	documents	does	not	
necessarily	reveal	‘facts’	about	these	social	and	institutional	relations	since	they	are	
embedded	in	each	other	(Mason,	2002).		
Prior	to	going	for	fieldwork	I	was	already	in	possession	of	a	large	number	of	essential	
documents	including	the	Ghana	National	Tourism	Development	Plan	2013‐2027,	Ghana	
National	Tourism	Policy	2007	and	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	(Part	1:	Sector	Strategy	&	
Vision).	Whilst	in	the	field	I	was	able	to	get	access	to	a	wide	range	of	policy	documents	
particularly	progress	reports	on	the	various	implementation	stages	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	(see	appendix	B	for	a	list	of	key	policy	documents	reviewed).	The	only	
difficulty	was	getting	access	to	the	1975‐1990	Ghana	National	Tourism	Development	
Plan	and	the	Ghana	National	Tourism	Strategic	Action	Plan	2003‐2007.	Nobody	at	the	
Ministry	of	Tourism,	Culture	and	Creative	Arts	knew	when	copies	of	these	plans	were	
held.	
Observations and other sources of information 
Participation	in	meetings	and	events	with	key	tourism	stakeholders	was	another	
stream	of	data	collection.	During	the	fieldwork	period	in	Ghana	I	had	the	opportunity	to	
participate	in,	observe,	make	notes	and	make	recordings	of	speeches	during	various	
tourism	related	events.	These	included	the	Central	Regional	branch	of	the	Tour	Guides	
Association	meeting	in	Cape	Coast,	the	Central	Region	Tourism	Awards	Night	in	Elmina	
organised	by	the	Ghana	Tourism	Authority	and	the	commissioning	of	the	Eguafo‐
Dumpow	Eco‐heritage	site	attraction	led	by	the	Ghana	Heritage	Conservation	Trust.	
The	participant	observation	I	was	able	to	engage	in	provided	an	avenue	for	gaining	
additional	contextual	knowledge	within	which	to	situate	information	gained	from	the	
interviews	and	documentary	analysis.	
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In	addition	to	the	formal	participant	observation	of	meetings	and	events,	I	also	
undertook	a	number	of	observational	walks	around	Elmina.	In	particular	I	went	to	the	
various	projects	and	sites	that	were	a	key	component	of	the	Elmina	2015	strategy	to	
assess	their	current	state.	These	included	the	Elmina	Castle,	the	Elmina	Craft	Market,	
the	Nana	Kobina	Gyan	Square	and	a	number	of	renovated	old	merchant	houses.	I	
therefore	took	a	number	of	photographs	of	the	current	state	of	these	sites	and	projects	
which	were	then	used	to	compare	to	earlier	photographs.	These	photographs	(some	of	
which	are	used	in	this	thesis)	provide	visual	evidence	and	reminders	of	the	outcomes	of	
the	Elmina	2015	strategy.		
Data analysis and write-up 
Data	analysis	was	an	iterative	process	that	already	started	with	the	writing	up	of	the	
initial	research	proposal	and	continued	throughout	the	research	process.	The	overall	
analytic	strategy	adopted	relies	on	the	research	propositions	which	provide	a	
theoretical	orientation	to	guide	the	case	study	analysis	(Yin,	2009).	The	research	
propositions	shaped	the	case	study	design	and	research	questions,	and	consequently	
highlighted	priority	areas	to	focus	the	analysis.		
A	purpose‐made	spread	sheet	database	was	designed	to	log	information	regarding	
gathered	data	so	that	none	is	inadvertently	lost.	Audio	recordings	of	the	interviews	
were	stored	digitally	and	securely	with	backups,	along	with	transcriptions,	labelled	
with	identifiers	for	easy	retrieval.	In	ensuring	the	security	of	data,	all	data	files	were	
password	protected	to	protect	the	confidentiality	of	interviewees.	Data	was	securely	
stored	in	multiple	locations	–	on	my	personal	computer,	external	hard	drive	and	on	
flash	drives	with	cloud	storage	as	additional	backup	to	prevent	data	loss	and	ensure	
that	there	was	a	constant	back‐up	of	data	should	my	personal	computer	crash.	
Handwritten	notes	and	signed	consent	forms	were	scanned	and	stored	digitally	in	
addition	to	the	paper	copies.	A	list	of	interviews	indicating	time,	place	and	duration	was	
kept.	Notwithstanding	the	time	consuming	and	strenuous	nature	of	transcription,	all	
recorded	interviews	were	transcribed	wholly	and	verbatim	(excluding	most	of	the	
‘oohs’,	‘aahs’	and	‘hmms').	When	transcribing,	I	spent	an	extra	10	minutes	and	more	at	
the	end	of	each	audio	recording	to	write	up	an	initial	analysis	of	the	transcribed	
interview	identifying	the	key	themes	and	their	relation	to	other	transcribed	interviews	
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(a	sample	of	a	transcribed	interview	is	provided	in	appendix	D).	This	was	a	first	stage	in	
the	data	analysis	that	was	built	upon	after	all	the	interviews	have	been	transcribed.			
As	part	of	the	process	of	organising,	managing	and	analysing	the	data,	I	uploaded	the	
various	transcripts	and	notes	into	NVivo.	This	allowed	me	to	easily	code	the	data	into	
broad	codes	and	themes.	I	also	concurrently	set	up	a	manual	approach	to	organising	
and	managing	the	data	which	allowed	me	to	write	on	print‐outs	of	the	interview	
transcripts.		The	framework	approach	for	qualitative	analysis	as	developed	by	Ritchie	
and	Spencer	(1994)	was	used	to	analyse	both	primary	and	secondary	data.	The	five	
step	process	of	the	approach	consisted	of	familiarization,	identifying	a	thematic	
framework,	indexing,	charting,	and	mapping	and	interpretation.	An	iterative	following	
of	these	steps	enabled	the	data	to	be	scrutinised	for	meaning,	salience	and	connections	
between	what	actors	perceive	in	their	governing	interactions	and	what	actually	
pertains	in	their	day‐to‐day	activities.	Significantly,	this	approach	to	analysis	made	it	
easier	to	identify	salience	and	connections	between	governing	activities	or	inactivity	
and	outcomes	of	the	tourism‐led	LED	process.	Data	analysis	focused	on	building	up	
broad	sub‐themes	of	commonalities	and	differences	between	actors.	These	themes	
included,	‘political	interfering’,	‘party	politics’,	‘forced	staff	transfer’,	‘project	
champions’,	‘revenue	sharing’,	‘tourism	management’,	‘project	monitoring’,	‘KEEA	
politics’,	‘New	Patriotic	Party	role’,	‘National	Democratic	Congress	Party	role’	among	
others.	
The	familiarisation	stage	involved	immersion	in	the	data	–	listening	to	the	recordings,	
rereading	transcripts,	and	going	over	and	over	documents	–	in	order	to	get	an	overview	
of	the	range	and	diversity	of	the	data	gathered.	This	immersion	process	was	also	the	
beginning	of	abstraction	and	conceptualisation	that	led	to	setting	up	a	thematic	
framework	to	sift	and	sort	out	recurring	themes,	concepts	and	issues	relating	to	
governance	interaction	as	they	emerge.	To	use	the	example	of	the	theme	of	‘party	
politics’,	the	familiarisation	stage	involved	immersion	into	the	data	to	identify	when	
and	where	the	various	issues	to	do	with	party	politics	show	up.	This	included	
interviewees	from	public,	private	and	civil	society	sectors	mentioning	that	every	
development	issue	or	project	is	politicised	at	the	local	level.	Other	instances	that	were	
picked	up	on	were	when	interviewees	began	to	explain	what	happened	to	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	implementation	once	a	new	political	party	and/or	a	new	Municipal	Chief	
Executive	comes	into	office.		The	next	stage	in	data	analysis	was	to	devise	an	index	of	
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descriptive	key	issues	–	‘negative	incentive	for	forcing	staff	transfer’,	‘positive	incentive	
for	forcing	staff	transfer’	–	which	was	then	applied	to	all	data	in	an	iterative	process	of	
refining	the	analytic	themes.	The	charting	phase	involved	rearranging	data	in	
accordance	with	appropriate	thematic	references.	Building	on	the	party	politics	
example,	at	this	stage	more	refined	themes	emerged	under	which	data	was	rearranged.	
These	refined	themes	included	‘era	of	New	Patriotic	Party’,	‘era	of	National	Democratic	
Congress	Party’,	‘role	of	Municipal	Development	Planning	Officer	I’,	‘and	role	of	
Municipal	Development	Planning	Officer	II’	and	so	on.		
The	crux	of	data	analysis	took	place	in	the	mapping	and	interpretation	stage.		This	
process	is	neither	neutral	nor	mechanical	but	represents	the	outcome	of	choices	made	
with	regards	to	which	issues	are	considered	salient.	The	central	concern	at	this	point	
was	to	provide	a	coherent	analysis	of	all	gathered	data.	In	achieving	this	aim	of	analytic	
coherence,	Yin’s	(2009)	analytic	techniques	of	pattern	matching	and	explanation	
building	was	used	to	complement	the	framework	approach	to	data	analysis	utilised.	
Pattern	matching	consisted	of	for	example	comparing	the	empirical	patterns	of	
governance	interaction	with	the	predicted	patterns	in	order	to	accept	or	reject	the	
working	research	propositions.	This	helped	to	strengthen	the	internal	validity	of	the	
research.	Explanation	building	on	the	other	hand,	allowed	data	to	be	analysed	in	a	way	
that	built	up	an	explanation	about	the	causal	links	and	mechanisms	[the	‘how’	and	
‘why’]	between	the	key	issues	stated	in	the	research	questions.		
To	conclude	with	the	example	of	the		‘party	politics’	theme,	at	this	stage	the	issues	
coming	under	‘era	of	New	Patriotic	Party’,	‘era	of	National	Democratic	Congress	Party’,	
‘role	of	Municipal	Development	Planning	Officer	I’,	and	‘role	of	Municipal	Development	
Planning	Officer	II’	were	related	back	to	issues	of	the	progress	of	implementation	of	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy.	The	explanation	building	process	then	showed	for	example	how	
during	the	‘era	of	the	New	Patriotic	Party’	there	was	a	strong	political	commitment	to	
the	project	but	this	commitment	began	to	recede	once	the	‘era	of	the	National	
Democratic	Congress	Party’	had	begun.	Given	this,	a	plausible	conclusion	of	this	line	of	
‘party	politics’	thematic	analysis	was	that	there	is	a	causal	link	between	the	cycles	of	
political	party	change	and	the	rate	and	extent	of	implementing	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy.		After	establishing	such	a	plausible	explanation,	it	became	possible	to	then	
critically	analyse	through	pattern	matching	how	various	factors	such	as	power,	access	
to	resources	and	system	of	local	governance	influenced	this	causal	link.	The	whole	data	
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analysis	process	was	driven	not	only	by	the	proposed	conceptual	framework	but	
crucially,	by	the	themes	that	emerged	from	the	empirical	data	collected.	Data	analysis	
remained	an	iterative	processes	through	which	constant	reference	were	made	to	the	
original	research	questions	and	propositions.	
	
3.4 Reflexivity and ethical considerations 
As	a	Ghanaian	based	in	a	UK	university	carrying	out	research	in	Ghana	I	actively	had	to	
reflect	on	my	positionality.	There	were	a	number	of	issues	throughout	the	research	
process	that	provided	spaces	for	me	to	reflect	on	my	position	as	a	researcher,	a	PhD	
student	and	a	Ghanaian	with	a	deep‐seated	interest	in	the	socio‐economic	development	
of	my	country.	I	had	to	reflect	on	how	the	tensions	inherent	in	these	various	positions	
and	be	aware	of	them	throughout	the	research.	In	framing	the	research	issue	for	this	
thesis	I	invariably	set	a	boundary	around	the	issues	that	I	am	interested	in,	and	could	
research	and	write	about.	Thus	how	I	have	identified	the	research	agenda	and	the	
language	(of	governance)	I	use	to	describe	this	constrains	alternative	understandings.	
As	Mason	(2002:5)	indicates,	reflexivity	means	“thinking	critically	about	what	you	are	
doing	and	why,	confronting	and	often	challenging	your	own	assumptions,	and	
recognizing	the	extent	to	which	your	thoughts,	actions	and	decisions	shape	how	you	
research	and	what	you	see”.	I	therefore	did	not	see	myself	as	a	‘detached’	researcher	
out	in	the	field	to	simply	collect	data.	I	perceived	myself	as	being	positioned	within	the	
socio‐cultural	relations	within	which	data	for	this	research	was	‘constructed’.	
In	effect,	this	thesis	is	as	much	a	social	construction	rather	than	a	comprehensive	
statement	of	‘truth’	about	the	governance	of	tourism‐led	LED	planning	processes.	
Notwithstanding	how	I	have	sought	to	be	comprehensive	in	an	integrated	manner,	this	
thesis	offers	a	‘partial’	view	of	the	complexity	of	the	research	issue.	Given	this	
complexity,	complete	comprehensiveness	is	difficult,	if	not	impossible	to	achieve.	
Indeed	a	critical	question	to	ask	is	whether	achieving	complete	comprehensiveness	is	
desirable.	In	this	thesis,	therefore,	a	middle	ground	in	terms	of	comprehensiveness	and	
details	is	achieved	–	i.e.	I	sketch	out	an	overarching	structure	of	the	research	
problematique	while	at	the	same	time	paying	close	attention	to	the	important	details.	
For	instance,	through	the	use	of	the	interactive	tourism	governance	framework	to	
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arrive	at	the	research	questions,	particular	focus	was	given	to	institutions	and	
bureaucrats.	This	meant	that	the	views	and	voice	of	community	members	became	a	bit	
marginalised	in	the	overall	analysis.		
In	terms	of	ethical	considerations,	the	first	step	was	to	obtain	research	ethical	approach	
from	the	University	of	Sheffield	Ethics	Board	which	was	then	duly	followed	throughout	
the	research.	Details	of	the	information	sheet	and	consent	form	were	explained	to	my	
interviewees	during	the	initial	phone	contact.	At	the	agreed	upon	time	and	location	for	
the	interview,	interviewees	were	then	given	the	information	sheet	and	consent	form.	
Every	effort	was	made	to	ensure	that	interviewees	had	the	time	to	read	through	the	
information	sheet	and	consent	form	before	signing	it	and	that	I	was	able	to	provide	
further	explanation	to	any	queries	they	had.		
Due	to	the	varying	level	of	literacy	and	education	levels	of	community	members	
interviewed	in	Elmina,	the	local	dialect	was	used	where	appropriate.	Due	to	an	
understandable	distrust	of	signing	papers	that	they	could	not	fully	read,	verbal	consent	
was	sought	from	these	interviewees	before	I	asked	them	any	questions.	I	translated	and	
explained	the	information	sheet	and	consent	form	to	them	and	then	asked	for	the	
consent	before	proceeding	with	the	interview.	Moreover,	for	those	who	expressively	
stated	their	preference	for	complete	anonymity	efforts	have	been	made	to	meet	such	
requests.	In	the	analysis	and	final	writing	of	this	thesis,	the	views	of	all	interviewees	
have	been	represented	in	a	fair	and	accurate	manner.		It	is	not	expected	that	any	harm	–	
physically,	emotional	or	career	wise	–	will	behalf	any	interviewee	as	a	result	of	
participating	in	this	research.		
In	summary,	this	chapter	has	explained	in	detail	the	research	design	and	method	used	
for	this	research.	The	philosophical	foundation	of	this	research	stems	from	the	idea	that	
social	and	economic	actions	are	socially	constructed	and	hence	can	only	be	understood	
in	context	rather	than	only	through	individuals’	motives.	From	this	philosophical	
starting	point,	a	qualitative	research	designed	at	the	centre	of	which	was	an	embedded	
single	case	study	was	deployed	as	the	approach	to	the	research	inquiry.	I	then	
discussed	in	detail	the	primary	and	secondary	sources	of	data	collected.	Using	the	
theme	of	‘party	politics’,	I	have	discussed	in	great	length	the	process	of	data	analysis	
that	was	accomplished	using	the	framework	approach	to	qualitative	data	analysis	
(Ritchie	and	Spencer,	1994).	I	supplemented	this	approach	with	Yin’s	(2009)	pattern	
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matching	and	explanation	building	techniques	to	data	analysis.	The	final	section	in	this	
chapter	provided	an	overview	of	how	I	reflected	on	my	various	research	positionality	
as	a	researcher,	a	PhD	student	and	a	Ghanaian.	I	also	provided	an	overview	of	the	
ethical	considerations	that	underpinned	the	whole	research	project.	
The	next	four	Chapters	present	findings	from	this	research	starting	with	a	chapter	on	
the	wider	development	planning	and	tourism	planning	context	in	Ghana.	Chapters	5	–	7	
present	the	findings	of	analysing	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	and	its	governance	
discontents.	After	these	three	chapters,	I	draw	together	key	themes	from	the	analysis	in	
a	concluding	discussion	in	Chapter	eight	which	is	the	final	chapter	of	this	thesis.		
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Chapter 4 
Local economic development and tourism planning in 
Ghana  
A	key	argument	in	this	thesis	so	far	has	been	that	we	need	to	reconsider	the	tourism‐
poverty	nexus	in	terms	of	wider	place‐based	local	economic	development	planning	
processes.	The	planning	process	at	the	local	level	is	critical	to	enhancing	the	tourism‐
poverty	nexus	because	it	is	at	this	level	that	tourism	resources	are	located.	Moreover	
the	infrastructures	on	which	tourism	development	thrives	are	provided	through	local	
resources.	Consequently	in	localities	with	rich	tourism	resources,	a	tourism‐led	local	
economic	development	planning	approach	might	represent	a	viable	driver	for	
development	and	poverty	reduction.	This	is	because	of	the	potential	linkages	to	be	
made	between	tourism	and	sectors	like	agriculture,	construction	and	hospitality.	These	
linkages	contribute	to	job	creation	and	income	generation.	As	I	outlined	in	Chapter	2	of	
this	thesis,	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	requires	effective	
tourism	governance,	and	this	effectiveness	can	be	usefully	investigated	by	looking	at	
stakeholder	governance	capacity,	institutional	arrangements	and	the	effects	of	political	
cycles.			
In	this	first	empirical	chapter	I	analyse	and	examine	the	governance	of	tourism	
planning	and	local	economic	development	planning	in	Ghana.	The	first	section	looks	at	
the	governance	of	national	economic	development	planning	and	highlights	some	of	the	
contradictions	and	challenges	involved	in	embedding	tourism	development	as	part	of	
strategic	district	level	planning.	The	second	section	takes	the	analysis	to	the	national	
level	by	considering	how	tourism	has	been	conceptualised	within	national	economic	
development	policy	and	planning	over	the	years.	This	leads	to	an	analysis	of	the	
national	tourism	planning	experience	in	the	third	section	with	a	specific	focus	on	long	
term	national	tourism	development	plans.	In	the	final	section	I	dissect	the	tourism	
sector	in	Ghana	in	terms	of	resources,	key	institutional	actors	and	their	governing	
interactions.		
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4.1 Actors, structures and processes of governing local 
economic development planning 
This	section	starts	with	an	overview	of	the	socio‐economic	development	profile	of	
Ghana.	This	will	be	followed	by	a	subsection	that	analyses	the	decentralised	
governance	structures	in	place.	The	aim	of	this	section	is	to	show	how	decentralisation	
and	its	governance	both	enables	and	constrains	local	economic	development	planning	
and	the	role	MMDAs	can(not)	play	in	using	tourism	for	local	economic	development	
and	poverty	reduction	purposes.	
A historical-political and geo-economic overview of spatial development 
With	a	total	surface	area	of	238,	537	km2,	Ghana	is	slightly	larger	than	the	United	
Kingdom.	It	is	the	first	Sub‐Sahara	African	country	to	gain	independence	on	6th	March,	
1957	from	British	colonial	role.	It	is	bounded	to	the	North	by	Burkina	Faso,	the	East	by	
Togo	and	West	by	Cote	d’Ivoire.	To	the	South	of	the	country	is	the	Atlantic	Ocean	(Gulf	
of	Guinea)	which	provides	long	stretches	of	pristine	beaches	in	many	areas.	There	are	
10	regional	administrative	regions	(see	figure	6	below)	and	216	sub‐regional	divisions	
in	the	form	of	Metropolitan,	Municipal	and	District	Assemblies	(MMDAs)	(more	detail	
on	this	in	the	next	section).	This	division	of	the	country	into	regions	and	districts	has	
been	informed	by	the	need	for	efficient	administration	and	crucially,	the	need	to	
maintain	homogenous	units	of	large	cultural	groupings	of	people.	This	logic	goes	back	
to	the	colonial	period	(Dickson,	1969;	Ofori,	2002).		
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	Figure	6	Map	of	Ghana	showing	regions	and	their	capitals	
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Ghana’s	population	according	to	2010	Population	and	Housing	Census	is	a	little	over	
24.6	million	with	50.9%	living	in	urban	areas	and	49.1%	living	in	rural	areas	(GSS,	
2012).	Spatially,	the	population	distribution	is	skewed	towards	the	Southern	parts	of	
the	country.	The	economic	structure	of	Ghana	has	remained	relatively	stable	with	no	
significant	changes	–	even	after	the	discovery	of	oil.	Endowed	with	a	number	of	natural	
resources	including,	timber,	cocoa	and	gold	among	others,	the	domestic	economy	
continues	to	revolve	around	primary	exports	and	subsistence	agriculture.	The	largest	
sector	as	a	share	of	the	GDP	is	the	services	sector	(51.9%).	However,	agriculture	
including	forestry	and	fishing	represents	the	largest	economic	activity	in	the	country	
constituting	16.8%	of	nominal	GDP	(GSS,	2015)	and	employing	about	41.5%	of	the	
economically	active	population	aged	15	years	and	older	(GSS,	2012).	At	the	end	of	
2014,	national	GDP	was	valued	at	$38.55	billion	dollars	compared	to	the	$48.65	billion	
dollars	recorded	at	the	end	of	2013	(GSS,	2015).	This	shrinking	of	the	national	economy	
is	partly	due	to	plummeting	global	commodity	prices	in	gold,	cocoa	and	oil	–	
commodities	on	which	the	country’s	economic	development	is	built	upon.	The	ups	and	
downs	of	GDP	growth	has	yet	to	translate	into	significant	structural	changes	in	the	
national	economy	(Osei	et	al.,	2015).	Over	the	years	the	country	has	been	become	
reliant	on	international	financial	and	technical	assistance	to	make	up	for	government	
revenue	shortfalls	and	as	part	of	budgetary	planning	and	efforts	at	reducing	poverty	
(see	table	4	below).	
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Table	4	A	stylised	political‐economic	history	of	Ghana	since	1957	
Period	 Political‐Economic	Events	
1957	 Ghana	gains	 independence	 from	British	rule	becoming	 the	 first	 sub‐
Saharan	country	to	become	independent	
1958	 Prime	Minister	Dr.	Kwame	Nkrumah	outlines	a	Five‐Year	Development	
Plan	as	part	of	the	‘Big	Push’	policy	
1964	 The	 construction	 of	 the	 Akosombo	 Hydroelectric	 Dam	 is	 completed	
with	a	by‐product	being	the	creation	of	the	largest	man‐made	lake	in	
the	world	–	the	Volta	Lake	
1966	 Dr.	 Kwame	 Nkrumah	 is	 overthrown	 in	 a	 bloodless	 military	 coup	
leading	to	the	establishment	of	the	National	Liberation	Council	(NLC)	
1972	 Dr.	 Busua’s	 government	 initiate	 an	 Economic	 Recovery	 Programme	
(ERP)	by	devaluing	the	national	currency		
	
A	bloodless	military	coup	disposes	of	Dr.	Busua’s	government	which	is	
then	 replaced	 with	 the	 National	 Redemption	 Council	 (NRC)	
government	headed	by	Colonel	Ignatius	Acheampong	
	
Exiled	first	President	Dr.	Kwame	Nkrumah	dies	while	seeking	medical	
treatment	in	Romania	
1979	 The	 Armed	 Forces	 Revolutionary	 Council	 (AFRC)	 lead	 by	 Flight	
Lieutenant	Jerry	Rawlings	takes	over	the	country	after	a	coup	against	
the	SMC	II	
	
Dr.	Hilla	 Limann	 ushers	 in	 the	 third	 republic	 as	 president	 of	 Ghana	
after	his	People’s	National	Party	(PNP)	wins	national	elections	initiated	
by	the	AFRC	
1981	 Flight	Lieutenant	Jerry	Rawlings	leads	another	coup	which	dissolves	
the	 third	republic.	The	Provisional	National	Defense	Council	 (PNDC)	
seizes	control	with	Flight	Lieutenant	Jerry	Rawlings	as	chairman	
1983	 IMF	 and	World	Bank	 supported	 Structural	Adjustment	Programmes	
(SAPs)	officially		start	in	Ghana	through	the	devaluation	of	the	national	
currency	
1986	 PNDC	 government	 officially	 introduces	 Economic	 Recovery	
Programme	II	
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1988	 A	decentralisation	programme	is	initiated	leading	to	the	creation	of	a	
three‐tier	 subnational	 governance	 structure	 –	 regional,	 district	 and	
sub‐district	units	
1992	 Ghana	 returns	 to	 Constitutional	 rule	 after	 a	 national	 referendum	
approves	a	new	constitution	and	multiparty	system	
	
First	 elections	 under	 the	new	 constitution	 are	 held	 and	won	by	 the	
PNDC	 which	 had	 become	 the	 National	 Democratic	 Congress	 (NDC)	
party	
2000	 The	New	Patriotic	Party	 (NPP)	wins	 the	 third	 election	of	 the	 fourth	
republic.	 The	 party	 leader,	 John	 Agyekum	 Kuffour	 is	 sworn	 in	 as	
president	 the	 following	 year.	This	 is	 the	 first	 change	of	 government	
through	a	ballot	box	rather	than	through	the	barrel	of	a	gun	since	1979.
2001	 Ghana	 joins	 the	 IMF/World	 Banks’	 Highly	 Indebted	 Poor	 Country	
(HIPC)	initiative	which	many	saw	as	a	new	form	of	SAPs	
2003‐2006	 The	 Ghana	 Poverty	 Reduction	 Strategy	 (GPRS)	 I	 is	 formulated	 and	
implemented	 in	 accordance	with	 the	 conditions	 outlined	within	 the	
HIPC	initiative	
2006‐2009	 GPRS	 II	 is	 formulated	 and	 implemented	 with	 a	 strategic	 focus	 on	
accelerated	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	
2007	 Oil	in	commercial	quantities	is	discovered	off	the	coast	of	Ghana	
2008	 The	NDC	led	by	Prof.	John	Evans	Atta	Mills	returns	back	to	power	after	
winning	national	elections	
2012	 Months	to	the	next	general	elections,	the	NDC’s	Prof.	Mills	passes	away	
and	his	vice	–	John	Mahama	is	installed	as	president	
John	Mahama	wins	 the	December	national	elections	as	 leader	of	 the	
NDC	and	is	sworn	into	office	as	president	the	following	year	
2013	 The	opposition	NPP	appeals	against	the	election	of	NDC’s	John	Mahama	
alleging	 rigged	 elections.	The	 Supreme	Court	 after	months	of	 public	
hearing	rejects	the	appeal.	
2014	 The	 IMF’s	 press	 release	 after	 its	 consultation	 with	 the	 Ghana	
government	 notes	 the	 emergence	 of	 large	 fiscal	 and	 external	
imbalances	since	2012	
In	 August,	 2014	 the	 government	 is	 ‘forced’	 to	 request	 for	 financing	
support	from	the	IMF	following	the	fiscal	debt	crisis	
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2015	 A	series	of	protests	and	demonstrations	are	held	across	the	country	to	
protest	the	failure	of	government	to	resolve	an	ongoing	three‐year	long	
power	crisis	that	has	forced	many	business	to	lay	off	people	and	some	
others	to	close	down		
There	are	also	a	number	of	demonstrations	against	generally	high	cost	
of	living	and	the	slowdown	of	economic	development	
2016	 In	 early	 2016	 government	 announced	 an	 increase	 in	 petroleum	
products	even	though	prices	on	the	world	marketing	were	at	all‐time	
low.	
Additionally,	 the	 Public	 Utilities	 Review	 Commission	 announced	
further	 increases	 in	 utility	 (water	 and	 electricity)	 tariffs	 that	 have	
already	been	increased	on	two	different	occasions	in	the	previous	year
	
Political	 campaigns	 for	 the	 general	 election	 heat	 up.	 Elections	 are	
scheduled	for	7th	December	
	
The	poverty	profile	in	Ghana	is	most	commonly	expressed	in	terms	of	the	rural‐urban	
dichotomy	as	these	areas	show	major	disparities	in	any	key	socio‐economic	indicator.	
While	these	disparities	continue	to	exist,	the	results	of	the	sixth	round	of	the	Ghana	
Living	Standard	Survey	(GLSS6)	in	2013	indicate	that	the	first	MDG	target	of	halving	
poverty	by	2015	has	been	met.	The	results	show	that	the	percentage	of	the	national	
population	living	in	poverty	declined	from	51.7%	in	1990	to	24.2%	in	2013	(GSS,	
2014a).	This	reduction	in	poverty	is	however	geographically	and	spatially	uneven.	
Figure	7	below	provides	a	clear	visual	overview	of	the	poverty	trend	per	administrative	
regions	as	captured	by	the	Ghana	Living	Stand	Surveys	in	1991/1992	(GLSS3),	
1998/1999	(GLSS4)	and	2005/2006(GLSS5).	
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	Figure	7	Poverty	profile	of	Ghana	per	region,	1991	–	2006	
The	above	figure	shows	a	geo‐spatial	variation	in	the	pattern	of	poverty	with	the	three	
regions	in	the	North	(Northern,	Upper	East	and	Upper	West	regions)	continuously	have	
a	higher	incidence	of	poverty	compared	to	the	other	regions	in	the	South.	The	spatial	
inequalities	in	present	Ghana	originate	from	legacies	of	the	colonial	era.	These	issues	
have	however	been	reinforced	and	exacerbated	by	post‐colonial	development	policies	
that	have	focused	on	the	resource‐rich	Southern	parts	(Songsore,	2003).	The	2010	
Ghana	MDG	Report	(UNDP/GOG,	2012)	for	instance	observed	a	decline	in	total	poverty	
reduction	expenditure	as	a	percentage	of	total	government	spending	from	34.6%	in	
2006	to	22.3%	in	2008	and	a	further	decline	to	21.3%	in	2010.	In	the	1998/1999	
GLSS4	results,	the	Eastern	and	Central	regions	were	considered	to	be	the	two	poorest	
regions	in	the	South	of	Ghana.	Both	regions	experienced	significant	reductions	in	
poverty	incidence	between	1998/1999	and	2005/2006.	However,	the	Central	Region	is	
still	generally	considered,	by	some	sections	of	policymakers,	the	media	and	the	general	
populace,	to	be	the	4th	poorest	region,	a	perception	that	is	not	in	congruence	with	the	
GLSS	results.	This	enduring	perception	is	attributable	perhaps	to	a	hangover	from	
earlier	period	as	perceptions	takes	time	to	change	and	catch	up	with	reality.			
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Given	the	Central	region’s	poverty	incidence	and	its	rich	endowment	of	tourism	
resources,	many	have	argued	that	tourism	represents	a	viable	route	for	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction	in	the	region	(Agyei‐Mensah,	2006;	Adu‐Ampong,	
2014).	Thus	the	Central	region	provides	an	empirical	setting	in	which	to	examine	the	
preposition	that	tourism	can	play	a	key	role	in	poverty	reduction.	Indeed	the	Central	
region	is	considered	as	the	hub	and	the	heartbeat	of	tourism	in	the	country.7	In	a	
number	of	workshops	organised	on	identifying	ways	of	boosting	economic	
development,	tourism	is	consistently	held	up	as	the	key	to	development	in	the	region.8	
Many	stakeholders	consider	the	role	of	Metropolitan,	Municipal	and	District	Assemblies	
(MMDAs)	to	be	crucial	in	this	respect.9	This	is	because	MMDAs	are	vested	with	the	
responsibility	of	overall	local	development	planning.	However	the	governance	
structures	of	this	planning	process	present	challenges	to	embedding	tourism	in	local	
development	plans	and	it	is	these	issues	that	I	will	now	address.	
Decentralised governance of local economic development planning: diversity, 
complexity and dynamics  
In	order	to	fully	understand	and	appreciate	the	role	that	governance	plays	in	tourism‐
led	local	economic	development	planning	in	Ghana,	it	is	instructive	to	note	that	there	is	
a	parallel	governance	system	in	Ghana	made	up	of	the	traditional	system	(informal)	
and	statist	system	(formal).	Both	systems	are	mutually	reinforcing	and	shape	the	
outcomes	of	development	planning	from	the	national	to	the	local	level.	The	traditional	
system	of	governance	which	is	centred	on	chieftaincy	is	constituted	by	four	
administrative	levels	as	shown	in	figure	8	below.	
	
	
																																																								
7	Interview	with	Eric	Ohene‐Larbi,	Deputy	Director	of	Centre	for	National	Culture,	Cape	Coast,	
05.09.2014;	Interview	with	Dr.	Nana	Ato	Arthur,	MP	and	former	MCE	for	KEEA,	07.11.2014	
8	Interview	with	Alex	Boakye,	Central	Regional	Director,	Ghana	Tourism	Authority,	Cape	Coast,	
10.09.2014	
9	Interview	with	Ebo	Dadzie,	Head	of	Tourism	Sub‐Committee,	KEEA,	31.10.2014;	Interview	
with	Dr.	Nana	Ato	Arthur,	MP	and	former	MCE	for	KEEA,	07.11.2014;	Interview	with	Alex	
Boakye,	Central	Regional	Director,	Ghana	Tourism	Authority,	Cape	Coast,	10.09.2014	
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Figure	8	Structure	of	traditional	governance	system	in	Ghana	
At	the	apex	of	the	traditional	governance	structure	is	the	paramountcy	which	is	headed	
by	the	paramount	chief.	The	administration	of	land	is	a	primary	concern	of	the	
traditional	governance	system	as	lands	in	Ghana	are	owned	by	traditional	authorities	
primarily	at	the	divisional	or	paramountcy	level	(Agyare,	2013).	Thus	the	traditional	
governance	system	is	deeply	involved	in	political	governance	and	hence	in	the	shaping	
of	development	outcomes.		Significantly	for	this	thesis,	the	traditional	and	chieftaincy	
institutions	in	Ghana	are	the	embodiment	and	guarantors	of	traditional	cultural	
heritage	and	identity	and	they	still	command	respect	and	allegiance.	It	is	this	
traditional	cultural	heritage	and	identity	that	serves	as	a	key	tourism	resource	to	be	
‘exploited’	for	socio‐economic	development.	This	raises	questions	as	to	the	extent	to	
which	traditional	authorities	have	a	say	in	developing	heritage	assets	for	tourism	and	
how	revenue	from	cultural	heritage	tourism	gets	distributed.	Thus	a	discussion	of	
tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	must	take	cognisance	of	the	role	
played	by	traditional	governance	systems.	Moreover,	the	1992	constitution	guarantees	
the	existence	of	and	provides	for	the	establishment	of	regional	and	national	house	of	
chiefs	in	an	almost	identical	way	to	the	parliamentary	system.10	Thus	formal	
governance	mechanisms	have	always	been	deeply	embedded	in	(neo‐)	traditional	
governance	systems	from	the	colonial	era	up	to	date.	
In	terms	of	the	formal	statist	governance	system,	Ghana	is	an	unitary	republic	
operating	a	decentralised	democratic	governance	as	enshrined	in	the	1992	Constitution	
as	“Decentralisation	and	Local	Government”.	State	policy	towards	decentralisation	
however	predates	the	adoption	of	the	1992	constitution	and	can	be	traced	back	to	the	
																																																								
10	For	detailed	discussion	about	how	the	chieftaincy	institutions	shape	development	outcomes	
in	Ghana	see,	Boafo‐Arthur	(2003),	Schramm	(2004)	and	Knierzinger	(2011).		
Paramount	Chief	
Divisional	Chief
Local	Chief	
Sub‐local	Chief
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colonial	era	when	the	British	introduced	Indirect	Rule	in	1878	(Ayee,	2003).	From	the	
post‐independence	era	up	to	the	Structural	Adjustment	Programmes	(SAPs)	period,	
local	economic	development	planning	was	largely	a	top‐down	activity.	The	problem	of	
poverty	and	socio‐economic	inequalities	were	defined	by	central	government	agencies	
and	‘experts’	without	recourse	to	the	views	of	the	intended	beneficiaries.	Consequently	
national	and	sector	development	plans	remained	“beautiful	on	paper”11	but	failed	to	
materialise.		This	failure	was	due	to	among	other	things	political	and	economic	
instabilities,	mismatch	of	plans	and	national	budgets	and	significantly	a	lack	of	
opportunity	for	local	communities	to	undertake	their	own	development	initiatives	
(Owusu,	2005).	Within	this	context	and	the	negative	effects	of	SAPs,	local	agitation	
grew	for	increased	participation	in	development	planning.	This	was	also	in	line	with	a	
growing	global	discourse	on	participation,	empowerment	and	good	governance	
(Grindle,	2004)	as	a	condition	for	further	international	development	aid	assistance.	
These	factors	lead	to	the	passing	of	legislation	on	decentralised	administrative	
governance	and	local	economic	development	planning.	
The	current	form	of	decentralisation	in	Ghana	stems	from	the	radical	reforms	of	1988	
ushered	in	by	the	Provisional	National	Defence	Council	(PNDC)	government.	These	
reforms	were	given	legal	backing	in	Chapter	20	of	the	1992	Constitution	which	states	
that	“Ghana	shall	have	a	system	of	local	government	and	administration	which	shall,	as	
far	as	practicable,	be	decentralized”	(Article	240	[1]).	The	1988	reforms	established	a	
three‐tier	system	of	sub‐national	governance	–	the	regional,	district	and	sub‐district	
levels.	This	was	modified	through	the	Local	Government	Law	(Act	462)	of	1993	into	a	
four‐tier	system	for	Metropolitan	Assemblies,	but	maintaining	the	three‐tier	system	for	
Municipal	and	District	Assemblies.	The	decentralisation	policy	seeks	to	promote	
popular	participation	in	local	decision‐making	processes,	to	stimulate	responsive	local	
level	governance	and	to	enhance	the	efficiency	and	effectiveness	of	service	delivery	by	
bringing	responsible	institutions	closer	and	accountable	to	the	people	they	are	to	serve	
(Ayee,	2008).	Thus	Metropolitan,	Municipal	and	District	Assemblies	(commonly	
referred	to	as	District	Assemblies)	represent	the	essential	cog	in	the	governance	
machinery	for	decentralised	national	and	local	economic	development	planning.	
																																																								
11	Interview	with	Felix	Nguah,	Regional	President	of	Tour	Guides	Association	Ghana,	Elmina,	
09.09.2014	
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Metropolitan, Municipal and District Assemblies: images, instruments and 
scale of planning 
There	are	four	levels	of	governance	in	Ghana.	The	first	level	is	the	national	government	
including	deconcentrated	entities	such	as	the	National	Development	Planning	
Commission	(NDPC)	and	line	ministries	such	as	the	Ministry	of	Local	Government	and	
Rural	Development	and	the	Ministry	of	Tourism,	Culture	and	Creative	Arts.	The	second	
level	consists	of	the	10	administrative	regions	represented	by	the	Regional	
Coordinating	Councils	(RCCs)	who	have	upward	accountability	and	responsibility	to	
the	central	government.	The	Metropolitan,	Municipal	and	District	Assemblies	(MMDAs)	
are	the	third	and	most	important	level	in	terms	of	local	economic	development	
planning	and	poverty	reduction	(see	figure	9	below)	.		
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	Figure	9	Local	government	structure	and	responsibilities	
Source:	Ayee	(2013)	
MMDAs	are	considered	as	a	hybrid	form	of	decentralised	authority	because	of	the	
combination	of	elected	and	appointed	officials	(Ayee,	2013).	Assembly	Members	of	
various	electoral	areas	represent	70%	of	MMDA	members	and	are	elected	by	universal	
adult	suffrage.	The	remaining	30%	are	nominated	by	the	national	President	and	include	
Metropolitan,	Municipal	and	District	Chief	Executives	(MMDCEs)	as	well	as	traditional	
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authorities,	community	leaders	and	other	expert	representatives.	MMDCEs	are	the	
administrative	and	political	heads	at	the	local	level	combining	both	political	and	
executive	powers.	They	are	nominated	by	the	President	but	are	subject	to	approval	by	
two‐thirds	of	the	MMDA	members	through	voting.	This	situation	is	an	institutional	
legacy	of	the	past	stemming	from	the	implicit	objective	of	the	1988	decentralisation	
reforms	of	the	Provisional	National	Defence	Council	(PNDC)	government.	This	politics	
of	decentralisation	was	an	attempt	by	the	PNDC	government	to	legitimise	itself	by	
using	decentralisation	as	“an	instrument	of	stabilizing	a	political	system	in	crisis	and	
securing	some	of	the	political	objectives	of	the	government”	(Ayee,	1997:39)	while	
holding	power	at	the	local	level.	Thus	MMDCEs	are	appointed	based	on	loyalty	and	
accountability	to	the	central	government.	In	a	sense	they	are	Presidents	of	the	local	
government	structure	and	often	enjoy	unrivalled	power	at	the	district	level	with	little	
downwards	accountability.		
Governance	at	the	local	level	is	supposed	to	be	nominally	non‐partisan	–	i.e.	those	
standing	for	local	elections	as	Assembly	Members	cannot	stand	on	political	party	lines	
even	though	they	may	be	members	of	a	political	party.	The	reality	however	is	different,	
especially	given	that	the	Member	of	Parliament	(MP)	in	a	given	jurisdiction	is	also	a	
non‐voting	member	of	the	MMDAs.	Thus	party	politics	are	very	much	a	part	of	
governance	at	the	local	level12.	Given	that	MMDCEs	are	appointed	based	on	their	
allegiance	to	the	ruling	national	party	there	are	bound	to	be	tensions	and	frictions	
where	the	corresponding	MP	belongs	to	the	opposition	party	(Ayee,	2003).	It	is	
commonly	known	that	MMDCEs	of	one	political	party	who	aspire	to	become	future	MPs	
and	win	the	parliamentary	seat	away	from	the	opposition	party	tend	to	sabotage	the	
sitting	MP	in	order	to	make	him	or	her	appear	incompetent	and	unpopular.	Such	
tensions	between	opposing	political	parties	and	sometimes	MMDCEs	and	MPs	of	the	
same	party	tend	to	result	in	the	failure	to	continue	with	policies	and	projects	that	were	
started	by	a	different	party	government.	This	is	one	of	the	structural	factors	that	
shaped	the	outcomes	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	as	will	be	further	explained	in	
Chapters	5,	6	and	7.		
																																																								
12	Interview	Frederick	Nyame,	Planning	Officer,	Central	Regional	Coordinating	Council,	Cape	
Coast,	08.09.2014;	Interview	with	Dr.	Nana	Ato	Arthur,	MP	and	former	MCE	for	KEEA,	Cape	
Coast,	07.11.2014;	Interview	with	Labaran	Fuseini,	Municipal	Planning	Officer,	KEEA,	Elmina,	
23.07.2015	
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The	fundamental	function	of	Metropolitan,	Municipal	and	District	Assemblies	(MMDAs)	
is	the	responsibility	of	overall	development	of	the	localities	through	planned	and	
coordinated	projects	and	programmes.		There	are	86	specific	responsibilities	entrusted	
to	the	MMDAs	ranging	from	the	provision	of	basic	services	to	the	collection	of	revenue.	
Thus	MMDAs	are	political	and	administrative	authorities;	development	authorities;	
planning	authorities;	and	revenue	collection	authorities	among	others.13	The	financial	
instruments	available	for	carrying	out	their	responsibilities	come	through	three	main	
sources.	The	first	two	sources	are	Internally	Generated	Fund	(IGF)	from	local	rates	and	
Ceded	Revenue	from	taxes	paid	by	local	businesses	such	as	chemical	sellers,	
dressmakers	and	restaurants	which	are	collected	on	behalf	of	the	assemblies	by	the	
Ghana	Revenue	Authority.	The	third	source	of	funding	which	is	also	the	bulk	of	MMDA	
finance	comes	from	central	government	transfers	through	the	District	Assemblies	
Common	Fund	(DACF)	which	is	a	constitutionally‐guaranteed	contribution	of	not	less	
than	5%	of	central	government	revenue.	However,	MMDAs	are	often	constrained	in	
achieving	their	set	objectives	due	to	the	irregular	flow	of	the	DACF.	This	is	caused	by	
both	bureaucratic	failures	and	centre‐local	political	party	politics.	The	scale	of	such	
challenges	is	aptly	captured	in	this	comment	by	the	Municipal	Coordinating	Director	of	
the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abream	Assembly:	
It	is	just	that	we	have	a	lot	of	constraints	when	it	comes	to	resources.	We	depend	
on	foreign	inflows	that	is	central	government	inflows.	We	have	the	common	fund,	
the	district	assembly	common	fund	but	as	we	talk	now	[November]	2014	up	to	
now	we	are	supposed	to	be	getting	the	money	in	quarters	1st	quarter,	2nd	quarter,	
3rd	quarter	and	4th	quarter.	As	we	sit,	1st	quarter	gone,	2nd	quarter	gone,	3rd	
quarter	gone,	4th	quarter	is	going	and	we	haven’t	received	1	single	cedi	from	our	
share	of	the	common	fund	and	there	is	a	budget	there	to	carry	out	certain	projects	
and	programmes	so	how	are	you	doing	that?14	
Notwithstanding	the	irregular	flow	of	the	DACF,	MMDAs	are	expected	to	carry	out	their	
core	functions	of	development	planning	by	drawing	up	a	four	year	District	Medium	
Term	Development	Plan	(DMTDP)	which	follow	national	political	cycles	of	change	in	
government.			
																																																								
13	Interview	Frederick	Nyame,	Planning	Officer,	Central	Regional	Coordinating	Council,	Cape	
Coast,	08.09.2014;	Interview	with	Dr.	Nana	Ato	Arthur,	MP	and	former	MCE	for	KEEA,	Cape	
Coast,	07.11.2014;	Interview	with	Alhaji	Musah,	Municipal	Coordinating	Director,	KEEA,	Elmina,	
04.11.2014:	see	also	Ayee	(2013).	
14	Interview	with	Alhaji	Musah,	Municipal	Coordinating	Director,	KEEA,	Elmina	04.11.2014	
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The nitty-gritty of local economic development planning processes  
Planning	for	the	District	Medium	Term	Development	Plan	(DMTDP)	takes	place	within	
a	national	decentralised	planning	system	(see	figure	10	below).	The	main	actors	in	this	
system	are	the	National	Development	Planning	Commission	(NDPC)	and	Sector	
Ministries	(Finance	and	Economic	Planning,	Tourism,	Culture	and	Creative	Arts,	
Education,	Health	etc.)	at	the	national	level,	the	Regional	Coordinating	Councils	(RCCs)	
at	the	regional	level,	and	then	finally	the	MMDAs	at	the	district	levels.		
	Figure	10	Decentralised	national	development	planning	process	in	Ghana	
(MDAs	–	Ministries,	Departments	and	Agencies;	RCC	–	Regional	Coordinating	Council;	DMTDPs	–	
District	Medium	Term	Development	Plans)	Source:	Adjei‐Fosu	(2013)	
	
The	NDPC	is	the	highest	coordinating	body	tasked	with	the	responsibility	of	national	
economic	development	planning.	In	consultation	with	relevant	stakeholders	the	NDPC	
prepares	and	issues	the	Medium	Term	Expenditure	Framework	(MTEF)	along	with	
other	fiscal	and	financial	guidelines	which	are	used	by	the	sector	ministries,	the	RCCs	
and	the	MMDAs	in	drawing	up	their	respective	development	plans.	At	the	regional	
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level,	RCCs	coordinate	and	harmonise	district	level	development	plans	and	
programmes	which	are	then	approved	by	the	NDPC.	The	RCCs	are	also	responsible	for	
the	monitoring,	coordination	and	evaluation	of	the	performances	of	MMDAs	in	their	
region.		
As	with	governance,	the	nitty‐gritty	of	decentralised	development	planning	takes	place	
at	the	level	of	the	MMDAs	where	the	District	Planning	Coordinating	Unit	(DPCU)	are	
tasked	with	performing	the	planning	functions	of	the	MMDAs.	The	DPCU	is	made	up	of	
the	District	Planning	Officers	and	a	minimum	of	eleven	officers	drawn	from	the	heads	
of	the	various	decentralised	Ministries,	Departments	and	Agencies	(MDAs)	in	addition	
to	the	central	MMDA	administration.15	Of	particular	relevance	to	this	thesis	is	the	fact	
that	tourism	related	MDAs	like	the	Ministry	of	Tourism,	Culture	and	Creative	Arts,	the	
Ghana	Tourism	Authority	and	the	Ghana	Museums	and	Monuments	Board	have	not	
been	decentralised	to	the	MMDAs	as	at	yet16.	This	means	that	District	Medium	Term	
Development	Plans	(DMTDP)	tend	to	give	only	a	passing	mention	to	tourism	because	of	
a	lack	expert	inputs.	This	situation	is	compounded	by	poor	institutional	collaboration	
between	tourism‐related	agencies	(Adu‐Ampong,	2014).		
The	first	stage	in	preparing	the	DMTDP	involves	identifying	and	defining	the	needs	and	
aspirations	of	local	communities	into	the	Community	Action	Plans	(CAPs).	The	CAPs	of	
various	areas	are	then	harmonised	by	the	DPCU	secretariat	and	then	sent	back	to	the	
communities	for	validation.17	Once	validated,	further	inputs	are	added	from	the	five	
statutory	sub‐committees	of	the	MMDAs	‐	social	services,	finance	and	administration,	
development	planning,	works,	and	security	and	justice.	In	addition	to	these	statutory	
sub‐committees,	MMDAs	may	constitute	other	sub‐committees	that	they	deem	useful.	
Thus	in	the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	(KEEA),	there	is	a	
Tourism	sub‐committee	because	the	area	has	a	number	of	tourism	resources	and	assets	
that	they	seek	to	utilise	for	socio‐economic	development.	The	District	Planning	
Coordinating	Unit	(DPCU)	synthesises	the	various	inputs	to	the	CAP	into	the	District	
																																																								
15	Interview	with	Irene	Rafiatu	Hudu	Assistant	Municipal	Planning	Officer,	KEEA,	Elmina,	
23.07.2015	 	
16	Discussions	are	however	underway	to	add	the	tourism	ministry	and	its	agencies	to	the	next	
MDA	decentralisation	bill	for	parliamentary	consideration	according	to	Interview	with	Nana	
Bright	Oduro	Kwarteng,	Chief	Director,	MOTCCA,	Accra,	23.10.2014:	Interview	with	Olivia	
Opoku‐Adoma,	Director	for	Research,	Statistics	and	Information,	MOTCCA,	Accra,	20.10.2014	
17	Interview	with	Labaran	Fuseini,	Municipal	Planning	Officer,	KEEA,	Elmina	23.07.2015	
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Medium	Term	Development	Plan	(DMTDP)	which	is	given	final	approval	by	the	General	
Assembly	of	the	MMDA.	In	the	implementation	phase	the	local	economic	development	
planning	process	receives	a	rude	jolt	as	interests,	political	ambitions	and	political	
cycles	coincide	to	override	the	aspirations	of	communities	captured	in	the	DMTDP.	
The	politics	of	decentralisation	has	concentrated	power	at	the	local	level	in	a	few	hands	
–	especially	the	hands	of	the	Metropolitan,	Municipal	and	District	Chief	Executives	
(MMDCEs).	Since	they	are	appointed	on	political	party	affiliation	and	loyalty,	MMDCEs	
have	upward	accountability	to	the	central	government	rather	than	to	the	local	
population.	Political	considerations	of	winning	the	next	election	tend	to	trump	
systematic	implementation	of	DMTDP	as	explained	by	a	Municipal	Planning	Officer	of	
KEEA:	
…	people	appointed	to	head	the	assemblies	are	politicians.	They	lack	the	necessary	
expertise	when	it	comes	to	what	the	development	plan	is	and	why	it	should	be	
prepared	and	how	it	should	be	done	and	how	it	should	be	followed.	So	even	when	
you	prepare	the	development	plan	it	is	not	referred	to	for	anything.	They	go	out	
there	and	with	the	political	thinking	around	their	necks	they	decide	what	should	
be	done	where,	not	based	on	any	plan,	not	based	on	any	data.	I	hope	you	get	that.	
The	Chief	Executive	can	go	out	and	tell	a	people	he	feels	his	party	has	a	lot	of	
sympathisers	in	this	community	then	tell	them	I’m	giving	you	a	school,	6‐unit	
classroom	block,	just	that	town.	Whether	or	not	it	was	captured	in	your	plan,	
whether	or	not	it	is	an	issue	that	it	should	be	addressed	in	the	community	to	
ameliorate	their	development	challenges,	no	he	gets	it	done.	Even	a	toilet	to	this	
community	he	gets	it	done.	So	when	you	talk	about	preparing	a	plan,	engaging	
the	people,	he	doesn’t	really	have	interest	because	whether	there	is	a	plan	or	not	
he	can	always	have	his	way,	when	in	actual	fact	it	should	be	the	plan	preparation	
stage	that	should	see	his	attention	so	that	he	gets	all	his	issues	in	there.18	
	
This	frank	assessment	of	the	situation	by	the	Municipal	Planning	Officer	raises	
questions	about	the	level	of	discretionary	power	available	to	MMDCEs.	By	acting	
informally,	MMDCEs	often	subvert	decisions	arrived	at	through	the	planning	process.	
This	breaks	accountability	mechanisms	and	linkages	between	plans	and	spending.	This	
is	an	outcome	of	a	failure	in	institutional	design	in	which	MMDCEs	have	upward	
accountability	to	the	President	rather	that	to	constituents	at	the	local	level.	Moreover,	
DMTPs	are	not	accorded	enough	formal	authority	to	guide	spending	which	means	that	
																																																								
18	Interview	with	Labaran	Fuseini,	Municipal	Planning	Officer,	KEEA,	Elmina	23.07.2015	
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project	spending	tends	to	be	done	on	partisan	lines.	This	situation	is	especially	adverse	
when	there	is	a	change	in	political	party	governments	at	the	end	of	political	cycles.	
Thus	many	development	projects	and	programmes	are	left	uncompleted	and	
unfinished	due	to	the	competitive	nature	of	party	politics.	Parties	in	government	are	
usually	looking	to	start	their	own	projects	rather	than	complete	an	existing	one	in	
order	to	claim	political	points.	Underlying	this	political	economy	of	unfinished	projects	
is	a	lack	of	political	will	and	the	constant	search	of	political	expediency	at	the	expense	
of	long	term	planning19.	These	issues	are	an	inherent	part	of	the	decentralised	
governance	and	planning	system	which	shaped	both	the	process	and	outcomes	of	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	as	will	be	discussed	in	detailed	in	Chapter	7.		
The	foregoing	discussion	has	outlined	the	actors,	structures	and	processes	of	governing	
local	economic	development	planning.	This	has	provided	a	context	within	which	to	
situate	the	premise	of	this	thesis	as	outlined	in	Chapter	1	on	the	need	for	a	more	
analytic	and	systematic	approach	to	examining	governance	issues	in	relation	to	the	
tourism‐poverty	nexus.	I	have	shown	the	images	held	by	policymakers	with	regards	to	
the	goal	of	decentralisation	and	the	instruments	and	the	action	potential	within	which	
MMDAs	operate.	In	providing	an	overview	of	decentralisation	I	have	highlighted	the	
fact	that	tourism	planning	is	not	fully	decentralised.	Unlike	other	ministries,	
departments	and	agencies,	tourism	related	agencies	are	not	able	to	make	inputs	into	
the	DMTDP.	This	is	especially	relevant	in	gaining	a	better	understanding	of	the	
governance	issues	around	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	and	the	extent	to	which	it	was	
embedded	in	the	DMTDP	of	the	municipality.		In	the	next	section	of	this	chapter	I	
consider	these	local	issues	with	the	context	of	national	development	policy	and	
planning.	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																								
19	Interview	with	Justice	Amoah,	former	Municipal	Planning	Officer	of	KEEA	and	Project	
Coordinator	of	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	Dunkwa‐On‐Offin,	13.11.2014	and	17.07.2015	
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4.2 From forex to growth to poverty reduction: tourism in the 
eyes of national development planning from 1957-2017   
In	this	section	I	explore	the	extent	to	which	tourism	development	has	been	prioritised	
within	national	development	planning	and	policies.	The	section	is	divided	into	four	
subsections	with	the	first	looking	at	the	image	of	tourism	within	national	planning	from	
independence	up	to	2002.	The	next	two	subsections	looks	at	the	New	Patriotic	Party’s	
Ghana	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	Papers	I	&	II	and	the	National	Democratic	Congress’s	
Ghana	Shared	Growth	and	Development	Agenda	I	&II.	The	final	subsection	summarises	
the	enduring	image	of	tourism’s	role	in	national	economic	development	while	noting	
the	change	and	continuities	over	the	years.		
Tourism as a net foreign exchange earner in the early years 
At	independence,	it	was	well	known	that	the	country	was	endowed	with	immense	
tourism	potential.	Tourism	was	seen	as	an	opportunity	to	bring	about	economic	
development	and	reduce	regional	disparities	as	many	tourism	resources	and	assets	
were	found	in	poor	communities.	The	construction	in	1956	of	the	Ambassador	Hotel	in	
Accra	to	accommodate	guests	to	the	1957	independence	celebration	is	seen	as	the	first	
formal	tourism	development	project	by	the	government	(Asiedu,	1997).	Further	efforts	
at	tourism	development	were	shaped	by	various	short,	medium	and	long	term	national	
development	policies	and	plans.	Within	these	plans	there	are	considerable	variations	in	
the	policy	goals	and	priority	given	to	the	tourism	sector.	As	summarised	in	table	5	
below	tourism	enjoyed	increased	prominence	in	national	development	plans	over	time	
with	a	slight	dip	in	2003.	
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Table	5	Key	national	development	plans	in	Ghana	and	the	number	of	times	the	word	‘tourism’	
appears	in	them	
	
Year		 National	development	plan	and	coverage	in	years Number	of	times	
the	word	‘tourism’	
appears	
1950	 10‐year	Plan	for	Economic	and	Social	
Development	of	the	Gold	Coast,	1950	–	1960	
Unavailable
1951	 5‐year	Development	Plan,	1951/52	– 1956/57	 Unavailable
1958	 Second	5‐year	Development	Plan,	1959	– 1964	 Unavailable
1964	 7‐year	Development	Plan	for	National	
Reconstruction	and	Development	(including	a	
National	Physical	Development	Plan),	1963/64	–	
1969/70	
1	
1977	 5‐year	Development	Plan,	1975/76	– 1979/80 13	
1995	 Ghana	–Vision	2020	(The	First	Step:	1996	–
2000)	
15	
2003	 Ghana	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	(GPRS)	I,	
2003‐2005	
9	
2005	 Growth	and	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	(GPRS)	
II,	2006‐2009	
47	
2010	 Ghana	Shared	Growth	and	Development	Agenda	
(GSGDA)	I,	2010‐2013	
61	
2014	 Ghana	Shared	Growth	and	Development	Agenda	
(GSGDA)	II,	2014‐2017	
66	
	
In	the	7‐year	Development	Plan	for	National	Reconstruction	and	Development,	
considered	to	be	one	of	the	best	plans	ever	developed	in	the	country,	there	is	one	
instance	of	the	word	‘tourism’	and	another	of	the	word	‘tourist’	in	the	whole	document.	
The	plan	states	that	“Tourism	is	in	many	countries	a	very	important	source	of	foreign	
exchange	earnings	and	this	should	be	encouraged	as	a	means	of	improving	our	invisible	
trade	with	the	rich	countries	of	the	world”	(pg.	228).	However,	no	mention	is	made	of	
the	tourism	resources	available	and	how	these	are	to	be	developed	to	increase	forex.		
Thus	there	was	no	attempt	at	embedding	tourism	within	the	wider	place‐based	
projects	that	were	to	be	implemented	over	the	course	of	the	plan.	On	the	contrary,	the	
5‐year	Development	Plan	of	1974/75‐1979/80	gave	increased	prominence	to	tourism	
(13	occurrences	of	the	word	‘tourism’)	seeing	tourism	as	a	source	of	foreign	exchange	
that	can	be	utilised	while	taking	care	to	“minimise	ecological,	social	and	other	hazards	
which	tourism	seems	to	generate	when	not	properly	programmed	and	monitored”	(pg.	
22).	There	was	an	awareness	of	potential	economic	leakages	and	the	need	to	embed	
tourism	within	national	development	planning	projects.	For	instance	the	plan	noted	
that	the	construction	of	the	Kumasi‐Kuntunase	road	was	important	for	boosting	
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tourism	in	the	areas	surrounding	the	Lake	Bosomtwi.	The	overall	planning	goal	was	to	
develop	the	tourism	sector	as	a	viable	net	foreign	exchange	earner.		
The	Ghana	Vision	2020	(The	First	Step:	1996‐2000)	was	developed	as	a	long	term	
development	plan	to	guide	the	attainment	of	a	middle	income	country	status	by	2020.	
The	goal	was	to	lay	a	foundation	for	accelerated	growth	and	development	of	the	
country	over	the	subsequent	two	decades	and	tourism	was	crucial	in	this.	Tourism’s	
role	was	conceptualised	in	terms	of:	i)	agriculture	(forestry)	linkages;	ii)	services	sector	
in	order	to	establish	Ghana	as	a	major	venue	for	international	tourism	and;	iii)	culture,	
especially	in	relation	to	slavery	and	colonial	heritage.	This	is	the	first	plan	that	linked	
the	use	of	cultural	heritage	(Pan‐Africanism)	to	tourism	promotion	in	order	to	attract	
Africans	in	the	Diaspora.	Significant	attempts	were	to	be	made	to	diversify	the	tourism	
products	and	services	on	offer.	There	was	a	clear	shift	in	marking	out	culture	and	
heritage	as	the	basis	for	future	tourism	development	as	signified	in	1998	by	the	first	
ever	Emancipation	Day	celebrations	that	attracted	a	number	of	Africans	in	the	Diaspora	
and	in	the	Caribbean.	In	this	plan,	the	role	of	tourism	in	national	development	was	
taken	more	seriously	and	efforts	were	made	to	embed	tourism	within	national	
development	programmes	and	projects.	This	notwithstanding,	the	development	of	
tourism	was	seen	largely	in	terms	of	increased	foreign	exchange	earnings.		
Tourism as direct poverty strategy vs. growth targeted strategy in the Ghana 
Poverty Reduction Strategy I & II 
The	Ghana	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	2003‐2005	(GPRS	I)	made	mention	of	‘tourism’	
only	9	times.	The	GPRS	I	focused	on	poverty‐related	spending	and	redistributive	
policies	as	a	direct	poverty	reduction	strategy.	The	tourism	sector	was	identified	as	
part	of	the	strategies	that	can	be	developed	to	directly	address	poverty	reduction	goals.	
In	addition	to	existing	business	and	conference	tourism,	holiday,	vacation	and	leisure	
tourism	were	to	be	expanded	as	areas	with	the	potential	“through	multiplier	effects	to	
create	employment	opportunities	in	other	sectors,	for	example	the	food	industry”	(pg.	
72).	Within	the	GPRS	I,	tourism’s	role	in	national	development	was	conceived	of	in	the	
specific	terms	of	tourism’s	direct	and	indirect	employment	potentials	–	as	well	as	for	
foreign	exchange	earnings.	It	was	recognised	that	tourism	can	“employ	and	enhance	the	
skills	of	people	in	geographical	areas	where	the	poor	reside	most”	(pg.	iii).	Thus	there	is	
a	clear	linking	of	tourism	promotion	and	development	to	the	plan’s	overarching	
poverty	reduction	goals.	
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In	line	with	a	shift	in	international	donor	emphasis	from	poverty‐related	spending	and	
redistributive	policies	to	a	focus	on	growth,	the	Ghana	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	
2006‐2009	became	the	Growth	and	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	(GPRS	II).	This	change	
in	name	reflected	the	change	in	policy	intent.	The	GPRS	II	saw	growth	as	the	primary	
path	to	poverty	reduction	and	the	tourism	sector	was	increasingly	seen	as	essential	for	
this	growth	to	happen.	The	word	‘tourism’	appears	47	times	in	the	plan	compared	to	
the	9	times	found	in	the	GPRS	I	and	the	overall	policy	thrust	of	the	GPRS	II	was	“to	
realise	the	potentials	of	the	sector	by	making	Ghana	a	competitive	and	quality	tourism	
destination	whilst	preserving	the	country’s	cultural,	historical	and	environmental	
heritage”	(Pg.	38).	In	order	to	achieve	it,	the	GPRS	II	outlined	four	main	strategies	and	
policy	interventions	to	be	pursued	over	the	life	span	of	the	plan.	These	were:	1)	
promote	tourism	as	a	major	source	of	domestic	revenue;	2)	promote	domestic	tourism	
to	foster	national	cohesion	as	well	as	redistributive	income;	3)	promote	sustainable	and	
responsible	tourism	in	such	a	way	to	preserve	historical,	cultural	and	natural	heritage	
and;	4)	promote	crafts	industry	for	tourist	trade	and	export.		Although	the	GPRS	II	
makes	clear	the	importance	of	tourism	to	the	national	economy,	the	emphasis	here	was	
on	the	growth	potentials	of	the	sector	to	become	the	main	foreign	exchange	earner	for	
the	country.	
Both	the	GPRS	I	and	GPRS	II	were	prepared	by	the	New	Patriotic	Party	(NPP)	
government	that	came	into	power	for	the	first	time	in	2001	and	left	office	in	2009.	The	
poverty	focus	of	the	GPRS	I	was	instrumental	in	the	design	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	
as	the	new	government	sought	to	bring	about	local	economic	development.		The	GPRS	I	
is	the	first	national	development	plan	that	conceptualised	a	direct	relationship	between	
tourism	and	poverty	reduction	in	addition	to	the	usual	focus	on	foreign	exchange	
earnings.	In	contrast,	the	GPRS	II	did	not	make	a	direct	conceptualisation	of	tourism’s	
role	in	poverty	reduction.	While	the	GPRS	I	was	primarily	directed	towards	achieving	
the	Millennium	Development	Goals	–	specifically	halving	of	poverty	–	the	GPRS	II	was	a	
strategic	shift	towards	accelerated	growth	of	the	economy.	Thus	the	general	policy	
focus	of	the	plan	was	on	growth	as	a	pathway	to	poverty	reduction.	In	a	sense	the	
problematic	idea	of	‘trickle‐down’	permeates	this	plan	as	the	assumption	was	that	a	
focus	on	growth	would	eventually	lead	to	employment	creation	and	then	poverty	
reduction.	Thus	the	unfolding	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	can	be	understood	within	
this	shift	from	poverty	to	growth	in	the	GPRS	I	and	GPRS	II.	While	the	GPRS	I	talks	
about	the	need	to	“vigorously	expand	employment	in	the	sectors	such	as	tourism”	(pg.	
iii),	it	is	not	very	clear	on	the	‘how’	of	fully	exploiting	the	employment	potentials.	The	
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GPRS	II	on	the	other	hand	provided	specific	strategies	but	noted	that	major	constraints	
such	as	inadequate	infrastructure	and	low	quality	of	service	delivery	and	standards	
were	hampering	the	effective	utilisation	of	tourism.	
Sharing tourism’s growth in the Ghana Shared Growth and Development 
Agenda I & II 
After	8	years	in	opposition,	the	National	Democratic	Congress	(NDC)	party	came	back	
into	office	in	2009	and	prepared	the	Ghana	Shared	Growth	and	Development	Agenda	
(GSGDA	I)	for	2010‐2013.	The	emphasis	in	this	plan	is	on	accelerated	employment	
creation	and	income	generation	for	poverty	reduction.		‘Tourism’	is	mentioned	on	61	
occasions	in	the	plan	and	the	sector	is	seen	as	one	of	seven	growth	pillars	and	priority	
areas	to	drive	the	long‐term	growth	and	economic	development	of	the	country	(Adu‐
Ampong,	2015).	The	GSGDA	I	identifies	and	make	provisions	for	overcoming	some	of	
the	structural	constraints	facing	the	tourism	sector	including	the	legal	and	institutional	
framework,	human	resources	and	financing.	For	instance,	in	2011	the	Ghana	Tourist	
Board	(GTB)	was	upgraded	to	the	Ghana	Tourism	Authority	(GTA)	through	an	Act	of	
Parliament	to	provide	the	needed	institutional	framework	for	tourism	development,	
the	significance	of	which	is	discussed	in	Section	4.3	of	this	chapter.		The	establishment	
of	the	GTA	also	came	with	the	establishment	of	the	Tourism	Development	Fund	(TDF)	
to	be	financed	through	government	seed	capital	and	a	1%	levy	on	tourist	
accommodation.	The	TDF	is	to	be	used	for	tourism	product	development	and	other	
infrastructural	development	projects	that	can	contribute	to	the	competitiveness	of	the	
sector.		
The	Ghana	Shared	Growth	and	Development	Agenda	2014‐2017	(GSGDA	II)	is	the	
current	national	development	plan	and	was	prepared	in	the	context	of	Ghana	having	
attained	the	status	of	a	lower	middle‐income	country.	The	overall	policy	objective	is	
economic	transformation	built	on	higher	employment	composition	in	industry	and	
services.	This	is	to	be	achieved	through	accelerated	public	investments	and	the	
promotion	of	tourism	to	facilitate	job	creation.	Tourism	(with	66	mentions)	is	once	
again	given	prominence	and	identified	as	one	key	strategic	area	to	utilise.	Specifically,	
the	GSGDA	II	outlines	that	“Ghana’s	historical,	cultural	and	ecotourism	assets	will	be	
leveraged	with	support	services	and	infrastructure	to	make	the	country	an	important	
tourism	destination	and	accelerate	the	growth	of	tourism	earnings”	(pg.	22).	Clear	
strategic	linkages	between	tourism	and	other	sectors	like	creative	arts	are	identified	as	
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essential	for	tourism	to	create	jobs	and	increase	foreign	exchange	earnings.	Unlike	in	
the	1980s‐1990s	when	the	focus	was	mainly	on	foreign	exchange	earnings,	the	GSGDA	
II	provides	a	nuanced	conceptualisation	of	tourism’s	role	in	national	development	as	
one	of	job	creation	and	income	generation.	However,	the	plan	is	unclear	as	to	the	kinds	
of	(skilled)	job	to	be	created	through	tourism.	The	main	focus	appears	to	be	on	youth	
entrepreneurial	employment	opportunities	to	be	created	through	improving	tourist	
infrastructure	and	“underpinned	by	vigorous	promotion	of	international	conferences,	
cultural,	leisure,	health,	and	education	tourism”	(pg.	51).		The	prominence	given	to	the	
tourism	sector	within	the	GSGDA	II	provides	a	framework	for	understanding	current	
tourism	development	policy	and	planning	efforts	in	the	country.			
Enduring images of tourism over the years: from a source of forex to a 
catalyst for growth and poverty reduction 
In	the	early	days	of	national	development	planning,	the	image	of	tourism	was	one	of	
foreign	exchange	earnings.	This	image	of	tourism’s	role	was	reinforced	in	the	1980s‐
1990s	when	after	years	of	political	and	economic	instability	the	country	sought	to	
rebuild	its	economic	base.	During	this	period	the	development	of	tourism	was	part	of	
the	Structural	Adjustment	Programmes	that	sought	to	diversify	the	national	economy	
away	from	over	dependence	on	primary	produce	exports.	The	tourism	sector	was	seen	
as	an	opportunity	to	increase	foreign	exchange	earnings	and	improve	the	country’s	
balance	of	payment	deficit.	The	early	2000s	ushered	in	a	poverty	focus	in	national	
development	plans.	Consequently,	tourism’s	role	was	reconceptualised	as	a	source	of	
direct	and	indirect	employment	opportunities	that	contributes	to	poverty	reduction	
efforts.		This	image	has	received	a	retouch	in	contemporary	times	as	the	overall	focus	of	
national	development	has	shifted	away	from	direct	poverty	reduction	strategies	to	one	
of	growth	and	employment	creation.	Tourism	is	currently	one	of	seven	key	economic	
sectors	on	which	the	long‐term	transformation	of	the	economy	is	to	be	built.	
Given	the	transformations	in	how	tourism	is	perceived	within	national	development	
plans,	the	instruments	and	action	potentials	available	to	stakeholders	involved	in	plan	
implementation	have	also	changed.	Importantly	the	modes	and	levels	of	governance	
activities	that	shape	tourism	development	have	evolved	over	the	years	resulting	in	
significant	changes	to	tourism	planning	and	the	use	of	tourism	for	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction.	For	instance	the	changing	portfolio	of	the	Ministry	
of	Tourism	since	its	inception	in	1993	(see	detailed	discussion	of	this	in	section	4.3	and	
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4.4	below)	suggests	that	there	is	not	a	clear	decision	from	successive	national	
governments	on	how	best	to	connect	tourism		with	other	parts	of	government.	This	
situation	has	had	a	role	in	shaping	the	trajectory	of	tourism	development.	While	many	
of	these	changes	have	taken	place	at	the	national	level,	there	has	been	a	neglect	of	
tourism	governance	at	the	regional	and	district	levels.	This	situation	has	had	adverse	
consequences	on	tourism	development	at	the	regional	and	district	levels	due	to	unclear	
roles	and	overlapping	responsibilities	between	tourism	and	non‐tourism	governance	
institutions	and	agencies.		
The	analysis	in	this	section	so	far	has	sought	to	make	clear	the	changing	diversity,	
complexity	and	dynamics	of	tourism’s	role	as	seen	in	successive	development	plans	in	
Ghana.		These	changes	also	have	political	dimensions	that	have	ripple	effects	at	the	
local	level.	It	is	worth	remembering	that	the	GPRS	I&II	and	the	GSGDA	I&II	were	
formulated	under	the	New	Patriotic	Party	and	the	New	Democratic	Congress	Party	
governments	respectively.	Ghana’s	political	space	is	a	highly	competitive	one.	Political	
parties	are	therefore	keen	on	claiming	maximum	credit	and	votes	and	hence	will	rather	
start	their	own	projects	than	complete	existing	ones.	This	is	especially	the	case	when	it	
comes	to	physical	infrastructure	projects	with	high	visibility	like	construction	of	roads,	
markets,	schools	among	others.	In	such	cases,	the	party	that	begins	the	project	becomes	
associated	with	it	in	the	minds	of	voters	even	if	another	party	happens	to	continue	it	up	
to	completion.	This	is	an	important	context	to	bear	in	mind	when	understanding	how	
political	cycles	and	party	politics	greatly	shaped	the	(dis)continuities	in	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	implementation.		It	has	been	important	to	explore	these	issues	because	
any	research	on	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	at	the	locality	level	needs	to	be	situated	
within	the	larger	framework	of	development	policy	and	planning	in	a	given	country.	It	
is	the	national	development	policy	framework	that	tend	to	give	shape	to	tourism	
development	plans.		Thus	the	interplay	between	national	development	policy	and	
national	tourism	development	plans,	which	I	now	turn	to	in	the	next	section,	provides	
the	images,	instruments	and	action	potential	of	stakeholders	at	the	local	level	who	seek	
to	utilise	tourism	for	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.		
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4.3 Tourism planning in Ghana: “tourism first” vs. 
“development first” 
The	tourism	sector	in	Ghana	continues	its	trajectory	as	the	fastest	growing	economic	
sector	of	the	economy	since	the	turn	of	the	new	millennium	(see	figures	7	and	8	below).	
Starting	from	an	insignificant	entry	into	and	contribution	to	national	accounts,	the	
tourism	sector	rose	to	become	the	third	highest	foreign	exchange	earner	for	the	
country	in	2010	(Adu‐Ampong,	2014).	Having	been	overtaken	by	remittances,	the	
sector	is	currently	the	fourth	highest	GDP	earner.	In	this	section	I	examine	how	
successive	governments	have	approached	tourism	development	planning	since	
independence.		
I	divide	up	this	period	into	four	phases	building	on	the	three	identified	by	Akyeampong	
(2006).	These	are:	1)1957	–	1966:	era	of	active	state	involvement;	2)1966	–	1985:	era	
of	passive	state	involvement	(with	a	twist);	3)1985	–	2006:	era	of	deregulated	state	
involvement	and;	4)	2006	–	2016:	era	of	reactivated	state	involvement.	Each	phase	is	
analysed	using	the	binary	of	“Tourism	First”	or	“Development	First”	developed	by	
Burns	(1999).	In	summary,	a	“Tourism	First”	approach	focuses	on	developing	tourism	
as	an	industry	with	an	emphasis	on	achieving	high	tourist	arrival	numbers	and	gross	
national	receipts.	The	arguments	for	focusing	on	developing	tourism	first	is	hinged	on	
tourism’s	multiplier	effects.	A	“Development	First”	approach	on	the	other	hand	sees	
“tourism	as	a	means	of,	or	a	tool	for,	achieving	national	social	and	economic	goals”	
(Burns,	1999:332).	A	Development	First	approach	focuses	on	a	holistic	approach	to	
development	through	tourism	that	is	set	against	the	context	of	social,	cultural	and	
environmental	costs.	These	categories	are	used	heuristically,	and	should	be	seen	as	not	
mutually	exclusive	but	rather	as	a	continuum	within	any	tourism	planning	process.		
The	analysis	in	this	section	is	set	out	in	four	sub	sections.	In	the	first	subsection	I	
explore	the	tourism	development	planning	in	the	first	two	phases	between	1957	and	
1985.	The	next	two	subsections	will	consider	the	tourism	planning	experience	from	
1985	to	2016	paying	specific	attention	to	the	key	long	term	tourism	development	plans	
that	were	developed	within	each	phase.	The	final	subsection	identifies	some	of	the	
enduring	challenges	to	tourism	plan	implementation.		
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From active state tourism planning to passive state involvement with a twist: 
1957-1985 
The	1957‐1966	period	witnessed	an	active	role	of	the	state	as	an	investor	and	
entrepreneur	in	tourism	development	in	Ghana.	In	1956	the	Ambassador	Hotel	was	
commissioned	as	the	first	international	class	hotel	to	be	built	in	Ghana.	This	was	to	
serve	as	accommodation	for	dignitaries	attending	the	planned	independence	
celebrations	of	Ghana	in	March,	1957.	Indeed	given	that	the	political	economy	of	Ghana	
at	this	time	was	based	on	a	strong	socialist	inclinations	–	‘African’	or	‘scientific’	
socialism	–	the	state’s	role	in	overall	national	development	was	near	total.	Although	
there	was	an	active	state	investment	in	the	nascent	tourism	sector,	there	was	no	
specific	tourism	policy	nor	plan	(see	discussion	in	section	4.2	above).	There	was	
government	ambivalence	in	prioritising	tourism	within	national	development	planning	
because	international	tourism	was	seen	as	a	form	of	neo‐colonialism	which	was	
incompatible	with	the	tenets	of	‘African	socialism’.			
When	the	government	of	Dr.	Kwame	Nkrumah	engaged	in	hosting	Pan‐African	
conferences	and	other	international	meetings,	summits	and	conferences	(Akyeampong,	
2006)	their	need	for	building	international	hotels	and	conference	facilities	had	to	be	
met.	The	ideology	of	‘African	socialism’	meant	that	a	mixed	approach	of	strong	state	
involvement	and	indigenous	private	sector	involvement	was	encouraged	in	tourism	
development.	Thus	tourism	planning	within	this	period	fell	under	a	“Development	
First”	approach.	Tourism	planning	and	development	was	to	be	used	as	tool	for	overall	
socio‐economic	development	of	the	country	based	on	socialist	principles.		Thus	the	
Ghana	Museums	and	Monuments	Board	(GMMB)	and	other	agencies	and	the	State	
Hotels	and	Tourist	Corporation	(SHTC)	were	set	up	in	1957	and	1962	respectively.	The	
SHTC	was	split	in	1965	into	the	Ghana	Tourist	Corporation	(GTC)	and	the	State	Hotels	
Corporation	(SHC)	with	the	former	tasked	with	developing,	promoting	and	regulating	
the	tourism	sector.	Consequently	although	the	government	was	well	aware	of	the	
foreign	exchange	to	be	gained	from	international	tourism	the	development	of	the	sector	
was	not	simply	left	to	economic	considerations.	Importantly	the	development	of	
tourism	served	the	political	goals	of	highlighting	the	socio‐economic	progress	being	
made	in	the	newly	independent	country.	
In	1966,	the	Nkrumah	government	was	overthrown	in	a	military	coup	ushering	in	what	
has	been	considered	as	the	lost	decades	for	Ghana	(see	table	4	above).	The	1966	–	1985	
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period	was	an	era	of	passive	state	involvement	in	tourism	planning	but	with	a	twist.	
The	high	frequency	of	successful	and	abortive	coups	d’état	led	to	economic	meltdown	
and	political	instabilities	which	had	a	negative	impact	on	tourism	development	(Teye,	
1988).	The	twist	in	the	tale	is	that	many	tourism	development	and	impact	studies	were	
undertaken	during	this	period	(see	table	6	below).	This	period	was	therefore	the	
beginning	of	a	more	systematic	approach	to	tourism	planning	and	development	
although	many	of	the	plans	never	saw	the	light	of	day.	In	addition	there	was	also	
considerable	institutional	tinkering	in	the	tourism	sector.	In	1973	the	Ghana	Tourist	
Corporation	(GTC)	was	split	up	into	the	Ghana	Tourist	Control	Board	(GTCB)	and	the	
Ghana	Tourist	Development	Company	Limited	(GTDC).	In	1977	the	GTCB	was	renamed	
as	the	Ghana	Tourist	Board	(GTB)	and	remained	so	until	2013	when	it	became	the	
Ghana	Tourism	Authority	(discussed	in	more	detail	below).	
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Table	6	Selected	key	tourism	planning	and	development	studies	in	Ghana	1972‐1978	
	
Year	 Focus	 Title Sponsor	 Type	of	
Regime	
1972	 Resource	
Inventory	
Report	of	the	Feasibility	Study	
Committee	on	the	Development	
of	Ghana’s	Tourist	Attraction	for	
the	Five	Year	Plan	Period	1972‐
76	
Government	of	Ghana Civilian
1973	 Planning	and	
Development	
Tourism	in	Ghana Government	of	
Ghana/United	
Nations	Development	
Programme	
Military
1973	 Development	 Developing	the	Tourist	Industry	
in	Ghana	
Government	of	
Ghana/United	States	
Agency	for	
International	
Development	
Military
1973	 Economic	
Impact	
Tourism	and	Foreign	Exchange	
Earnings	in	Ghana	
Institute	for	
Statistical,	Social	and	
Economic	Research,	
Ghana	
Military
1974	 Tourism	
Master	Plan		
Tourism	in	Ghana:	Development	
Guide	1975‐1990	
Government	of	
Ghana/Danish	
International	
Development	Agency	
Military
1975	 Resource	
Utilisation	
Tourism	in	Ghana:	Utilising	
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The	first	major	nationwide	tourism	master	plan	in	Ghana	was	the	15‐year	Tourism	
Development	Plan	1975‐1990	(also	known	as	the	Tourism	Master	Plan).	This	was	a	
comprehensive	plan	developed	with	financial	and	technical	assistance	provided	by	the	
Danish	government.	The	plan	assessed	Ghana’s	tourist	assets,	human	resource	
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development	needs	and	evaluated	the	potentials	for	developing	the	physical,	cultural	
and	historical	resources	of	the	country	vis‐à‐vis	the	general	and	tourism‐specific	
infrastructural	needs.	The	country	was	delineated	into	three	tourism	development	
zones	–	the	coastal	zone	starting	from	the	beachline	of	the	Togolese	border	on	the	East	
through	to	the	Cape	Coast/Elmina	area	in	the	Central	Region;	the	Western	zone	and	
then	the	Northern	zone	from	the	Ashanti	Region	northwards.	Initial	development	was	
to	be	concentrated	in	the	coastal	zone	especially	the	Cape	Coast/Elmina	area	which	is	
still	the	case	up	to	the	current	time.	The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	therefore	a	
continuation	and	beneficiary	of	this	trend.		
The	1975‐1990	Tourism	Master	Plan	was	a	classic	example	of	a	“Tourism	First”	
approach	to	tourism	planning	and	development.	A	number	of	projections	were	made	in	
terms	of	tourist	arrivals	and	receipts	which	served	as	the	basis	for	undertaking	tourism	
development	projects.	A	12.5%	average	annual	growth	rate	was	envisaged	for	the	15	
years	of	the	plan	with	arrivals	projected	to	increase	from	64,000	in	1975	to	357,000	a	
year	by	1990.	Between	1975	and	1990	a	projected	total	of	35,700	additional	direct	and	
indirect	jobs	were	to	be	created	while	foreign	exchange	earnings	were	expected	to	
reach	$57	million	a	year	by	1990	(Teye,	1999;	Asiedu,	2008).	State	involvement	in	
tourism	development	during	this	period	was	passive	and	did	not	go	beyond	
commissioning	of	studies,	passing	of	new	legislation	and	restructuring	of	tourism	
institutions.	In	summary,	over	this	time	period	a	“Tourism	First”	approach	was	adopted	
towards	tourism	planning	and	development.	However,	the	many	coup	d’états	and	
constant	regime	changes	created	a	political‐economic	situation	that	was	not	conducive	
for	plan	implementation	or	for	encouraging	international	tourist	arrivals.	
Diversified and deregulated state involvement in tourism planning: 1985-2006 
The	1985‐2006	period	is	significant	in	terms	of	both	tourism	planning	and	
development	as	well	as	overall	national	economic	development	planning.	Amidst	the	
economic	turmoil	of	the	last	successful	military	coup	in	1981,	the	Provisional	National	
Defence	Council	(PNDC)	regime	with	help	from	the	World	Bank	and	IMF	embarked	
upon	the	liberalisation	of	the	national	economy.	The	implementation	of	the	Structural	
Adjustment	Programmes	(SAPs)	which	began	in	1983	sought	to	deregulate	the	
economy	and	free	it	from	state	controls	and	market	distortions	as	well	as	promote	a	
private‐sector‐led	trade	and	investment	economic	environment	(Konadu‐Agyemang,	
	
	
129	
	
2000).	Within	this	context,	the	tourism	sector	was	transformed	as	part	of	diversifying	
the	national	economy.	From	the	passiveness	of	the	1966‐1985	period,	the	tourism	
sector	began	to	see	high	growth	rates	in	both	international	arrivals	and	receipts.	As	
foreign	aid	and	international	development	assistance	flowed	in,	so	did	the	international	
tourist	traffic.	Massive	foreign	direct	investments	began	to	pour	into	the		tourism	sector	
leading	to	a	tripling	of	registered	hotels	from	273	in	1989	to	766	in	1997	(Konadu‐
Agyemang,	2001).	These	transformations	were	underpinned	by	strategic	tourism	
planning	and	policies.	
Under	the	remit	of	the	SAPs,	PNDC	Law	116	of	1985	declared	the	tourism	sector	as	a	
‘priority	sector’.	The	Ghana	Tourist	Development	Company	(GTDC)	in	1987	had	its	
mission	reoriented	toward	tourism	promotion	and	the	mobilisation	of	investment	
resources.	A	first	substantive	Ministry	of	Tourism	was	established	in	1993	which	
played	a	key	role	in	tourism	promotion	leading	to	a	5‐year	Tourism	Development	
Action	Programme	in	1996.	Emancipation	Day	celebrations	were	introduced	into	the	
Ghanaian	tourism	calendar	in	1998	after	the	President’s	visit	to	the	Caribbean	the	
previous	year	to	witness	their	celebration.	Through	this	and	the	PANAFEST	(Pan	
African	Historical	Theatre	Festival)	a	large	number	of	Africans	in	the	diaspora	and	
other	international	tourists	flocked	to	Ghana	in	the	late	1990s	as	tourism	enjoyed	a	
boom.	As	part	of	a	broader	Ghana	Vision	2020	(see	discussion	under	section	4.2	above),	
a	new	15‐year	National	Tourism	Development	Plan	1996‐2010	(GNTDP	1996‐2010)	
was	prepared	with	financial	support	from	the	United	Nations	Development	Programme	
(UNDP)	and	technical	assistance	from	the	United	Nations	World	Tourism	Organisation	
(Teye,	1999).		
The	GNTDP	1996‐2010	was	a	comprehensive	master	plan	and	a	culmination	of	the	
initial	policy	attempts	of	developing	tourism	as	a	major	tool	for	socio‐economic	
development.		Although	there	are	elements	of	a	“Development	First”	approach	to	it	the	
GNTDP	1996‐2010	can	be	considered	to	be	largely	underpinned	by	a	“Tourism	First”	
approach	to	tourism	planning.	Thus	the	major	objectives	for	developing	the	tourism	
sector	were	to	among	other	things,	to	“bring	socio‐economic	benefits	to	the	country	
including	generating	income,	employment,	foreign	exchange	earnings	and	government	
revenues,	serving	as	a	catalyst	to	expansion	of	other	economic	sectors,	and	
strengthening	both	the	urban	and	rural	economies”	(p.28).	This	was	a	reflection	of	the	
nascent	state	of	the	tourism	sector	that	required	a	strong	case	to	be	made	about	its	
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economic	viability	in	order	to	secure	the	commitment	of	both	public	and	private	sector	
investors.	The	plan	did	conceptualise	the	tourism	planning	process	at	three	
geographical	and	governance	levels	–	the	national,	regional	and	district	levels.	
However,	this	aspect	of	the	plan	was	not	fully	followed	through	leading	to	the	current	
lack	of	coherent	tourism	planning	and	governance	at	the	local	district	level	
This	era	of	deregulated	state	involvement	in	the	tourism	sector	is	“regarded	as	a	
watershed	in	the	development	of	tourism	in	Ghana	and	the	period	1985‐2007	can	be	
considered	as	the	‘golden	age’	of	Ghana’s	tourism	development”	(Akyeampong,	
2006:17).	With	its	mix	of	Tourism	First	and	Development	First	approaches,	the	
important	role	of	the	sector	in	overall	national	economic	development	strategies	was	
highlighted.	The	mandate	of	the	tourism	sector	was	regularly	reoriented	and	realigned	
to	meet	strategic	national	interests.	For	instance	the	Ministry	of	Tourism’s	mandate	
was	expanded	in	2003	to	include	the	modernisation	of	the	capital	city	to	become	the	
Ministry	of	Tourism	and	the	Modernisation	of	the	Capital	City	(MOTMCC).	This	new	
mandate	was	then	realigned	again	in	2006	to	address	the	issue	of	Diaspora	Relations	
(Ministry	of	Tourism	and	Diaspora	Relations)	in	the	year	leading	up	to	the	50th	
independence	anniversary	and	start	of	the	Joseph	Project	(discussed	in	detailed	below).	
Thus	although	the	economy	was	liberalised	and	deregulated	the	state	still	maintained	a	
strong	role	in	shaping	the	trajectory	of	tourism	development.	
Reactivating state involvement in tourism planning: 2006-2016 
The	past	ten	years	have	seen	a	number	of	significant	developments	in	terms	of	tourism	
planning	and	development	in	Ghana.	The	New	Patriotic	Party	(NPP)	government	that	
was	in	power	between	2001	and	2009	created	a	“golden	age	for	business”.	This	
encouraged	private	sector	investment	in	the	tourism	sector	which	was	given	priority	in	
the	Growth	and	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	2006‐2009	(see	section	4.2	above).	
Tourism	planning	within	this	period	was	strategically	tied	to	overall	national	
development	ambitions.	Coming	up	to	the	50th	Independence	celebrations	of	Ghana	in	
2007,	the	newly	realigned	Ministry	of	Tourism	and	Diaspora	Relations	(MOTDR)	
launched	the	Joseph	Project	to	position	Ghana	not	only	as	a	tourist	destination	but	as	a	
Homeland	destination	for	Africans	in	the	Diaspora	in	search	of	their	roots.	This	was	a	
fairly	successful	project	leading	to	increased	patronage	of	the	annual	Emancipation	Day	
and	biennial	PANAFEST	celebrations.	
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In	policy	terms,	the	National	Tourism	Policy	was	developed	to	a	7th	draft	in	August,	
2006	with	the	support	of	the	Netherlands	International	Development	Organisation	
(SNV).	While	this	still	remains	a	draft	policy	document,	it	provided	important	direction	
for	tourism	planning.	The	tinkering	and	constant	realignment	of	the	mandates	of	the	
tourism	ministry	meant	that	towards	the	end,	the	GNTDP	1996	–	2010	had	lost	some	
relevance.	When	it	elapsed	in	2010,	the	re‐christened	Ministry	of	Tourism	lacked	the	
capacity	to	prepare	a	new	long	term	tourism	development	plan20	and	instead	prepared	
a	Tourism	Sector	Medium	Term	Development	Plan	(TSMTDP)	for	2010‐2013.	The	main	
goal	of	the	TSMTDP	2010‐2013	was	to	“develop	Ghana	as	an	internationally	
competitive	and	high	quality	destination	where	the	tourism	industry,	besides	
producing	macroeconomic	benefits,	explicitly	contributes	to	poverty	reduction	and	
conservation	of	the	country’s	cultural,	historical	and	environmental	heritage”	(pg.	vii).	
Thus	the	TSMTDP	2010‐2013	was	finely	poised	between	a	Development	First	and	a	
Tourism	First	approach	to	tourism	planning.	This	plan	has	now	been	succeeded	by	the	
new	15‐year	Ghana	National	Tourism	Development	Plan	2013‐2027.	
Unlike	earlier	long	term	plans	the	GNTDP	2013‐2027	took	a	mere	two	months	to	
complete.21	The	GNTDP	2013‐2027	is	presented	as	an	update	on	the	GNTDP	1996‐2010	
and	aims	to	provide	a	new	direction	for	the	development	of	the	sector	over	the	next	15	
years	by	assessing	how	best	tourism	can	contribute	to	national	and	local	economic	
development.	The	new	plan	considers	tourism’s	role	in	employment	creation,	revenue	
generation,	environmental	conservation,	national	cohesion	and	overall	economic	
growth.	The	GNTDP	2013‐2027	appears	indecisive	with	respect	to	positioning	the	
tourism	sector	vis‐à‐vis	overall	national	economic	development	as	sections	of	the	plan	
seem	to	counter	each	other.	For	example	in	the	executive	summary,	the	plan	states	that	
tourism	is	not	seen	as	being	significant	in	the	Ghana	Shared	Growth	and	Development	
Agenda	(GSGDA	2010‐2013).	This	is	however	inconsistent	with	the	GSGDA	2010‐2013	
itself,	which	identifies	the	tourism	sector	as	one	of	seven	growth	pillars	(in	addition	to	
agriculture,	manufacturing,	infrastructure,	services,	extractive	industry	–	oil,	gas	and	
minerals	–		and	creative	arts)	on	which	the	foundation	of	Ghana’s	long‐term	growth	and	
economic	transformation	is	to	be	built	through	direct	private	and	public	sector	
investments	(Adu‐Ampong,	2015).	A	plausible	explanation	for	this	seeming	
																																																								
20	Interview	with	Dr.	Joel	Sonne,	Director	of	Projects,	Ministry	of	Tourism,	Culture	and	Creative	
Arts,	Accra,	16.09.2014	
21	Interview	with	Dr.	Joel	Sonne,	Director	of	Projects,	Ministry	of	Tourism,	Culture	and	Creative	
Arts,	Accra,	16.09.2014	
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contradiction	lies	in	the	fact	that	although	tourism	has	been	regarded	as	an	engine	of	
growth	there	has	not	been	enough	corresponding	government	investment	in	the	sector.	
Tourism’s	role	in	development	is	conceptualised	clearly	within	the	GNTDP	2013‐2027.	
Throughout	the	plan	the	emphasis	is	on	identifying	the	opportunities	that	can	enhance	
the	sector	as	well	as	identifying	the	obstacles	and	constraints.	The	main	goal	guiding	
the	GNTDP	2013‐2027	is	to	“ensure	that	tourism	in	Ghana	achieves	its	full	potential	in	a	
sustainable	and	responsible	manner	and	that	it	contributes	to	the	country‘s	GDP,	reduces	
poverty,	ensures	that	its	operation	is	not	detrimental	to	the	environment	and	the	
culture	and	traditions	of	the	Ghanaians	and	attracts	a	wide	range	of	markets”	(p.	9	
emphasis	added).	In	contrast	to	the	earlier	plan	the	GNTDP	2013‐2027	has	a	central	
focus	on	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	and	seeks	to	utilise	tourism	not	only	for	general	
economic	growth	but	also	specifically	for	poverty	reduction.	In	this	sense,	the	GNTDP	
2013‐2027	adopts	a	clear	Development	First	approach	to	tourism	planning.		
Following	such	a	Development	First	approach,	there	is	an	acknowledgment	in	the	plan	
that	increased	economic	growth	is	important	although	not	for	its	own	sake.	There	is	an	
awareness	in	the	plan	that	the	traditional	‘trickle	down’	effect	that	was	inherent	in	the	
1996‐2010	plan	had	failed	to	materialise	and	so	deliberate	steps	need	to	be	taken	if	
tourism	is	to	have	an	impact	on	poverty	reduction.	The	argument	is	that	for	tourism	to	
contribute	to	a	broad	based	growth	agenda	there	have	to	be	increased	linkages	
between	tourism	and	other	sectors	of	the	economy.	It	is	within	this	context	that	this	
thesis	makes	an	important	theoretical	and	empirical	contribution	by	showing	that	the	
best	way	to	increase	linkages	is	to	fully	embed	tourism	within	local	economic	
development	planning.	This	is	yet	to	be	done	in	Ghana	and	explains	why	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	did	not	live	up	to	expectations.	For	tourism	to	play	a	significant	role	in	
economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	it	needs	to	be	anchored	at	the	local	level	
and	not	only	planned	from	the	national	level.	
The	period	of	2006‐2016	has	been	an	era	in	which	the	state	has	reactivated	its	steering	
role	in	tourism	planning.	Although	direct	investment	in	the	sector	has	been	minimal	the	
state	has	used	tourism	policy	and	planning	to	reorient	the	tourism	sector.	For	instance	
the	Tourism	Act	817	was	passed	in	2011	to	re‐christen	the	Ghana	Tourism	Board	(GTB)	
as	the	Ghana	Tourism	Authority	(GTA).	In	the	process	a	Tourism	Development	Fund	
has	been	established	and	additional	powers	has	been	granted	to	the	GTA	to	engage	in	
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direct	tourism	investment	(see	discussion	below	on	the	tourism	governing	system).	
The	Ministry	of	Tourism	was	in	2013	further	realigned	into	the	Ministry	of	Tourism,	
Culture	and	Creative	Arts	(MOTCCA)	reflecting	the	bundling	of	tourism,	culture	and	the	
creative	arts	sectors.		Discussions	are	currently	underway	to	consider	how	best	to	fit	all	
three	sectors	within	a	new	coherent	policy	and	plan.	
Enduring challenges to tourism planning in Ghana – with specific reference to 
the implementation of the Ghana National Tourism Development Plan 2013-
2027 
Over	the	years,	tourism	planning	in	Ghana	has	been	faced	with	numerous	challenges	in	
terms	of	implementation.	Five	key	challenges	can	be	identified	from	the	analysis	above	
on	the	tourism	planning	experience.	Firstly,	the	political	and	economic	instabilities	
experienced	in	the	late	1960s	and	late	1980s	delayed	the	take‐off	of	tourism	
development.	Investors	and	tourists	alike	were	discouraged	from	visiting	an	unstable	
political	environment.	This	stalled	attempts	at	implementing	tourism	plans.	The	second	
challenge	has	been	poorly	designed	institutional	arrangements.	The	high	level	of	
fragmentation	in	both	public	and	private	institutions	involved	in	the	tourism	sector	has	
hindered	effective	collaboration	and	coordination	in	tourism	planning	and	
development	(Adu‐Ampong,	2014).	This	is	linked	to	the	issue	of	an	unstable	political	
environment	that	meant	that	the	mandate	and	functions	of	tourism	institutions	were	
constantly	being	realigned	to	meet	short	term	political	goals.		
The	third	main	challenge	to	tourism	planning	in	Ghana	has	been	the	absence	of	
legislation	to	provide	political	and	legal	backing	to	tourism	plans.	There	is	as	yet	no	
legally	binding	National	Tourism	Policy	and	hence	the	implementation	of	tourism	plans	
lack	regulatory	enforcement.	Subsequent	governments	are	under	no	legal	obligation	to	
commit	to	plan	implementation.	The	issue	of	financing	is	the	fourth	main	challenge	to	
tourism	planning	in	Ghana.	Budgetary	allocation	to	the	tourism	ministry	for	plan	
implementation	and	projects	remain	inadequate.	With	limited	government	investment	
to	open	up	new	areas	through	infrastructural	projects	like	building	roads,	extending	
water	lines	and	electricity,	private	investment	has	been	slow	and	tend	to	flow	into	
already	developed	areas	in	the	Coastal/Central	zone	as	advocated	in	the	first	15‐year	
1975	Tourism	Master	Plan.	The	final	challenge	facing	tourism	planning	in	Ghana	has	
been	deficiencies	in	the	quality	and	quantity	of	available	human	resource	in	view	of	the	
required	needs	of	the	sector.	This	lack	of	capacity	in	both	professional	and	vocational	
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roles	in	the	tourism	and	hospitality	sector	constrains	the	effective	development	and	
implementation	of	tourism	plans	and	strategies.	There	is,	for	instance,	no	national	hotel	
training	school	at	this	moment	and	the	Hotel,	Tourism	and	Catering	Training	Institute	
(HOTCATT)	is	unable	to	live	out	its	mandate	due	to	their	financial	and	logistical	
challenges	(see	discussion	below).	
Given	all	five	main	issues	outlined	above,	the	implementation	of	the	GNTDP	2013‐2027	
faces	a	number	of	challenges.		The	primary	challenge	is	that	the	GNTDP	2013‐2027	is	
yet	to	be	adopted	as	a	national	legal	document	that	is	binding	on	all	successive	
governments.	Without	a	national	legal	status,	the	plan	remains	an	aspiration	more	than	
anything	else.	Subsequently	it	is	likely	that	no	systematic	implementation	of	the	plan	
will	take	place.	At	best	what	will	happen	is	a	piecemeal	implementation	process.	
Related	to	this	challenge	is	the	fact	that	successive	governments	have	different	views	of	
what	the	tourism	sector	should	be	about.	With	the	constant	changes	to	the	portfolio	of	
the	tourism	ministry,	it	is	possible	that	successive	governments	might	come	with	
different	agendas	that	are	not	in	line	with	the	plan.	Indeed	the	latest	realignment	to	the	
Ministry	of	Tourism,	Culture	and	Creative	Arts	after	the	GNTDP	2013‐2027	was	
developed	means	the	culture	and	creative	arts	aspects	will	have	to	be	reviewed	and	
extended.	However,	with	the	Ghana	National	Tourism	Policy	of	2006	still	a	seventh	
draft,	it	will	not	be	surprising	should	the	GNTDP	2013‐2027	remain	unchanged	and	
hence	not	fully	implemented	to	reflect	the	new	sector	realignment.		
The	issue	of	funding	also	remains	a	critical	challenge	to	the	full	implementation	of	the	
plan.	For	a	majority	of	the	projects	and	actions	slated	to	be	carried	in	the	first	5	years	of	
the	plan,	there	is	no	clear	indication	of	where	the	sources	of	funding	are	to	come	from.	
This	is	a	serious	challenge	especially	in	instances	where	more	than	one	institution	is	
stated	as	being	responsible	for	actualising	the	projects	and/or	actions.	It	is	already	well	
established	that	the	Ministry	of	Tourism	since	its	establishment	has	been	underfunded	
and	suffers	from	low	budgetary	allocations.22	Therefore	the	failure	of	the	plan	to	
indicate	where	the	needed	funds	are	going	to	come	from	represents	a	formidable	
challenge	to	the	implementation	of	these	projects.	For	the	GNTDP	2013‐2027	to	be	
																																																								
22	Interview	with	Nana	Oduro	Kwarteng,	Chief	Director,	Ministry	of	Tourism,	Culture	and	
Creative	Arts,	Accra,	23.10.2014;	Interview	with	Dr.	Joel	Sonne,	Director	of	Projects,	Ministry	of	
Tourism,	Culture	and	Creative	Arts,	Accra,	16.09.2014;	Interview	with	Mrs.	Olivia	Opoku‐
Adomah,	Director	of	Research,	Statistics	and	Information,	Ministry	of	Tourism,	Culture	and	
Creative	Arts,	20.10.2014	
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implemented	successfully	and	for	it	to	contribute	to	economic	development	and	
poverty	reduction	there	is	an	urgent	need	to	address	these	challenges	and	overcome	
them.	Much	hope	is	now	pinned	on	the	new	Tourism	Development	Fund	in	this	regard.	
		
4.4 The tourism sector in Ghana: resources, institutions and 
governance capacity 
Governability	can	be	conceived	of	as	the	balancing	of	governance	needs	of	resources,	
individuals,	groups	and	the	capacity	of	governors	to	meet	these	needs.	Thus	the	
governability	of	the	tourism	sector	is	concerned	with	assessing	how	likely	the	tourism	
sector	can	be	successfully	governed	to	bring	about	desired	outcomes	given	the	set	of	
tourism	resources,	the	institutional	arrangements	and	the	capacity	of	governors	within	
these	institutions.	I	explore	the	governability	of	the	tourism	sector	in	Ghana	in	this	
section	and	set	out	the	discussion	under	three	subsections.	The	first	subsection	
provides	a	portrait	of	the	realities	of	tourism	development	in	Ghana.	In	the	second	
subsection,	I	offer	a	description	of	the	various	tourism	resources	–	i.e.	the	system‐to‐be‐
governed	component	–	followed	by	an	analyses	of	the	various	institutions‐as‐governors	
which	are	in	place.	In	the	final	subsection,	I	evaluate	the	governance	process	in	the	
form	of	communication,	collaboration	and	coordination	within	and	between	the	
various	tourism	related	institutions.		
The contemporary reality of tourism in Ghana: markets, visitors and earnings 
The	tourism	sector	in	Ghana	continues	its	trajectory	as	the	fastest	growing	economic	
sector	of	the	economy	since	the	turn	of	the	new	millennium	(see	figures	11	and	12	
below).	Starting	from	an	insignificant	entry	into	and	contribution	to	national	accounts,	
the	tourism	sector	rose	to	become	the	third	highest	foreign	exchange	earner	for	the	
country	in	2010	(Adu‐Ampong,	2014).		
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	Figure	11International	tourist	arrivals	and	receipts	for	Ghana	1993‐2011	
Having	been	overtaken	by	remittances,	the	sector	is	currently	the	fourth	highest	GDP	
earner.	It	is	estimated	that	in	the	year	ending	2013	the	travel	and	tourism	sector	made	
a	direct	contribution	of	US	$1.3	billion	and	a	total	contribution	of	US	$	3	billion	to	GDP	
which	is	about	3%	of	total	GDP	and	7.2%	of	total	GDP	respectively	(WTTC,	2014).	In	his	
State	of	the	Nation	Address,	the	Ghanaian	President	in	2014	however	noted	that	the	
tourism	and	creative	sector	contributed	US	$	1.9	billion	representing	4.7%	of	total	GDP	
(Adu‐Ampong,	2015).	Although	there	are	differences	in	total	figures	due	to	differences	
in	methodology,	what	is	clear	is	that	the	tourism	sector	in	Ghana	is	currently	a	
significant	contributor	to	economic	growth	and	development.	Nonetheless,	the	
question	remains,	to	what	extent	do	local	communities	benefit	from	the	tourism	sector	
and	its	contribution	to	the	national	GDP.		
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					Figure	12	Net	tourism	forex	earnings	and	GDP	contribution	in	Ghana	1995‐2011	
In	order	to	fully	understand	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	and	its	subsequent	
implementation	challenges,	it	first	needs	to	be	situated	within	the	realities	of	tourism	in	
Ghana.	This	is	in	terms	of	the	key	source	market	of	tourists	to	Ghana,	their	travel	
patterns	and	itineraries	and	the	role	of	tour	operators	in	shaping	the	distribution	of	
tourists	across	the	various	tourism	attractions	in	the	country.	In	this	section,	I	outline	
the	main	market	segments	of	tourists	that	visit	Ghana,	the	key	generating	regions,	the	
patterns	of	tourists	flow	within	the	country	and	the	role	of	local	tour	guides	and	
operators.	It	should	be	noted	that	one	of	the	key	challenges	facing	the	Ghanaian	
tourism	sector	is	the	issue	of	accurate	and	up‐to‐date	statistics.	The	section	therefore	
relies	on	the	statistics	and	information	provided	through	the	Ghana	National	Tourism	
Development	Plan	2013‐2027.	These	statistics	are	aggregation	of	figures	from	the	
Ghana	Immigration	Service,	the	Ghana	Tourism	Authority,	the	Ghana	Statistical	Service,	
the	Ghana	Revenue	Authority	and	the	Bank	of	Ghana.		
International tourist arrivals, key source regions and patterns of flow in 
Ghana 
The	Ghana	Tourism	Authority	(GTA)	estimates	that	the	one	million	mark	of	
international	arrivals	was	passed	in	2011.	However,	figures	from	the	Ghana	
Immigration	Service	(GIS)	do	not	appear	to	concur	with	this.	The	estimate	of	the	GTA	is	
based	on	projections	while	that	of	the	GIS	is	based	on	self‐completed	entry/exit	card	
for	international	arrivals.	In	the	year	ending	2014,	international	tourist	arrivals	in	
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Ghana	were	recorded	by	the	World	Bank	to	be	around	1,093,000.	This	figure	is	an	
aggregation	of	data	from	the	World	Tourism	Organisation,	Yearbook	of	Tourism	
Statistics,	Compendium	of	Tourism	Statistics	and	other	data	files.	The	figure	below	
from	the	GIS	depicts	the	number	of	international	arrivals	in	Ghana	up	to	the	year	
ending	2011.	
	Figure	13	International	arrivals	in	Ghana,	2000‐2011	(excludes	people	travelling	with	Ghanaian	
passports)	
Source:	Ghana	Immigration	Service	
The	composition	of	international	tourists	arriving	in	Ghana	is	concentrated	in	a	few	key	
markets	with	the	top	8	countries	making	up	60%	of	all	foreign	arrivals	in	2011.	Figures	
from	both	the	GTA	and	the	GIS	shows	that	that	has	not	been	any	major	change	in	the	
international	tourist	market	structure	for	Ghana	since	2005.	The	key	source	markets	in	
2011	were	Nigeria	(19%),	the	USA	(13%),	UK	(9%),	Cote	d’Ivoire	(5%),	India	(3%),	
Germany	(3%),	South	Africa	(3%)	and	the	Netherlands	(3%).	The	motivations	of	
international	tourists	to	Ghana	are	varied.	Nonetheless,	a	2009	report	of	the	Ghana	
Tourism	Authority	(GTA)	shows	that	the	main	purposes	of	visits	for	40%	of	arrivals	are	
professionally	related	travel	–	businesses,	conferences,	study/training.	Visiting	friends	
and	relatives	(VFR)	is	the	second	most	important	travel	motivation	(25%	of	arrivals)	
with	leisure	holiday	travel	coming	in	as	a	third	main	purpose	with	19%	of	arrivals.	
Thus	in	terms	of	leveraging	tourism	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction,	it	would	appear	that	professional‐related	travel	in	the	form	of	business,	
conferences	and	education	tourism	represents	a	viable	route.			
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The	most	common	itinerary	of	international	tourists	in	Ghana	tend	to	revolve	around	
the	triangle	of	Accra‐Kumasi‐Cape	Coast	with	the	length	of	stay	varying	between	2	
nights	and	6	weeks.	These	cities	have	varied	tourism	products	and	assets	and	therefore	
are	at	the	core	of	tourism	development	and	activities	in	Ghana	(see	discussion	below	on	
key	tourism	resources).	It	is	this	core	triangle	that	shapes	the	tourist	experience	in	
Ghana	as	the	flagship	attractions	on	offer	are	located	in	these	areas	such	as	long	
stretches	of	pristine	beaches,	the	Cape	Coast	and	Elmina	Castles,	the	Kakum	National	
Park	and	Lake	Bosomtwi	among	others.	Due	to	the	short	average	length	of	stay,	most	
international	tourist	itineraries	tend	to	be	packed	full	and	congested.	This	means	that	
in	many	instances,	tourists	are	moved	from	one	attraction	to	the	other	with	little	time	
for	meaningful	contact	and	interaction	with	local	communities.	This	is	especially	the	
case	with	the	Accra‐Cape	Coast	side	of	the	tourism	triangle.	A	number	of	tour	operators	
design	packages	in	such	a	way	that	tourists	embark	on	a	same‐day	return	trip	from	
Accra	to	the	Cape	Coast	area.		Many	tourism	businesses	in	and	around	Cape	Coast	for	
instance,	complain	about	the	fact	that	tourists	are	not	staying	long	enough	in	the	local	
economy	to	bring	about	the	desired	benefits	of	tourism.	As	the	President	of	the	Central	
Region	Ghana	Hotels	Association	explained,		
“I	will	say	that	is	part	of	business	activities	in	the	Central	Region	because	looking	
at	night	life	in	Cape	Coast	it’s	not	like	the	one	you	have	in	Accra.	Yah,	so	when	you	
look	at	it,	you	go	to	the	Castle,	you	go	to	the	Kakum	[National	Park],	you	go	to	the	
Forts	and	all	those	slave	areas,	after	you	are	done	at	the	end	of	the	day	you	would	
like	to	go	and	sit	somewhere	to	be	entertainment	which	we	don’t	have	in	Cape	
Coast.	So	obviously	they	would	like	to	go	to	Accra	whereby	they	have	these	posh	
restaurants,	whereby	there	are	live	bands,	discotheques	and	then	yeah,	we	don’t	
have	those	things	in	Cape	Coast.	So	that	is	one	thing	we	are	lacking	in	the	Central	
Region”23	
The	close	proximity	between	Accra	and	Cape	Coast,	and	the	fact	that	there	are	limited	
night	time	leisure	and	recreation	activities	in	the	Cape	Coast	municipality	means	that	as	
much	as	possible,	tour	operators	and	tour	guides	maintain	an	itinerary	that	returns	
tourists	back	to	Accra	on	the	same	day.	The	challenge	has	been	to	diversify	tourism	
attractions	in	the	Cape	Coast	metropolis	and	surrounding	areas	that	can	capture	the	
interests	of	tourists	for	at	least	an	overnight	stay	in	the	area.24	It	is	within	such	a	
																																																								
23	Interview	with	Mr.	Ben	Aidoo,	Central	Regional	President,	Ghana	Hotels	Association,	
30.11.2014	
24	Interview	with	Mr.	Alex	Boakye,	Regional	Director,	Ghana	Tourism	Authority,	Central	Region,	
10.09.2014	
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context	that	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	needs	to	be	understood	and	assessed	in	terms	of	
its	ambition	of	utilising	tourism	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.		
	
Tourism as a system-to-be-governed 
As	explained	in	Chapter	2	of	this	thesis,	a	system‐to‐be‐governed	refers	to	the	set	of	
resources	and	network	of	users	and	stakeholders	within	a	given	system.	The	
boundaries	of	any	given	sector	as	a	system‐to‐be‐governed	–	but	especially	for	a	highly	
fragmented	sector	as	tourism	–	are	fuzzy	and	is	thus	determined	by	the	perspectives	of	
given	actors	at	specific	times.	The	set	of	resources	that	make	up	the	system‐to‐be‐
governed	are	not	necessarily	self‐evident	but	they	acquire	relevance	through	the	
attribution	of	meanings	and	values	given	by	actors.	Thus	it	is	only	through	stakeholder	
interactions	that	a	set	of	resources	get	imbued	with	meanings	and	given	value	as	
tourism	resources.		
Consequently	in	outlining	the	boundaries	of	Ghana’s	tourism	sector	as	a	system‐to‐be‐
governed,	I	rely	on	the	perspectives	of	actors	interviewed	as	well	as	the	definitions	
offered	within	national	planning	and	policy	documents.	To	do	this	I	categorise	the	set	of	
tourism	resources	in	Ghana	under	the	three	main	headings	–	1)	Historical/Cultural	and	
UNESCO	World	Heritage	Sites;	2)	Natural	resources	and	protected	areas	and;	3)	
Akwaaba:	the	proverbial	Ghanaian	hospitality.	These	categories	should	not	be	seen	in	
isolation	because	there	are	many	overlaps	between	them	(see	appendix	C).	These	
tourism	resources	tend	to	be	mutually	constitutive	when	it	comes	to	how	Ghana	is	
perceived	as	a	tourism	destination.		
Historical/Cultural	and	UNESCO	World	Heritage	Sites:	In	1979	the	forts	and	castles	
dotted	along	the	coast	of	Ghana	were	granted	World	Heritage	Site	(WHS)	status	by	the	
World	Heritage	Committee	under	selection	criteria	(IV)	–	‘to	be	an	outstanding	example	
of	a	type	of	building,	architectural	or	technological	ensemble	or	landscape	which	
illustrates	(a)	significant	stage(s)	in	human	history’.	These	sites	spread	across	the	Volta,	
Greater	Accra,	Central	and	Western	Regions	of	Ghana	consist	of	3	castles,	15	forts,	4	
forts	in	partial	ruins,	5	ruins	with	visible	structures	and	2	sites	with	traces	of	former	
fortifications.	The	most	developed	of	these	sites	for	tourism	are	the	Cape	Coast	and	
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Elmina	Castles	in	the	Central	Region	in	consonance	with	the	1975‐1990	tourism	plan	as	
discussed	previously.		Indeed	there	is	a	common	misperception	among	Ghanaians	and	
tourists	that	it	is	only	the	Cape	Coast	and	Elmina	Castles	that	are	UNESCO	WHS.25	In	
addition	to	these	castles	and	forts	Ashanti	Traditional	Buildings	(ATBs)	in	the	Ashanti	
Region	of	Ghana	were	also	inscribed	onto	the	World	Heritage	List	in	1980.	However,	
ATBs	have	not	been	fully	developed	as	tourism	resources	compared	to	the	castles	and	
forts.	This	is	an	example	of	a	resource	that	require	further	government	investment	in	
order	to	be	fully	developed	as	an	attraction.	
The	fact	of	being	the	first	country	south	of	the	Sahara	to	gain	independence	in	1957	and	
the	historical	role	played	by	the	country	in	Pan‐Africanism	and	African	unity	represent	
rich	historical	tourism	capital	for	the	country.	This	is	underscored	by	the	post‐
independence	branding	of	the	country	as	the	Black	Star	of	Africa.	This	status	was	given	
new	meaning	when	the	country	became	the	first	African	country	visited	by	the	first	US	
President	with	African	heritage	‐	Barack	Obama	and	his	family	in	2009.	The	cultural	
capital	of	Ghana	that	attracts	both	domestic	and	international	visitors	every	year	
include	traditional	Ghanaian	institutions	like	chieftaincy,	festivals	and	everyday	way	of	
life.	Yearly	festivals	of	different	ethnic	groups	like	Ogua	Fetu	Afahye	in	Cape	Coast,	
Bakatue	in	Elmina	and	Hogbetsotso	festival	in	Anlo	attract	large	numbers	of	both	
domestic	and	international	tourists.26	There	is	also	the	annual	Emancipation	Day	and	
biennial	PANAFEST	celebrations	that	attract	a	high	number	of	Africans	in	the	Diaspora.	
Both	events	are	centred	on	the	slavery	heritage	of	Cape	Coast	and	Elmina	Castles	as	
well	as	incorporating	traditional	elements.	Notwithstanding	the	overall	diversity	on	
offer	in	terms	of	tourist	attractions,	the	core	tourism	resources	in	Ghana	is	represented	
by	the	UNESCO	WHS	and	the	historical	legacy	of	the	colonial	era	in	addition	to	
traditional	culture	and	festivals.27	It	has	been	argued	that	“European	heritage,	colonial	
legacies,	and	traditional	institutions	and	festivities	are	the	bricks	and	mortar	of	Ghana’s	
																																																								
25	Interview	with	Raymond	Agbo,	Deputy	Director	(Museums),	GMMB,	Accra,	13.08.2014	
26	Interview	with	Michael	Attipoe,	Director	(Finance	and	Administration),	Ghana	National	
Commission	on	Culture,	Accra,	14.08.2014;	Interview	with	Eric	Ohene‐Larbi,	Central	Regional	
Deputy	Director	(Administration),	Centre	for	National	Culture,	Cape	Coast,	05.09.2014	
27	Interview	with	Kwaku	Passah,	President	of	Tour	Guides	Association	of	Ghana,	Accra,	
21.08.2014	
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tourism	industry”	(Addo,	2011:	421).	The	sense	is	that	“without	culture	then	there	is	
not	tourism…so	tourism	and	culture	are	like	bedfellows”28	in	Ghana.		
Natural	resources	and	protected	areas:	There	are	two	major	ecological	zones	that	make	
up	the	natural	landscape	of	Ghana	–	the	high	forest	zone	in	the	South	West	and	the	
savannah	in	the	North	East.	The	high	forest	zone	represents	about	a	third	of	the	land	
area	of	Ghana	and	consists	of	266	gazetted	forest	reserves	(Derkyi,	2012).	There	are	16	
Protected	Areas	(PAs)	in	Ghana	that	are	under	the	jurisdiction	of	the	Wildlife	Division	
of	the	Forestry	Commission.	These	PAs	are	made	up	of	7	National	Parks,	6	Resource	
Reserves,	2	Wildlife	Sanctuaries	and	1	Strict	Nature	Reserve.	The	Wildlife	Division	of	
the	Forestry	Commission	is	also	responsible	for	the	management	of	5	coastal	Ramsar	
Sites	and	2	Zoos	in	Accra	and	Kumasi.	It	is	these	that	form	the	bulk	of	the	natural	
attraction	base	of	tourism	resources	in	Ghana.	In	addition	to	these	are	the	long	and	
wide	sandy	beaches	along	most	of	Ghana’s	coast	which	in	many	places	are	in	pristine	
condition.	The	Lake	Volta	as	the	largest	man‐made	lake	in	the	world,	a	number	of	
spectacular	waterfalls,	crocodile	pond	in	Paga	and	the	Stilt	Village	in	Nzulezu	are	other	
natural	resource	attractions	for	tourism.	
There	are	currently	no	natural	resource	based	attractions	in	Ghana	that	have	been	
designated	as	UNESCO	WHS.	However	three	key	attractions	–	the	Kakum	National	Park,	
the	Mole	National	Park	and	the	Nzulezu	Stilt	Settlement	have	since	2000	being	put	on	
the	UNESCO	tentative	list.	These	sites	are	considered	to	be	suitable	for	inscription	to	
the	final	list	but	the	procedure	is	yet	to	begin	in	earnest.29	Notwithstanding	the	
diversity	of	natural	resources	on	offer,	it	is	only	a	few	sites	that	have	well	developed	
tourist	and	visitor	facilities.	Notable	among	these	sites	include	the	Mole	National	Park,	
the	Kakum	National	Park	with	the	canopy	walkway,	the	Boabeng‐Fiema	Monkey	
Sanctuary	and	the	Shai	Hills	Resource	Reserve.	These	resources	are	surrounded	by	a	
complex	web	of	users	and	stakeholders	with	a	diversity	of	roles	and	responsibilities.	
These	include	the	Wildlife	Division	of	the	Forestry	Commission,	the	Ghana	Heritage	
Conservation	Trust,	the	Nature	Conservation	and	Resource	Centre	and	community	
groups	and	individuals	whose	livelihoods	involve	the	use	of	these	resource.	
Coordination	and	collaboration	among	these	stakeholders	tend	to	be	a	challenge	which	
																																																								
28	Interview	with	Eric	Ohene‐Larbi,	Central	Regional	Deputy	Director	(Administration),	Centre	
for	National	Culture,	Cape	Coast,	05.09.2014	
29		Ghana	National	Tourism	Development	Plan	2013‐2027	
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have	impeded	the	effective	development	of	the	identified	triangle	of	tourism	resources	
around	the	sites	in	Accra,	Kumasi	and	Cape	Coast/Elmina30	(See	figure	14	for	an	
overview	of	key	tourism	resources	in	Ghana).	
Akwaaba:	the	proverbial	Ghanaian	hospitality:	If	the	bricks	and	mortar	of	Ghana’s	
tourism	industry	consist	of	the	cultural	capital	and	UNESCO	WHS	then	the	decorative	
painting	is	made	from	the	proverbial	Ghanaian	hospitality	afforded	to	visitors.	
Akwaaba	–	meaning	a	‘warm	welcome’	is	the	first	word	most	tourists	will	encounter	in	
Ghana.	It	is	this	warmth	that	ensures	that	there	are	many	repeat	visits	to	Ghana.	There	
are	also	a	number	of	visitors	who	choose	Ghana	through	word‐of‐mouth	testimony	
from	those	who	have	experienced	this	warmth.	Currently	the	country	is	marketed	with	
the	brand	tagline	of	“Ghana:	Culture,	Warmth	and	Much	More”.	The	friendly	nature	of	
people	and	the	safe	and	secure	way	in	which	tourists	are	able	to	move	about	(Dayour,	
2013),	represents	an	essential	part	of	the	tourism	resources	available	in	the	country.	
While	this	sense	of	warm	hospitality	is	embodied	within	communities	and	‘enforced’	
through	traditional	authority,	formal	hospitality	establishments	do	not	always	hold	up	
to	this	ideal.	This	is	mainly	due	to	the	amorphous	development	of	the	hospitality	sector	
in	Ghana	and	the	lack	of	proper	hotel	training	institution	available	in	the	country.31	
Consequently	the	country	has	gained	the	unfortunate	reputation	as	being	an	‘expensive	
destination’	due	to	the	high	cost	of	hospitality	services	relative	to	quality.	The	
perceived	poor	standards	of	service	and	professionalism	in	the	hospitality	sector	lead	
to	low	rates	of	tourist	satisfaction.		
																																																								
30	Ghana	National	Tourism	Development	Plan	2013‐2027;	Interview	with	Enoch	Ashie,	Park	
Manager,	Kakum	National	Park,	Kakum,	11.09.2014;	Interview	with	Michael	Attipoe,	Director	
(Finance	and	Administration),	Ghana	National	Commission	on	Culture,	Accra,	14.08.2014	
31	Interview	with	Joseph	Mensah,	Hospitality	Lecturer	(Ghana	Institute	of	Management	and	
Public	Administration)	and	CEO	of	HospitalityPlus	Ltd.,	Accra,	18.09.2014;	Interview	with	Judith	
Abase,	Acting	Director,	Hotel	Catering	and	Tourism	Training	Institute,	Accra,	17.09.2014	
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	Figure	14	Map	of	Ghana	showing	key	tourism	resources	
(Source:	Ghana	Ministry	of	Tourism	http://www.touringghana.com/tourist	sites.asp)	
 
Tourism governing system: institutions and governors 
In	line	with	the	complexities	of	the	tourism	system‐to‐be‐governed,	the	tourism	
governing	system	in	Ghana	is	a	complex	one.	The	tourism	governing	system	is	made	up	
of	the	set	of	institutions	and	steering	mechanisms	through	which	the	development	of	
the	tourism	sector	is	managed.	In	this	section	I	outline	some	of	the	key	governing	
institutions	in	the	tourism	sector	of	Ghana	and	their	steering	mechanisms.	A	look	at	the	
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roles	and	responsibilities	of	public,	private	and	third‐sector	institutions	involved	in	
tourism	will	make	evident	the	stakeholder	governance	capacity	in	terms	of	the	fit	
between	images,	instruments	and	action	potential.	Importantly	the	discussion	in	this	
subsection	will	help	to	identify	how	the	goals	and	visions	of	the	various	governing	
institutions	relate	to	each	other	–	i.e.	whether	they	differ,	compete	or	co‐operate.	This	
will	help	in	highlighting	the	extent	to	which	tourism	governance	intersects	with	local	
economic	development	planning	and	governance.	I	begin	with	public	institutions	
followed	by	the	private	sector	institutions	and	finally	civil	society	institutions.	
Ministry	of	Tourism,	Culture	and	Creative	Arts:	Prior	to	the	establishment	of	a	
substantive	Ministry	of	Tourism	in	1993,	tourism	management	was	an	appendage	to	
the	Ministry	of	Culture	and	then	to	the	Ministry	of	Trade	and	Industry	in	the	1960s	to	
1980s.32	The	mandate	of	the	ministry	has	been	to	oversee	the	development,	promotion	
and	coordination	of	all	tourism	related	activities	in	Ghana.	As	highlighted	in	the	earlier	
sections	of	this	chapter,	the	tourism	ministry	has	undergone	a	number	of	realignment	
and	changes	to	the	focus	of	this	fundamental	mandate.		An	expanded	Ministry	of	
Tourism	and	the	Modernisation	of	the	Capital	City	(MOTMCC)	came	into	existence	
between	2003	and	2006.	In	2006	it	became	the	Ministry	of	Tourism	and	Diaspora	
Relations	(MOTDR)	in	time	for	the	launching	of	the	Joseph	Project	and	the	50th	
Independence	anniversary	of	Ghana	and	the	yearlong	celebrations	that	sought	to	
reunite	Africans	in	the	Diaspora,	with	Ghana	as	a	tourism	destination	positioned	as	the	
gateway	for	this	homecoming.	Functions	were	streamlined	and	the	ministry	reverted	
back	to	being	just	Ministry	of	Tourism	with	a	change	of	government	in	2009.	In	2013	
the	mandate	of	the	ministry	was	realigned	to	become	the	Ministry	of	Tourism,	Culture	
and	the	Creative	Arts	(MOTCCA)	following	the	end	of	one	political	cycle	that	brought	in	
a	new	government.	
The	vision	and	mandate	of	MOTCCA	is	to	develop	tourism	with	culture	serving	as	the	
fulcrum	and	in	partnership	with	key	stakeholders.33	Specifically	the	ministry	is	to	
“develop	sustainable	tourism	pivoted	on	Ghanaian	culture	and	creative	arts	as	a	key	
																																																								
32	Interview	with	Michael	Attipoe,	Director	(Finance	and	Administration),	Ghana	National	
Commission	on	Culture,	Accra,	14.08.2014;	see	also	Tourism	Sector	Medium	Term	Development	
Plan	2010‐2013	
33	Interview	with	Nana	Oduro	Kwarteng,	Chief	Director,	Ministry	of	Tourism,	Culture	and	
Creative	Arts,	Accra,	23.10.2014	
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driver	to	accelerated	national	development”.34	In	line	with	this	new	image	the	
governance	instruments	and	action	potential	of	MOTCCA	has	been	expanded	to	14	state	
and	quasi‐state	agencies	including	the	traditional	implementation	agencies	of	the	
Ghana	Tourism	Authority	(GTA)	and	the	Hotel	Catering	and	Tourism	Training	Institute	
(HOTCATT).	Although	the	instruments	available	to	the	MOTCCA	to	translate	and	link	
the	vision	into	action	have	remained	the	same	–	namely	legislation,	regulation	and	the	
development	of	policies	and	programmes	including	direct	investment	–	the	expanded	
number	of	agencies	brought	under	its	remit	potentially	increases	the	actions	that	can	
be	taken	to	put	instruments	into	effect.	This	entails	adequate	mobilisation	of	support	
and	socio‐political	will	among	key	stakeholders	which	is	unfortunately	not	always	the	
case.			
The	main	steering	mechanism	of	the	MOTCCA	in	governing	the	tourism	sector	is	one	of	
a	top‐down	approach	although	there	are	sometimes	elements	of	co‐management	
involved.	Currently	heads	of	the	14	agencies	under	the	ministry	participate	in	senior	
management	meetings.	However	there	tend	to	be	infrequent	meetings	of	the	inter‐
ministerial	advisory	committee	headed	by	MOTCCA.35	This	presents	a	number	of	
challenges	to	effective	communication,	collaboration	and	coordination	among	
stakeholders.	Moreover,	outcomes	of	these	high	level	meetings	are	not	effectively	
communicated	to	agencies	at	the	regional	and	district	levels.	A	related	issue	is	that	the	
MOTCCA	suffers	from	high	turnover	rates	of	ministers,	deputies	and	chief	directors.36	
This	instability	of	leadership	at	the	ministry	affects	policy	continuity.37	Some	
stakeholders	express	misgivings	about	the	appropriateness	of	some	of	the	new	
agencies	brought	under	the	ministry.	Some	agencies	like	the	National	Commission	on	
Culture	and	the	Ghana	Museums	and	Monuments	Board	enjoyed	a	semi‐ministerial	
status	prior	to	their	incorporation	under	the	MOTCCA.	These	agencies	therefore	see	
themselves	as	only	advising	the	MOTCCA.	Thus	if	“…the	minister	[of	MOTCCA]	wants	the	
commission	[Ghana	National	Commission	on	Culture]	to	do	[something]	she	writes	a	
																																																								
34	MOTCAA	(2016)	Vision,	http://www.motcca.gov.gh/index.php/2015‐02‐10‐02‐45‐28/2015‐
02‐10‐02‐48‐32/2015‐02‐10‐02‐56‐53	(accessed	on	23.02.2016)	
35	Interview	with	Nana	Oduro	Kwarteng,	Chief	Director,	Ministry	of	Tourism,	Culture	and	
Creative	Arts,	Accra,	23.10.2014	
36	Interview	with	Dr.	Joel	Sonne,	Director	of	Projects,	Ministry	of	Tourism,	Culture	and	Creative	
Arts,	Accra,	16.09.2014;	Interview	with	Charles	Osei‐Bonsu,	Acting	Chief	Executive	Director,	
Ghana	Tourism	Authority,	Accra,	17.09.2014;	Ghana	National	Tourism	Development	Plan	2013‐
2027	
37	Interview	with	Senior	Officer	at	the	Ghana	Tourism	Authority,	Accra,	20.08.2014;		
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letter”.38	This	is	because	unlike	internal	departments	the	minister	cannot	simply	
instruct	agencies	to	carry	out	tasks	without	first	putting	it	in	writing	for	the	agencies	to	
consider.		
Ghana	Tourism	Authority:	The	genesis	of	the	Ghana	Tourism	Authority	(GTA)	is	found	
in	1962	when	the	State	Hotel	and	Tourist	Corporation	(SHTC)	was	set	up	to	develop	
and	manage	hotels	and	other	catering	guest	houses	around	the	country	(Asiedu,	1997).	
The	SHTC	was	in	1968	split	up	into	the	Ghana	Tourist	Corporation	(GTC)	and	the	State	
Hotels	Corporation	(SHC).	In	1973	the	GTC	became	the	Ghana	Tourist	Control	Board	
(GTCB)	and	the	Ghana	Tourist	Development	Corporation	(GTDC).	In	1977	the	GTCB	
was	made	the	Ghana	Tourist	Board	(GTB)	and	tasked	with	the	overall	development	of	
the	tourism	industry	including	planning,	regulation	and	promotion.	Its	commercial	
functions	were	placed	under	the	GTDC	because	“the	GTCB	could	not	be	a	player	and	a	
referee	at	the	same	time,	operating	commercial	ventures	in	the	same	industry	in	which	
it	is	the	statutory	regulator”	(Akyeampong,	2006:14).		With	the	setting	up	of	a	
substantive	tourism	ministry	the	GTB	became	the	main	implementation	agency.	In	
2011,	the	GTB	became	the	Ghana	Tourism	Authority	(GTA)	with	enlarged	mandate	
through	the	Tourism	Act	of	2011	(Act	817).			
The	vision	of	the	GTA	is	to	make	Ghana	the	preferred	tourism	destination	capital	of	the	
West	Africa	sub	region	through	developing	a	quality	non‐mass	approach	to	cultural	
heritage	tourism,	ecotourism	and	conference	tourism.	To	accomplish	this,	Act	817	
established	a	Tourism	Development	Fund	(TDF)	to	be	funded	through	a	1%	Tourism	
Levy	on	tourist	services.	The	TDF	is	to	provide	the	decried	lack	of	financial	resources	to	
develop	tourism	facilities	and	infrastructures.	While	the	mechanisms	for	collecting	the	
levy	was	laid	out	from	the	start,	the	mechanisms	for	disbursing	the	funds	had	yet	to	be	
finalised	as	at	the	end	of	fieldwork	in	2015.	The	question	this	raises	is	whether	in	the	
end	the	GTA	will	be	given	enough	power	and	authority	over	the	TDF	to	correspond	
with	its	new	functions.	The	expanded	functions	of	the	GTA	to	include	regulation	of	
attraction	sites	and	tourism	product	development	is	seen	as	a	step	in	the	right	direction	
for	the	tourism	sector	in	Ghana.39	The	GTA	carries	out	its	mandate	through	11	Regional	
																																																								
38	Interview	with	Michael	Attipoe,	Director	(Finance	and	Administration),	Ghana	National	
Commission	on	Culture,	Accra,	14.08.2014	
39	Interview	with	Spencer	Doku,	Manager	for	Planning	and	Business	Development,	Ghana	
Tourism	Authority,	Accra,	14.08.2014;	Interview	with	Nana	Twum	Barima	II,	Manager	for	
Research,	Statistics	and	Information,	Ghana	Tourism	Authority,	Accra,	20.08.2014;	Interview	
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Offices	with	the	Act	817	requiring	the	establishment	of	District	Offices	as	well.	At	the	
moment	however,	the	GTA	is	“experimenting	with	7	Districts	and	the	idea	of	the	
District	Offices	is	to	be	in	close	contact	with	the	district	assemblies	[MMDAs]	and	then	
all	the	relevant	agencies	so	that	they	can	really	form	the	bedrock	of	tourism	
development	and	promotion	within	the	district”.40		
As	the	main	implementation	agency	of	the	MOTCCA,	the	GTA	engages	in	more	
interactions	with	key	stakeholders	in	the	day‐to‐day	regulation	and	management	of	the	
tourism	sector.	In	its	governing	interactions,	the	GTA	relies	mainly	on	regulatory	
instruments	such	as	registration,	licensing	and	accreditation	of	tourism	enterprises.41	
The	main	form	of	interactions	between	the	GTA	and	other	stakeholders	especially	at	
the	destination	level	is	through	communication	but	these	are	typically	confined	to	the	
national	and	regional	levels.	Indeed	due	to	the	logistical	constraints	facing	the	
institution,42	the	existing	forms	of	interactions	among	stakeholders	is	incomplete	and	
not	mutually	supportive	when	it	comes	to	developing	and	improving	tourism	
facilities.43	Consequently	there	is	little	communicative	interaction	between	the	GTA	and	
stakeholders	in	small	towns	and	cities	where	potential	tourism	resources	may	be	
located.	With	the	establishment	of	the	Tourism	Development	Fund	and	the	setting	up	of	
district	offices,	there	are	expectations	that	the	GTA’s	interaction	with	other	
stakeholders	will	be	improved.44	
The	Hotel,	Tourism	and	Catering	Training	Institute:	In	1989	a	training	unit	was	set	up	to	
polish	up	the	skills	of	hotel	staff	to	serve	the	needs	of	officials	and	diplomats	attending	
the	1991	Non‐Aligned	Movement	conference	in	Ghana.45	This	unit	became	formalised	
																																																								
with	Sampson	Donkor,	Deputy	Director	(Finance	and	Administration),	Ghana	Tourism	
Authority,	Accra,	18.08.2014	
40	Interview,	Charles	Osei	Bonsu,	Acting	Executive	Director,	Ghana	Tourism	Authority,	Accra,	
17.09.2014	
41	Interview	with	Alex	Boakye,	Central	Regional	Director,	Ghana	Tourism	Authority,	Cape	Coast,	
10.09.2014;	Tourism	Act,	2011	(Act	817).	
42	Interview	with	Sampson	Donkor,	Deputy	Director	(Finance	and	Administration),	Ghana	
Tourism	Authority,	Accra,	18.08.2014;	Tourism	Sector	Medium‐Term	Development	Plan	2010‐
2013	
43	Interview	with	Alex	Boakye,	Central	Regional	Director,	Ghana	Tourism	Authority,	Cape	Coast,	
10.09.2014:	Ghana	National	Tourism	Development	Plan	2013‐2027	
44	Interview	with	Sampson	Donkor,	Deputy	Director	(Finance	and	Administration),	Ghana	
Tourism	Authority,	Accra,	18.08.2014;	Interview,	Charles	Osei	Bonsu,	Acting	Executive	Director,	
Ghana	Tourism	Authority,	Accra,	17.09.2014;	Interview	with	Spencer	Doku,	Manager	for	
Planning	and	Business	Development,	Ghana	Tourism	Authority,	Accra,	14.08.2014	
45	Interview	with	Judith	Abase,	Acting	Director,	Hotel,	Tourism	and	Catering	Training	Institute,	
Accra,	17.09.2014	
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as	the	Hotel,	Tourism	and	Catering	Training	Institute	(HOTCATT)	at	the	end	of	the	
conference	and	was	later	made	an	implementation	agency	of	Ministry	of	Tourism.	The	
objective	of	HOTCATT	is	to	provide	training	programmes	in	order	to	develop	and	
enhance	the	available	human	resource	for	the	tourism	and	hospitality	industry.		
HOTCATT	provide	training	programmes	for	middle	and	basic	supervisory	roles	
including	front	office,	housekeeping,	kitchen	work	and	tour	guiding	among	others.	
These	training	programmes	are	delivered	at	their	rented	premises	in	Accra	which	was	
meant	to	be	an	interim	location	but	has	remained	a	permanent	place	up	to	this	time.	A	
building	project	started	in	2007	(see	figure	15)	to	provide	a	better	place	for	the	
institute	has	been	left	uncompleted	due	the	effects	of	political	cycles	that	led	to	change	
of	government	and	tourism	ministers	with	differing	policy	focus.46		
	
		Figure	15	The	uncompleted	and	abandoned	building	for	the	Hotel,	Tourism	and	Catering	
Training	Institute	
Source:	Author’s	fieldwork	photo	archives	
In	a	2005	review	it	was	concluded	that	HOTCATT	was	underperforming	due	to	a	lack	of	
resources,	weak	curriculum,	poor	leadership	and	management	among	others.47	
																																																								
46	Off	the	record	conversation	with	a	number	of	tourism	stakeholders.	
47	Ghana	National	Tourism	Development	Plan	2013‐2027	
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Consequently,	the	Ghana	Institute	of	Management	and	Public	Administration	(GIMPA)	
took	over	HOTCATT	after	signing	a	Memorandum	of	Understanding	(MOU)	with	the	
Ministry	of	Tourism	in	2009.	GIMPA	was	expected	to	give	the	image	of	HOTCATT	an	
uplift	while	improving	professional	standards.48	However,	in	2011	the	Ministry	of	
Tourism	took	back	control	of	HOTCATT	due	to	GIMPA	misunderstanding	the	MOU	and	
hence	not	been	able	to	achieve	the	set	objectives.49	This	sudden	abrogation	of	the	MOU	
is	seen	as	having	been	caused	in	part	by	some	“underground	forces”	and	the	“initial	
perception	[among	other	stakeholders]	that	GIMPA	was	expensive	and	therefore	if	they	
link	it	[HOTCATT]	to	GIMPA	can	the	students	pay	[?]”50	Currently	HOTCATT	is	in	a	
transition	stage	and	discussions	are	underway	to	decide	on	new	proposals	for	a	Public‐
Private	Partnership	(PPP)	arrangement.		Ultimately,	the	goal	is	to	establish	a	National	
Hotel	School	in	addition	to	regional	HOTCATT	centres.51	
The	major	form	of	governing	interaction	by	the	HOTCATT	involves	communication,	
collaboration	and	coordination	with	other	stakeholders	especially	the	Ghana	Tourism	
Authority	(GTA),	the	Ghana	Tourist	Development	Company	(GTDC)	and	the	Ghana	
Tourism	Federation	(GHATOF).	The	interaction	with	the	GTA	is	fraught	with	
inconsistencies	due	to	overlapping	roles	and	responsibilities	where	there	should	have	
been	collaboration	and	coordination.	This	long	quote	from	the	Acting	Director	of	
HOTCATT	summarises	some	of	the	tensions	in	stakeholder	interactions;	
Hmmm	clash	of	interests	with	GTA,	I	will	be	honest	with	you	they	actually	set	up	
this	school	when	they	were	GTB	okay.	I	will,	we	were	then	to	train	for	them,	we	
were	actually	with	them.	They	go	and	do	the	inspection	and	we	were	there	as	the	
specialised	human	resource	for	them	to	be	able	to,	because	most	of	these	officers	
at	the	GTB	they	don’t	have	the	hospitality	background.	You	could	have	graduated	
in	Sociology,	that	is	it	but	that	doesn’t	make	you	an	executive	house	keeper,	ahuh	
so	this	was	what	HOTCATT	brought	on	board,	so	it	was	like	if	you	are	going	for	
inspection,	take	them,	we	would	have	gone	as	a	team	so	am	able	to	tell	you	that	
																																																								
48	Interview	with	Judith	Abase,	Acting	Director,	Hotel,	Tourism	and	Catering	Training	Institute,	
Accra,	17.09.2014;	Interview	with	Joseph	Mensah,	Hospitality	Lecturer	(Ghana	Institute	of	
Management	and	Public	Administration)	and	CEO	of	HospitalityPlus	Ltd.,	Accra,	18.09.2014	
49Interview	with	Judith	Abase,	Acting	Director,	Hotel,	Tourism	and	Catering	Training	Institute,	
Accra,	17.09.2014;	Interview	with	Joseph	Mensah,	Hospitality	Lecturer	(Ghana	Institute	of	
Management	and	Public	Administration)	and	CEO	of	HospitalityPlus	Ltd.,	Accra,	18.09.2014;	
Ghana	National	Tourism	Development	Plan	2013‐2027	
50	Interview	with	Joseph	Mensah,	Hospitality	Lecturer	(Ghana	Institute	of	Management	and	
Public	Administration)	and	CEO	of	HospitalityPlus	Ltd.,	Accra,	18.09.2014	
51	Interview	with	Judith	Abase,	Acting	Director,	Hotel,	Tourism	and	Catering	Training	Institute,	
Accra,	17.09.2014;	Interview	with	Joseph	Mensah,	Hospitality	Lecturer	(Ghana	Institute	of	
Management	and	Public	Administration)	and	CEO	of	HospitalityPlus	Ltd.,	Accra,	18.09.2014	
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this	is	that,	in	the	kitchen	I	will	tell	you	the	storage	is	wrong,	this,	look	out	for	this,	
let	us	look	out	for	this,	this	is	how	they	go	about	to	do	it	but	that	has	never	been	
the	case.	Yes,	so	they	do	their	own	thing	and	the,	that,	that,	and	even	they	do	some	
kind	of	trainings,	they,	they	also	do	some	training	that	is	where	such	there	is	
conflict	of	interests	because	we	are	here…	
This	quote	shows	that	a	lack	of	collaboration	and	coordination	between	institutions	
like	the	GTA	and	HOTCATT	has	adverse	effect	on	managing	the	sector.	The	creation	and	
development	of	good	synergy	between	institutions	is	important	because	no	single	
institution	or	stakeholder	has	sufficient	overview	to	deploy	required	governing	
instruments	nor	sufficient	action	potential	to	dominate	unilaterally.		
The	Ghana	Tourist	Development	Company:	The	Ghana	Tourist	Development	Corporation	
is	a	quasi‐private,	quasi‐public	entity	established	in	1973.	It	is	currently	a	limited	
liability	company	called	the	Ghana	Tourist	Development	Company	(GTDC).	The	GTDC	is	
an	agency	under	the	Ministry	of	Tourism,	Culture	and	Creative	Arts	(MOTCCA)	and	is	
supposed	to	be	an	investment	wing	that	sources	for	both	local	and	international	
investment	to	develop	tourist	attractions	in	Ghana.52	The	Ghana	Tourism	Authority	
holds	40%	of	the	shares	of	GTDC	with	the	remaining	60%	made	up	of	shares	of	the	
Bank	of	Ghana,	the	National	Investment	Bank	and	the	State	Insurance	Company.	The	
GTDC	receives	no	subvention	from	the	state	and	must	generate	its	own	operating	and	
investment	funds.53	According	to	the	Deputy	Executive	Director	the	vision	is	to	use	
“GTDC	as	a	tool	to	develop	the	tourism	industry”54	by	promoting	and	mobilising	
investment	and	equity	participation	in	joint	investment	ventures	in	tourism	
development.	Currently	the	GTDC	co‐owns	and	co‐manages	the	Duty	Free	Shop	at	the	
Kotoka	International	Airport	in	Accra,	runs	the	Akuaba	Travel	Agency,	and	a	car	rental	
agency	in	addition	to	managing	three	tourist	receptive	facilities.55		
In	terms	of	governance	interactions	the	GTDC	works	in	close	collaboration	with	the	
MOTCCA	and	other	agencies	under	the	ministry.	Although	not	a	sub‐vented	
																																																								
52	Interview	with	Gideon	Aryeequaye,	Deputy	Executive	Director,	Ghana	Tourist	Development	
Company,	Accra,	12.08.2014	
53	Interview	with	Gideon	Aryeequaye,	Deputy	Executive	Director,	Ghana	Tourist	Development	
Company,	Accra,	12.08.2014;	Interview	with	Spencer	Doku,	Manager	for	Planning	and	Business	
Development,	Ghana	Tourism	Authority,	Accra,	14.08.2014	
54	Interview	with	Gideon	Aryeequaye,	Deputy	Executive	Director,	Ghana	Tourist	Development	
Company,	Accra,	12.08.2014	
55	Interview	with	Gideon	Aryeequaye,	Deputy	Executive	Director,	Ghana	Tourist	Development	
Company,	Accra,	12.08.2014;	Ghana	Tourism	Development	Plan	2013‐2027	
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government	agency,	the	Directors	of	the	GTDC	are	appointed	by	the	President	who	also	
nominates	board	members.56	The	board	of	the	GTDC	has	representation	from	the	GTA	
as	a	shareholder	and	the	other	agencies	that	hold	shares	in	the	company.	This	means	
that	although	it	is	a	quasi‐private	entity	the	activities	of	the	GTDC	is	streamlined	to	
serve	national	interest	in	the	tourism	sector.	The	existing	form	of	interactions	between	
the	GTDC	and	other	agencies	are	therefore	mutually	supportive	and	usually	consistent	
with	the	vision	and	mission	of	the	company.	Since	interactions	are	mostly	at	the	
national	level	as	the	GTDC	has	issues	in	adapting	its	form	of	interactions	to	reach	the	
local	level.		
The	Ghana	Museum	and	Monuments	Board:	The	Ghana	Museum	and	Monument	Board	
(GMMB)	was	established	along	with	the	opening	of	the	National	Museum	of	Ghana	on	
5th	March,	1957	to	be	the	legal	custodian	of	Ghana’s	material	cultural	heritage	including	
both	movable	and	immovable	heritage.	The	mission	and	goal	is	to	acquire,	preserve,	
display	and	document	the	material	cultural	heritage	in	Ghana.	The	GMMB	was	
“equipped	to	chart	the	progress	of	the	new	nation	as	it	went	forward	and	the	collection	
of	memorabilia	to	do	with	the	past	as	an	inspiration	for	the	future”.57	Currently	the	
vision	and	mission	of	GMMB	is	stated	as	“to	be	an	effective,	efficient	and	focused	
institution	in	the	preservation	of	the	material	cultural	heritage	of	Ghana	and	West	
Africa”	and	“…to	acquire,	protect,	conserve	and	document	the	Nation’s	movable	and	
immovable	material	cultural	heritage	for	posterity,	for	the	purposes	of	research	and	
education	of	the	public”	respectively.58	This	mission	of	providing	research	and	
education	to	the	public	on	Ghana’s	heritage	is	where	the	work	of	GMMB	intersects	with	
tourism	both	as	part	of	the	system‐to‐be‐governed	and	as	part	of	the	governing	system.	
This	is	because	the	GMMB	has	the	ultimate	governing	and	management	responsibilities	
over	all	museums	and	cultural	monuments	in	Ghana	including	the	UNESCO	World	
Heritage	Sites	that	are	the	crown	of	Ghana’s	tourist	attraction	resources	(see	discussion	
above	on	tourism	resources	in	Ghana).		
The	core	activity	of	the	GMMB	is	the	management	of	the	museums	and	monuments,	
made	possible	through	its	head	office	in	Accra	and	regional	presence	in	the	Ashanti	
																																																								
56	Interview	with	Gideon	Aryeequaye,	Deputy	Executive	Director,	Ghana	Tourist	Development	
Company,	Accra,	12.08.2014	
57	Interview	with	Dr.	Zagba	Oyortey,	Executive	Director,	Ghana	Museums	and	Monuments	
Board,	Accra,	23.09.2014	
58	GMMB	official	website	http://www.ghanamuseums.org/mission.php	(Accessed	on	
04.03.5016)	
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Region	(Kumasi),	the	Volta	Region	(Ho),	Upper	East	Region	(Bolgatanga),	Upper	West	
Region	(Wa)	and	combined	Central	and	Western	Regions	(Cape	Coast).	The	GMMB	does	
not	see	itself	as	working	necessarily	in	or	for	tourism	and	this	tends	to	be	a	source	of	
clashing	interests	between	itself	and	other	stakeholders	like	the	MOTCCA	and	the	GTA.	
The	Education	Unit	Head	of	the	GMMB	Central	Regional	office	explained	that	“…we	
don’t	have	a	vision	of	tourism	development.	We	have	a	vision	of	maintain[ing]	the	
facility	[Cape	Coast	Castle],	making	sure	that	the	facilities	are	in	good	condition…from	
the	GMMB	point	of	view	we	are	providing	education	so	our	staff	are	not	even	called	
tour	guides	[but	rather	museum	educators	and	school	service	officers]	as	we	are	not	in	
tourism”.59	
The	governance	interactions	of	the	GMMB	with	other	stakeholders	in	the	tourism	
sector	tend	to	be	tense.	While	channels	of	communication	between	stakeholders	exist,	
these	are	often	incomplete,	inconsistent	and	plain	contradictory	interactions.	The	
GMMB	as	a	state	agency	has	been	moved	around	different	ministries	from	education	
through	culture	and	chieftaincy	affairs	to	the	tourism	ministry.60	Given	the	national	and	
internationally	binding	legislation	underpinning	their	mandate	it	is	not	always	easy	to	
make	their	activities	fit	the	agenda	of	other	stakeholders	in	the	tourism	sector.	This	
sometimes	results	in	a	clash	of	perspectives	as	to	how	best	to	utilise	the	cultural	assets	
of	museums	and	monuments	as	tourist	attraction	sites.	The	Executive	Director	of	the	
GMMB	succinctly	summarises	this	stakeholder	conflict	of	interest;	
“…	the	conception	of	a	ministry	of	tourism	of	what	the	forts	and	castles	are	is	
radically	different	from	ours…maybe	conflict	of	interest	is	too	strong	a	word.	
What	they’ve	tried	to	do	subsequently	is	to	try	and	merge	what	our	expectations	
are	or	our	understanding	of	what	we	do	with	theirs,	it’s	not	as	seamlessly	as	it	
could	be	but	it’s	not	irreparable,	it	can,	it	can	be	fixed	because	those	are	the	
present	demands.	You	see,	you	can	see	a	fort	and	a	castle	as	a	place	to	visit	and	a	
place	where	people	will	visit	and	spend	money.	You	can	also	see	the	forts	and	the	
castle	as	the	evidence	of	the	past	which	should,	we	should	conserve,	conserve	so	as	
to	use	to	educate	people,	so	you	see	already	it’s	not	the	numbers	that	will	matter	
to	a	conservationist	as	much	as	they	want	the	thing	to	last	for	another	500	years.	
																																																								
59	Interview	with	Essel	Blankson,	Senior	Museums	and	Monuments	Officer	(Head	of	Education),	
Ghana	Museums	and	Monuments	Board,	Central	Region,	Cape	Coast,	08.09.2014	
60	Interview	with	Raymond	Agbo,	Deputy	Director	(Museums),	Ghana	Museums	and	Monuments	
Board,	Accra,	20.08.2014;	Interview	with	Dr.	Zagba	Oyortey,	Executive	Director,	Ghana	
Museums	and	Monuments	Board,	Accra,	23.09.2014	
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So	if	a	conservationist	have	their	way	they	will	even	limit	the	number	of	people	
because,	so	as	to	better	conserve	it…”61		
The	consequence	of	this	differing	perspective	means	that	attempts	at	‘modernising’	the	
forts	and	castles	to	include	guest	houses	and	restaurants	is	met	with	disagreement.	
These	ideas	are	inconsistent	with	the	international	standards	that	have	to	be	followed	
by	sites	on	the	UNESCO	World	Heritage	Sites	List	and	so	have	to	be	rejected	by	the	
GMMB.		In	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	for	example,	one	of	the	initial	plans	was	to	convert	
Fort	Jago	into	a	tourist	accommodation	but	the	GMMB	had	to	come	out	against	such	
proposition	because	the	structural	integrity	of	the	Castle	as	a	UNESCO	World	Heritage	
site	would	have	been	affected.		
The	Wildlife	Division	of	the	Forestry	Commission:	Up	until	1999,	the	Wildlife	Division	of	
the	Forestry	Commission	(WD‐FC)	was	a	unit	of	the	Forestry	Department	at	the	
Ministry	of	Agriculture	with	responsibility	for	wildlife	issues.	In	1965	it	became	a	line	
agency	under	the	then	Ministry	of	Forestry	called	the	Department	of	Game	and	Wildlife	
later	becoming	the	Wildlife	Department	in	1997.	Having	moved	from	the	Ministry	of	
Agriculture	to	the	Ministry	of	Forestry	through	to	the	Ministry	of	Lands	and	Mineral	
Resources,	the	WD‐FC	is	currently	under	the	Ministry	of	Lands	and	Natural	Resources.		
The	WD‐FC	has	direct	responsibility	for	managing	all	wildlife	in	Ghana	including	those	
that	are	trans‐boundary.	Through	a	system	of	protected	areas	(PAs),	the	WD‐FC	
manages	6.2%	of	Ghana’s	total	land	area	(13,	489	square	kilometres).	Thus	the	natural	
resources	and	protected	areas	that	form	a	large	part	of	Ghana’s	tourism	resources	are	
managed	by	the	WD‐FC.		
The	mandate	of	the	WD‐FC	is	to	“conserve	wildlife	in	Ghana	in	general	and	manage	
wildlife	protected	areas	in	particular	within	representative	ecological	zones	of	the	
country”	while	its	mission	is	the	“conservation,	sustainable	management	and	
development	of	Ghana’s	wildlife	resources	for	socio‐economic	benefit	to	all	segments	of	
society”.62	In	order	to	achieve	its	primary	objective	of	conservation	and	wildlife	
protection	the	division	sees	the	development	of	eco‐tourism	and	tourist	activities	in	the	
																																																								
61	Interview	with	Dr.	Zagba	Oyortey,	Executive	Director,	Ghana	Museums	and	Monuments	
Board,	Accra,	23.09.2014	
62	Interview	with	Luri	Kanton,	Operations	Manager,	Wildlife	Division	of	Forestry	Commission,	
Accra,	19.08.2014;	Interview	with	David	Kpelle,	Tourism	and	Commercial	Officer,	Wildlife	
Division	of	Forestry	Commission,	Accra,	19.09.2014;	Interview	with	Enoch	Ashie,	Park	Manager,	
Kakum	National	Park,	Kakum,	11.09.2014	
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PAs	as	one	key	strategy	to	pursue.	In	pursuance	of	this	strategy	the	WD‐FC	plays	a	key	
governing	role	in	the	tourism	sector	of	Ghana.	PAs	are	classified	according	to	their	
tourism	potentials	and	thus	each	PA	management	plan	includes	specific	tourism	
developed	plans.63	Class	A	PAs	are	the	Mole	National	Park	and	the	Kakum	National	Park	
which	have	the	most	developed	tourist	facilities.	Although	it	develops	linkages	with	
other	agencies,	the	WD‐FC	has	sole	responsibility	for	the	management	of	all	tourist	
activities	within	PAs.	All	revenue	from	tourist	activities	at	PAs	accrues	to	the	accounts	
of	the	Forestry	Commission.	There	is	no	revenue	sharing	arrangement	between	the	
WD‐FC	and	adjoining	communities	due	to	restrictions	of	current	legislation.64	
The	governance	interaction	between	the	WD‐FC	and	other	stakeholders	in	the	tourism	
sector	tends	to	be	constrained	by	existing	legislative	frameworks.	There	are	no	
effective	channels	of	communication	and	avenues	for	joint‐decision	making	by	all	the	
agencies	who	control	key	resources	that	are	the	bedrock	of	tourism	development.	The	
WD‐FC	have	absolute	legal	administrative	and	management	oversight	and	there	is	a	
lack	of	collaboration	and	coordination	when	it	comes	to	tourist	activities	within	PAs.	As	
the	Park	Manager	at	Kakum	National	Park	puts	it	“…the	Forestry	Commission	our	main	
mandate	is	not	for	tourism,	our	main	mandate	is	to	regulate	the	use	of	the	natural	
resources	of	which	tourism	is	one	and	also	conserve	the	resource	and	sustainably	
development	and	manage	it,	you	get	me?”65	Thus	effective	stakeholder	interactions	need	
to	be	improved	from	the	inter‐ministerial	level	through	to	the	implementation	agencies	
level.	This	will	ensure	that	although	agencies	like	the	WD‐FC	might	have	differing	core	
mandates,	their	activities	with	regards	to	tourism	are	mutually	supportive	and	
consistent	with	the	vision	of	tourism	held	by	the	MOTCCA	and	the	GTA.	
The	Ghana	Tourism	Federation:	As	an	umbrella	organisation,	the	Ghana	Tourism	
Federation	(GHATOF)	is	the	apex	body	that	represents	the	interests	of	all	private	sector	
associations	involved	in	the	tourism	sector	of	Ghana.	Prior	to	its	establishment	in	
1994/1995	the	private	sector	involvement	in	the	tourism	sector	was	disparate	and	not	
concerted.	GHATOF	was	therefore	established	to	serve	as	a	link	between	the	various	
private	sector	trade	associations	and	public	sector	ministries,	agencies	and	
																																																								
63	Interview	with	Luri	Kanton,	Operations	Manager,	Wildlife	Division	of	Forestry	Commission,	
Accra,	19.08.2014	
64	Interview	with	Luri	Kanton,	Operations	Manager,	Wildlife	Division	of	Forestry	Commission,	
Accra,	19.08.2014;	Interview	with	Enoch	Ashie,	Park	Manager,	Kakum	National	Park,	Kakum,	
11.09.2014	
65	Interview	with	Enoch	Ashie,	Park	Manager,	Kakum	National	Park,	Kakum,	11.09.2014	
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departments	engaged	in	the	tourism	sector.	Since	its	formation	GHATOF	has	engaged	in	
the	development	and	promotion	of	tourism	through	lobbying	for	legislations	and	
organising	training	and	capacity	building	for	its	members	(Akyeampong,	2006).	
Current	membership	stands	at	23	trade	associations66	comprising	associations	
registered	and	licensed	by	the	Ghana	Tourism	Authority	(GTA)	status	such	as	the	Tour	
Operators	Union	of	Ghana	(TOUGHA),	Ghana	Hotels	Association	and	the	Ghana	
Traditional	Caterers	Association	(GTCA).	
The	one	vision	that	binds	all	members	of	GHATOF	is	the	need	to	improve	customer	
service	because	“in	terms	of	customer	service	we	[GHATOF	members)	need	to	work	
together	as	a	team	because	if	one	fails	all	of	us	fail”.67	As	part	of	its	governing	
interactions	GHATOF	works	closely	with	the	Ghana	Council	for	Technical	and	
Vocational	Education	and	Training	(COTVET),	GTA,	HOTCATT	and	MOTCCA	as	well	as	
other	international	development	institutions	like	the	Japan	International	Cooperation	
Agency	(JICA)	and	the	Netherlands	Development	Organisation	(SNV).These	interactions	
are	usually	carried	out	at	the	national	level	and	involve	training	and	capacity	building	
programmes.	An	established	Public	Private	Partnership	Forum	process	is	now	dormant	
after	the	seed	funding	from	JICA	got	finished.68	The	involvement	of	the	private	sector	in	
the	governance	interactions	of	the	tourism	sector	has	not	been	as	effective	due	to	
among	other	things	funding	challenges	and	weak	institutional	capacity.	GHATOF	has	
only	a	national	office	and	as	at	yet	no	regional	or	district	level	presence.	Efforts	are	now	
however	being	made	to	get	representation	at	the	regional	and	district	levels	in	order	to	
get	to	know	more	of	the	issues	at	destinations	outside	of	Accra.	
Non‐Government/Civil	Society	Organisations:	In	addition	to	the	public	and	private	sector	
institutions	and	organisations,	there	are	also	a	number	of	third	sector	organisation	that	
are	involved	in	the	governing	activities	of	the	tourism	sector.	These	organisations	are	
disparate	and	each	operates	in	specific	geographical	areas	and	in	relation	to	specific	
tourist	attraction	sites	and/or	tourism	development	projects.	The	governing	
																																																								
66	Interview	with	Daniel	Nana	Anim,	President	of	the	Ghana	Tourism	Federation,	Accra,	
14.08.2014;	Interview	with	Kwaku	Passah,	President	of	Tour	Guides	Association	of	Ghana,	
Accra,	21.08.2014	
67	Interview	with	Daniel	Nana	Anim,	President	of	the	Ghana	Tourism	Federation,	Accra,	
14.08.2014	
68	Interview	with	Kwaku	Passah,	President	of	Tour	Guides	Association	of	Ghana,	Accra,	
21.08.2014;	Interview	with	Daniel	Nana	Anim,	President	of	the	Ghana	Tourism	Federation,	
Accra,	14.08.2014;	Interview	with	Herbert	Acquaye,	National	President,	Ghana	Hotels	
Association,	Accra,	12.08.2014	
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interactions	undertaken	by	these	organisations	are	mostly	related	to	the	specific	
projects	that	they	are	involved	in.	These	interactions	are	often	at	the	destination	level	
and	do	not	always	relate	to	overarching	policy	interactions	that	take	place	at	the	
national	level.	Prominent	among	these	are	the	Nature	Conservation	Research	Centre	
(NCRC),	the	Ghana	Heritage	Conservation	Trust	(GHCT),	the	Ghana	Tourism	Society	
and	the	Ghana	Wildlife	Society.		
The	NCRC	was	founded	in	1996	as	a	local	conservation	organisation	and	has	worked	
with	communities	around	protected	areas	to	start	ecotourism	initiatives	across	the	
country.	Through	the	work	of	the	NCRC,	a	Ghana	Rural	Ecotourism	and	Travel	Office	
(GREET)	was	officially	started	in	2010.	However	due	to	financial	challenges	their	first	
office	closed	down	and	the	plan	is	to	now	have	a	GREET	desk	when	the	Accra	Visitor	
Centre	project	is	completed.69	The	GHCT	on	the	other	hand	was	launched	in	1996	and	
registered	in	1997	under	the	Trustees	Incorporation	Act	of	1962	(Act	106).	The	GHCT	
operates	mainly	in	the	Central	Region	manages	the	Canopy	walkway	and	visitor	
reception	centre	at	the	Kakum	National	Park	and	supports	the	Cape	Coast	and	Elmina	
Castles	(the	GHCT	will	be	discussed	in	detail	in	Chapter	5	as	they	played	a	key	role	in	
the	Elmina	2015	Strategy).70	
International	Development	Agencies:	Over	the	years	there	have	been	a	number	of	
international	development	agencies	and	partners	involved	in	the	tourism	sector	in	
Ghana.	Such	involvement	ranges	from	financial	assistance	to	technical	assistance	
through	to	direct	development	of	tourism	products	and	projects.	The	height	of	the	
international	development	agency	involvement	in	the	tourism	sector	of	Ghana	was	
between	2000	and	2010.	This	period	witnessed	an	intensive	involvement	of	various	
development	agencies	and	international	non‐government	organisations	in	the	tourism	
sector	of	Ghana.	These	activities	and	projects	have	expanded	the	tourist	attractions	
available	across	the	country	while	improving	the	conditions	of	tourist	receptive	
facilities.	In	particular	international	development	agency	involvement	in	tourism	has	
been	centred	on	encouraging	community	participation	in	the	management	of	tourism	
resources.	This	was	seen	as	a	way	of	increasing	the	benefits	of	tourism	accruing	to	local	
																																																								
69	Interview	with	Douglas	Nanka	Bruce,	Director,	Ghana	Rural	Ecotourism	and	Travel	Office,	
Accra,	22.10.2014	
70	Interview	with	Francis	Cobbinah,	Executive	Director,	Ghana	Heritage	Conservation	Trust,	
Cape	Coast,	29.09.2014;	Interview	with	Nkunu	Akyea,	Former	Executive	Director,	Ghana	
Heritage	Conservation	Trust,	Cape	Coast,	08.09.2014	
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communities.	The	Netherlands	Development	Organisation	(SNV)	for	instance	have	been	
involved	in	the	setting	up	of	a	Savanaland	Destination	Management	Organisation	for	
communities	around	the	Mole	National	Park	and	were	involved	in	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy.	In	2007	the	SNV	was	recognised	for	its	efforts	in	tourism	development	in	non‐
traditional	tourist	areas	with	the	Ghana	Tourist	Authority’s	prestigious	‘development	
partner’	of	the	year	award	(Akyeampong	and	Aseidu,	2008).		
Since	2010	there	has	been	a	drastic	reduction	in	the	number	of	international	
development	agencies	and	international	non‐government	organisations	involved	in	the	
tourism	sector	of	Ghana.	This	has	been	due	to	both	domestic	and	international	political	
economy	issues.	For	instance	there	has	been	an	international	management	decision	by	
the	SNV	in	the	Netherlands	to	discontinue	their	involvement	in	tourism.	This	is	a	world‐
wide	policy	decision	that	has	refocused	SNV	away	from	tourism	in	all	operating	
countries	including	Ghana.	This	withdrawal	of	the	SNV	from	tourism	had	repercussions	
for	the	implementation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	as	shall	be	further	discussed	in	
Chapters	7.		The	United	Nations	Development	Programme	and	the	United	Nations	
World	Tourism	Organisation	through	the	Sustainable	Tourism	Eliminating	Poverty	(ST‐
EP)	programme	however	remain	somewhat	active	in	the	governance	of	the	tourism	
sector	in	Ghana	through	the	provision	of	financial	and	technical	assistance.		
Communication, collaboration and coordination of tourism governing 
interactions 
In	this	section	so	far	I	have	explored	the	complexities	of	the	tourism	governing	system	
in	Ghana	and	have	shown	the	diversity	of	institutions	and	steering	mechanisms.	
Interactions	within	public	sector	institutions	such	as	the	MOTCCA	are	based	on	strong	
governing	hierarchies	with	high	differentiation	of	functions	between	each	hierarchy.	
Governance	interactions	between	public	sector	institutions	are	constrained	by	rigid	
legal	regimes	that	leave	little	room	for	effective	integration	and	coordination	of	
governing	activities.	The	structure	of	public	sector	bureaucracy	has	resulted	in	a	
compartmentalised	rather	than	an	integrated	analysis	of	how	individual	agencies	can	
contribute	to	tourism	development	and	governance.	A	lack	of	information	sharing	and	
poor	communication	in	developing	tourism	plans	further	contributes	to	this	general	
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lack	of	integrated	analysis.	Indeed	the	inter‐ministerial	committee	that	is	conveyed	and	
chaired	by	the	MOTCCA	is	far	from	active	and	for	the	whole	of	2014	did	not	meet.71	
Communication	between	various	governing	institutions	at	the	national	level	ranges	
from	low	to	medium.	Across	the	national,	regional	and	district	levels	there	is	low	and	
infrequent	interaction.	Stakeholders	interviewed	at	the	regional	and	district	level	were	
of	the	view	that	all	the	action	in	terms	of	tourism	policy	and	planning	activities	takes	
place	in	Accra	and	that	very	little	is	communicated	downwards.	In	an	interview	with	
the	Regional	Director	of	the	National	Commission	on	Culture	in	Cape	Coast	it	became	
evident	that	intra‐organisation	communication	is	also	a	problem.	This	long	quote	
provides	rich	contextual	information	that	reflects	the	extent	of	communication	within	
the	tourism	sector;	
For	example	you	know	I	just	phoned	Accra	because	I	was	reading	something	from	
this	paper	[Daily	Graphic	Newspaper]	and	this	paper	they	have	declared,	I	think	
it’s	starting	from	today,	today	to	4th	October	as	a,	is	it	a	drama	month	or	
something	like	that,	creative,	is	it	creative	arts	something,	something	and	there	
are	a	whole	lot	of	activities	going	on	in	Accra.	So	I	just	phoned	our	headquarters,	
NCC	[National	Commission	for	Culture],	the	director,	Mr	Attipoe	and	I	said	Mr.	
Attipoe	am	reading	this	from	the	paper,	so	are	you	telling	me	that	Accra	is	Ghana	
and	Ghana	is	Accra,	because	we	are	here…	am	surprised	because	apart	from	the	
high	school	drama	competition,	the	rest	we	are	not	aware	and	he	say	oh	you	see	
it’s	money	…	and	I	said	it’s	not	a	matter	of	invitation,	it’s	a	matter	of	
information..72	
This	quote	shows	that	stakeholders	take	a	different	perspective	on	the	essence	of	
sharing	information.	This	lack	of	information	flow	affects	communication	both	within	
and	across	institutions	operating	at	the	national,	regional	and	district	geographical	
scales.	Cross‐institutional	communication	while	rated	as	medium	at	the	national	level	is	
rated	as	very	low	at	the	regional	and	district	levels.	Thus	there	is	also	very	little	
governing	communication	for	example	between	the	regional	offices	of	the	Ghana	
Tourism	Authority	(GTA)	and	the	National	Commission	on	Culture	in	Cape	Coast.	If,	as	
Bang	(2003)	has	argued,	governance	is	political	and	social	communication	then	the	
																																																								
71	Interview	with	Olivia	Opoku	Adomah,	Director	for	Research,	Statistics	and	Information,	
MOTCCA,	Accra,	21.10.2014	
72	Interview	with	Christiana	C.	Oparebea,	Regional	Director,	Centre	for	National	Culture,	Central	
Region,	Cape	Coast,	05.09.2014	
	
	
160	
	
failure	of	tourism	governing	institutions	to	openly	communicate	accounts	for	their	
inability	to	effectively	govern	the	tourism	sector.		
There	is	a	related	issue	here	about	stakeholder	governance	capacity	when	it	comes	to	
the	failings	in	communication,	collaboration	and	coordination.	As	conceptualised	in	
Chapter	2,	section	2.1,	stakeholder	governance	capacity	can	be	thought	of	in	terms	of	
the	alignment	between	images,	instruments	and	action	potentials.	The	evidence	shows	
that	within	the	tourism	sector	in	Ghana,	coordination	is	limited.	There	is	a	lack	of	
alignment	between	the	images	held	by	stakeholders	such	as	the	MOTCCA,	the	GTA,	the	
GMMB	and	the	National	Commission	on	Culture,	the	instruments	available	to	them	and	
the	action	potentials	within	which	they	work.	Even	within	institutions,	there	is	a	
misalignment	in	images,	instruments	and	action	potential.	This	is	exemplified	in	the	
case	of	the	Cape	Coast	office	and	the	national	head	office	of	the	National	Commission	on	
Culture	(see	previous	paragraphs).		The	image	of	tourism’s	potential	for	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction	is	arrived	at	through	communication.	The	low	
levels	of	communication	and	collaboration	within	the	tourism	sector	in	Ghana	
consequently	result	in	a	lack	of	alignment	between	images	held	by	stakeholders,	
instruments	and	action	potentials	available	to	them.	This	ultimately	affect	stakeholder	
governance	capacity,	especially	at	the	national	level	in	utilising	tourism	for	local	
economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.		
The	success	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	depends	on	the	
collaboration	between	institutions	and	the	coordination	of	governing	activities.	Given	
the	diversity	and	complexity	of	institutions	involved	in	the	tourism	sector	the	current	
hierarchical	process	of	arriving	at	governing	decisions	is	not	optimal.	The	dynamics	
(Kooiman,	2000)	within	the	tourism	sector	in	the	sense	of	tensions,	misunderstandings	
and	suspicion	among	stakeholders	offer	both	potential	for	change	in	both	positive	and	
negative	ways.	Often,	the	dynamics	within	the	tourism	governing	system	in	Ghana	are	
driven	by	conflicting	interests.	However,	through	open	communication	and	
collaboration,	there	is	the	possibility	of	turning	the	tensions	into	positive	changes	in	
how	the	tourism	sector	is	governed.	A	collaborative	process	of	negotiation	and	dialogue	
between	representatives	of	different	sectors	of	society	appears	as	the	most	optimal	
mechanism	for	arriving	at	decisions	and	actions.	This	ensures	that	decisions	are	
binding	on	all	stakeholders	involved	and	that	actions	can	be	coordinated	to	achieve	
desired	outcomes.	This	process	of	stakeholder	negotiation	and	dialogue	is	currently	
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lacking	in	the	tourism	sector	of	Ghana	especially	at	the	local	level	where	metropolitan,	
municipal	and	district	assemblies	(MMDAs)	barely	feature	in	tourism	governing	
arrangements.	The	question	is	whether	the	involvement	of	MMDAs	might	make	a	
difference	in	improving	tourism	governance	interactions.	While	it	appears	that	MMDAs	
might	have	something	to	bring	to	the	table	in	both	positive	and	negative	ways,	this	is	an	
empirical	question	that	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	offers	an	opportunity	to	explore.	
	
Conclusions 
This	chapter	has	explored	the	institutional	structures	for	decentralised	local	economic	
development	planning	in	Ghana	and	the	way	tourism	has	been	conceptualised	within	
national	economic	development	policies	and	plans	since	independence.	The	chapter	
also	explored	in	detail	the	actors,	structures	and	processes	of	tourism	development	and	
the	challenges	facing	the	sector.	This	chapter	argues	that	institutional	structures,	
inconsistence	of	policy	and	weaknesses	of	inter‐agency	collaboration	are	problems	of	
and	for	tourism	development	and	attempts	at	embedding	tourism	within	local	
economic	development	planning	processes.	It	has	also	provided	a	context	within	which	
to	situate	the	premise	of	this	thesis	as	outlined	in	Chapter	1	on	the	need	for	a	more	
analytic	and	systematic	approach	to	examining	governance	issues	in	relation	to	the	
tourism‐poverty	nexus.	Within	Ghana’s	current	form	of	decentralisation,	tourism	
planning	is	not	fully	decentralised	and	thus	tourism	related	agencies	are	not	able	to	
directly	make	inputs	into	the	making	of	District	Medium	Term	Development	Plans	
(DMTDPs).	This	issue	is	compounded	by	the	position	of	tourism	within	successive	
national	economic	development	plans.		
Furthermore,	the	tourism	sector	itself	has	been	shown	to	be	characterised	by	a	high	
level	of	complexity	and	diversity	in	terms	of	the	institutional	actors	involved	in	the	
governing	process.	Given	the	complexity	and	diversity	of	stakeholders,	interaction	
within	the	tourism	sector	is	shaped	by	resulting	dynamics	due	to	conflicting	interests.	It	
is	however	aspects	of	these	dynamics	that	offer	the	potential	for	change	in	the	
governability	of	tourism	sector.	Sometimes,	this	change	is	positive	in	leading	to	an	
alignment	of	stakeholder	images,	instruments	and	action	potential.	This	chapter	has	
however	shown	that	in	the	tourism	sector	of	Ghana,	the	dynamics	within	the	sector	
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more	often	than	not	make	governing	a	challenge.	Systematic	implementation	of	tourism	
development	plans	continues	to	be	a	challenge	facing	the	sector	due	to	financial	
limitations	and	the	regular	change	to	the	portfolio	of	the	tourism	ministry.	The	issues	
explored	in	this	chapter	raise	a	number	of	issues	for	current	understanding	of	the	
tourism‐poverty	nexus.	
First,	this	chapter	has	shown	that	tourism	is	a	socio‐economic	and	political	activity	
within	a	highly	complex	system	made	up	of	a	variety	of	actors	and	stakeholders	
(Britton,	1982;	Ioannides	and	Debbage,	1998;	Waayers	et	al,	2012;	Adu‐Ampong,	
2014).	A	key	point	highlighted	here	is	that	the	tourism	policy	and	planning	process	is	
not	simply	a	technocratic	process	but	rather	a	social	and	political	process	that	is	open	
to	contestations.	Such	understanding	raises	significant	questions	for	the	conclusion	of	
Rogerson	(2014)	that	tourism	policy	and	planning	when	embedded	as	part	of	local	and	
regional	economic	development	can	have	a	greater	impact	on	poverty	reduction.	As	has	
been	shown	by	the	policy	implementation	literature,	it	is	important	to	approach	policy	
analysis	by	first	looking	at	the	range	of	actors	involved	and	the	interactions	between	
them	(Peters	and	Pierre,	2006;	Howlett	et	al.,	2015).	Moreover,	there	are	questions	
about	the	extent	to	which	one	can	think	of	policy	implementation	as	operating	in	a	
linear	process	(Hill	and	Hupe,	2008;	Sabatier,	1991).	National	institutional	structures	
and	underpinning	political	contestations	need	to	be	understood	and	explained	first	
before	any	attempts	are	made	at	embedding	tourism	policy	and	planning	in	local	
institutions.	As	Harrison	(2008)	has	noted,	enhancing	the	use	of	tourism	for	poverty	
reduction	requires	a	developmental	state	that	sets	out	its	development	and	tourism	
strategy	around	such	aims.	This	is	where	the	governing	issues	of	coordination,	steering	
and	goal‐oriented	interventions	(Kooiman,	1993)	becomes	important	to	ensure	an	
alignment	of	institutions.	It	is	within	such	process	of	alignment	that	institutional	
thickness	gets	formed	and	capacity	developed	for	localities	to	grow	and	develop	
(Coulson	and	Ferrario,	2007).	
Second,	in	relation	to	the	concept	of	institutional	thickness	as	conceptualised	in	
Chapter	2,	section	2.2,	his	chapter	indicated	a	low	level	of	institutional	thickness	within	
the	tourism	sector	of	Ghana.	While	there	is	a	broadly	shared	image	of	tourism’s	
potential	contribution	to	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction,	different	
institutions	have	differing	perspectives	on	translating	this	image	into	reality	given	their	
set	of	instruments	and	action	potential.	While	not	directly	contradictory,	the	
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application	of	some	of	the	instruments	are	not	consistent	with	each	other	due	to	the	
fact	that	only	a	few	institutions	operate	at	the	national,	regional	and	district	levels	at	
the	same	time.	Many	of	the	key	institutions	like	the	GTA	and	GHATOF	operate	at	either	
the	national	and	regional	level	with	little	presence	at	the	local	destination	level.	Thus,	
the	strong	presence	of	a	plethora	of	institutions	needed	to	provide	local	coalition‐
building	which	is	a	key	building	block	of	institutional	thickness	(Raco,	1998)	is	missing	
at	local	level	destinations.	National	level	institutions,	although	they	have	bigger	action	
potential	for	driving	national	policy	direction	have	little	action	potential	for	actually	
affecting	the	nitty‐gritty	of	everyday	tourism	management	and	governance	
interactions.	It	is	the	institutions	at	the	destination	level	that	are	likely	to	have	the	
needed	leverage	and	presence	to	maximise	the	use	of	tourism	for	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction.	However,	destination	level	institutions	such	as	
metropolitan,	municipal	and	district	assemblies	(MMDAs)	are	not	always	involved	in	
mutual	interactions	and	discussions	on	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	due	to	the	structure	
of	institutional	relationships.		
A	policy	focus	on	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	(LED)	planning	necessitates	
the	development	of	a	certain	level	of	institutional	thickness	and	new	forms	of	
governance	arrangements	(see	Chapter	2,	section	2.3).	This	is	to	ensure	that	
stakeholders	have	adequate	governance	capacity	to	develop	and	implement	plans	in	a	
collaborative	way.		As	this	chapter	has	shown	clearly,	both	the	institutional	structures	
for	local	economic	development	and	tourism	development	are	in	a	constant	flux	due	to	
policy	inconsistency	and	weak	inter‐agency	collaboration,	especially	at	the	national	and	
regional	level.	Thus	at	the	national	level,	there	is	a	lack	of	stakeholder	governance	
capacity	–	in	the	sense	of	an	alignment	and	coordination	between	images,	instruments	
and	action	potentials	held	by	various	stakeholders	–	in	planning	for	the	use	of	tourism	
for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	Low	levels	of	communication,	
collaboration	and	coordination	not	only	affect	governance	capacity	but	also	the	extent	
of	institutional	thickness	at	the	national	level	around	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus.	The	
open	question	then	is	whether	localising	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	
planning	processes	offers	a	solution	to	these	problems.	Such	a	change	of	scale	might	not	
be	immune	to	wider	political	and	institutional	conditions	even	though	Metropolitan,	
Municipal	and	District	Assemblies	(MMDAs)	have	the	constitutional	mandate	to	plan,	
manage	and	govern	overall	local	economic	development	in	the	areas	under	their	
jurisdiction.		
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In	the	next	chapters	I	present	the	empirical	case	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	The	
development	of	this	strategy	was	led	by	the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	Municipal	
Assembly	(KEEA)	in	the	Central	Region	of	Ghana.		The	KEEA	sought	to	utilise	its	
cultural	heritage	tourism	assets	as	a	catalyst	for	LED	and	poverty	reduction.	The	
process	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	faced	challenges	in	terms	of	the	fit	of	images,	
instruments	and	action	potential	of	all	stakeholders.	Some	stakeholders	like	the	GMMB	
did	not	have	the	corresponding	instruments	to	ensure	that	tourism	in	Elmina	was	being	
leveraged	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	The	KEEA	on	the	
hand,	while	having	some	of	the	instruments	needed,	did	not	have	access	to	a	conducive	
action	potential	through	which	it	could	encourage	collaboration	and	coordination.	
These	factors	shaped	the	level	of	institutional	thickness	developed	for	implementation	
of	the	Strategy.	Stakeholders’	inability	to	provide	an	adequate	fit	between	the	images,	
instruments	and	action	potential	for	the	implementation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	
was	further	compounded	by	changes	brought	in	through	national	and	local	electoral	
and	political	cycles.		
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Chapter 5 
	
The Elmina 2015 Strategy: plans, actors and 
stakeholder governance capacity 
The	previous	chapter	analysed	and	examined	the	governance	of	tourism	planning	and	
local	economic	development	planning	in	Ghana	as	a	whole	and	provides	the	context	in	
which	to	situate	the	rest	of	the	thesis.	This	chapter	offers	an	analysis	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	using	the	theoretical	and	analytical	framework	developed	in	Chapter	
Two.	Particularly	in	this	chapter,	I	examine	the	stakeholder	governance	capacity	upon	
which	the	delivery	and	implementation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	anchored.	The	
aim	is	to	identify	the	particular	ways	in	which	different	aspects	of	stakeholder	
governance	capacity	shaped	the	process	and	outcomes	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	
The	analysis	in	this	chapter	is	therefore	based	on	the	three	key	elements	of	stakeholder	
governance	capacity	–	images,	instruments	and	action	potential.			
There	are	four	sections	to	this	chapter	the	first	of	which	provides	an	account	of	the	
socio‐economic	conditions	of	Elmina,	the	development	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	and	
the	stakeholders	involved.	The	second	section	analyses	the	images	held	by	
stakeholders	in	terms	of	the	facts,	visions	and	presuppositions	they	attributed	to	what	
could	be	achieved	from	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	This	section	also	provides	an	in‐
depth	analysis	of	the	sector	strategy	document	in	which	the	idea	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	is	given	full	expression.	The	third	section	identifies	and	examines	how	the	
various	instruments	available	to	stakeholders	enabled	and	constrained	the	extent	to	
which	images	were	translated	into	action.	Finally,	the	fourth	section	analyses	the	socio‐
political	room	for	action	‐	i.e.	action	potential	–	within	which	stakeholders	were	to	
implement	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.		
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5.1 Reinventing Elmina: European African town of history, 
heritage and poverty 
Given	its	well‐documented	extraordinary	past,	it	is	impossible	to	do	justice	to	the	
complex	history	of	Elmina	in	a	few	pages.	This	section	therefore	briefly	highlights	some	
of	the	historical	trajectories	that	are	relevant	to	this	study.	The	pre‐colonial	and	
colonial	periods	in	Elmina	cannot	be	discussed	in	detail	due	to	space	constraints.	
However,	particular	attention	will	be	given	to	how	key	historical	trajectories	have	
shaped	the	contemporary	socio‐economic	dynamics	of	the	city.			
Imbued	with	over	700	years	of	history,	the	modern	city	of	Elmina	traces	its	roots	to	the	
adventures	of	Kwaa	Amankwaa.	Local	history	has	it	that	Kwaa	Amankwaa	a	native	of	
the	nearby	Eguafo	village	on	one	of	his	hunting	expeditions	towards	the	coast	came	
across	a	stream	which	he	christened	Anomansa	‐	meaning	an	inexhaustible	supply	of	
water.	He	subsequently	brought	over	people	from	Eguafo	to	come	and	settle	in	this	
place	thereby	founding	the	village	of	Amankwaa	Krom	(Henige,	1974).	The	traditional	
name	of	Anomansa	became	superseded	by	the	Portuguese	name	of	'La	Mina'	('The	
Mine)	in	reference	to	the	abundance	of	gold	in	the	area.	Over	time	the	Portuguese	name	
became	localised	as	'Edina'	and	later	anglicised	as	Elmina.	Thus	at	present	Edina	is	the	
traditional	name	of	the	area	while	Elmina	represents	the	English	name.	Traditionally	
inhabitants	of	Elmina	trace	their	ancestry	to	the	Ashanti	Kingdom	of	interior	Ghana.	
Consequently,	Elmina	was	long	considered	as	an	independent	city‐state	while	the	
surrounding	settlements	formed	part	of	the	Fante	Kingdom.		
The	year	1470	marked	a	change	in	the	trajectory	of	Elmina's	development	when	
Portuguese	explorers	Juan	de	Santaran	and	Pedro	d'Escobara	landed	at	the	coast.	
Subsequently,	twelve	ships	with	600	men	arrived	in	Elmina	from	Portugal	on	19th	
January	1482	lead	by	Don	Diego	d'Azambuja.	The	chief	of	Elmina	at	the	time,	Nana	
Kobina	Ansah	I	agreed	and	leased	land	for	Don	Diego	d'Azambuja	to	build	St.	George's	
Castle	(Essah,	2001).	This	made	Elmina	to	be	the	"first	place	in	the	whole	of	Africa	for	a	
land	title	deed	to	be	signed"73	between	locals	and	European	explorers.	The	building	of	
the	Castle	rejuvenated	Elmina's	development	and	made	it	a	centre	of	commerce	with	
surrounding	regions	as	well	as	a	key	node	in	an	international	trading	network	between	
																																																								
73	Interview	with	Ebo	Dadzie,	Head	of	Tourism	Sub‐Committee,	KEEA,	16.07.2015	
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Africa,	Europe	and	the	Americas.		In	1637,	the	Dutch	took	over	control	of	the	castle	
from	the	Portuguese	and	continued	with	the	booming	transatlantic	slave	trade.	It	was	
during	this	time	that	Elmina	came	to	be	known	as	the	European	African	city	owing	to	
an	increased	settlement	of	Dutch	merchants	in	the	city.	European‐styled	merchant	
houses	were	built	and	the	city	layout	was	reconfigured	to	Dutch	standards.	In	1871,	the	
British	took	over	and	after	the	abolition	of	the	slave	trade,	used	the	castle	as	the	central	
administrative	centre	during	colonial	rule.	In	the	aftermaths	of	Ghana’s	independence	
in	1957,	the	castle	was	used	for	various	purposes	including;	as	an	office	for	the	Ghana	
Education	service,	as	a	District	Assembly	office	and	as	a	policy	training	academy	before	
its	inscription	unto	the	UNESCO	World	Heritage	List	in	1979	under	criteria	(iv)	–	‘to	be	
an	outstanding	example	of	a	type	of	building,	architectural	or	technological	ensemble	or	
landscape	which	illustrates	(a)	significant	stage(s)	in	human	history’.	It	was	only	after	
this	time	that	the	Elmina	Castle	which	remains	the	oldest	European	building	in	Africa,	
became	recognised	as	a	tourist	attraction	site	and	efforts	were	made	to	preserve	and	
present	it	as	such	(Bruner,	1996).	
The geo-political and socio-economic state of Elmina 
With	a	2012	population	of	just	over	23,000	(GSS,	2014b),	Elmina	is	the	biggest	
settlement	in,	and	the	capital	of	the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	(KEEA)	
Municipality	of	the	Central	Region	of	Ghana,	headed	by	the	Municipal	Chief	Executive.	
The	KEEA	Municipality	is	made	up	of	six	zonal	councils,	54	electoral	areas	and	15	
decentralised	departments.		There	are	four	overlapping	traditional	areas/councils	
within	the	municipality	–	these	being	Komenda,	Edina	(Elmina),	Eguafo	and	Abrem	
traditional	areas.	The	population	of	these	areas	are	largely	Fanti	in	ethnicity.	Thus,	as	
well	as	being	the	seat	of	the	Elmina	Urban	Council	as	per	the	decentralisation	policies	
in	place,	Elmina	also	doubles	up	as	the	capital	of	the	Edinaman	Traditional	Council	
which	is	headed	by	the	Paramount	Chief.	This	dual	system	of	governance	within	Elmina	
requires	cooperation	and	dialogue	between	the	political	system	and	the	traditional	
system	in	many	areas	of	socio‐economic	policy	making.	This	is	because	both	the	
political	administrative	structures	and	the	traditional	structures	have	responsibility	for	
the	overall	development	of	the	area	under	their	jurisdiction.		Out	of	the	four	major	
traditional	occupations	in	Elmina	–	gold	prospecting,	fishing,	salt	making	and	pottery	–	
salt	making	and	fishing	with	its	associated	processes	remain	the	most	dominant	
occupation	in	contemporary	times	(see	figure	16	below),	in	addition	to	the	ubiquitous	
petty	trading	and	commerce.		It	is	estimated	that	60%	of	employment	in	Elmina	is	in	
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the	informal	sector	while	the	remaining	40%	of	formal	sector	employment	is	found	in	
teaching,	nursing	and	government	jobs	at	the	KEEA	Municipal	offices	(KEEA,	2002).	
The	informal	sector	includes	activities	such	as	fishing,	ship	building,	fish	processing,	
salt	mining,	artisanal	self‐employment,	agriculture	and	petty	trading.		
		Figure	16	Fishing	boats	in	the	Benya	Lagoon	with	the	Elmina	Castle	in	sight	
Poverty	incidence	is	widespread	in	Elmina	and	is	manifested	in	a	number	of	indicators.	
These	include	high	rates	of	unemployment,	high	school	dropout	rates,	high	rates	of	
child	delinquency,	low	school	enrolment	rates,	high	rates	of	teenage	pregnancy	among	
others.	For	instance,	the	results	of	the	2010	Ghana	Population	and	Housing	Census	
shows	that	“at	least	three	in	every	ten	persons	[in	the	KEEA	municipality]	are	
economically	not	active	(32.4%)”	and	that	“one	key	finding	of	important	social	and	
health	implication	is	the	poor	nature	of	housing	condition	in	the	Municipality	which	
confirms	the	relative	poverty	of	the	residents”	(GSS,	2014:70)	–	see	figure	17	below.	As	
the	KEEA	Municipal	Coordinating	Director	concedes,	“…yes	we	have	poverty,	the	bulk	
of	people	are	poor	so	to	speak	and	if	you	go	into	the	hinterland	you	see	people	depend	
on	seasonal	cropping	and	they	are	peasant	farmers,	from	hand	to	mouth.	This	is	how	
they’ve	survived	all	the	way”74.	The	Municipal	Assembly	identifies	the	key	development	
																																																								
74	Interview	with	Alhaji	Musah,	Municipal	Coordinating	Director,	KEEA,	Elmina	04.11.2014	
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challenges	in	Elmina	and	its	environs	as	found	in	education,	agriculture,	WASH	(water,	
sanitation	and	hygiene),	health	and	local	economic	development75.	Improvements	in	
these	areas	are	considered	as	essential	for	improving	socio‐economic	development	and	
poverty	reduction.	It	is	in	this	regard	that	beginning	in	the	mid‐1990s,	tourism	came	to	
be	seen	as	a	potential	‘third	sector’	growth	pole	in	Elmina		‐	after	fishing	and	salt	
mining	‐	which	could	serve	as	a	catalyst	for	local	economic	development	(Holden	et	al.,	
2011).		
	Figure	17	A	shot	of	the	Elmina	Township	from	the	hill	of	Fort	Java	
Elmina	is	endowed	with	a	number	of	cultural	heritage	tourism	resources	and	assets.	
These	include	the	UNESCO	World	Heritage	Site	of	Elmina	Castle	and	Fort	St.	Jago,	18th	
and	19th	century	built	traditional	Asafo	Posts,	Old	Merchant	houses,	the	Old	Dutch	
Cemetery,	the	Bakatue	and	Edina	Bronya	traditional	festivals	and	a	number	of	
historical	landmarks	in	addition	to	a	long	stretch	of	beach	and	the	Benya	Lagoon.	These	
assets	have	long	been	noted	as	having	the	potential	to	attract	a	large	number	of	both	
domestic	and	international	tourists	to	Elmina.	The	first	serious	attempt	at	developing	
tourism	in	Elmina	as	part	of	a	strategy	to	stimulate	regional	and	local	economic	
development	and	tackle	poverty	came	under	the	Central	Regional	Integrated	
Development	Programme	(CERIDEP).	CERIDEP,	which	was	funded	by	the	UNDP	and	
																																																								
75	Interview	with	Labaran	Fuseini,	Municipal	Planning	Officer,	KEEA,	Elmina	23.07.2015:	KEEA	
Medium	Term	Development	Plan	2014‐2017	
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USAID,	was	implemented	by	the	Central	Regional	Development	Commission	
(CEDECOM)	between	1993	and1998.	This	project	was	aimed	at	developing	an	
integrated	tourism	programme	for	the	Central	Region	culminating	in	the	restoration	of	
the	Cape	Coast	and	Elmina	Castles	as	well	as	the	development	of	the	Canopy	Walkway	
at	the	Kakum	National	Park.	Thus	in	1995,	the	Elmina	Castle	and	Fort	St.	Jago	were	
partly	renovated	and	given	fresh	painting.	Unlike	in	the	case	of	Cape	Coast	where	a	
number	of	historic	houses	were	also	renovated	through	home‐owner	grants,	the	
project	in	Elmina	was	isolated	rather	than	integrated	into	overall	economic	
development	strategy.	In	its	evaluation	reports,	the	UNDP	identified	a	lack	of	
coordination	between	stakeholders	and	recommended	the	involvement	of	the	
Municipal	Assemblies	and	Chiefs	as	stakeholders	in	future	tourism	related	programmes	
and	projects	(cited	in	Sonne,	2010).	These	recommendations	were	later	to	be	applied	in	
the	subsequent	tourism	development	project	that	came	to	Elmina.	
The Elmina Cultural Heritage Management Programme 
Given	its	historical	role	in	Ghanaian‐European	relations,	the	Elmina	Township	has	seen	
a	number	of	major	development	initiatives	taking	place	in	the	late	1990s	to	the	early	
2000s.	These	included	the	CERIDEP	project	and	the	construction	of	market	stalls,	
provision	of	waste	containers	and	trucks	through	a	World	Bank	loan	scheme	under	the	
Urban	II	and	III	projects.	Furthermore,	a	fish	nursery	and	fish	processing	centre	had	
been	constructed	with	support	from	the	French	and	Canadian	governments	as	had	the	
provision	of	waste	bins	and	other	equipment	to	the	Waste	Department	of	the	KEEA	
Municipality	by	CORDAID	and	the	German	Embassy	in	Accra.	The	various	development	
projects	initiated	in	Elmina	in	particular	and	the	KEEA	Municipality	in	general,	have	
been	characterised	by	isolated	impacts	and	a	lack	of	an	integrated	approach	to	
addressing	the	development	challenges	of	the	city	and	the	municipality	at	large.	It	was	
in	this	regard	that	the	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	Management	Programme	(ECHMP)	was	
initiated	in	the	year	2000	under	the	leading	auspices	of	the	KEEA	Municipal	Assembly.	
The	ECHMP	was	an	attempt	to	provide	a	coordinated	effort	towards	existing	and	
ongoing	initiatives	in	order	to	define	and	develop	an	integrated	approach	to	the	
development	of	Elmina.	The	ECHMP	aimed	at	stimulating	the	development	potentials	in	
Elmina	through	the	creation	of	new	local	employment	opportunities	in	order	to	
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alleviate	poverty	and	improve	living	standards76.		With	initial	funding	from	the	Dutch	
government,	a	fundamental	aim	of	the	ECHMP	was	urban	heritage	conservation	and	the	
revitalisation	of	identified	mutual	heritage	between	Ghana	and	the	Netherlands.	This	
mutual	heritage	which	constituted	the	system‐to‐be‐governed	within	the	ECHMP	
process	refers	to	the	evolved	heritage	still	evident	in	Elmina	today.	The	system‐to‐be‐
governed	was	comprised	of	primarily	the	Elmina	Castle,	Fort	St.	Jago,	Java	Museum,	Old	
Dutch	Cemetery,	Asafo	Posts,	St.	Joseph’s	Catholic	Church	building	and	museum,	the	
Methodist	Church	Chapel	building,	numerous	merchant	houses	and	the	very	layout	of	
the	city	of	Elmina.	It	was	these	(potential)	tourist	assets	that	underpinned	the	overall	
objective	of	the	ECHMP	which	was	to	develop	a	“clear‐cut	strategy	and	institutional	
framework	for	integrated	urban	cultural	heritage	conservation	in	Elmina	town	and	to	
revitalise	the	identified	mutual	heritage”77.		
The	governing	system	within	which	to	develop	and	implement	the	ECHMP	strategy	was	
made	up	of	the	following	key	institutions	and	actors.		The	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐
Abrem	(KEEA)	Municipal	was	the	primary	stakeholder	in	the	preparation	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy.	This	was	done	in	close	collaboration	with	the	Ghana	Museums	and	
Monuments	Board	(GMMB),	the	Institute	for	Local	Government	Studies	(ILGS)	in	Accra	
and	with	technical	support	from	the	Institute	of	Housing	and	Urban	Development	(IHS)	
at	the	Erasmus	University	of	Rotterdam	and	the	University	of	Groningen	(RUG)	both	in	
the	Netherlands.	In	addition,	the	Ghana	Heritage	Conservation	Trust	(GHCT),	the	Ghana	
Tourism	Authority	(GTA),	the	Regional	Environmental	Protection	Agency	(EPA),	the	
Regional	Town	and	Country	Planning	Department,	the	Public	Works	Department	and	
the	Regional	Attorney	General’s	Department	were	also	involved	in	a	supervisory	role.	
Moreover,	a	large	number	of	business	leaders	and	community	groups	were	involved	in	
the	preparation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.		
In	order	to	create	a	sense	of	local	ownership,	the	governing	interactions	for	the	ECHMP	
process	were	designed	in	such	a	way	that	allowed	multiple	public	consultations	and	
involvement	of	the	community.	There	were	thus	four	phases	to	the	planning	process	of	
the	ECHMP	(see	figure	18	below).	In	the	first	phase,	a	number	of	public	consultations	
were	held	in	order	to	identify	key	stakeholders	who	were	to	later	form	working	groups.	
One	of	the	first	outputs	from	this	phase	was	the	development	of	the	Elmina	Profile	
																																																								
76	KEEA	(2002a)	The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	
77	KEEA	(2002b:1)	The	Elmina	Profile	
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based	on	the	public	consultation	and	desk	research.	The	Elmina	Profile	served	as	a	
baseline	document	that	highlighted	various	development	issues	in	Elmina.	The	
centrepiece	of	this	first	phase	was	the	Elmina	Town	Consultation	held	between	15th	
and	18th	April,	2002,	the	official	opening	of	which	was	attended	by	Prince	Willem	
Alexander	(currently	King	Willem	Alexander)	and	Princes	Maxima	of	the	Netherlands	
and	the	chiefs	and	people	of	the	Elmina	traditional	area.	The	presence	of	the	Dutch	
royalty	underlined	the	high	level	of	importance	that	was	attached	to	the	ECHMP	and	its	
objective	of	preserving	the	mutual	heritage	between	the	Dutch	and	Elmina	(Ghana).		
		Figure	18	The	four	phases	of	the	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	Management	Programme	
Source:	KEEA	(2002)		
In	the	phase	II	of	the	ECHMP	process,	five	priority	areas	were	arrived	at	through	a	
series	of	community	stakeholder	consultations.	These	were:	1)	drainage	and	waste	
management;	2)	fishing	and	fishing	harbour;	3)	tourism	and	local	economic	
development;	4)	health	and;	5)	education.	Following	on	from	this,	phase	III	involved	
the	formation	of	working	groups	of	about	20	members	each	for	the	identified	priority	
areas.	The	working	groups	were	tasked	with	developing	specific	strategic	action	plans	
and	projects	that	can	be	implemented	for	each	given	priority	area.	This	might	be	
interpreted	as	perhaps	a	sign	of	the	lack	of	joined‐up	governance	of	the	process	at	the	
outset.	However,	the	setting	up	of	these	working	groups	made	up	of	a	wide	range	of	
stakeholders	was	an	attempt	at	collaborative	planning.	The	various	strategic	action	
plans	were	then	aggregated	by	the	core	Task	Force	group	of	the	ECHMP	into	the	Elmina	
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2015	Strategy.	The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	mapped	out	a	strategy	for	the	future	
integrated	development	of	Elmina	accompanied	by	specific	action	and	project	plans	for	
all	the	five	priority	areas.	These	project	and	action	plans	were	to	be	implemented	
across	phase	III	and	phase	IV.	With	its	tagline	of	‘Building	on	the	Past	to	Create	a	Better	
Future’,	the	success	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	predicated	on	the	effective	
implementation	of	priority	three	–	tourism	and	local	economic	development.		
	
5.2 Reimaging the Elmina Castle as a catalyst for local 
economic development 
As	developed	in	Chapter	2	section	2.1,	the	concept	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity	
denotes	the	capabilities	available	to	stakeholders	to	interact	with	others	by	forming	
images	and	selecting	appropriate	instruments	of	implementation	within	a	given	socio‐
political	room	for	action.	In	this	section,	I	first	identify	the	key	stakeholders	involved	in	
the	formulation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	and	analyse	the	images	they	held	of	
tourism’s	role	in	local	economic	development.	Importantly,	the	analysis	will	highlight	
some	of	the	underlying	contradictory	images	stakeholders	held	regarding	what	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	‘originally’	intended	to	represent.		
The cast, roles and backstory of the Elmina 2015 Strategy  
The	seeds	of	the	idea	that	turned	out	to	be	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	can	be	traced	to	
the	Save	Elmina	Association	(SEA).	The	SEA	was	founded	in	1990	by	a	group	of	Dutch	
nationals	and	a	handful	of	Elmina	citizens	(Holsey,	2008).	Some	of	the	Dutch	nationals	
involved	in	the	setting	up	of	the	SEA	were	either	residents	in	Ghana	or	had	conducted	
their	research	on	the	Dutch	connections	in	Elmina78.	A	key	Dutch	member	of	the	SEA	at	
the	start	was	Dr.	Michel	Doortmont	who	was	then	at	the	Erasmus	University	of	
Rotterdam	and	would	later	be	part	of	the	University	of	Groningen	team	providing	
technical	assistance	to	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.		The	SEA,	which	was	registered	as	a	
																																																								
78	Interview	with	Ebo	Dadzie,	Head	of	Tourism	Sub‐Committee,	KEEA	and	founding	member	of	
SEA,	16.07.2015	
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non‐profit	non‐governmental	association	of	citizens	and	friends	of	Elmina	published	a	
number	of	‘Save	Elmina’	Magazines.		
The	first	of	these	magazines	was	published	in	1995	through	the	financial	support	of	the	
Dutch	Embassy	in	Ghana	for	a	production	run	of	500	copies.	The	preface	of	this	first	
edition	was	written	by	Thomas	Austen	Ankumah,	the	then	District	Chief	Executive	
(DCE)	of	the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	(KEEA)	District	Assembly.	In	this	preface,	
the	DCE	applauds	the	work	of	the	SEA	in	drawing	attention	to	Elmina’s	historical	and	
architectural	heritage.	The	DCE	proposes	the	development	of	sister‐city	relations	
between	Elmina	and	those	cities	in	the	Netherlands	with	strong	connections	to	the	
trade	house	that	were	built	in	Elmina.	The	preface	is	signed	off	with	the	“…hope	that	it	
[the	efforts	of	the	SEA]	soon	will	result	in	new	private	investment	that	will	rekindle	the	
rehabilitation	of	Elmina’s	monumental	town	centre”	(SEA,	1995:3).		The	SEA	magazine	
made	the	case	about	the	tourist	potential	of	restoring	the	many	historical	houses	found	
in	Elmina.	Using	an	example	from	Cote	d’Ivoire,	the	writers	of	the	magazine	were	of	the	
view	that	the	restoration	of	one	or	two	houses	could	see	the	beginning	of	the	
rehabilitation	of	the	whole	town.	The	magazine	contained	a	detailed	architectural	
drawings	showing	how	the	rehabilitation	of	Bridge	House	could	be	adapted	to	serve	as	
a	restaurant	with	a	roof	top	bar.	Due	to	the	inability	to	attract	the	needed	funding,	the	
work	of	the	SEA	slowed	down	towards	the	late	1990s.		
Around	the	end	of	1999	and	early	2000,	the	Ghana	Museums	and	Monuments	Board	
(GMMB)	wrote	a	project	proposal	for	the	rehabilitation	of	Elmina	castle.	They	applied	
to	the	Dutch	government	for	funding	through	a	partnership	with	the	Netherlands	
Institute	for	Conservation,	Art	and	Science	(NICAS)79.	For	the	GMMB,	the	image	they	
held	was	basically	one	of	a	simple	conservation/restoration/rehabilitation	project	of	
the	Elmina	Castle	to	prevent	the	collapse	of	the	Castle.	The	intention	of	the	GMMB	was	
to	develop	and	make	use	of	local	capacity	for	consultancy	and	implementation	of	the	
project.	The	GMMB’s	proposal	was	thus	solely	focused	on	the	Elmina	Castle	with	no	
bearing	on	the	surrounding	Elmina	Township.	Wind	of	this	project	proposal	got	to	the	
people	based	at	the	Institute	of	Housing	Studies	and	Urban	Development	(IHS)	of	the	
Erasmus	University	of	Rotterdam	and	Michel	Doortmont	who	had	by	then	moved	to	the	
																																																								
79	Interview	with	Nicholas	Ivor,	Central	and	Western	Regional	Director	of	GMMB,	30.10.2014;	
Interview	with	Dr.	Anthony	Annah‐Prah,	Head	of	Implementation	of	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	
Management	Programme,	03.11.2014.		
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University	of	Groningen	(RUG)80.	After	the	GMMB	entered	into	discussions	with	the	IHS	
and	RUG,	it	was	suggested	that	the	best	way	to	secure	funding	was	to	expand	the	scope	
of	the	project	proposal	beyond	just	restoring	the	castle.	From	the	interviews,	it	appears	
that	the	Dutch	counterparts	had	a	much	stronger	and	decisive	role	in	expanding	on	the	
original	idea	of	castle	renovation.	Building	on	the	experiences	of	the	IHS,	it	was	decided	
that	the	proposal	should	link	the	rehabilitation	of	the	castle	to	the	revitalisation	of	the	
whole	Elmina	Township	–	bringing	in	the	original	idea	earlier	espoused	by	the	SEA.		
This	was	based	on	the	recognition	that	the	community	needed	to	see	a	direct	benefit	
from	any	rehabilitation	work	on	the	castle.	This	is	because,		
“…people	will	come	to	the	castle,	within	an	hour	or	two	they	are	finished.	There	is	
nothing	to	sustain	their	stay	here	for	at	least	three	days	and	the	local	community	
does	not	benefit	from	that	type	of	tourism	and	it	was	very	clear	that	the	Castle	did	
not	bring	any	economic	benefit	to	the	people	so	they	didn’t	care,	they	didn’t	care	
to	litter	around	it,	to	put	canoes	around	it,	sometimes	to	use	it	as	places	of	
convenience”.81	
	
The sector strategy and vision for tourism-led local economic development   
The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	comprised	of	three	key	reports:	1)	Sector	Strategy	and	
Vision;	2)	Project	Portfolios	and;	3)	Elmina	Profile	and	Summary	Profile.	The	Elmina	
Profile	was	a	report	on	the	socio‐economic	development	and	political	situation	of	
Elmina.	This	served	as	basis	for	developing	the	Sector	Strategy	and	Vision	as	well	as	the	
Project	Portfolios.	The	Elmina	Profile	also	served	as	a	baseline	against	which	to	
evaluate	its	outcomes.	Out	of	the	three	reports,	it	is	the	Sector	Strategy	and	Vision	
report	that	offers	an	insight	into	how	stakeholders	arrived	at	an	image	of	how	tourism,	
local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	were	related	in	Elmina.		In	this	
section,	I	provide	a	detailed	analysis	of	the	Sector	Strategy	and	Vision.	I	highlight	how	it	
conceptualised	the	relationship	between	tourism	and	poverty	reduction	and	make	the	
argument	that	the	entire	strategy	was	hinged	on	tourism.	
In	the	foreword	of	the	report,	the	then	District	Chief	Executive	of	the	KEEA	starts	of	by	
explaining	that	it	is	the	existing	cultural	heritage	in	Elmina	that	is	being	renovated	and	
																																																								
80	Interview	with	Justice	Amoah,	Former	Municipal	Planning	Officer	of	KEEA/Former	National	
Project	Coordinator	of	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	17.07.2015	
81	Interview	with	Dr.	Anthony	Annah‐Prah,	Head	of	Implementation	of	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	
Management	Programme,	03.11.2014.	
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conserved	in	an	integrated	manner.	He	is	quick	to	add	that	“…conservation	of	heritage	
is	not	considered	in	isolation	but	in	a	broader	environment	of	poverty,	social	and	
economic	development”	(KEEA,	2002a:7).	An	underlying	assumption	and	hope	in	the	
foreword	was	that	the	implementation	of	the	strategy	will	not	only	preserve	heritage	
but	at	the	same	time	improve	upon	the	living	conditions	of	the	people	in	the	city.	The	
introduction	of	the	report	takes	the	discussion	further	by	noting	that	“[u]unfortunately,	
the	surroundings	of	the	fort	and	castle	are	a	far	cry	from	an	attractive	area	for	tourists	
to	linger	around	and	spend	money”	(KEEA,	2002a:9).	While	fishing	was	considered	to	
be	the	major	economic	activity	in	Elmina,	it	was	nonetheless	“[w]ithout	doubt,	[that]	
the	historic	buildings	are	the	main	assets	of	the	town”	(KEEA,	2002a:9).	From	this	
starting	point,	it	became	simply	a	matter	of	connecting	other	sectors	of	the	local	
economy	to	the	potential	offered	by	the	estimated	100,	000	tourists	who	annually	come	
to	Elmina	in	order	to	expand	tourism‐related	employment	opportunities.	The	actual	
visitor	numbers	to	the	Elmina	Castle	between	2007	and	2015	are	shown	in	the	figure	
19	below.	
	Figure	19	Elmina	Castle	visitor	numbers,	2007‐2015	
Source:	Author’s	calculation	based	on	raw	daily	visitor	records	at	the	Elmina	Castle.	
Thus	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	set	out	a	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	
planning	strategy	that	went	beyond	simple	heritage	conservation.	In	summary,	the	
argument	was	this;	
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The	Elmina	2015	strategy	goes	beyond	restoring	monuments.	It	believes	that	with	
improved	tourist	infrastructure,	the	revitalisation	of	the	existing	monuments	and	
the	development	of	other	important	cultural	sites,	tourism	can	become	a	major	
economic	activity	in	Elmina	and	serve	to	improve	the	general	standard	of	living	in	
the	town.	The	strategy	identifies	tourism	as	an	entry	point	in	facilitating	
sustainable	development	through	an	integrated	development	approach.	Thus	
mutual	cultural	heritage	and	monuments	serve	as	a	springboard	in	working	
towards	improvement	of	living	standards.	At	the	same	time,	the	improvements	to	
the	other	sectors	such	as	health,	education	and	waste	management	will	enhance	
the	touristic	potential	of	Elmina,	thereby	allowing	for	a	synergistic	development	
framework.		
KEEA	(2002a:10)		
It	is	on	this	basis	that	this	thesis	focuses	on	the	tourism	and	local	economic	
development	component	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	A	key	reason	for	this	focus	is	that	
the	success	of	the	other	areas	was	to	a	large	extent	predicated	on	the	success	of	the	
tourism	and	local	economic	development	priority	area.	Consequently,	while	the	whole	
is	greater	than	the	sum	of	its	parts,	the	outcomes	of	the	tourism	and	local	economic	
development	component	is	representative	of	the	larger	plan	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy.	An	understanding	of	the	extent	of	success	achieved	under	the	tourism	and	
local	economic	development	component	provides	insights	into	the	extent	of	success	in	
the	other	components.		
Under	the	tourism	and	local	economic	development	component,	the	main	problem	
identified	was	the	fact	that	the	average	length	of	tourist	stay	in	Elmina	was	1	night	and	
the	resulting	limited	benefit	accruing	to	the	town	from	tourism.	This	was	attributed	to	
among	other	things	the	undeveloped	tourist	attractions,	limited	tourist	information	and	
promotion	of	sites,	inadequate	tourism	facilities,	poor	sanitation,	a	lack	of	community	
awareness	and	limited	institutional	capacity.	On	the	basis	of	these	identified	problems,	
a	selected	number	of	strategic	actions	were	prioritised.	The	overall	strategic	objective	
for	tourism	was	“…to	make	Elmina	more	attractive	and	interesting	to	tourists	so	that	
they	will	increase	their	length	of	stay	[through]	…improvement	of	tourist	infrastructure	
and	marketing	sites	[and	the]…	development	of	un(der)‐developed	attractions	like	the	
Asafo	Posts,	the	Catholic	museum	and	the	Dutch	cemetery”	(KEEA,	2002a:61).	A	key	
shortcoming	within	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	process	at	this	point	was	the	failure	to	
situate	tourism	in	Elmina	within	the	larger	context	of	the	reality	of	tourism	
development	in	Ghana	as	a	whole	(see	discussion	in	Chapter	4,	section	4.4).	This	would	
have	allowed	stakeholders	to	understand	the	tourism	product	in	Ghana	that	includes	
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Elmina	Castle,	the	profile	of	visitors,	the	key	source	markets	and	the	role	of	local	tour	
operators	in	shaping	travel	itineraries.	Such	an	understanding	might	have	allowed	a	
different	way	of	determining	which	projects	were	to	be	implemented	and	how	to	
connect	them	to	the	reality	of	tourism	development	in	Ghana.	This	was	however	not	the	
case.		
In	addition	to	the	rehabilitation	of	selected	parts	of	the	Elmina	Castle	and	Fort	St.	Jago	
and	a	proposal	for	renovating	some	selected	historic	houses	through	a	home‐owner	
scheme	programme,	15	specific	project	proposals	were	developed	under	the	tourism	
and	local	economic	development	priority	area	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	(see	table	7	
below).	
Table	7	Projects	to	be	implemented	under	priority	area	3:	Tourism	and	Local	Economic	
Development	with	indicative	total	cost	
	
Project	 Total	Cost	(in	Euros)
Project	41:	Erection	of	signposts	at	
strategic	locations	in	town	
€	20,	000
Project	42:	Establishment	of	an	
internet	café	in	Elmina	
€	20,	000
Project	43:	Upgrading	of	Kiosks €	30,	000
Project	44:	Rehabilitation	of	the	
historic	site	adjacent	to	the	Castle	
€	22,	000
Project	45:	Developing	of	
community	performing	arts	night	
theatre	
€	1000
Project	46:	Providing	street	
lighting	in	Elmina	town	and	
illumination	of	the	Elmina	and	St.	
Jago	Castles		
€	43,	500
Project	47:	Diversify	choice	of	
eateries	and	hotels	in	Elmina	Town	
and	provide	alternative	services	
for	visitors	
€	830,	000
Project	48:	Redevelopment	of	
Trafalgar	Square	
€	30,	000
Project	49:	Tree	planting €	20,	000
Project	50:	Skill	development	and	
capacity	building	
€	1000
Project	51:	Redevelop	the	former	
government	garden	in	to	a	children	
playground	
€	50,	000
Project	52:	Improve	the	salt	
industry	
€	2,	900,	000	(with	€	20,	000	for	
feasibility	study)
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Project	53:	Ironman/Action	Elmina	
Competition:	running,	cycling,	boat	
races	and	swimming	
Sponsored	by	the	private	sector
Project	54:	Bike	rental	and	bike	
taxis	for	tourists	
In	co‐operation	with	the	private
Project	55:	Redevelop	the	beach	
along	Rawlings	high	street	
€	20,	000	– 30,	000	in	co‐operation	with	
private	sector
It	was	expected	that	the	implementation	of	these	projects	would	lead	to	“…the	
attainment	of	longer	stays	by	tourist	[which]	will	contribute	to	local	economic	growth	
and	generate	employment	and	income	in	Elmina.	It	will	thereby	contribute	to	the	
town’s	longer‐term	development	goals	including	its	social,	economic	and	heritage	
revitalisation”	(KEEA,	2002a:61).	In	the	conclusion	section	of	the	document,	the	
centrality	of	the	tourism	and	local	economic	development	component	to	the	whole	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	is	reiterated.	The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	starts	from	the	
restoration	and	management	of	existing	heritage	assets	for	tourism.	It	is	after	this	that	
tourism’s	potential	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	becomes	
mutually‐reinforcing	of	the	other	components	of	health,	sanitation	and	education.	The	
Strategy	document	succinctly	notes	that;	
But	this	strategy	goes	beyond	restoring	monuments.	It	recognises	the	importance	
of	taking	away	the	factors	that	presently	prevent	visitors	from	spending	more	
time	and	money	in	Elmina	Town.	Only	if	the	drains	will	be	cleaned,	illegal	waste	
dumps	are	cleared,	waste	is	collected	routinely	and	visitors	are	not	constantly	
harassed	by	children,	visitors	are	tempted	to	further	explore	the	town.	Paving	the	
streets	of	the	New	Town	and	upgrading	of	some	strategic	sites	such	as	the	former	
Government	Garden	and	the	historic	site	next	to	the	Castle	will	further	improve	
the	town	image	of	Elmina.	An	increase	in	tourist	numbers	can	make	this	sector	an	
important	industry	to	complement	the	present	sources	of	local	employment.	KEEA	
(2002a:84)		
The	last	section	of	the	Strategy	document	is	titled	“A	Vision	for	the	year	2015”	and	it	is	
here	that	the	ultimate	vision	for	Elmina	is	set	out	and	is	worth	quoting	in	part.	The	
vision	is	that;	
“In	2015	we	envisage	Elmina	to	be	a	thriving	town	in	which	fishing	is	still	the	
main	economic	activity	but	has	significant	other	sectors	of	employment	in	the	salt	
mining,	boat	building	but	most	importantly	the	tourist	industry.	The	unique	
heritage	assets	and	the	picturesque	harbour	make	the	town	Ghana’s	prime	tourist	
destination.	The	excellent	road	conditions	allow	tourists	to	reach	Elmina	by	car	
within	2	hours	from	Accra,	while	the	building	of	airstrip	is	underway.	The	town	is	
to	be	visited	by	over	150,000	tourists	annually	that	spend	an	average	of	two	
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nights	in	the	town	choosing	from	a	wide	range	of	choices	for	accommodation.	The	
local	population	is	also	benefitting	from	the	tourist	boom	and	consequent	
economic	development”	KEEA	(2002a:85)		
This	vision	for	what	Elmina	will	look	like	in	2015	did	not	however	materialise	as	
originally	envisaged.	The	hope	that	tourism	will	serve	as	a	catalyst	for	local	economic	
development	and	contribute	to	poverty	reduction	turned	out	to	be	less	real	than	
expected.	There	are	a	number	of	reasons	that	account	for	the	disjuncture	between	
objectives	and	eventual	outcomes.	Key	among	these	is	what	appears	to	be	a	failure	(or	
oversight)	of	Urban	Solutions	as	the	consultants	to	undertake	a	detailed	market	
research	of	tourist	behaviour	in	relation	to	visits	to	Elmina.	For	instance,	the	basis	on	
which	the	projected	annual	visits	of	150,000	tourist	was	made	remains	unclear.	
Records	at	the	Elmina	Castle	shows	that	in	the	year	ending	2014,	there	were	just	about	
58,000	tourists	which	is	paltry	compared	to	the	projected	figure	envisaged	in	the	
Strategy	document.	The	design	of	the	Strategy	failed	to	take	into	account	how	Elmina	as	
a	destination	is	intrinsically	a	part	of	the	regional	tourism	product.	This	means	that	the	
majority	of	tourists	visit	Elmina	as	part	of	a	day’s	itinerary	that	tend	to	include	the	Cape	
Coast	Castle	and	the	Kakum	National	Park	which	are	all	lying	within	about	30kms	of	
each	other.	From	this	perspective,	the	anticipated	average	spend	of	two	nights	was	
going	to	be	a	challenge	since	for	most	tourists,	a	visit	to	the	Elmina	Castle	is	part	of	a	
tight	itinerary	that	leaves	little	time	to	engage	with	the	rest	of	the	town	(Adu‐Ampong,	
2016).	Perhaps,	one	conclusion	to	be	drawn	from	how	the	vision	was	set	up	is	that	
there	was	not	a	realistic	assessment	of	what	was	possible	in	terms	of	tourism	
development	and	the	potential	of	tourism	within	Elmina	to	contribute	to	local	
economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	
The	planning	process	leading	up	to	the	formulation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	follows	
a	classic	stakeholder	identification‐stakeholder	consultation‐stakeholder	agreed	upon	
action	plans	process	–	which	is	commonly	referred	to	as	collaborative/communicative	
planning	(Healey.	1997,	1999;	see	also	Brand	and	Gaffikin,	2007	for	a	useful	critique).	
While	the	planning	process	to	arrive	at	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	might	pass	as	
unproblematic,	its	implementation	was	anything	but	that.	However,	to	account	for	the	
problematic	nature	of	implementation,	one	must	necessarily	take	a	closer	reading	of	
the	planning	process.	This	allows	for	the	identification	of	the	writings	that	had	always	
been	on	the	wall,	so	to	speak,	but	which	were	overlooked	in	the	euphoria	of	achieving	
consensus	and	arriving	at	a	shared	strategy.	In	the	next	main	section,	I	will	outline	and	
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assess	the	images	held	by	key	stakeholders	that	are	(were)	involved	in	the	tourism	and	
local	economic	development	planning	process.		
	
The role and influence of external donors in consolidating the image of a 
rehabilitated Elmina Castle 
The	original	image	held	by	the	GMMB,	the	IHS	and	the	RUG	after	the	start	of	the	ECHMP	
shifted	from	a	project	of	castle	rehabilitation	to	one	of	an	integrated	tourism‐led	local	
economic	development	project.	Having	expanded	this	way,	it	became	necessary	to	get	
the	politico‐administrative	backing	of	the	Ghanaian	state.	Consequently,	the	KEEA	
Assembly	was	brought	on	board	since	it	is	the	local	government	body	charged	with	the	
responsibility	for	overall	planning	and	development	of	the	district	of	which	Elmina	is	
the	district	capital.	It	therefore	became	clear	that	the	KEEA	had	to	act	as	the	leading	
agency	for	the	project	proposal	instead	of	the	GMMB.	Furthermore	the	Dutch	Institute	
for	Conservation,	which	was	the	preferred	partner	of	the	GMMB,	was	left	out	at	this	
stage82	and	the	Ghana	Institute	for	Local	Government	Studies	(ILGS)	was	also	brought	
on	board.	It	is	noteworthy	that	although	the	project	was	basically	proposing	a	vision	of	
heritage	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	process,	neither	the	Ghana	
Tourism	Authority	(GTA)	nor	the	Ministry	of	Tourism,	Culture	and	Creative	Arts	was	
involved.		With	the	proposal	ready,	funding	was	sought	and	secured	from	the	Culture	
Fund	of	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	the	Ministry	of	Education,	Culture	and	
Science	in	the	Netherlands.	It	is	from	this	funding	that	the	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	
Management	Programme	was	born.		
The	essence	of	the	image	held	by	stakeholders	at	this	point	can	be	put	like	this	–	an	
integrated	approach	to	cultural	heritage	asset	restoration	and	management	can	lead	to	
an	improvement	in	the	tourist,	social	and	economic	conditions	of	Elmina.	The	idea	was	
that	a	diversification	of	tourist	attractions	and	the	maintenance	of	existing	assets	will	
lead	to	increased	visits	and	duration	of	stay	of	tourists.	This	will	then	feed	into	the	local	
economy	through	the	multiplier	effects	of	tourists’	spending.		The	image	of	tourism’s	
																																																								
82	Interview	with	Nicholas	Ivor,	Central	and	Western	Regional	Director	of	GMMB,	30.10.2014	
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role	in	local	economic	development	held	by	stakeholders	at	the	conclusion	of	the	
ECHMP	was	given	expression	in	the	following	documents;	
 The	Elmina	Profile	
 The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	
 15	project	proposals	under	priority	area	III	–	tourism	and	LED	
 a	number	of	project	proposals	for	the	other	priority	areas	
 project	proposal	for	the	rehabilitation	of	Elmina	Castle	and	Fort	St.	Jago	
 project	proposal	for	renovating	selected	historic	buildings.	
	
At	the	conclusion	of	the	ECHMP	and	the	production	of	the	documents	outlined	above,	
the	KEEA	was	given	the	responsibility	of	implementing	the	projects	by	first	securing	
the	necessary	funding.	When	it	became	clear	that	additional	funding	could	be	secured	
from	the	Dutch	government	and	the	European	Union’s	Development	Fund	(EDF),	the	
representatives	of	the	IHS	established	a	consultancy	firm	–	Urban	Solutions	BV	–	as	a	
spin‐off	from	the	Erasmus	University	of	Rotterdam	in	2003.	Once	the	funding	for	
implementing	some	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	projects	had	been	secured,	Urban	
Solutions	BV	bid	for	and	won	the	contract	for	providing	consultancy	services	for	project	
implementation.	This	is	how	it	happened	in	the	words	of	interviewees	who	witnessed	
the	process;	
“…you	know	people	are	also	fast.	After	the	proposal	and	the,	soliciting	for	funds	to,	
Paul,	I	think	they	knew	where	they	could	get	funding	so	they	formed	before	the,	
they	formed	a	consortium	to	manage	the	programme	so	that	is	how	come	the	
Urban	Solutions	came	in	because	what	happened	was	that	they	were	not	paying	
the	officers	for	the	job,	they	were	always	taking	consultants	so	they	felt	that	okay	
if	I	have	done	to	this	point	and	there	is	money	coming	and	for	somebody	to	be,	if	I	
have	a	group	who	can	do	the	same	thing	why	not?	So	that	is	the	way	I	see	it,	I	
perceived	it	because	he	was	the	one	who	started	from	the	root	and	then	
maybe…”83	
	
“…let	me	put	it	this	way,	the	people	of	Urban	Solutions	were	originally	employees	
of	IHS	–	Institute	of	Housing	Studies	in	Rotterdam	–	and	to	make	themselves	
functionally	and	also	to	maintain	themselves	in	jobs	that	they	wanted,	they	
identified	places	which	need	help	and	together	with	the	locals	brought	up	
strategic	plans	with	action	plans,	with	budgets	and	in	collaboration	with	the	
																																																								
83	Interview	with	Justice	Amoah,	Former	Municipal	Planning	Officer	of	KEEA/Former	National	
Project	Coordinator	of	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	17.07.2015	
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locals,	sought	funds	from	institutions	and	it	is	from	the	funding	that	they	also	
carve	out	their	remuneration.”84	
This	situation	however	did	not	sit	well	with	the	original	image	held	by	the	GMMB	who	
wanted	to	use	the	project	to	make	use	of	and	develop	local	capacity	in	consultancy	
service	provision.	In	fact	the	GMMB	also	formed	a	small	business	unit	to	bid	for	
consultancy	services	and	projects	relating	to	the	Elmina	Castle	but	they	were	not	
successful.	This	was	in	part	explained	through	the	funding	rules	which	stipulated	that	
one	cannot	be	a	benefactor	and	a	contractor	of	the	same	project85.	Nonetheless	this	
became	a	source	of	disenchantment	for	the	GMMB	towards	the	whole	project	leading	to	
some	degree	of	ambivalence	towards	the	later	stages	of	project	implementation.		
The	analysis	above	provides	a	number	of	insights	into	the	processes	through	which	
stakeholders	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	developed	their	image	of	tourism	and	its	role	
in	local	economic	development.	The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	document	shows	no	
evidence	of	a	systematic	review	of	tourist	behaviour	in	Elmina.	However,	reference	is	
made	to	information	from	the	Ghana	Tourism	Authority	concerning	the	average	length	
of	tourist	stay	in	Elmina	which	happens	to	be	one	night.	The	facts	about	the	number	of	
visitors	to	the	castle	and	their	short	stay	and	lack	of	interaction	within	the	Elmina	
Township	shaped	stakeholders’	views.	Stakeholders	saw	that	given	a	diversified	and	
wide	range	of	attraction	sites,	visitors	were	more	likely	to	spend	more	time	and	money	
within	the	community	which	would	then	catalyse	a	number	of	local	economic	
development	opportunities.	Thus	the	linking	of	tourism	to	local	economic	development	
as	expressed	through	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	underlined	by	a	number	of	
assumptions	regarding	tourist	behaviour,	tourism	multiplier	effect	and	the	likelihood	of	
increased	tourism	leading	to	a	rejuvenation	of	other	sectors	of	the	local	economy.	
These	assumptions	are	aptly	expressed	also	in	the	view	of	interviewees	such	as	this;	
“You	see,	I	don’t	know	how	to,	I,	I,	am	not	find	the	words	to	really	describe,	
because	the	moment	you	tackle	tourism,	you	tackle	all	other	sectors	of	the	
economy.	We	say	that	people	produce	let’s	say	agriculture,	people	are	producing	
they	are	not	processing	so	people	lose	their	harvest	and	all	their	produce	and	all	
that,	do	you	think	that	if	we	have	another	million	or	2	million	people	visiting	
																																																								
84	Interview	with	Dr.	Anthony	Annah‐Prah,	Head	of	Implementation	of	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	
Management	Programme,	03.11.2014.	
85	Interview	with	Dr.	Anthony	Annah‐Prah,	Head	of	Implementation	of	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	
Management	Programme,	03.11.2014.	
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Ghana	and	spend	a	day	or	two,	our	demand	for	foodstuff	wouldn’t	go	up,	that	
whatever	is	produced	in	the	village	will	get	bought”86	
	
There	was	a	broadly	shared	consensus	among	stakeholders	about	what	they	perceived	
to	be	the	relationship	between	tourism	and	local	economic	development.	Stakeholders	
held	the	image	summarised	in	the	aspiration	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	which	was	to	
“restore	and	manage	mutual	heritage	existing	in	Elmina;	for	it	to	become	the	forefront	
of	an	integrated	programme	to	improve	the	tourist,	social	and	economic	condition	of	
Elmina”87.	Underneath	this	unified	image,	there	was	a	bit	of	infighting	with	regards	to	
the	direction	in	which	the	original	idea	of	the	GMMB	had	become	expanded.	The	
sharing	of	information	(communication)	and	the	aggregation	of	it	(coordination)	to	
arrive	at	an	image	of	tourism’s	potential	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction	was	characterised	by	the	diversity	of	stakeholders,	the	complexity	of	their	
internal	procedures	and	dynamics	of	conflicting	interests.	There	are	challenges	in	
aligning	the	images,	instruments	and	action	potential	of	the	stakeholders.	Thus	the	
process	of	transforming	stakeholders’	images	was	constrained	by	structural	elements	
of	the	judgements	of	some	of	the	stakeholders	like	the	GMMB	who	were	not	too	pleased	
that	their	preferred	partner	in	the	Dutch	Institute	for	Conservation	was	left	out	of	the	
project.	The	failure	to	develop	and	make	use	of	the	capacity	of	local	stakeholders	for	the	
consultancy	services	was	also	a	source	of	filter	that	shaped	stakeholders’	images.	
Indeed,	this	issue	of	a	lack	of	local	stakeholder	capacity	to	continue	with	
implementation	and	the	failure	to	develop	capacity	is	one	that	I	will	come	back	to	later.	
The	key	point	here	is	that	the	images	held	by	stakeholders	with	regards	to	project	
design	shaped	their	governance	capacity	when	it	comes	to	implementing	project	
objectives.		
	
	
																																																								
86	Interview	with	Francis	Cobbinah,	Executive	Director	of	Ghana	Heritage	Conservation	Trust,	
29.09.2014	
87	KEEA	(2002b:	86)	The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	
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5.3 Instruments to link tourism to local economic 
development 
A	key	aspect	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity	is	the	availability	of	instruments	that	
can	be	selected	to	translate	images	into	tangible	actions	and	outcomes.	Within	the	
ECHMP	process	there	were	a	number	of	instruments	available	to	and	used	by	different	
stakeholders.		As	Kooiman	(2008)	notes,	the	design	and	use	of	instruments	involves	
competing	interests	and	tensions.	Thus	stakeholders’	choice	of	instrument	is	not	
through	neutral	selection	but	is	arrived	at	vis‐à‐vis	their	position	in	society	and	within	
the	governance	system.	In	this	section,	I	provide	a	descriptive	analysis	of	the	key	
instruments	that	were	at	play	in	the	implementation	of	ECMP	and	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	projects	–	politico‐legal	and	administrative,	communicative	instruments	and	
financial	instruments.	The	key	point	from	this	section	is	to	highlight	the	fact	that	these	
instruments	were	dispersed	among	various	stakeholders.	This	dispersal	of	instruments	
and	underlying	resources	and	accompanying	lack	of	communication,	collaboration	and	
coordination	served	as	structural	constraints	to	the	full	achievement	of	project	
objectives.	These	structural	constraints	were	not	adequately	considered	and	so	there	
were	no	provisions	made	in	the	setup	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	to	overcome	these.		
Politico-legal and administrative instruments 
As	described	in	section	5.1	above,	the	seeds	that	finally	yielded	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	are	found	in	the	early	efforts	of	the	Save	Elmina	Association	(SEA).	As	a	non‐
profit	non‐governmental	organisation,	the	SEA	did	not	have	at	their	disposal	the	
essential	political,	legal	and	administrative	tools	with	which	to	take	forward	their	ideas.	
This	is	why	even	for	their	magazine	they	relied	on	the	District	Chief	Executive	of	the	
KEEA	to	give	it	a	sort	of	political	backing.	When	the	GMMB	resurrected	the	idea,	albeit	
in	a	more	circumscribed	form,	they	were	relying	on	the	legal	and	administrative	
prerogative	they	had	(see	discussion	in	Chapter	4	about	the	roles	and	responsibilities	
of	the	GMMB).	The	GMMB	is	the	legal	custodian	of	the	Elmina	Castle	and	has	
management	responsibilities	for	it.	Thus	if	the	project	had	ended	up	being	solely	about	
the	Elmina	Castle	then	the	GMMB	would	not	have	needed	the	support	of	any	other	
institution.	This	appears	to	have	been	the	preferred	position	of	the	GMMB88.	However,	
																																																								
88	Interviews	with	GMMB	officials	in	Accra	and	Cape	Coast	
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once	the	project	had	been	expanded	to	cover	overall	local	economic	development	of	
Elmina,	there	was	the	need	to	involve	the	KEEA	Municipal	Assembly.	
The	politico‐legal	backing	of	the	KEEA	to	the	ECHMP	rested	on	the	provisions	in	the	
Local	Government	Act	462	of	1993	and	section	5	of	the	National	Development	Planning	
System	Act	480	of	1994.	Under	these	legislations	the	KEEA	is	a	planning	authority	and	
the	only	institution	legally	mandated	to	prepare	local	and/or	sub‐district	development	
plans	either	directly	or	through	delegation	to	lower	tiers	of	government	like	Town	and	
Urban	Councils.	The	proposals	for	the	ECHMP	therefore	fell	into	the	category	of	a	sub	
district	local	economic	development	plan	of	Elmina	and	hence	the	KEEA	had	to	be	the	
leading	institution	for	the	project	in	order	to	provide	the	requisite	politico‐legal	
instruments.	The	KEEA	had	the	technocratic	mechanism	and	tools	for	the	planning	
process	as	the	preparation	of	District	Medium	Term	Development	Plans	(MTDP)	is	one	
of	its	key	responsibilities.	The	KEEA	was	therefore	able	to	facilitate	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	which	involved	a	much	more	detailed	planning	process	than	usually	accorded	
to	the	making	of	the	MTDP.	One	of	the	reasons	for	this	was	that	the	financial	resources	
were	provided	by	external	parties.	The	Planning	Officer	at	that	time	explains	that	“the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy,	that	was,	for	that	one	there	was	a	thorough	consultation,	
participation…	[T]he	resources	were	not	provided	by	the	assembly	otherwise	there	was	no	
[Elmina]	2015.”89	It	must	also	be	noted	that	at	this	point	in	time,	a	new	political	party	
had	just	come	in	into	office	for	the	first	time	and	was	eager	to	show	that	they	were	
bringing	the	promised	development	projects	to	the	community.	This	political	reality	
was	very	instrumental	in	shaping	the	enthusiasm	and	support	given	to	the	project	in	
the	beginning	(see	detailed	discussion	in	section	5.3	and	Chapter	7).		
Notwithstanding	its	legal	mandate	for	overall	development	of	the	municipality,	the	
remit	of	the	KEEA	did	not	extend	to	the	management	of	the	Elmina	Castle	or	many	of	
the	other	tourist	assets	of	the	municipality.	These	areas	fell	under	the	responsibility	of	
the	GMMB.	Thus	while	the	KEEA	came	to	lead	the	preparation	and	implementation	of	
the	ECHMP	and	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	plans,	it	was	the	GMMB	that	had	the	ultimate	
governing	authority	over	the	golden	goose	upon	whose	golden	eggs	all	other	
components	of	the	project	hinged.	In	addition,	given	the	dual	governance	structure	(see	
section	4.1	in	Chapter	4),	it	was	imperative	for	the	traditional	council	to	deploy	their	
																																																								
89	Interview	with	Justice	Amoah,	Former	Municipal	Planning	Officer	of	KEEA/Former	National	
Project	Coordinator	of	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	17.07.2015	
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traditional	authority	instruments	and	give	backing	to	the	project.	These	traditional	
instruments	consisted	largely	of	the	mobilisation	of	community	support	for	and	
participation	in	the	projects.	Thus	the	politico‐legal	instruments	that	made	the	ECHMP	
process	possible	were	dispersed	across	many	stakeholders.	During	the	interviews,	an	
interesting	counter	perspective	as	to	who	should	have	ultimately	been	in	charge	for	the	
project	was	given	by	the	head	of	the	tourism	subcommittee	at	KEEA,	who	also	serves	
on	the	traditional	council	and	is	often	a	spokesperson	for	the	traditional	council.	He	
noted	that	had	there	been	enough	capacity	within	the	traditional	council,	then	they	
should	have	been	the	ones	to	lead	the	project.	In	his	view,	because	of	the	fact	that	the	
land	on	which	the	Elmina	Castle	was	built	was	first	given	to	the	Portuguese	by	the	
traditional	authorities,	they	have	the	right	to	claim	the	castle	as	their	own.	In	his	own	
words,	
“If	the	traditional	council	have	the	capacity	to	manage	this	project	I	would	have	
been	the	first	person	to	suggest	that	what,	these	help	or	whatever	should	have	
channelled	through	there.	The	reason	is	that	any	project	for	the	people	by	the	
people	for	the	people	they	handle	it	very	well.	But	the	traditional	council	weren’t	
in	a	position	to	handle	such	a	big	project	and	for	that	matter	assembly	came	in	as	
the	facilitator.”	
The	dispersal	of	legislative	instruments	notwithstanding,	stakeholders	communicated,	
collaborated	and	coordinated	their	activities	to	ensure	the	smooth	take	off	of	the	
project.	In	the	beginning,	stakeholders	backed	the	project	through	the	politico‐legal	
instruments	available	to	them.	However,	the	power	to	use	these	instruments	were	not	
transferred	to	a	centralised	body	that	would	oversee	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	There	
was	no	mechanism	put	in	place	to	mitigate	future	misunderstandings	in	the	course	of	
project	development	and	implementation.	Could	this	have	been	a	source	of	
ambivalence	towards	the	project	from	stakeholders	like	the	GMMB	who	became	inward	
looking	once	the	Elmina	Castle	had	been	renovated?	The	fragmentation	of	stakeholders	
raises	questions	about	whether	there	were	institutional	and	organisation	mechanisms	
put	in	place	for	continued	communication,	collaboration	and	coordination	between	
stakeholders.	This	would	have	ensured	that	all	stakeholders	would	have	continued	to	
pool	their	instruments	together	even	when	the	initial	project	funding	and	enthusiasm	
had	waned.	It	appears	that	once	the	physical	projects	were	completed,	like	the	
rehabilitation	of	the	Elmina	Castle,	the	GMMB	pulled	back	on	the	revenue	sharing	
arrangements	in	place.	This	led	to	a	reduction	in	the	governance	capacity	of	other	
stakeholders	like	the	KEEA	and	the	traditional	council.	The	KEEA	and	the	traditional	
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council	therefore	grew	apathetic	towards	deploying	the	needed	governing	instruments	
like	enforcing	sanitation	rules	around	the	beaches	and	the	Elmina	Castle.		
Communicative Instruments 
In	the	initial	stages	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	preparation	and	project	
implementation,	a	number	of	communicative	instruments	were	developed	and	used	by	
the	KEAA	and	other	stakeholders.	Throughout	the	4	phases	of	the	ECHMP,	community	
and	interest	group	consultations	were	heavily	utilised	for	two	main	goals.	Firstly,	to	
accurately	capture	the	development	needs	of	the	community	and	secondly,	to	generate	
a	sense	of	ownership	among	the	community	members	towards	the	project.	Thus	it	was	
through	a	communicative	process	of	dialogue	and	negotiation	that	the	final	5	priority	
areas	were	agreed	upon.		However,	there	was	some	level	of	discontent	among	
community	members	with	regards	to	how	the	communicative	instruments	were	
deployed.	Those	community	members	who	were	involved	in	the	working	groups	and	
taskforce	were	“Not	too	happy	because	they	thought	that	meetings	should	be	paid	for	by	
way	of	sitting	allowances	and	all	that…the	locals	sometimes	thought	that	the	money	has	
been	given	to	Urban	Solutions	and	they	were	just	sitting	on	it	and	ahuh,	so	there,	there	
was	the	discontentment.”90	Thus	while	the	use	of	communicative	instruments	were	
useful	for	developing	a	sense	of	community	ownership	for	the	project,	it	also	brought	
about	some	tensions.	
In	addition	to	community	consultations,	the	initial	phase	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	
also	witnessed	increased	communication,	collaboration	and	coordination	between	key	
stakeholders.	This	improvement	provided	the	needed	foundation	support	for	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	to	take	off.	However,	due	to	the	constraints	of	institutional	
arrangements,	once	the	initial	fervour	for	the	project	had	waned,	the	communication	
between	stakeholders	fell	apart.	This	was	especially	so	once	the	funding	for	the	project	
had	been	expended.	Currently,	there	is	now	a	feeling	of	apathy	towards	communicative	
engagement.	As	summarised	by	the	current	municipal	planning	officer	of	KEEA,	
“You	see	if	you	look	at	the	key	actors	in	that	sector,	you’re	talking	about	the	GTB,	
the	GMMB,	you’re	talking	about	the	others.	There	is	no	direct	linkage	between	
																																																								
90	Interview	with	Dr.	Anthony	Annah‐Prah,	Head	of	Implementation	of	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	
Management	Programme,	03.11.2014.		
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their	activities	and	that	of	the	assembly.	The	assembly	has	a	responsibility	over	
the	entire	catchment	area	of	the	municipality	yet	every	activity	of	these	boards,	
these	agencies	as	far	as	tourism	is	concerned	is	without	the	involvement	of	the	
assembly.	So	the	assembly	over	the	years	have	not	made	any	effort	to	do	any	
serious	investment	in	tourism	because	they	wouldn’t	get	any	returns.”	
What	can	be	highlighted	from	the	above	is	that	there	is	a	breakdown	in	communication	
between	stakeholders.	The	failure	to	develop	the	channels	of	communication,	
collaboration	and	coordination	has	consequently	resulted	in	the	inability	of	
stakeholders	to	fully	achieve	the	set	objectives	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.		
Financial Instruments 
At	the	structural	level,	financial	resources	have	the	propensity	to	enable	and/or	
constrain	the	way	in	which	images	are	translated	into	tangible	actions.	The	availability	
of	financial	resources	makes	it	possible	to	bring	together	the	material,	human,	technical	
and	social	capital	assets	required	to	develop	and	implement	projects.	Within	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy,	the	source	and	conditions	of	the	financial	resources	available	served	as	
both	an	avenue	of	constraint	and	enablement	in	shaping	the	final	outcomes.	Phase	I	of	
the	ECHMP,	which	involved	the	preparation	of	the	Elmina	Profile	and	then	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	in	addition	to	the	numerous	project‐specific	proposals,	was	funded	
through	the	Culture	Fund	of	the	Netherlands	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs	and	funds	from	
the	Ministry	of	Education,	Culture	and	Science.	Project	implementation	funding	came	
from	the	Culture	Fund	of	the	Ministry	of	Foreign	Affairs.	This	funding	was	used	to	
complete	5	main	projects	(see	table	8	below).	The	remaining	projects	were	completed	
with	funding	from	the	9th	European	Union	Development	Fund	under	the	so‐called	
Cultural	Heritage	and	Local	Development	in	Elmina	Programme	(CHLDEP).	
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Table	8	The	financial	instruments	and	associated	projects	implemented	under	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	
	
Financial	Instruments	 Projects	Implemented	
Dutch	Culture	Fund	 ‐ Rehabilitation	of	Nana	Etsiapa	Hall	
‐ Renovation	of	Nana	Kobina	Gyan	
(formerly	Victoria/Trafalgar)	
Square	
‐ Restoration	of	Van	Dyke	House	
‐ Restoration	of	the	Dutch	Cemetery	
and	surrounding	area	(including	
Catholic	Museum)	
	
EU	9th	European	Development	Fund	
under	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	Local	
Economic	Development	Programme	
(CHLDEP)	
‐ Rehabilitation	of	selected	parts	of	St.	
George’s	(Elmina)	Castle	and	Fort	
Jago	
‐ Rehabilitation	of	St.	Jago	Hill	
‐ Renovation	of	selected	historic	
buildings	through	a	home‐owner	
scheme	(20	in	total)	
‐ Establishment	of	tourist	information	
and	tourist	facilities	
‐ Training	for	local	economic	
development	(tourist	guides,	
artisans,	financial	management	etc)	
Royal	Netherlands	Embassy	in	Ghana	
Funding	
‐ Renovation	of	4	Asafo	Posts	in	
Elmina	
	
These	main	sources	of	financial	instruments	were	project‐specific	and	hence	once	those	
projects	were	completed,	there	was	no	additional	financial	provision	for	continued	
maintenance	of	some	of	the	projects.	Some	of	the	projects,	like	the	renovation	of	
historic	buildings	were	to	be	partly	used	for	income‐generating	ventures	like	guest	
rooms	and	commercial	stores.	However,	not	all	these	income‐generating	activities	were	
successful	since	the	image	held	by	stakeholders	regarding	increased	tourist	numbers	
and	length	of	stay	in	the	community	were	not	realised.	An	Elmina	Development	Fund	
(EDF)	was	also	established,	envisaged	as	a	source	for	finance	for	ongoing	maintenance	
and	improvement	in	facilities.	In	addition,	the	EDF	was	to	be	used	to	train	young	people	
as	tour	guides	as	well	as	paving	city	streets	in	parts	of	Elmina.		
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The	EDF	was	to	be	financed	from	donations	and	a	daily	levy	of	$1	on	all	tourists	to	
Elmina	–	to	be	collected	by	owners	of	tourist	facilities.	In	the	2003	document,	the	EDF	
was	expected	to	initially	generate	$25,000	annually	and	to	increase	to	considerably	
more	as	tourists	visit	Elmina	and	stay	longer.	As	shown	in	table	9	below,	there	was	a	lot	
of	hope	placed	on	the	expected	flow	of	money	into	Elmina	through	Tourism.	
Table	9	Expected	flow	of	money	into	Elmina	from	Tourism	
(Source:	KEEA,	2002a)
	
However,	the	EDF	was	poorly	developed	and	deployed	as	a	financial	instrument.	In	
addition	to	the	fact	that	there	was	not	much	fund	accrued	due	to	poor	marketing	and	
collection,	there	was	no	clear	institutional	arrangement	as	to	the	management	of	the	
fund.	Perhaps	it	is	of	no	surprise	that	in	the	draft	final	report	of	the	project	compiled	by	
Urban	Solutions	–	the	project	consultants	–	and	dated	23th	October,	2006,	there	is	no	
mention	of	the	EDF.	This	absence	of	a	pot	of	funding	to	carry	on	project	
implementation,	especially	the	challenging	aspect	of	linking	increased	tourist	numbers	
to	local	economic	development,	meant	that	the	ultimate	objective	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	remained	unfulfilled.	One	way	of	looking	at	this	inadequate	financial	planning	
is	by	examining	the	power	imbalance	and	the	commitment	of	the	Urban	Solutions	as	
consultants	in	this	project.	The	decision	or	perhaps,	non‐decision	of	Urban	Solutions	to	
talk	of	the	long	term	financial	sustainability	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	in	its	final	
report	can	be	seen	as	the	‘second	face’	of	power	(Bachrach	and	Baratz,	1962).	As	
explored	in	Chapter	2,	section	2.3,	it	appears	that	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	a	
practice	run	for	Urban	Solutions	as	this	was	their	first	project	as	a	consultancy	
business.	As	a	Dutch	company	being	paid	by	the	Dutch	government	and	the	European	
Union	to	implement	a	project	in	a	developing	country,	the	internal	incentive	available	
to	Urban	Solutions	BV	within	the	aid	delivery	process	meant	that	they	did	not	have	to	
be	overly	concerned	with	failure.	The	development	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	can	
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therefore	been	seen	as	a	‘trial	and	error’	process	through	which	Urban	Solutions	could	
gain	experience	for	future	consultancy	work.	A	key	reason	for	this	is	situation	which	is	
also	underlined	by	power	differentials	is	the	absence	of	a	feedback	loop	through	which	
aid	recipients	can	hold	aid	donors	to	account.	
The	lack	of	financial	sustainability	being	planned	into	the	project	from	the	start	
constrained	the	governance	capacity	of	stakeholders.	In	the	absence	of	additional	
financial	instruments,	stakeholders	were	unable	to	maintain	and	further	improve	upon	
completed	projects	in	pursuit	of	the	ultimate	objective	of	using	tourism	to	catalyse	local	
economic	development.	The	GMMB	for	instance	should	have	been	made	to	set	aside	a	
percentage	of	visitor	fees	for	continued	maintenance.	As	this	was	not	planned	for,	all	
the	visitor	fees	that	accrue	to	the	GMMB	from	Elmina	Castle	go	straight	into	the	
national	consolidated	fund.	The	national	office	of	the	GMMB	then	have	to	make	
requests	in	order	to	access	these	funds.	It	is	after	this	that	the	Elmina	Castle	Manager	
can	make	request	for	funds	to	undertake	maintenance	work.	The	bureaucracy	involved	
in	this	process	is	a	big	constraint	to	effective	everyday	governing	activities	at	the	local	
level.	This	reality	is	succinctly	explained	in	the	quote	below	from	the	former	Executive	
Director	of	the	Ghana	Heritage	Conservation	Trust	which	provides	ongoing	financial	
support	for	the	maintenance	of	the	Elmina	and	Cape	Coast	Castles;	
“…the	government	way	of	doing	things,	if	you	want	a	pin	they	need	to	write	a	
memo	to	Accra	or	go	to	Accra	and	this	and	then	that,	by	the	time	it	come	back	you	
no	longer	need	a	pin	but	you	need	a	nail.	Then	you	start	writing,	oh	sorry	the	nail	
didn’t	work,	the	nail	didn’t	work,	let’s	go	for	a	nail	and	then	it	collapses.”91	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
																																																								
91	Interview	with	Nkunu	Akyea,	Former	Executive	Director	of	Ghana	Heritage	Conservation	
Trust,	08.09.2014	
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5.4 The socio-political room for implementation  
The	socio‐political	room	for	action	in	which	stakeholders	operate	is	what	is	termed	
action	potential.	It	is	here	that	stakeholders’	images	of	current	and	future	situations	are	
translated	into	tangible	actions	through	the	selection	and	application	of	appropriate	
tools.		This	is	a	process	that	usually	takes	place	within	the	intentional	level	of	action	
potential.	At	the	structural	level,	action	potential	is	embedded	within	institutional	
power	relations	that	serve	to	enable	and/or	constrain	the	ability	of	stakeholders	to	
meeting	their	governing	needs.	The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	came	with	certain	governing	
needs	that	had	to	be	met	in	order	for	it	to	be	successful.	This	meant	these	needs	had	to	
be	balanced	by	the	capacity	of	stakeholders,	which	in	turn	was	dependant	on	the	socio‐
political	room	for	action	available	to	stakeholders.	Thus	the	process	of	the	ECHMP	and	
resulting	Elmina	2015	Strategy	required	the	mobilisation	of	support	and	the	generation	
of	adequate	socio‐political	will	among	all	stakeholders.	To	a	large	extent,	the	action	
potential	available	is	shaped	by	how	stakeholders	are	able	to	answer	questions	about	
their	source	of	legitimacy	and	authority.	
The	most	notable	observation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	is	that	the	greatest	action	
potential	was	aggregated	in	state	institutions,	and	to	an	extent	in	the	structures	of	
political	parties.	The	(incomplete)	decentralised	governance	and	planning	system	
provided	the	source	of	legitimacy	and	authority	to	the	KEEA	Municipal	Assembly	when	
it	came	to	the	planning	process.	Since	the	project	involved	a	lot	of	planning	activities,	
the	KEEA	was	able	to	bring	to	bear	its	technocratic	planning	apparatus	in	a	way	that	
was	not	possible	for	any	other	stakeholder.	The	KEEA	was	therefore	able	to	derive	
considerable	authority	and	legitimacy	from	its	control	of	the	technical	planning	
knowledge	production	system.	Nonetheless,	the	incomplete	nature	of	the	decentralised	
governance	system	also	served	as	a	structural	source	of	constraint	to	the	governing	
role	of	the	KEEA	vis‐à‐vis	the	GMMB.	The	GMMB	is	the	only	state	institution	with	the	
administrative	and	legal	mandate	for	the	day	to	day	management	and	governing	
activities	of	the	Elmina	Castle	and	Fort	St.	Jago.	This	was	a	source	of	action	potential	for	
them	to	translate	their	image	of	the	castle	into	reality,	which	sometimes	tended	to	
differ	from	the	image	of	other	stakeholders	(see	discussion	in	Chapter	4,	section	4.4).	In	
essence	the	GMMB	sees	the	forts	and	castle	as	heritage	that	has	to	be	conserved	for	
educational	purposes.	Thus	if	they	had	their	way	they	might	limit	the	number	of	
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visitors	in	order	to	conserve	it	better.92	This	situation	was	therefore	an	underlying	
structural	constraint	even	as	the	ECHMP	expanded	to	include	overall	local	economic	
development.	The	failure	to	adequately	deal	with	this	meant	that	the	action	potential	
for	using	tourism	as	a	catalyst	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	
became	fragmented	across	different	state	institutions.	
The	fragmented	action	potential	did	not	paralyse	the	project	in	the	beginning	due	to	
high	levels	of	cross‐sectoral	coordination	and	mobilisation	of	support.	This	was	further	
given	strength	by	the	strong	political	support	of	the	newly	elected	government.	The	
ECHMP	began	earnestly	in	the	context	of	the	New	Patriotic	Party	(NPP)	government	
taking	over	power	from	the	National	Democratic	Congress	(NDC)	party.	This	context	
was	key	in	shaping	the	trajectory	and	outcomes	of	the	project	(see	Chapter	7	for	more	
detailed	discussion).	The	quick	point	to	make	here	is	that,	on	assumption	of	power,	the	
NPP	government	which	was	also	in	charge	of	the	KEEA	Municipality	were	eager	to	
show	that	they	were	bringing	development	to	the	area	and	so	encouraged	coalition	
between	different	sectoral	institutions.		
In	the	course	of	the	town	consultations	for	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	the	issue	of	
revenue	sharing	from	the	Elmina	Castle	was	raised	by	the	traditional	authorities	and	
community	leaders.	The	argument	was	that	the	traditional	authority	deserve	for	
royalties	to	be	paid	to	them	from	the	proceeds	generated	from	the	Castle	since	the	
Castle	is	on	traditional	land.	Comparison	was	made	to	other	traditional	authorities	in	
mineral	areas	like	the	Ashanti	traditional	authorities	who	receive	royalties	from	gold	
mining	companies.	These	concerns,	in	addition	to	that	of	the	KEEA	who	also	felt	they	
deserved	a	cut	in	the	revenue	for	ensuring	clean	surroundings	to	the	Castle,	were	
brought	to	the	attention	of	J.	H.	Mensah	who	was	a	senior	minister	in	the	then	NPP	
government	and	hails	from	Elmina.	He	mobilised	the	support	of	the	then	Minister	for	
Tourism	–	the	late	Jake	Obetsebi‐Lamptey	–	and	together	they	brought	the	issue	to	a	
Cabinet	meeting93.	It	was	thus	a	Cabinet	decision	that	established	an	‘informal’	revenue	
sharing	arrangement	between	the	GMMB,	the	Elmina	Traditional	Authority	and	the	
KEEA.	The	traditional	authority	and	the	KEEA	were	therefore	given	about	5‐10%	of	the	
																																																								
92	Interview	with	Dr.	Zagba	Oyortey,	Executive	Director,	Ghana	Museums	and	Monuments	
Board,	Accra,	23.09.2014	
93	Telephone	interview	with	Justice	Amoah,	Justice	Amoah,	Former	Municipal	Planning	Officer	of	
KEEA/Former	National	Project	Coordinator	of	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	20.10.2016	
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total	revenue	from	the	Elmina	Castle	on	a	yearly	basis94.	This	arrangement	greased	the	
wheels	of	the	socio‐political	room	for	action	and	strengthened	the	capacity	of	key	
stakeholders	to	meet	the	governing	needs	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.		
However,	after	the	NDC	party	returned	to	power	in	2009,	the	new	management	of	
GMMB	lobbied	for	this	arrangement	to	be	cancelled	on	the	basis	that	there	was	no	
legislative	instrument	backing	it.	Moreover,	officials	of	the	GMMB	argue	that	the	
revenue	generated	through	the	Elmina	Castle	is	also	used	for	the	preservation	and	
maintenance	of	the	many	forts	and	castles	dotted	along	the	Ghanaian	coast	that	do	not	
generate	any	revenue	themselves	but	are	part	of	the	UNESCO	World	Heritage	Status	
designation95.	The	earlier	Cabinet	directive	was	therefore	revoked	on	the	basis	that	it	
was	not	the	legal	and	formal	way	to	approach	the	issue	of	revenue	sharing.	The	
legislative	instrument	that	established	the	GMMB	stipulate	that	all	revenue	accruing	to	
heritage	sites	should	come	under	the	GMMB.	There	is	no	room	made	for	revenue	
sharing	arrangements	or	the	payment	of	royalties.	Consequently,	the	establishing	
legislative	instrument	needed	to	be	amended	first	through	parliament	so	that	a	formal	
revenue	sharing	arrangement	could	be	instituted.	This	amendment	process	is	however	
yet	to	begin.	Thus	after	2009	the	new	socio‐political	environment	–	in	which	there	was	
no	revenue	sharing	–	constrained	the	action	potential	of	stakeholders	in	meeting	their	
governance	needs.	This	contributed	to	the	decline	in	the	level	of	communication,	
collaboration	and	coordination	among	stakeholders	and	ultimately	in	a	decrease	in	
governance	capacity	for	the	realisation	of	the	objectives	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.		
In	the	initial	phase	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	action	potential	was	aggregated	in	
state	institutions	who	coordinated	their	activities	to	ensure	that	there	was	enough	
capacity	to	meet	governing	needs.	This	was	helped	in	no	small	measure	by	the	
‘informal’	revenue	sharing	arrangement	between	the	GMMB,	the	KEEA	and	traditional	
council.	When	this	revenue	sharing	arrangement	was	abrogated	in	2009,	the	socio‐
political	room	for	action	changed	leading	to	a	fragmentation	of	action	potential	among	
various	institutions.	This	fragmentation	lead	to	a	decline	in	communication,	
																																																								
94	Interview	with	Justice	Amoah,	Former	Municipal	Planning	Officer	of	KEEA/Former	National	
Project	Coordinator	of	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	17.07.2015;	Interview	with	Ebo	Dadzie,	Head	of	
Tourism	Sub‐Committee,	KEEA,	16.07.2015;	Interview	with	Clifford	Ashun,	Elmina	Castle	
Manager,	10.08.2015		
95	Interview	with	Dr.	Zagba	Oyortey,	Executive	Director,	Ghana	Museums	and	Monuments	
Board,	Accra,	23.09.2014;	Interview	with	Raymond	Agbo,	Deputy	Director	(Museums),	GMMB,	
Accra,	13.08.2014	
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collaboration	and	coordination	ultimately	affecting	stakeholder	governance	capacity	–	
especially	that	of	the	KEEA	–	in	meeting	the	governance	needs	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy.	
	
	
Conclusions 
The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	the	result	of	a	comprehensive	tourism‐led	local	
economic	developing	planning	process.	There	were	four	main	phases	envisaged	for	the	
project	–	stakeholder	identification,	analysis	and	vision,	strategy	and	action	plans	and	
implementation.	An	analysis	of	the	strategy	and	action	plans	in	particular	highlights	
that	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	largely	centred	on	the	assumption	that	developing	
and	enhancing	the	heritage	tourism	assets	of	Elmina	would	catalyse	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction.	The	analysis	further	shows	that	it	was	the	
transition	from	the	third	stage	to	the	final	stage	of	implementation	that	the	project	
encountered	a	number	of	challenges.		
This	chapter	has	provided	an	answer	to	the	first	and	second	research	questions	set	out	
in	Chapter	1.	This	is	in	relation	to	how	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	conceptualised	the	
relationship	between	tourism,	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	and	
the	extent	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity	in	developing	and	implementing	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	and	how	this	shaped	outcomes.	A	simplified	answer	to	the	
second	research	question	is	that	there	was	some	level	of	stakeholder	governance	
capacity	but	that	this	was	not	high	enough	to	guide	the	transition	to	the	
implementation	stage.	The	analysis	in	this	chapter	provides	a	more	nuanced	response.	
In	the	initial	stages	of	the	project,	stakeholders	all	shared	an	overriding	image	of	how	
tourism	could	contribute	to	local	economic	development.	This	allowed	them	to	pool	
together	their	individual	capacities	and	ensure	a	strong	stakeholder	governance	
capacity.	However,	this	pooling	together	of	capacities	through	the	use	of	
complementary	instruments	appears	to	have	taken	place	only	because	the	resources	
out	of	which	financial	instruments	were	fashioned	came	from	an	external	source.	Once	
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the	external	funding	was	removed,	the	fractures	in	stakeholder	relationships	opened	
up	and	there	was	little	attempt	to	repair	these	fractures	and	ride	on	the	coordination	
momentum	created	by	the	external	funding.		
Stakeholder	governance	capacity	is	about	the	alignment	of	images,	instruments	and	
action	potentials	(see	Chapter	2,	section	2.2).	Over	the	course	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	process,	there	were	many	instances	of	misalignment	of	these	three	elements	
within	and	between	stakeholders.	A	prime	example	of	such	misalignment	can	be	seen	
in	the	relationship	between	the	KEEA	and	the	GMMB	who	were	two	key	stakeholders	in	
the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	The	dynamics	between	these	two	institutions,	which	could	
have	offered	the	potential	for	positive	outcomes	however	resulted	in	a	negative	
outcome	due	competing	interests	that	were	not	reconciled	or	aligned.	The	KEEA	was	
keen	on	getting	access	to	part	of	the	revenue	accruing	from	visitor	fees	at	the	Elmina	
Castle.	The	GMMB	on	the	other	hand	sought	to	keep	these	revenues	away	from	other	
stakeholders.	Part	of	the	reason	for	this	is	due	to	the	complexity	and	diversity	in	their	
internal	procedures	as	well	as	the	differing	instruments	that	were	available	to	them.	
The	legislative	instrument	that	guides	how	revenue	from	the	Elmina	Castle	is	to	be	
disbursed	stipulates	that	all	funds	should	go	to	the	GMMB	and	not	to	any	other	body.	
Thus	while	there	was	a	shared	image	between	the	KEEA	and	the	GMMB	in	their	efforts	
to	utilise	tourism	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction,	the	legislative	
as	well	as	the	financial	instruments	to	make	this	happen	were	dominated	by	the	GMMB.	
The	GMMB	was	unwilling	to	match	its	image	with	available	instruments	leading	to	a	
lack	of	alignment.	This	misalignment	affected	the	governability	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	–	where	governability	refers	to	the	ability	of	governors	to	meet	governance	
needs	given	their	capacities	(Kooiman,	1993,	2008;	Jobbins,	2003).	The	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	brought	about	governances	needs	that	required	the	pooling	together	of	not	
only	shared	visions	but	critically	also	instruments,	especially	financial	ones,	in	order	to	
meet	those	needs.	This	pooling	of	instruments	and	coordination	activities	did	not	
effectively	take	place.		
The	fragmentation	of	instruments	among	stakeholders	contributed	to	undermining	the	
vision	of	how	to	make	the	transition	to	the	stage	of	full	implementation	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy.	This	was	further	compounded	by	the	change	in	action	potential	when	
the	semi‐formally	brokered	revenue	sharing	arrangement	was	overturned.	The	end	of	
revenue	sharing	between	the	Ghana	Museums	and	Monuments	Board	and	the	KEEA	
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and	Elmina	traditional	Authority	shaped	the	socio‐political	action	potential	of	
stakeholders.	This	constrained	their	ability	to	meet	the	governance	needs	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy.		Overall	therefore,	there	was	a	low	level	of	governance	capacity	to	
ensure	that	the	‘software’	aspects	of	the	Strategy	were	fully	implemented	so	that	
tourism	could	indeed	catalyse	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	in	
Elmina.	
The	low	level	of	governance	capacity	that	characterised	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	is	
starkly	represented	in	the	(in)actions	of	the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	Municipal	
Assembly	(KEEA).	The	KEEA	remains	the	key	governing	stakeholder	when	it	comes	to	
the	management	and	administration	of	local	economic	development	and	poverty	
alleviation	in	Elmina	and	its	immediate	environs.	There	were	a	lot	of	expectations	and	
responsibilities	placed	on	the	KEEA	as	the	local	government	authority	to	foster	
communication,	collaboration	and	coordination	between	other	stakeholders	to	ensure	
that	the	goals	of	the	Strategy	are	met.	However,	these	responsibilities	were	not	always	
accompanied	by	corresponding	access	to	the	resources	from	which	to	fashion	
governing	instruments.	While	the	KEEA	understood	the	potential	of	tourism	to	catalyse	
local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction,	the	legal	and	importantly,	financial	
instruments	for	managing	the	tourism	assets	in	Elmina	are	held	by	the	Ghana	Museums	
and	Monuments	Board	(GMMB).	With	increasing	attention	on	local	governments	to	
facilitate	sustainable	tourism	development	(Dredge,	2001;	Churugsa,	2007;	Ruhanen,	
2013),	the	analysis	in	this	chapter	raises	important	questions	about	what	can	be	
expected	from	local	governments.	Given	the	multiplicity	of	other	state	and	non‐state	
institutions	involved	in	tourism,	what	role	is	there	for	local	government?	How	do	local	
governments	reconcile	their	day‐to‐day	management	of	public	service	provision	with	
the	long	term	planning	required	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	initiatives?		
The	analysis	in	this	chapter	shows	that	the	mere	presence	of	local	governments	and	
other	state	institutions	in	tourism	development,	while	a	necessary	condition,	is	not	
sufficient	for	effective	development	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity.	The	finding	of	
an	inadequacy	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity	offers	an	explanation	as	to	the	
failure	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	However,	this	is	only	a	partial	explanation.	It	is	not	
enough	to	know	the	proximate	reasons	for	the	inadequacy	of	stakeholder	governance	
capacity.	To	arrive	at	a	deeper	level	of	understanding	regarding	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy,	one	requires	an	analysis	of	institutional	thickness,	and	to	consider	how	
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changes	in	wider	national	and	regional	socio‐political	landscape	shape	actions	at	the	
local	level.	A	key	question	is	whether	the	presence	of	a	plethora	of	institutions	at	
various	levels	of	governance	contributes	to	developing	institutional	thickness	that	can	
enhance	the	capacity	for	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	(Amin	and	Thrift,	
1995).	It	is	to	these	issues	around	institutional	thickness	that	I	now	turn	to	in	the	next	
chapter.		
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Chapter 6 
	
Institutional thickness for sustained tourism-led local 
economic development  
The	literature	on	local	economic	development	(LED)	planning	has	established	that	the	
success	of	new	LED	initiatives	to	a	large	extent	depends	on	the	development	of	
appropriate	organisational	and	institutional	structures	(Helmsing,	2003;	Pike	et	al.,	
2006).	Such	organisational	and	institutional	structures	do	not	always	start	from	
scratch.	More	often	than	not,	LED	initiatives	depend	on	building	synergy	between	
existing	organisations.	In	relation	to	existing	structures,	newly	emerging	organisational	
and	institutional	structures	might	then	have	to	replace	them,	be	superimposed	on	them	
or	be	subsumed	under	them	and/or	made	to	operate	side	by	side.	There	are	a	number	
of	combinations	available	and	the	choice	of	which	option	to	pursue	rests	on	the	local	
political	context.	The	resulting	mix	of	organisational	and	institutional	arrangements	
and	interactions	–	i.e.	institutional	thickness	–	then	come	to	play	a	key	role	in	shaping	
the	sustainability	and	success	of	new	LED	initiatives.	In	this	chapter,	I	make	use	of	the	
concept	of	institutional	thickness	as	outlined	in	Chapter	2,	section	2.2	to	explore	the	
depth	and	extent	of	thickening	experienced	by	the	organisational	and	institutional	
structures	within	which	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	evolved.		
There	are	four	sections	to	this	chapter,	the	first	of	which	analyses	how	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	aligned	with	national	economic	development	policy	and	national	tourism	
development	plans.	This	analysis	is	to	ascertain	the	extent	to	which	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	linked	up	to	national	institutional	and	organisational	structures	for	economic	
as	well	as	tourism	development.	In	the	second	section,	I	turn	my	attention	to	the	
specifics	of	the	planning	process	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	in	relation	to	the	
institutional	and	organisational	structures	of	the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	
Municipality	Assembly	(KEEA).	The	point	here	is	firstly	to	answer	the	question	of	the	
KEEA	municipality’s	involvement	in	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	The	answer	to	that	
question	appears	to	be	positive	since	the	whole	process	could	not	have	gone	ahead	
without	the	active	involvement	of	the	KEEA.	However,	the	analytical	and	more	
interesting	puzzle	is	to	identify	the	extent	to	which	it	was	embedded	within	KEEA’s	
structures	and	the	resulting	patterns	of	coalition	and	structures	of	domination.	In	the	
third	section,	I	zoom	in	on	the	Elmina	Tourism	Office	and	the	Elmina	Arts	and	Craft	
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Market	which	were	established	to	add	to	a	strong	institutional	presence	and	create	
mutual	interactions	between	various	stakeholders.	An	overarching	analytic	conclusion	
is	then	provided	in	the	last	section	of	this	chapter.		
	
6.1 The fit of the Elmina 2015 Strategy with national 
development and tourism policy planning 
This	section	looks	at	the	extent	to	which	the	tenets	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	
reflected	existing	and	contemporary	national	development	plans	as	well	as	national	
tourism	development	plans.	The	assumption	here	is	that	an	alignment	between	the	
aims	and	objectives	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	and	those	of	national	development	
plans	and	national	tourism	plans	add	to	a	strong	institutional	presence	that	can	
contribute	to	institutional	thickness	within	which	it	is	to	be	implemented.	Similarly,	
once	new	national	development	plans	and	national	tourism	plans	change	focus	so	that	
there	is	no	longer	clear	alignment	with	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	then	there	is	less	
institutional	support	to	ensure	complete	implementation.	
Linking local development plans with national development policy 
At	the	time	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy’s	preparation,	the	national	economic	
development	strategy	in	place	was	the	Ghana	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	Paper	2003‐
2005	(GPRS	I).	The	overall	focus	of	the	GPRS	I	was	on	redistributive	policies	and	
poverty‐related	spending	(see	discussion	in	Chapter	4,	section	4.2).	This	meant	that	the	
economic	and	political	climate	in	the	country	as	at	that	time	was	very	conducive	to	the	
ideas,	aims	and	objectives	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	It	is	also	pertinent	to	reiterate	
the	point	that	although	a	decentralised	development	planning	process	was	supposed	to	
be	in	place,	municipal	and	local	plans	such	as	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	have	to	fit	
within	overall	national	development	strategies	of	the	ruling	political	party.	Thus	the	
Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	Management	(ECHMP)	planning	process	that	gave	birth	to	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	had	to	follow	the	planning	guidelines	set	out	for	the	preparation	
of	District	Medium	Term	Development	Plans	(MTDP).	This	enabled	those	involved	in	
the	process	to	tap	into	resources	made	available	to	support	national	development	
priorities	and	to	make	that	reflect	in	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.		There	was	thus	a	
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shared	awareness	of	a	common	enterprise	between	national	and	local	institutions	
regarding	the	need	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	Actors	at	
the	KEEA	during	the	interviews	pointed	out	that	they	saw	an	opportunity	to	bring	in	
and	link	up	issues	of	education,	health	and	sanitation	to	the	original	proposal	for	the	
rehabilitation	of	the	Elmina	Castle.96	
The	GPRS	I	also	had	specific	implications	for	the	development	of	the	tourism	sector.	
The	tourism	sector	was	identified	as	part	of	those	strategies	that	could	be	developed	to	
directly	address	poverty.	As	noted	in	Chapter	4,	the	GPRS	I	was	the	first	national	
development	strategic	plan	that	conceptualised	a	direct	relationship	between	tourism	
and	poverty	reduction.	It	was	acknowledged	that	tourism	can	have	a	strong	impact	on	
the	development	objectives	of	the	country	at	both	the	national	and	local	levels.	This	in	
part	explains	the	government’s	support	in	the	making	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	The	
GPRS	I	shifted	the	traditional	overemphasis	on	tourism’s	contribution	to	foreign	
exchange	earnings	to	a	focus	on	how	to	utilise	it	at	the	very	local	level.	Within	such	a	
framework,	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	provided	a	very	specific	instance	of	how	
tourism’s	potential	can	be	tied	up	with	local	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction.	In	this	way,	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	fitted	in	and	aligned	itself	with	the	
national	development	strategy	in	place.	This	gave	the	project	strong	claims	of	
legitimacy	and	governmental	backing	in	the	beginning	phase.	A	practical	outcome	of	
this	was	how	actors	at	the	local	level	managed	to	get	national	actors	to	institute	a	
revenue	sharing	arrangement	of	the	proceeds	of	the	Elmina	Castle	between	the	Ghana	
Museums	and	Monuments	Board	(GMMB),	the	KEEA	and	the	Elmina	Traditional	
Authority	(see	section	Chapter	5,	section	5.4).		
In	the	period	of	2006	–	2009,	national	economic	development	was	guided	by	the	
Growth	and	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	(GPRS	II).	Unlike	the	GPRS	I,	the	focus	of	the	
GPRS	II	shifted	from	redistributive	policies	and	poverty‐related	spending	to	that	of	
growth.	The	tourism	sector	was	considered	crucial	to	this	new	focus	on	economic	
growth.		However,	this	new	focus	on	growth	was	more	concerned	with	increased	
revenue	to	national	coffers	rather	than	a	redistribution	of	revenue.	On	the	balance	of	
available	evidence,	it	appears	that	during	this	period,	the	implementation	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	did	not	have	the	same	level	of	support	as	it	did	under	the	GPRS	I.	A	focus	
																																																								
96	Interview	with	Justice	Amoah,	Former	Municipal	Planning	Officer	of	KEEA/Former	National	
Project	Coordinator	of	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	13.11.2014;	Interview	with	Ebo	Dadzie,	Head	of	
Tourism	Sub‐Committee,	KEEA,	31.10.2014	
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on	growth	meant	that	the	interest	in	tourism	was	more	about	how	it	can	increase	
government’s	foreign	exchange	revenues	and	thus	help	to	plug	balance	of	payment	
deficits.	This	was	accompanied	by	less	interest	in	how	communities	can	directly	tap	
into	tourism	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	which	is	what	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	seeking	to	do.	One	of	the	practical	outcomes	of	this	shift	
appears	to	have	led	to	a	realignment	of	the	portfolio	of	the	Ministry	of	Tourism	into	the	
Ministry	of	Tourism	and	Modernisation	of	the	Capital	City	and	then	into	the	Ministry	of	
Tourism	and	Diaspora	Relations	during	the	period	of	the	GPRS	II.	These	changes	meant	
a	divergence	in	policy	aims	between	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	and	that	of	national	
development	plans	for	the	tourism	sector.		
At	its	expiry,	the	GPRS	II	was	replaced	by	the	two	sets	of	the	Ghana	Shared	Growth	and	
Development	Strategies	–	GSGDA	I	and	GSGDA	II.	The	GSGDA	I	and	the	GSGDA	II	were	in	
place	between	2010‐2013	and	2014	–	2017	respectively.	These	national	development	
strategies	held	a	slightly	different	vision	of	tourism’s	role	in	economic	development.	It	
is	important	to	highlight	here	that	the	GSGDA	I	and	GSGDA	II	were	enacted	under	a	new	
political	party	government	‐	the	National	Democratic	Congress	party	–	while	the	GPRS	I	
and	GPRS	II	were	formulated	under	the	New	Patriotic	Party	government.	As	will	be	
fully	discussed	in	Chapter	7,	change	of	political	party	government	tend	to	come	with	
inherent	issues	in	terms	of	project	continuity.	Within	the	GSGDA	I,	the	tourism	sector	
was	seen	as	an	area	to	encourage	strong	private	sector	participation.	The	private	sector	
was	to	drive	the	tourism	sector	for	job	creation	and	revenue	generation.	Within	this	
context,	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy’s	focus	on	state	driven	tourism‐led	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction	became	slightly	misaligned	with	national	
development	strategies.	In	practice	however,	the	state	was	seen	as	playing	a	crucial	
role	through	infrastructure	investments	that	will	encourage	private	sector	
participation	in	the	tourism	sector.	Although	efforts	were	made	during	this	period	to	
address	challenges	of	the	tourism	sector,	these	were	all	geared	towards	starting	new	
initiatives	rather	than	helping	to	complete	existing	projects	like	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy.	This	period	also	saw	the	termination	of	the	revenue	sharing	arrangement	
between	the	GMMB,	KEEA	and	the	Elmina	Traditional	Authority.		
The	GSGDA	II	also	gave	prominence	to	the	tourism	sector	by	identifying	it	as	one	of	
seven	growth	pillars	on	which	the	future	long	term	development	of	the	country	was	to	
be	built.	Once	again	the	focus	is	on	diversifying	tourist	attractions	and	initiating	new	
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projects.	Moreover,	policies	for	the	tourism	sector	are	targeted	at	the	macro	level	with	
the	aim	of	improving	tourism’s	contribution	to	national	revenue.	In	the	GSGDA	II	the	
overall	strategy	for	the	tourism	sector	is	to	make	strategic	linkages	between	tourism	
and	other	sectors	in	order	to	achieve	the	goal	of	using	tourism	to	create	jobs	and	
increase	foreign	exchange	earnings.	This	strategy	is	to	be	“underpinned	by	vigorous	
promotion	of	international	conferences,	cultural,	leisure,	health	and	education	tourism”	
(pg.	51).	The	GSGDA	II	looks	to	the	private	sector	through	the	mobilisation	of	Public‐
Private	Partnerships	(PPPs)	to	achieve	the	goals	of	addressing	the	deficits	in	
infrastructure,	human	resource	and	tourism	product	diversification.	It	appears	from	
available	evidence	that	at	the	start	of	the	GSGDA	II,	the	implementation	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	was	already	in	a	dire	state	and	key	stakeholders	seem	to	have	given	up	
on	it.	The	potential	support	from	the	GSGDA	II	in	terms	of	encouraging	PPPs	could	
therefore	not	be	utilised	for	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	This	was	due	to	the	lack	of	good	
patterns	of	coalition	between	national	institutions	and	local	ones	which	affected	the	
development	of	institutional	thickness	and	the	ability	of	local	institutions	to	tap	into	the	
resources	available	at	the	national	level.		
In	terms	of	the	evolution	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	vis‐à‐vis	national	economic	
development	strategies,	the	institutional	space	to	support	full	implementation	began	to	
shrink	once	the	‘G	‐	Ghana’	in	the	GPRS	I	was	replaced	by	‘G	–	Growth’	in	the	GPRS	II.	
This	change	of	emphasis	meant	that	the	focus	on	tourism’s	role	in	economic	
development	became	shifted	from	the	micro	to	the	macro	level.	Moreover,	the	
subsequent	focus	of	the	GSGDA	I	and	GSGDA	II	on	private	sector	participation	came	at	a	
time	when	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	in	a	dire	state	in	terms	of	implementation.	
The	changing	patterns	of	mutual	awareness	of	a	shared	enterprise	between	national	
and	local	institutions	meant	that	on	one	hand,	there	were	times	when	there	was	less	
institutional	depth	at	the	regional	and	national	level	to	provide	the	necessary	support	
for	implementing	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	On	the	other	hand,	the	inadequacy	of	
strong	institutional	depth	at	the	local	level	during	the	latter	period	meant	that	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	could	not	reach	for	the	potential	resources	available	at	the	
national	level.		
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National tourism plans and institutional support for local tourism development 
plans 
The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	developed	at	the	time	of	the	Ghana	National	Tourism	
Development	Plan	(GNTDP)	1996‐2010.	The	GNTDP	1996‐2010	was	a	15	year	plan	for	
tourism	development	that	focused	on	enhancing	tourism’s	contribution	to	economic	
growth.	The	plan	made	note	of	the	role	that	tourism	could	play	to	improve	upon	the	
economic	situation	of	communities	living	around	key	tourist	sites.	There	was	however	
not	much	consideration	–	aside	talk	of	multiplier	effects	and	trickle	down	effects	–		
given	to	the	specifics	of	how	tourism	could	aid	local	economic	development	and	
poverty	reduction.	At	the	time	of	its	development	in	2003,	the	anticipated	‘trickle	
down’	effects	advocated	in	the	GNTDP	1996‐2010	were	failing	to	fully	materialise.	
Communities	living	around	key	tourist	attractions	were	not	gaining	much	benefit	from	
tourism	activities.	The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was,	on	many	levels,	unique	in	its	
conceptualisation	of	tourism	having	a	direct	role	in	local	economic	development	and	
poverty	reduction.	Its	focus	on	directly	addressing	poverty	issues	through	tourism	was	
well	received.	This	is	because	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	provided	an	opportunity	to	put	
to	test	at	the	district	level	the	assumptions	held	in	the	GNTDP	1996‐2010	about	
tourism’s	potential	to	contribute	to	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.		In	
all,	there	was	a	strong	alignment	between	the	GNTDP	1996‐2010	and	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	and	this	thickened	the	institutional	structures	for	implementation.	This	
thickening	of	institutions	is	in	the	sense	of	a	mutual	awareness	of	being	involved	in	a	
common	enterprise	among	stakeholders	at	all	levels,	and	clear	and	shared	priorities	
concerning	the	use	of	tourism	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	
In	practice	this	came	in	the	form	of	technical	advice	and	knowledge	transfer	from	
national	and	regional	stakeholders	during	the	planning	stage	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy.	This	institutional	support	did	not	however	get	carried	over	when	the	
subsequent	national	tourism	development	plan	was	made.	
The	Ghana	National	Tourism	Development	Plan	(GNTDP)	2013‐2025	was	“…prepared	
that	one	over	a	2	month	period,	from	October	to	November,	2012,	covering	a	2	month	
period.	Precisely	because	of	the	challenges	we	had	in	terms	of	funding,	in	terms	of	
funding	and	then	also	in	terms	of	availability	of	personnel	who	had	to	work	on	it”97	This	
plan	sought	to	review	the	previous	15	year	tourism	development	plans	and	to	assess	
																																																								
97	Interview	with	Dr.	Joel	Sonne,	Director	of	Projects,	Ministry	of	Tourism,	Culture	and	Creative	
Arts,	19.09.2014	
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the	position	of	the	tourism	sector	in	terms	of	contribution	to	national	and	local	
economic	development.	This	plan	was	prepared	by	a	team	led	by	Dr.	Joel	Sonne,	the	
Director	of	Projects	at	the	Ministry	of	Tourism,	Culture	and	Creative	Arts.	Dr.	Sonne	
completed	his	PhD	thesis	in	2010	on	tourism’s	role	in	poverty	reduction	in	Elmina	from	
the	perspective	of	the	community.	His	thesis	touched	on	some	aspects	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	process	and	implementation	challenges.	However,	when	it	came	to	the	
making	of	the	GNTDP	2013‐2027	in	which	he	quotes	a	generous	portion	of	his	PhD	
thesis,	there	is	no	mention	made	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	There	is	not	a	single	
reference	to	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	in	the	whole	of	the	362‐page	document.		
The	neglect	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	in	the	GNTP	2013‐2027	is	all	the	more	
surprising	given	that	the	goal	was	to	reassess	how	tourism	can	be	positioned	to	
effectively	contribute	to	national	and	local	economic	development.	There	were	so	many	
lessons	from	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	that	could	have	been	incorporated	into	the	
tourism	plan.	The	state	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	at	the	time	when	the	GNTDP	2013‐
2027	was	made	provided	a	clear	example	of	what	to	do	and	what	not	to	do	when	it	
comes	to	utilising	tourism	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	Even	
under	the	section	in	the	GNTDP	2013‐2027	where	there	is	a	discussion	about	the	use	of	
tourism	to	tackle	poverty	at	the	destination	level,	no	assessment	is	made	of	what	
happened	to	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.		The	lessons	from	the	ups	and	downs	of	
implementing	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	were	simply	not	alluded	to	in	the	new	tourism	
plan.	That	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	did	not	feature	at	all	in	the	GNTDP	2013‐2027	is	
indeed	odd.	Perhaps	part	of	the	reason	for	this	oversight	lies	in	the	fact	that	by	the	time	
the	GNTDP	2013‐2027	was	being	developed	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	has	simply	fallen	
off	the	radar	of	most	stakeholders.	The	main	impact	of	this	situation	is	that	there	is	no	
institutional	learning	from	the	outcomes	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	to	inform	future	
tourism‐led	local	economic	development	initiatives.		
What	can	be	deduced	from	the	above	is	that	the	implementation	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy,	especially	post	2006,	became	highly	constrained	by	the	lack	of	strong	
institutional	networks	and	a	positive	policy	environment.		Neither	national	economic	
development	strategies	nor	national	tourism	development	plans	sought	to	integrate	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	as	an	example	of	using	tourism	for	local	economic	development	
and	poverty	reduction.	On	the	basis	of	available	evidence,	it	is	fair	to	conclude	that	
while	the	policy	shifts	at	the	national	level	might	have	had	an	impact	on	the	support	
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and	resources	available	for	the	implementation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	it	is	the	
timing	of	the	completion	of	the	physical	projects	that	most	significantly	impacted	upon	
the	success	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	The	completion	and	handing	over	of	the	
physical	projects	to	the	various	agencies	and	the	failure	to	work	on	institutional	change	
at	this	point	constrained	the	development	of	the	needed	institutional	thickness	to	
support	the	continuity	of	the	strategy.	Ironically,	on	page	218	of	the	GNTDP	2013‐2027	
it	is	noted	that	“tourism’s	potential	for	poverty	reduction	cannot	be	realised	until	there	
is	a	development	paradigm	shift	from	macro‐economic	oriented	goals	to	poverty‐
focused	livelihood	opportunities	and	decision‐making	process	at	the	local	levels”.	This	
is	exactly	what	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	sought	to	accomplish	by	integrating	tourism	
development	with	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	goals.	
Nonetheless,	the	GNTDP	2013‐2027	failed	to	point	out	what	lessons	could	be	learned	
from	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	to	inform	future	initiatives.		
	
6.2 Embedding the Elmina 2015 Strategy in the district 
medium term development plans of KEEA 
In	this	section	I	examine	the	extent	to	which	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	embedded	
within	the	development	planning	and	governance	structures	of	the	KEEA	Municipal	
Assembly.	The	conceptual	assumption	here	is	that	a	deep	embedding	within	these	
structures	will	mean	that	the	institutional	structures	for	implementation	will	have	been	
thickened	to	meet	the	governance	needs	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	There	are	two	
ways	in	which	I	approach	the	issue	of	embeddedness	and	its	link	with	institutional	
thickness.	Firstly,	I	focus	on	examining	whether	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	as	an	area	
level	plan	became	a	part	of	subsequent	District	Medium	Term	Development	Plans	
(MTDP)	of	the	KEEA	Assembly.	The	second	approach	which	is	treated	fully	in	section	
6.3	looks	at	what	happened	to	those	institutional	and	organization	structures	that	
emerged	as	part	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	planning	process.		
MTDPs and Elmina 2015 Strategy 
The	question	of	whether	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	embedded	in	the	KEEA	is	to	be	
answered	by	looking	at	the	subsequent	Medium	Term	Development	Plan	(MTDP)	
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produced	by	the	municipal	assembly	in	the	periods	after	the	strategy	was	drawn	up.	
MTDPs,	as	explained	in	detail	in	Chapter	4,	section	4.1,	are	compiled	every	3‐4	years.	A	
MTDP	is	an	aggregation	of	the	development	needs	and	plan	of	action	covering	all	
communities	falling	under	the	responsibility	of	the	KEEA.	The	National	Development	
Planning	Commission	(NDPC)	provides	guidelines	for	the	preparations	of	District	
MTDPs.	These	guidelines	stipulate	that	assemblies	are	to	engage	in	community	
participation	in	the	planning	process	(see	discussion	in	Chapter	4,	section	4.1).	This	is	
to	ensure	that	MTDPs	are	in	fact	an	aggregation	of	the	development	needs	of	
communities.	Thus	the	preparation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	as	an	area	level	
development	plan	had	to	follow	the	guidelines	set	out	by	the	NDPC.	This	should	have	
entailed	a	full	deployment	of	the	technical	planning	capacity	of	the	KEEA.		
It	is	known	that	on	many	occasions	resource	and	capacity	constrains	mean	that	most	
metropolitan,	municipal	and	district	assemblies,	are	not	able	to	fully	follow	the	
planning	guidelines98.	Consequently,	new	MTDPs	tend	to	include	a	lot	of	repeated	
information	and	materials	from	previous	MTDPs	since	there	are	not	enough	resources	
to	fully	follow	through	the	planning	guidelines.	Moreover,	the	development	challenges	
facing	many	communities	remain	unmet	from	one	cycle	of	MTDP	to	another.	In	
contrast,	the	external	funding	for	the	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	Management	
Programme	meant	that	the	making	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	–	an	area	council	plan	–	
followed	and	even	exceeded	the	planning	guidelines	of	the	NDPC.	The	preparation	of	
the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	involved	detailed	stakeholder	identification	and	iterative	
consultation	between	the	KEEA	and	community	groups	(see	section	5.1).	It	was	
through	such	a	detailed	planning	process	that	the	five	development	priority	areas	were	
arrived	at	and	specific	projects	designed	to	meet	identified	development	needs.		
It	has	to	be	remembered	that	the	detailed	planning	process	for	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	was	only	possible	because	of	external	funding	for	the	ECHMP,	and	that	usually	
the	KEEA	would	have	lacked	the	resources	to	undertake	such	a	detailed	process.	In	this	
context,	one	would	expect	that	once	this	process	had	been	completed,	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	would	be	embedded	in	and	form	part	of	all	subsequent	MTDPs	prepared	by	
the	KEEA,	as	the	strategy	proposed	development	that	would	extend	across	the	lifecycle	
of	a	number	of	MTDPs.	However,	a	review	of	subsequent	MTDPs	after	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	had	been	developed	shows	that	this	embedding	process	did	not	occur.		The	
																																																								
98	Interview	with	Labaran	Fuseini,	Municipal	Development	Planning	Officer,	KEEA,	23.07.2015	
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reasons	for	this	are	varied.	Some	of	the	key	reason	however	relates	to	the	loss	of	
institutional	memory	and	institutional	knowledge	which	was	a	direct	result	of	the	
haphazard	transfer	of	municipal	staff,	and	changing	political	leadership.	These	reasons	
will	be	fully	explored	in	Chapter	7.	For	now	it	is	important	to	review	what	subsequent	
MTDPs	had	to	say	about	tourism	development	within	the	KEEA	in	general	and	in	
Elmina	in	particular.		
A	review	of	the	previous	MTDP	for	2010‐2013	and	the	current	2014‐2017	MTDP99	
offers	key	insight	into	the	lack	of	embeddedness	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	In	the	
2010‐2013	MTDP	no	mention	is	made	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	In	the	sections	
where	tourism	is	discussed,	the	plan	notes	that	“tourism	potential	[in	Elmina	and	the	
municipality]	is	yet	to	be	fully	tapped.”100,	and	goes	on	to	explain	that	while	Elmina	and	
Cape	Coast	remain	the	tourism	hub	in	Ghana,	“…yet	few	of	the	benefits	of	tourism	
actually	reach	the	local	population	and	the	local	administration”101.	Despite	its	
preparation	being	led	by	the	KEEA,	there	is	no	mention	in	the	MTDP	as	to	whether	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	successful,	or	how	it	is	to	be	extended.	In	fact,	between	2009	
and	2011,	there	was	no	Municipal	Development	Planning	Officer	at	post	at	the	KEEA.	
This	was	due	to	a	hostile	environment	created	by	the	new	Municipal	Chief	Executive	
from	the	National	Democratic	Party	who	did	not	want	to	work	with	personnel	who	had	
previously	worked	under	the	New	Patriotic	Party	government102.	This	meant	that	there	
was	no	institutional	knowledge	that	would	have	ensured	that	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	
was	incorporated	into	the	MTDP.		
In	the	2013‐2017	MTDP,	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	mentioned	once	and	as	a	
reference	source	for	one	of	the	picture	depicting	drainage	and	sanitation	issues	that	
featured	in	the	original	document.	There	is	no	discussion	of	some	of	the	action	plans	
initiated	by	or	through	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	and	their	current	status.	This	is	how	
																																																								
99	It	was	impossible	to	get	access	to	2006‐2009	MTDP	or	earlier	ones.	The	current	Planning	
Officer	at	the	KEEA	did	not	come	to	meet	a	copy	of	any	earlier	MTDP	in	the	office.	It	is	fair	to	
assume	that	even	these	earlier	MTDP	did	not	embed	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	since	the	
development	issues	facing	Elmina	remains	the	same.	
100	KEEA	(2010:3)	Medium	Term	Development	Plan	under	the	Ghana	Shared	Growth	and	
Development	Agenda	(GSGDA	I:	2010‐2013)	
101	KEEA	(2010:6)	Medium	Term	Development	Plan	under	the	Ghana	Shared	Growth	and	
Development	Agenda	(GSGDA	I:	2010‐2013)	
102	Interview	with	Labaran	Fuseini,	Municipal	Development	Planning	Officer,	KEEA,	23.07.2015	
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the	current	Municipal	Development	Planning	Officer	explained	why	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	was	not	embedded	in	2014‐2017	MTDP	of	the	KEEA:	
When	you	look	at	this	document,	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	It	was	a	beautiful	
document	prepared	to	address	the	key	issues	in	these	areas,	drainage	and	waste	
management,	fishing	and	fishing	harbour,	tourism	and	local	economic	
development,	education	and	health.	I	came	here,	met	this	document,	I	went	
through,	I	realised	it	was	a	very	useful	document	that	was	prepared	and	before	
they	could	start	implementation	the	government	under	which	they	prepared	this	
thing	went	out	of	office.	So	I	made	frantic	efforts	to	get	this	document	reviewed	so	
that	we	could	still	follow	through	the	objectives	of	the	document.	But	it	was	like	
this	was	prepared	by	the	NPP	government	and	I	[current	NDC	government]	don’t	
want	to	have	anything	to	do	with	it.	So	we	had	to	put	it	back	where	I	just	brought	
it	out	from.	So	it	is	like	the	issue	of	continuity	is,	its	partisan	political	
consideration	of	issues	is	affecting	a	lot	of	things	everywhere	especially	in	the	
assemblies103	
It	is	clear	from	the	analysis	above	that	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	not	embedded	
within	the	development	planning	framework	of	the	KEEA.	The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	
appears	to	have	just	been	a	parallel	development	plan	for	Elmina	that	elapsed	once	the	
international	funding	backing	it	had	been	expended.	This	is	contrary	to	one	of	the	key	
objectives	that	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	sought	to	meet	–	that	of	defining	a	more	
integrated	approach	to	long	term	development	planning.		A	key	institutional	objective	
of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	to	strengthen	the	systems	of	local	government	in	
Elmina	and	enable	them	to	implement	the	strategy	in	an	integrated	and	participatory	
manner.	This	was	to	entail	the	strengthening	of	key	local	processes,	systems	and	
human	resources	–	like	the	making	of	MTDPS	–	to	ensure	effective	and	continued	
management	of	and	financing	of	local	development	processes.	Embedding	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	in	subsequent	MTDPs	would	have	meant	that	the	municipality	had	to	
allocate	some	funding	for	these	projects.	However,	once	the	detailed	plans,	aims	and	
objectives	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	had	fallen	off	the	radar	of	the	KEEA,	there	was	
no	oversight	responsibility	for	monitoring,	evaluation	and/or	continuity	of	the	projects.		
	
																																																								
103	Interview	with	Labaran	Fuseini,	Municipal	Development	Planning	Officer,	KEEA,	23.07.2015	
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6.3 Building institutional density: the Elmina Tourism Office 
and the Elmina Arts and Crafts Market 
The	Elmina	Tourism	Office	(ETO)	was	created	as	a	direct	outcome	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	to	serve	as	an	organisational	and	institutional	structure	that	could	contribute	
to	the	successful	implementation	of	project	objectives.	In	a	similar	vein,	the	Elmina	Arts	
and	Craft	Market	(EACM)	was	set	up	and	built	as	an	integral	part	of	using	tourism	for	
local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	Artisans	and	craftsmen	in	the	
community	were	to	have	a	place	to	produce,	advertise	and	sell	their	wares	to	tourists.	
In	this	section,	I	present	an	analysis	of	how	these	two	institutional	structures	operated	
and	failed	to	live	up	to	their	expectations.	In	particular	I	focus	on	unpacking	some	of	the	
underlying	causes	for	the	way	things	turned	out.	
The Elmina Tourism Office 
The	Elmina	Tourism	Office	(ETO)	was	set	up	on	the	ground	floor	of	one	of	the	
renovated	merchant	houses	(see	figure	20	below).	The	ETO	was	to	serve	as	an	
institutional	structure	to	ensure	the	sustainability	and	also	continuity	of	using	tourism	
as	a	tool	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	It	was	to	be	an	
information	and	visitor	reception	facility	in	the	centre	of	the	Elmina	Township.	The	
goal	was	that	every	tourist	visiting	Elmina	will	make	the	ETO	their	visit	point	of	call.	
This	was	to	ensure	that	tourists	get	to	know	more	of	the	many	other	diversified	tourist	
highlights	on	offer	rather	than	the	singular	focus	on	the	Elmina	Castle.	The	reasoning	
behind	the	ETO	is	captured	in	this	quote	from	the	interviews;	
“Let	all	visitors	coming	to	the	Elmina	visit	the	place	first	whether	going	to	Castle	
or	whatever	go	there	first.	Yes,	your	mission,	I	want	to	visit	the	Elmina	Castle,	
okay	this	that	that,	just	put	a	token	here,	they	take	you	to	the	Castle”104	
In	addition	to	raising	funds	from	tokens	–	i.e.	gifts	and	donations	–	given	by	tourists,	the	
ETO	was	stocked	with	postcards,	t‐shirts,	specially	packed	salts	from	the	salt	mines	in	
the	community	as	well	as	other	tourist	souvenirs.	This	was	to	serve	as	a	source	of	
income	for	running	the	office	as	well	as	income	for	the	producers	of	these	local	
souvenirs.	There	was	also	a	group	of	trained	tour	guides	attached	to	the	ETO	who	were	
																																																								
104	Interview	with	Ebo	Dadzie,	Head	of	Tourism	Sub‐Committee,	KEEA,	16.07.2015	
	
	
214	
	
to	benefit	from	taking	tourists	on	tours.	Furthermore,	the	ETO	was	equipped	with	a	
Public	Address	system,	a	set	of	canopies	and	plastic	chairs	that	was	hired	out	as	extra	
source	of	income.	The	renovated	community	square	which	was	renamed	Nana	Kobina	
Gyna	square	(Trafalgar	Square	being	the	former	name)	was	under	the	management	of	
the	ETO.	The	ETO	was	thus	responsible	for	taking	bookings	and	revenue	from	those	
renting	the	Nana	Kobina	Gyan	square	for	funerals	and	other	community	events.	The	
deal	was	that	people	would	rent	the	square	in	addition	to	the	PA	system,	canopies	and	
chairs	that	are	available	from	the	ETO.	The	revenue	from	these	activities	were	to	be	
used	to	maintain	and	improve	upon	the	touristic	infrastructures	in	the	community	
including	the	sign	board	and	directional	signage	erected	under	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy.		
		Figure	20	The	Elmina	Tourism	Office	building	
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The	ETO	was	first	managed	by	one	Richard	Ewusi	–	a	citizen	of	Elmina	–	who	was	
appointed	after	interviews	organised	by	Urban	Solutions	–	the	Dutch	consultancy	
company	–	and	the	KEEA.	He	was	sent	out	on	a	training	programme	to	Kenya	to	build	
his	management	capacity	before	taking	over	the	management	of	the	ETO105.	The	first	
six	months	of	his	salary	was	guaranteed	from	the	programme	funds	and	it	was	
expected	that	his	subsequent	remuneration	would	come	from	the	revenue	streams	
identified	above.	As	manager	of	the	ETO,	Richard	Ewusi	was	to	be	accountable	to	the	
KEEA	Municipal	Assembly	who	were	given	oversight	governance	responsibility	for	the	
running	of	the	place.	In	fact	the	proceeds	from	the	ETO	accrued	to	the	assembly	as	part	
of	its	Internally	Generated	Funds	(IGF).		After	the	first	six	months	of	operation,	the	
active	involvement	of	the	KEEA	in	providing	oversight	governance	for	the	ETO	began	to	
wane	–	among	other	things	due	to	ongoing	personnel	changes	within	the	KEEA	
Municipal	Assembly	as	discussed	in	detail	in	Chapter	7,	sections	7.2	and	7.3.		
While	accounting	to	the	KEEA	for	the	revenue	accrued	at	the	ETO,	the	manager’s	salary	
was	not	being	paid	to	him106.	Once	the	salary	stop	forthcoming,	the	manager	of	the	ETO	
started	to	remunerate	himself	from	the	revenue	coming	to	him.	This	lead	to	a	
mismanagement	of	the	ETO	and	its	associated	revenue‐generating	assets.	The	KEEA	
also	failed	to	put	in	place	adequate	monitoring	and	evaluation	mechanisms.	The	result	
was	that	funds	from	the	ETO	were	embezzled	and	there	was	no	effort	made	to	maintain	
the	assets	and	tourist	infrastructures	under	the	ETO107.	Many	interviewees	pointed	out	
that	for	mainly	political	reasons,	the	ETO	manager	was	not	held	to	full	account	for	the	
mismanagement	of	the	place.	What	happened	is	best	quoted	in	the	words	of	one	of	the	
interviewees.	
He	was	given	free	hands	to	operate	there	so	there	was	some	funds	even	in	the	
account,	he	operated	the	account	and	took	money	for	whatever	he,	eventually	he	
could	not	run	the	place	very	well	and	the	place,	we	even	called	him	for	him	to	
render	an	account	twice	he	came	but	he	could	not	give	a	good	account	of	his,	so	
eventually	he	deserted	the	office	and	I	don’t	know	at	the	moment	where	is	he	now	
whether	he	has	gone	to	Europe	or	whatever.108	
																																																								
105	Interview	with	Dr.	Anthony	Annah‐Prah,	Head	of	Implementation	of	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	
Management	Programme,	03.11.2014	
106	Interview	with	Justice	Amoah,	Former	Municipal	Planning	Officer	of	KEEA/Former	National	
Project	Coordinator	of	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	13.11.2014	
107	Interview	with	Michael	Bentil‐Arthur,	Assemblyman/Head	of	Development	Planning	
Subcommittee/Head	of	Elmina	Zonal	Council,	KEEA,	01.10.2014	
108	Interview	with	Ebo	Dadzie,	Head	of	Tourism	Sub‐Committee,	KEEA,	31.10.2014	
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The	expectation	that	the	ETO	would	contribute	to	institutional	thickness	failed	to	
materialise.	This	greatly	affected	the	extent	to	which	the	goal	of	using	tourism	for	local	
economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	could	be	reached.	Moreover	the	long	
term	sustainability	and	continuity	expected	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	became	
subverted.	Currently,	the	offices	of	the	ETO	are	being	used	as	the	office	of	the	Elmina	
Zonal	Council.	The	tourist	signage	and	directional	signboards	have	faded	and/or	fallen	
down	without	any	maintenance	(see	figure	21	below).	The	ETO	was	to	make	visible	the	
direct	ways	in	which	tourism	was	beneficial	to	the	community.	However,	the	
mismanagement	and	embezzlement	of	funds	meant	that	it	was	not	able	to	play	its	
expected	role.	The	ETO	required	a	high	level	of	communication,	collaboration	and	
coordination	between	the	various	agencies	with	a	strong	steering	role	from	the	KEEA.			
The	tourism	office	was	set	up	as	an	independent	place	which	is	answerable	to	DCE	
[District	Chief	Executive].	Veronica	Nelson	the	DCE	sat	down	for	the	boy	to	take	all	
the	money	and	equipment	away,	you	never	prosecuted	and	so	the	tourism	office	is	
there	to	take	receipts	for	those	who	use	Nana	Kobina	Gyan	Square,	how	does	it	
promote	tourism,	all	the	signages	that	we	put	you	know	for	Elmina	town	tour,	
walking	tour	they	are	all	faded,	they	are	all	torn…109	
As	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	slipped	from	the	top	of	the	agenda	of	the	assembly,	there	
was	less	and	less	oversight	management	of	what	was	going	on	at	the	ETO.	In	the	end,	
the	mismanagement	of	the	ETO	played	a	role	in	the	failure	to	achieve	the	aim	of	using	
tourism	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	
  	
	
																																																								
109	Interview	with	Dr.	Anthony	Annah‐Prah,	Head	of	Implementation	of	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	
Management	Programme,	03.11.2014.	
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Figure	21	Faded	and	broken	down	Elmina	2015	Strategy	sign	boards	
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The Elmina Arts and Craft Market 
A	key	component	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	to	act	as	a	catalyst	for	generating	
local	economic	development	opportunities.	In	both	direct	and	indirect	ways,	these	
income	generating	opportunities	were	to	be	linked	to	the	expected	increase	in	heritage	
tourists	coming	to	Elmina.	It	was	towards	this	end	that	the	Elmina	Arts	and	Craft	
Market	(EACM)	was	established	as	a	primary	mechanism	for	tapping	into	the	tourist	
market	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	The	EACM	was	to	be	an	
avenue	for	local	artisans	and	craftsmen	to	produce,	display	and	sell	their	work	to	
tourists	visiting	Elmina.	The	establishment	of	the	EACM	was	also	geared	towards	
increasing	the	density	of	tourism‐related	attractions	in	the	town	–	i.e.	to	thicken	the	
institutional	support	structures	within	which	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	objectives	were	
to	be	achieved.	The	expectation	was	that	the	tourists	would	be	directed	from	the	ETO	
and	the	Elmina	Castle	to	the	EACM	where	they	would	then	buy	artefacts,	souvenirs	and	
other	memorabilia.	This	would	then	generate	revenue	for	shop	keepers	and	contribute	
to	overall	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	According	to	project	
documents	these	three	sites	were	to	“become	a	true	tourism	centre	of	the	town”	(Urban	
Solutions,	2006:11).	The	EACM	was	sited	to	the	North‐West	of	the	renovated	Nana	
Kobina	Gyan	Square	with	the	Elmina	Tourism	Office	located	in	building	on	the	Southern	
corner	of	the	Square	(see	figure	22	below).		
Figure	22	Map	of	the	centre	of	Elmina	
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Prior	to	the	establishment	of	the	EACM,	it	was	noted	by	Urban	Solutions	–	the	
consultants	–that	there	were	barely	any	artisans	in	Elmina.	Although	there	were	a	few	
people	active	in	arts	and	craft,	their	activities	were	not	on	a	professional	level	nor	fully	
geared	towards	meeting	tourist	demand.	Thus	a	cohort	of	artisans	and	craft	makers	
had	to	be	developed	from	scratch.	A	number	of	people	in	the	community	were	given	
training	in	various	arts	and	craft	design	and	production	including	wood	work,	metal	
and	fabrics	(see	figure	23	below).	The	training	programme	was	contracted	to	the	Aid	to	
Artisans	Ghana	(ATAG)	for	implementation	over	the	course	of	over	15	months.	A	
progress	report	of	the	period	documents	that	over	80	people	were	trained	in	various	
craftsmanship	in	wood,	metal,	textiles	and	leather	products	among	others	(Urban	
Solutions,	2006).		
In	addition	to	this,	OBAP	Services	–	an	accounting	and	bookkeeping	services	company	–	
were	contracted	to	provide	business	training	for	the	craftsmen	and	craftswomen.	There	
were	38	artisans	from	the	ATAG	training	programme	who	received	further	training	
from	OBAP	Services.	This	second	training	programme	focused	on	soft	skills	and	
covered	topics	such	as	‘Skills	in	Costing’,	‘Principles	of	Management’	and	‘Financial	
Management’.	Furthermore,	there	were	also	379	business	operators	across	Elmina	who	
received	business	sensitisation	and	rudimentary	training	in	such	topics	as	
‘Fundamentals	of	Business	Development’,	‘Principles	of	Management’,	‘Record	Keeping’,	
‘Financial	Management’	and	‘Taxation’.	These	hard	and	soft	training	programmes	were	
to	ensure	that	artisans	and	business	operators	understood	the	tourist	market	and	were	
thus	able	to	tap	into	it.	These	goals	were	already	specified	within	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	documents	and	part	of	the	EU	funding	under	the	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	
Local	Economic	Development	Programme	(CHLDEP)	were	specifically	earmarked	for	
training	artisans.	
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		Figure	23	Artisans	in	training	at	the	height	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	
Source:	KEEA	photo	archives	
	
In	the	first	few	months	of	the	opening	of	the	EACM,	there	was	surge	in	patronage.	A	
number	of	tourists	were	coming	to	the	market	through	the	ETO	and	the	Elmina	Castle	
leading	to	a	boom.	This	initial	surge	of	visitor	numbers	at	the	EACM	was	partly	due	to	
the	heightened	awareness	from	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	projects	as	a	whole.	When	
the	EACM	started	operating,	there	were	ongoing	projects	like	the	renovation	of	the	old	
merchant	houses.	This	gave	high	visibility	and	attraction	to	the	EACM.	Moreover,	there	
were	newly	erected	sign	boards	and	directional	signs	at	vintage	points	throughout	the	
community	which	directed	tourists	to	the	market.	There	was	also	a	high	level	of	
communication,	collaboration	and	coordination	between	the	key	stakeholders	such	as	
the	ETO,	the	KEEA	and	the	GMMB.	A	close	reading	of	the	various	progress	reports	and	
interview	transcripts	seems	to	suggest	that	as	the	physical	projects	began	to	wind	
down	and	be	handed	over,	the	level	of	communication,	collaboration	and	coordination	
began	to	fall.	This	affected	patronage	at	the	EACM	because	tourists	were	no	longer	
directed	from	the	Elmina	Castle	or	from	the	ETO	which	itself	was	being	mismanaged.	
Currently,	the	EACM	is	a	disserted	place	and	many	of	artisans	and	shop	keepers	have	
packed	up	and	left	(see	figure	24	below).	
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 	Figure	24	The	deserted	and	empty	Elmina	Arts	and	Craft	Market	
	
In	analysing	this	situation,	there	are	two	key	explanatory	variables	that	help	in	
understanding	how	the	EACM	unravelled.	Through	these	variables,	it	is	possible	to	see	
why	the	EACM	was	unable	to	live	up	to	the	expectations	of	contributing	to	the	use	of	
tourism	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	Importantly,	the	
collapse	of	the	EACM	also	meant	the	loss	of	institutional	density	for	the	implementation	
of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	The	first	reason	for	the	failure	of	the	EACM	has	to	do	with	
its	location	vis‐à‐vis	the	physical	plan	and	layout	of	the	town	centre.	For	a	market	that	
is	geared	towards	tourists	who	come	to	the	town	chiefly	for	the	Elmina	Castle,	the	
choice	of	the	location	is	interesting.	This	is	especially	so	because	there	were	no	changes	
made	to	the	way	most	tourists	access	the	Elmina	Castle.	The	assumption	was	that	more	
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tourists	would	take	up	the	town	tours	being	offered	through	the	Elmina	Tourism	Office	
and	hence	would	be	taken	to	the	EACM.	This	assumption	however	neglected	the	fact	
that	most	tourists	visiting	Elmina	come	in	buses	or	private	vehicles	that	pass	through	
the	town	and	are	allowed	to	park	right	in	front	of	the	Castle.	The	planning	that	went	in	
to	setting	up	the	EACM	failed	to	situate	the	tourism	product	in	Elmina	in	the	context	of	
the	national	tourism	system	(see	Chapter	4,	section	4.4.).	Elmina	Castle	is	part	of	the	
Ghanaian	tourism	product	and	is	often	provided	by	tour	operators	as	part	of	a	wider	
Central	Region	tour	package.	Given	the	usually	tight	and	hurried	itinerary	of	tourists	
who	get	to	Elmina,	after	visiting	the	Castle	most	jump	right	back	into	their	vehicles	and	
drive	out	of	town.	This	is	without	so	much	as	walking	through	the	town,	let	alone	
visiting	the	EACM.	The	planning	of	the	EACM	failed	to	incorporate	the	views	of	tour	
operators	and	tour	guides	who	usually	bring	most	tourists	to	Elmina.		
The	location	of	the	EACM	is	far	out	of	sight	from	the	main	thoroughfare	that	leads	up	to	
the	bridge	over	which	tourist	cross	to	get	to	the	forecourt	of	Elmina	Castle.	Thus	there	
is	no	chance	that	tourists	in	their	buses	might	even	see	the	EACM	and	decide	to	visit	it	
(Adu‐Ampong,	2016).	Even	if	they	had	been	informed	of	it	at	the	Castle,	the	distance	of	
the	EACM	does	not	present	a	strong	incentive	for	them	to	go	out	of	their	way.	Tourists	
know	that	they	can	also	get	these	arts	and	crafts	at	other	points	of	their	travel	itinerary.	
In	one	of	the	final	project	documents	from	2008,	the	President	of	ATAG	who	
implemented	the	training	programme	for	artisans	and	helped	in	setting	up	the	EACM	is	
quoted	as	saying	“[n]ow	that	the	Arts	and	Craft	market	is	finished,	we	are	happy	that	its	
location	outside	the	Castle	is	good,	the	emotional	impact	of	a	visit	to	the	Castle	does	not	
have	a	positive	effect	on	the	purchasing	behaviour	of	the	tourists”	(KEEA,	undated:	30).	
This	approach	to	planning	the	location	of	the	EACM	while	having	some	merits	ignored	
the	fact	there	are	shops	within	the	walls	of	the	Castle.	
The	second	reason	that	might	account	for	the	collapse	of	the	EACM	is	the	existence	of	
arts	and	craft	shops	within	the	Elmina	Castle.	These	already	existing	shops	within	the	
castle	are	usually	manned	by	sales	persons	and	not	necessarily	artisans	themselves.	
The	establishment	of	the	EACM	therefore	created	direct	competition	with	the	shops	in	
the	Castle.	This	competition	is	perhaps	the	strongest	causal	reason	why	the	EACM	did	
not	survive	for	long.	This	is	because	tourists	visiting	the	Elmina	Castle	had	immediate	
access	to	the	shops	in	the	Castle.	In	fact	during	a	tour	of	the	Castle,	the	shops	are	
pointed	out	to	tourists	and	they	are	encouraged	to	visit	these	shops.	Given	this	
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arrangement,	tourists	will	have	little	to	no	inclination	to	then	walk	through	the	town	to	
get	to	the	EACM.		Furthermore,	as	the	shop	owners	were	paying	rent	to	the	GMMB,	it	
was	in	the	interest	of	the	GMM	to	ensure	that	tourists	buy	from	the	shops	inside	the	
Castle	rather	than	going	over	to	the	EACM	whose	management	was	tied	up	with	the	
KEEA.	Thus	the	issue	of	the	physical	layout	of	the	town,	the	location	of	the	EACM,	in	
addition	to	the	competition	from	the	shops	within	Castle	constrained	the	use	of	the	
EACM	as	an	institutional	mechanism	through	which	tourism	was	to	contribute	to	local	
economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	(Adu‐Ampong,	2016).	This	was	
compounded	by	reduced	stakeholder	communication	and	collaboration.	There	was	
little	coordination	between	the	KEEA,	the	GMMB,	the	ETO	and	artisans	at	the	EACM.	
Consequently,	as	tourist	traffic	to	the	EACM	dwindled,	its	sustainability	and	the	very	
sustainability	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	became	undone.	Surprisingly,	this	outcome	
was	not	foreseen	in	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	hence	there	was	no	coordinated	effort	to	
prevent	such	an	outcome.		
The	goal	of	setting	up	the	ETO	and	the	EACM	was	to	provide	new	institutional	
structures	that	were	specifically	geared	towards	becoming	the	catalyst	for	local	
economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	These	two	key	structures	were	to	
bolster	the	density	of	tourism	attractions	and	assets	through	which	the	larger	
objectives	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	could	be	achieved.	Due	to	the	reasons	outlined	
above,	the	structures	became	unsustainable	and	therefore	were	unable	to	contribute	to	
the	objectives	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	From	the	perspective	of	the	literature	on		
policy	implementation	failure,	there	are	a	number	of		interesting	counterfactual	‘what	
if’	questions	(Bovens	and	‘t	Hart,	1996)	that	could	be	asked	to	further	explore	the	
failure	of	the	ETO	and	the	EACM	to	contribute	to	institutional	thickness.	One	of	these,	is	
the	question	of	what	would	have	happened	if	the	EACM	for	instance	had	been	
developed	on	the	foregrounds	directly	in	front	of	Elmina	Castle.	It	can	be	argued	that	
this	would	have	increased	the	likelihood	of	tourists	patronising	products	at	the	EACM	
because	they	would	have	seen	the	market	as	they	enter	and	exit	the	Castle.		
It	is	evident	that	the	stakeholders	involved	in	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	perceived	the	
policy	making	process	in	a	linear	fashion.	Thus	it	was	felt	that	one	can	move	from	
decision	making	and	then	seamlessly	progress	into	translated	outcomes.	It	has	been	
noted	that	this	is	rarely	the	case	in	policy	making	and	that	it	is	important	to	approach	
this	process	by	identifying	the	key	actors	involved	and	the	ways	in	which	their	actions	
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and	inactions	might	affect	policy	outcomes	(Howlett	et	al.,	2015;	Peters	and	Pierre,	
2006).		In	summary,	this	long	quote	from	Member	of	Parliament	for	KEEA	and	the	
former	Municipal	Chief	Executive	under	whose	watch	the	projects	began	provides	a	
flavour	of	the	linear	vision	held	for	the	EACM	and	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	
I	think	that	it	will	only	have	impact	if	we	look	at	the	way	we	were	actually	
developing	this	strategy.	We	added	what	we	call	local	economic	development.	
Close	to	the	old	market	in	Elmina	if	you	pass	there,	nothing	is	going	on	there	
though	but	if	you	pass	there,	we	were	going	to	assemble	all	those	who	were	
developing	beads	and	other	things	to	stay	there	so	that	when	and	even	within	the	
strategy	we	had	in	mind	that	those	who	visit	the	castle,	they	wouldn’t	even	drive	
straight	to	the	castle.	Their	cars	will	be	parked	at	the	Kobina	Gyan	Square.	They	
will	be	walking,	along	the	line	when	they	are	walking,	they	will	drop	to	buy	a	
bottle	of	water,	they	will	drop	to	buy	a	bottle	of	blue	skies,	where	would	they	do	
that?	It	will	be	along	the	route	going	to	the	castle.	How	people	are	going	to	benefit	
from	this	will	be,	somebody	from	Elmina	selling	his	or	her	bottle	of	water.	They	
will	buy	from	them.	It's	a	way	of	making	money.	If	beads	and	these	that	these	
people	were	actually	developing,	tourists	buying	from	them,	we	will	be	promoting	
local	economic	development.	If	this	our	homestay,	these	houses	that	if	they	had	
been	able	to	work,	it’s	a	way	of	empowering	the	poor.	This	was	what	we	had	in	
mind	that	we	said	tourism	and	local	economic	development110.			
	
6.4 Form and depth of institutional thickness 
Municipalities	such	as	the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	(KEEA)	
want	to	promote	tourism	because	they	see	it	as	an	opportunity	to	diversify	their	
economies,	create	employment	and	aid	overall	local	economic	development.	
Interviewees	from	the	KEEA	spoke	about	the	potential	benefits	that	tourism	can	bring	
to	the	municipality.	However,	there	is	a	challenge	facing	KEEA	when	it	comes	to	tapping	
into	the	potential	of	tourism	for	local	economic	development.	This	challenge	was	partly	
overcome	through	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	whose	external	funding	source	provided	
the	needed	institutional	support	for	the	KEEA.	Normally,	the	KEEA	is	overwhelmed	
with	the	day‐to‐day	issues	of	local	basic	service	provision	and	resolving	immediate	
priorities	of	fixing	roads,	repairing	markets	and/or	fixing	street	lights.	Within	such	an	
environment	of	pressing	needs,	tourism	tends	to	drop	down	on	their	list	of	priorities.	
Thus	while	there	is	a	shared	image	of	tourism’s	potential	positive	role	in	local	economic	
																																																								
110	Interview	with	Nana	Ato	Arthur,	MP	for	KEEA/Former	KEEA	MCE/Former	Regional	Minister,	
07.11.2014	
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development	among	municipal	staff,	the	immediate	demands	on	their	time	and	
inadequate	resources	keep	them	from	developing	and	entrenching	institutional	
structures	that	can	tap	into	tourism	to	achieve	local	economic	development	and	
poverty	reduction.	
From	the	interview	data	two	key	observations	can	be	made	regarding	the	perceptions	
of	the	form	and	depth	of	embeddedness	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	and	how	it	shaped	
outcomes.	On	one	hand	are	those	who	feel	that	the	project	did	not	succeed	because	it	
was	too	much	embedded	in	the	KEEA	structures	and	hence	suffered	from	the	vagaries	
of	inherent	political	issues.	Others	are	however	of	the	view	that	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	was	not	embedded	deep	enough	in	the	structures	of	KEEA	nor	of	the	
community.	In	this	view,	this	lack	of	depth	of	embeddedness	explains	why	the	
outcomes	were	less	than	hoped	for.	For	those	in	the	first	camp,	their	view	is	
exemplified	in	this	quote	by	the	Executive	Director	of	the	Ghana	Heritage	Conservation	
Trust	who	stressed	that,	“…if	you	needed	that	project	to	succeed,	even	though	it	will	need	
the	protection	and	support	of	the	state,	it	must	be	independent…So	what	am	saying	is	that	
the	2015	strategy	was	good,	really	very	good	but	then	again	structural‐wise,	who	is	
supposed	to	implement	that?”111	From	this	perspective,	given	the	many	responsibilities	
of	the	KEEA,	the	added	task	of	governing	the	implementation	process	for	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	proved	to	be	beyond	their	capacity.	However,	there	is	the	prior	question	
of	who	the	policy	writers	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	envisaged	as	taking	the	project	
forward.	In	this	regard,	the	KEEA	was	clearly	seen	as	the	best	institution	to	carry	out	
the	full	implementation	of	the	vision	since	it	has	the	constitutional	mandate	of	ensuring	
overall	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	in	the	municipality.	
It	appears	that	if	an	independent	and	well‐endowed	institutional	structure	had	been	set	
up	to	lead	the	implementation	process,	then	the	chance	of	success	would	have	been	
higher.		This	view	therefore	echoes	the	point	made	by	Rodriguez‐Pose	and	Tijmstra	
(2007:525)	that	“the	success	of	LED	strategies	depends	to	a	large	degree	on	the	
existence	of	appropriate	local	and	regional	institutional	systems	and	on	the	availability	
of	the	necessary	frameworks	and	skill	levels	at	all	government	tiers”.	In	this	regard	the	
KEEA	was	an	appropriate	local	institution	to	lead	the	design	of	the	strategy.	
Nonetheless,	another	layer	of	independent	institutional	body	to	oversee	full	
																																																								
111	Interview	with	Francis	Cobbinah,	Executive	Director,	Ghana	Heritage	Conservation	Trust,	
29.09.2014	
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implementation	and	monitoring	and	evaluation	of	projects	might	have	given	further	
depth	to	the	institutional	structures	in	the	locality	or	lead	to	a	duplication	of	
institutions	and	a	lack	of	accountability	–	see	the	example	of	the	Elmina	Tourism	Office	
discussed	above.	It	must	be	noted	that	even	when	new	organisational	and	institutional	
structures	have	been	put	in	place,	it	is	important	to	have	adequate	oversight	from		
existing	bodies	like	the	KEEA.	It	was	the	breakdown	of	this	oversight	governance	
responsibility	of	the	KEEA	that	lead	to	the	mismanagement	of	the	Elmina	Tourism	
Office	revenue	and	assets.		As	one	interviewer	noted,	“you	know	the	governance	system	
is	not	working.	You	know	also	because	it	is	not	working	the,	those	at	the	helm	of	affairs	
are	not	on	their	toes,	you	get	it,	ahuh	they	are	not	on	their	toes	ahuh,		so	we	need	to	have	a	
strong	supervisory	system	to	make	governance	work”112	
The	second	perspective	from	the	interviews	point	out	that	there	was	a	shallow	depth	of	
embeddedness	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	within	the	KEEA	and	the	community.	From	
this	perspective,	the	project	failed	because	it	was	not	strongly	rooted	into	the	
community	nor	within	the	KEEA.	The	reason	for	this	perceived	shallow	depth	of	
embeddedness	is	explained	in	terms	of	the	commitment	of	those	individual	actors	who	
are	involved	in	the	planning	and	implementation	process.	Thus	for	some	people,	the	
best	way	would	have	been	to	have	people	who	hail	from	Elmina	at	the	helm	of	the	
governing	process.	This	sentiment	found	expression	in	quotes	such	as	these	which	are	
worth	quoting	in	some	detail;	
“But	the	assembly	coming	in	with	its	expertise,	I	don’t	kick	against	it	but	most	of	
them	are	not	from	Elmina	so	they	weren’t	interested	in	the	project	itself	or	the	
benefits	that	the	community	will	derive…so	you	can	see	that	when	you	put	wrong	
officers	into	a	project	which	does	not	concern	them	too	much,	it	brings	about	the	
collapse	of	the	whole	thing	or	something	like	that.	So	that	is	what	I,	this	is	what	I	
have	to	say	about	why	the	project	has	been	in	abyss	now	and	up	to	now	nobody	
seem	to	take	the	second	phase	on.”113	
“The	technocratic	or	the	expertise	who	were	then	in	place	helped	channel	the	
project,	did	that	but	I’m	sorry	it	is	only	the	coordinator	who	was	Elminaian	and	he	
happens	to	be	Prof.	Annah	Prah	at	that	time.	He	had	to	request	for	sabbatical	
leave	for	2	years	to	help	this	project	to	be	carried	on.	But	the	assembly	they	also	
supposed	to	write	a	cheque,	they	are	also	supposed	to	do	that	monitoring,	do	that,	
awarding	contracts	to	these	people	and	all	that.	They	did	but	how	competent	
these	people	were?	How	committed	are	these	technocratic	were?	How	did	they	
																																																								
112	Interview	with	Felix	Nguah,	Manager	of	Elmina	Ecotours	Ltd/Interim	Chair	of	Tour	Guides	
Association	Central	Region,	09.09.2014	
113	Interview	with	Ebo	Dadzie,	Head	of	Tourism	Sub‐Committee,	KEEA,	31.10.2014	
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value	the	sustainability	of	this	project,	aftermath	of	the	first	phase?	I’ll	say	most	of	
them	did	not	put	value	on	it	and	carelessly	never	thought	of	sustaining	the	
programme	after	the	first	one”114	
The	assumption	in	these	quotes	is	that	developing	the	right	depth	of	institutional	
thickness	will	require	that	actors	are	‘true’	Elminians	who	will	be	more	interested	in	
attending	to	the	long	term	sustainability	of	the	project.	To	some	extent	this	assumption	
is	plausible	since	it	has	been	argued	by	for	example	Pike	et	al.,	(2006:123)	that	
communities	need	to	be	empowered	to	self‐determine	an	appropriate	form	of	local	
economic	development	initiatives.	The	fact	that	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	initiated	
by	and	funded	by	external	agencies	took	away	a	bit	of	the	self‐determination	of	the	
community.		The	other	side	to	this	is	that	the	manager	of	the	Elmina	Tourism	Office	
when	it	was	first	opened	was	from	Elmina.	Thus	one	would	expect	that	he	would	have	
been	particularly	keen	to	ensure	the	success	of	the	activities	under	his	authority.	As	
already	explained	in	the	section	above,	this	did	not	turn	out	to	be	so.	Thus,	it	is	not	so	
much	whether	key	actors	hail	from	Elmina	but	rather	the	extent	to	which	there	are	
clear	institutional	and	organisational	lines	of	authority	and	accountability	to	ensure	
effective	governance	of	the	process.	
	
Conclusions 
The	tourism	planning	process	is	recognised	as	being	a	social	and	political	process	as	
well	as	being	a	technocratic	one	involving	a	number	of	governmental	and	societal	
institutions	(Dredge	and	Jenkins,	2007).	It	is	through	effective	planning	and	
implementation	that	tourism’s	potential	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction	can	be	enhanced	(Brohman,	1996;	Harrison,	2008).	Thus	to	understand	
tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	processes	such	as	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy,	it	is	important	to	consider	the	institutional	structures	that	enable	and	
constrain	the	planning	processes	and	the	social	and	political	processes	that	underline	it	
all.	This	chapter	explored	the	third	research	question	of	this	thesis	which	looks	at	the	
extent	to	which	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	embedded	into	the	institutional	
arrangement	for	local	economic	development	planning	at	the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐
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Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	(KEEA).	In	particular,	the	concept	of	institutional	thickness	
allowed	the	analysis	to	identify	the	level	of	institutional	presence,	the	level	of	mutual	
interaction	between	stakeholders,	the	structures	of	domination	and	pattern	of	
coalitions	as	well	as	the	awareness	among	stakeholders	of	being	involved	in	a	common	
enterprise.	The	development	of	institutional	thickness	enhances	the	propensity	of	
tourism‐led	local	economic	development	initiatives	to	be	successful	and	sustainable.	
In	this	chapter	I	examined	the	extent	to	which	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	as	a	tourism‐
led	local	economic	development	initiative	was	rooted	in	a	system	of	institutional	
support.	To	arrive	at	such	an	understanding	it	has	been	important	to	analyse	whether	
national	economic	development	planning	systems	and	national	tourism	development	
planning	systems	provided	enough	institutional	support	for	implementing	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy.	A	plethora	of	institutions	at	national,	regional	and	in	particular	at	the	
local	level	is	a	necessary	condition	for	developing	institutional	thickness	(Raco,	1998)	
that	can	ensure	the	sustainability	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	
initiatives.	The	start	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	characterised	by	a	strong	
institutional	presence	derived	from	its	alignment	with	national	economic	development	
policies	and	national	tourism	development	plans.	The	provision	of	such	institutional	
support	was	in	the	form	of	setting	up	new	organisational	structures	such	as	the	Elmina	
Tourism	Office	and	the	Elmina	Arts	and	Crafts	Market.	The	capacity	of	existing	
organisations	was	also	enhanced	through	a	revenue	sharing	arrangement	that	enabled	
them	to	take	on	additional	governance	responsibilities	for	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	
This	support	network	however,	began	to	disintegrate	midway	through	implementation	
due	to	among	others	the	inability	to	build	on	the	new	institutional	support	and	changes	
in	national	economic	and	tourism	development	policies	and	plans.	The	analysis	in	this	
chapter	therefore	goes	to	support	the	argument	by	Amin	and	Thrift	(1995)	that	a	
strong	institutional	presence	while	being	a	necessary	condition	is	not	sufficient	by	itself	
to	lead	to	the	development	of	institutional	thickness.		
Furthermore,	the	analysis	in	this	chapter	shows	that	the	expected	‘institutional	
isomorphism’	(MacLeod,	1997)	that	was	to	come	with	the	setting	up	of	new	
institutional	and	organisation	structures	failed	to	materialise.	The	Elmina	Tourism	
Office	(ETO)	and	the	Elmina	Arts	and	Crafts	Market	(EACM)	were	set	up	to	add	to	a	
strong	institutional	presence	and	the	KEEA	was	charged	with	oversight	management	
responsibilities.	However,	key	stakeholders	conceived	of	the	establishment	of	the	ETO	
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and	the	EACM	as	a	linear	policy	making	process	that	will	lead	to	goal	attainment.	There	
was	inadequate	attention	paid	to	the	ways	in	location	of	the	ETO	and	the	EACM	could	
affect	outcomes,	and	to	how	competing	interests	could	undermine	the	success	of	policy	
objectives.	Moreover,	the	analysis	shows	that	the	structures	and	lines	of	accountability	
were	weak	due	to	reduced	stakeholder	communication	and	collaboration.	The	KEEA	
was	unable	to	hold	the	Manager	of	the	ETO	to	account	for	the	resources	put	at	his	
disposal	which	were	to	be	used	to	further	enhance	the	implementation	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy.	Moreover,	the	establishment	of	the	EACM,	rather	than	encouraging	
stakeholder	interaction	based	on	a	mutual	awareness	of	being	involved	in	a	common	
enterprise,	appears	to	have	led	to	sectionalism	and	disengagement	from	some	
institutions	like	the	Ghana	Museums	and	Monuments	Board	(GMMB).	This	is	partly	
because	there	were	existing	arts	and	craft	shops	within	the	Elmina	Castle	from	which	
the	GMMB	collected	rent	charges.	Thus	there	was	an	absence	of	shared	norms	and	
practices	(Coulson	and	Ferrario,	2007)	and	an	inadequate	attempt	at	“the	
establishment	of	trust	relations	and	mutual	cooperation	(Raco,	1998:978	emphasis	in	
original)	that	would	have	contributed	to	the	development	of	institutional	thickness.		
The	analysis	in	this	chapter	also	shows	that	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	not	
embedded	within	subsequent	Medium	Term	Development	Plans	(MTDPs)	of	the	KEEA.	
The	planning	and	implementation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	appears	to	have	become	
parallel	to,	rather	than	integrated	into	the	long	term	development	planning	of	the	
KEEA.	Embedding	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	into	subsequent	MTDPs	would	have	
thickened	the	institutional	support	for	implementation.	If	subsequent	MTDPs	had	made	
reference	to	it	and	looked	to	build	on	it,	the	governance	needs	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	would	have	been	kept	alive	on	the	agenda	of	the	KEEA	so	that	resources	were	
allocated	to	meet	its	needs.	Furthermore,	this	embedding	process	would	have	
contributed	to	the	development	of	a	mutual	awareness	of	being	involved	in	a	common	
local	enterprise	amongst	old	and	new	stakeholders	at	all	levels.	As	it	so	happened,	the	
depth	of	embeddedness	was	shallow	and	hence	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	fell	off	the	
planning	and	governance	agenda	of	the	KEEA.	This	conclusion	raises	questions	about	
the	emphasis	on	the	local	level	within	the	concept	of	institutional	thickness.	Is	the	local	
level	the	optimal	spatial	scale	to	assess	the	ways	institutional	thickness	shaped	
tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	outcomes?	While	the	local	level	
offers	much	insight	into	the	planning	process,	a	look	at	the	regional	and	national	level	
can	also	provide	additional	insights	into	the	structures	of	domination	and/or	patterns	
of	coalition	that	shape	action	at	the	local	level.	This	makes	visible	the	forms	of	political	
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and	social	exclusion	that	shapes	the	process	of	institutionalisation	(Raco,	1998).	In	
many	ways	the	level	of	institutional	thickness	developed	for	the	planning	and	
implementation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	influenced	by	political	contestations	
and	it	is	these	issues	that	I	explore	in	depth	in	the	next	chapter.	
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Chapter 7 
	
“Today it’s party A, tomorrow it’s party B”: political 
cycles and the shaping of development outcomes 
	
Much	like	any	development	intervention,	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	
initiatives	are	deeply	political.	The	political	underpinnings	of	tourism‐led	local	
economic	development	initiatives	exist	at	the	international,	national,	regional	and	local	
levels.	A	fundamental	reason	for	the	political	nature	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	
development	initiatives	is	because	at	its	heart,	it	involves	a	wide	range	of	stakeholders	
and	actors	with	differing	vested	interests.	Differing	vested	interests	represent	a	
potential	source	of	stakeholder	conflicts	that	can	impede	joined‐up	communication,	
collaboration	and	coordination	efforts.	An	awareness	of	the	political	nature	of	tourism‐
led	local	economic	development	initiatives	is	therefore	critical	in	exploring	the	
governance	of	such	initiatives.	While	there	is	a	sizeable	literature	on	tourism	
governance	in	general,	there	is	little	research	that	provides	an	extensive	focus	on	the	
political	underpinnings	of	governance.	Rarer	still	is	research	that	looks	at	tourism	
governance	in	terms	of	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus.	In	this	last	empirical	chapter	of	the	
thesis,	I	consider	some	of	the	key	political	elements	that	shaped	the	governance	of	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	as	a	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	initiative.	The	idea	
of	‘cycles’	offers	the	organising	frame	to	this	chapter.	I	use	cycles	to	refer	to	the	cyclical	
nature	or	patterns	of	change	in	ideas	and	politics	from	the	international	level	to	the	
local	level.	This	allows	me	to	open	up	the	workings	of	the	KEEA	and	international	donor	
funding.	These	have	so	far	in	the	thesis	appeared	as	‘black	boxes	‘	but	will	now	be	
opened	up	to	show	the	political	contestations	that	surrounded	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy.		
There	are	three	main	sections	in	this	chapter.	In	the	first	section,	I	assess	the	prevailing	
international	development	donor	policy	and	funding	under	which	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	was	born	and	how	this	shaped	the	trajectory	of	its	growth	and	eventual	
downturn.	I	first	consider	the	opportunities	and	constraints	of	the	European	and	Dutch	
funding.	In	particular	I	look	at	how	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	got	tied	up	in	the	internal	
evolution	of	private	sector	organisations	and	NGOs	who	were	funded	to	implement	
certain	aspects	of	the	initiative.	The	first	section	also	examines	how	cycles	of	
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international	donor	funding	to	the	KEEA	shaped	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	The	second	
section	is	structured	around	how	national	and	local	election	cycles	resulted	in	changes	
in	leadership	at	the	KEEA	and	the	political	implications	of	each	change	of	party	
government	on	the	implementation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	The	analysis	in	this	
section	takes	a	closer	look	at	the	shaping	role	of	District/Municipal	Chief	Executives	on	
the	outcomes	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	Finally,	I	examine	how	the	transfer	system	
of	local	government	service	staff	was	hijacked	by	political	elements	at	the	municipal	
level.	Specifically,	I	pay	close	attention	to	the	key	role	played	by	District/Municipal	
Development	Planning	Officers	and	how	the	cycles	of	their	transfers	shaped	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy.			
	
7.1 Changing rhythms of international donor policy and 
funding  
A	number	of	development	aid	agencies	and	donor	governments	have	in	recent	times	
attempted	to	integrate	political	economy	analyses	and	assessments	in	their	policies	and	
practices.	However,	these	attempts	have	not	always	been	successful	or	effective	in	
bringing	about	desired	outcomes.	The	reasons	for	this	situation	are	varied.	Key	among	
these	reasons	is	the	fact	that	the	very	nature	of	these	development	aid	agencies	and	
donor	policy	means	that	development	is	by	and	large	seen	in	primarily	technical	terms.	
Moreover,	those	development	consultants	and	professionals	are	faced	with	incentives	
that	tend	to	make	them	resistant	to	fully	integrate	political	economy	analyses	and	
assessments.	This	is	because	development	institutions	are	not	expected	to	mingle	in	the	
politics	of	a	given	country	or	locality.	Consequently	development	consultants	and	
professionals	tend	to	depoliticise	issues	and	must	rely	on	technical	and	technocratic	
definitions	of	development	problems	in	order	to	justify	their	interventions	–	the	anti‐
politics	machine	(Ferguson,	1994;	Escobar,	1995).	In	this	section,	I	consider	some	of	
these	issues	by	exploring	how	the	donor	funding	mechanisms	underpinning	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	shaped	outcomes.	The	section	is	structured	around	two	subsections	that	
look	firstly	at	EU	and	Dutch	funding.	In	the	final	subsection,	I	consider	how	a	new	cycle	
of	donor	funding	to	the	KEEA	after	a	change	of	national	political	party	government	
displaced	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	
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Funding for mutual heritage preservation from the European Union and the 
Dutch government 
Attempts	to	get	funding	to	undertake	a	renovation	of	various	historic	and	heritage	
buildings	in	Elmina	goes	back	to	the	1990s	when	the	Save	Elmina	Association	(SEA)	
was	very	active	(see	discussion	in	Chapter	5,	section	5.2).	In	the	very	late	1990s	and	at	
the	turn	of	the	new	millennium	the	Ghana	Museums	and	Monuments	Board	(GMMB)	
also	sought	for	funding	to	help	in	the	renovation	of	the	Elmina	Castle.	It	was	at	this	time	
that	international	donor	funding	cycles	became	aligned	to	the	needs	of	Elmina.	In	view	
of	the	300‐year	celebrations	of	Ghanaian‐Dutch	diplomatic	relations	of	which	the	town	
of	Elmina	is	a	physical	embodiment,	funding	began	to	pour	in.	This	was	the	beginnings	
of	the	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	Management	Programme	(ECHMP)	which	was	then	
funded	by	the	Dutch	government	and	through	which	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	
formulated.		
The	funding	from	the	Dutch	government	made	it	possible	for	the	KEEA	to	undertake	a	
much	more	detailed	planning	process	and	public	consultations	for	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	than	is	normally	possible	when	preparing	the	Medium	Term	Development	
Plans	(MTDPs)	of	the	assembly.	The	funding	also	meant	that	the	pace	and	trajectory	of	
the	project	was	controlled	to	an	extent	by	the	Dutch	government115.	Many	of	the	
projects	identified	through	the	ECMP	and	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	focused	on	the	
remnants	of	Dutch	culture	and	heritage	in	Elmina,	including	the	Dutch	Cemetery	and	
Old	Dutch	merchant	houses.	Once	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	had	been	formulated,	
additional	funding	was	secured	from	the	European	Union	through	the	9th	framework	of	
the	European	Development	Fund	(EDF).	This	funding,	to	the	tune	of	€1.6	million116,	was	
for	the	implementation	of	5	key	strategic	projects	under	the	so	called	Elmina	Cultural	
Heritage	and	Local	Economic	Development	Programme	(CHLDEP).	The	conditions	that	
came	attached	to	this	fund	meant	that	it	was	Urban	Solutions	BV	that	got	contracted	as	
the	international	consultants	for	the	project.	This	situation	did	not	go	down	well	with	
the	GMMB	who	had	favoured	a	local	consultant	in	order	to	develop	and	build	
																																																								
115	Interview	with	Michael	Bentil‐Arthur,	Assemblyman/Head	of	Development	Planning	
Subcommittee/Head	of	Elmina	Zonal	Council,	KEEA,	01.10.2014	
116	Interview	with	Dr.	Anthony	Annah‐Prah,	Head	of	Implementation	of	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	
Management	Programme,	03.11.2014.	
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capacity.117	Indeed	the	GMMB	did	set	up	a	consulting	business	unit	to	specifically	bid	
for	part	of	the	project	but	they	were	unsuccessful.	This	was	primarily	due	to	EU	funding	
rules	that	stipulated	against	an	organisation	being	a	benefactor	and	a	contractor	of	the	
same	project.118	
The	Dutch	international	development	organisation	SNV	was	contracted	by	Urban	
Solutions	BV	to	implement	Lot	4a	of	CHLDEP.	This	lot	was	for	tourism	and	local	
economic	development.	At	that	time	the	SNV	was	venturing	into	the	tourism‐poverty	
nexus	project,	there	was	a	general	trend	across	the	international	development	field	to	
consider	tourism	as	a	viable	route	to	local	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction	(Scheyvens,	2007;	Hummel	and	van	der	Duim,	2012,	2016).	Much	of	
international	donor	funding	tend	to	go	into	employing	their	own	country	organisations	
and	consultants	for	project	implementation	in	third	countries.	This	appears	to	be	
essentially	what	happened	with	SNV	being	contracted	to	carry	out	this	component	of	
the	project.	Among	other	things,	the	main	objective	for	SNV	was	to	integrate	tourism	as	
an	economic	activity	into	the	daily	lives	of	residents	and	to	build	capacity	for	utilising	
tourism	in	Elmina.	There	was	only	one	document	that	I	could	source	with	regard	to	
SNV’s	role	in	tourism	and	local	economic	development.	This	is	an	Elmina	Tourism	
Management	Plan	document	that	is	an	outcome	of	a	steering	committee	meeting	in	
June,	2005.	In	this	document	a	number	of	plans	and	strategies	were	envisaged	for	
development	tourism.	It	included	developing	an	Elmina	Brand	to	cover	all	the	
individual	tourist	attractions	and	assets.	This	was	to	be	the	‘software’	aspect	to	
accompany	the	‘hardware’	component	of	physical	building	renovations.		
This	software	aspect	however	appears	to	have	been	unsuccessful	as	there	is	no	
mention	of	it	in	the	subsequent	progress	report.	Indeed,	in	the	course	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	implementation	SNV	underwent	a	structural	transformation	from	its	
headquarters	in	the	Netherlands	due	to	funding	cuts.	The	result	was	a	consolidated	
focus	on	WASH	(water,	sanitation	and	hygiene)	in	terms	of	programming	and	a	phasing	
out	of	tourism‐related	programmes	(Hummel	and	van	der	Duim,	2012,	2016).	This	
change	in	international	development	policy	of	SNV,	on	the	balance	of	available	
evidence,	appears	to	have	affected	the	sustainability	and	continuity	of	the	software	
components	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	While	phasing	out	their	tourism‐related	
																																																								
117	Interview	with	Nicholas	Ivor,	Central	and	Western	Regional	Director	of	GMMB,	30.10.2014	
118	Interview	with	Dr.	Anthony	Annah‐Prah,	Head	of	Implementation	of	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	
Management	Programme,	22.07.2015	
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programmes	did	not	mean	an	abrupt	end	to	existing	contracts,	in	the	case	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy,	it	meant	that	there	was	no	follow‐up	monitoring	and	evaluation	of	the	
projects	executed.	Indeed,	in	the	draft	final	report	of	the	whole	project	prepared	by	
Urban	Solutions,	there	is	no	mention	of	the	SNV’s	work	under	the	contracted	Lot	4a.	
This	is	perhaps	a	sign	of	the	unsuccessful	aspect	of	the	SNV’s	involvement	in	integrating	
tourism	as	an	economic	activity	into	the	daily	lives	of	residents.		
The	EU	and	Dutch	government	funding	mechanisms	had	profound	effects	on	both	the	
process	and	outcomes	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	Firstly,	there	was	an	over	focus	on	
physical	projects	–	i.e.	the	‘hardware’	side.	It	appears	that	the	process	of	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction	was	considered	in	primarily	technical	terms.	Thus	
much	of	the	funding	was	for	the	renovation	and	rehabilitation	of	buildings	and	other	
physical	infrastructure	including	the	Elmina	Castle,	Fort	St.	Jago,	Dutch	Cemetery,	Old	
Dutch	merchant	houses	among	others.	While	these	were	essential,	there	was	not	an	
accompanying	strong	emphasis	on	the	‘software’	side	of	the	process.	This	software	side	
included	fully	understanding	the	political	economy	of	Elmina	and	Ghana	at	large	and	
integrating	this	understanding	in	the	design	of	the	projects	to	ensure	continuity	and	
sustainability.	In	the	draft	final	report	of	23rd	October,	2006	prepared	by	Urban	
Solutions	BV,	there	is	very	little	mention	of	the	software	side	of	the	project.	Instead	
there	is	a	detailed	listing	and	explanation	of	the	hardware	aspects	of	building	
renovation,	rehabilitation	and	painting.	Moreover,	since	the	project	was	strongly	led	by	
Urban	Solutions	BV,	once	they	pulled	out	of	Elmina	after	having	completed	their	
contract,	a	capacity	vacuum	was	created	because	the	KEEA	was	not	in	a	position	to	
continue.119		
The	history	of	Urban	Solutions	BV	and	its	role	in	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	highlights	
the	incentive	structures	in	the	aid	value	chain	that	affect	aid	effectiveness.	As	discussed	
in	Chapter	2,	section	2.3,	assessment	of	aid	effectiveness	tend	to	be	biased	because	it	
places	the	full	burden	of	effectiveness	on	recipient	countries	with	little	regard	to	the	
role	of	donor	countries	and	other	actors	in	the	value	chain	of	the	aid	delivery	process.	
In	looking	at	the	evolution	of	Urban	Solutions	BV	and	the	other	Dutch	institutions	that	
were	involved	in	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	it	becomes	clear	that	there	were	negative	
incentives	within	the	aid	delivery	process.	This	contributed	to	the	low	rate	of	
effectiveness	in	meeting	some	of	the	project	objectives.	Urban	Solutions	BV	started	as	a	
																																																								
119	Interview	with	Nicholas	Ivor,	Central	and	Western	Regional	Director	of	GMMB,	30.10.2014	
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spin‐off	from	the	Institute	of	Housing	Studies	and	Urban	Development	(HIS)	based	at	
the	Erasmus	University	of	Rotterdam	in	the	Netherlands.	The	IHS	(see	Chapter	5,	
section	5.2)	was	involved	in	the	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	Management	Programme	
(ECHMP)	out	of	which	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	developed.	After	the	Strategy	was	
developed	and	funding	secured,	staff	of	the	IHS	who	had	been	seconded	to	the	ECHMP	
moved	to	establish	Urban	Solutions	BV	as	a	private	consultancy	business	in	November,	
2003.	Thus	it	appears	that	the	academics	at	the	IHS	saw	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	as	an	
opportunity	to	strike	out	into	the	world	of	full	time	consultancy	business.		
Given	that	funding	was	from	the	Dutch	government	and	the	EU,	the	newly	founded	
Urban	Solutions	BV	was	selected	to	provide	consultancy	services	to	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy.	Thus	although	the	Dutch	government	was	providing	aid	to	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy,	part	of	this	aid	was	flowing	back	into	the	Netherlands	through	the	use	of	
Dutch	consultants	and	Dutch	NGOs	(see	previous	paragraph).	This	use	of	technical	
assistance	through	which	a	not‐so‐insignificant	percentage	of	aid	budget	is	spent	on	
consultancy,	has	been	reported	to	be	ineffective	and	overpriced	(Easterly	and	Pfutze,	
2008;	Borda‐Rodriguez	and	Johnson,	2013).	Nonetheless	this	mechanism	of	aid	
delivery	was	used	for	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	This	appears	to	have	become	a	source	
of	negative	incentive	within	the	value	chain	of	the	aid	delivery	process.	From	available	
evidence	it	appears	that	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	simply	a	practice‐run	for	Urban	
Solutions	BV	in	terms	of	their	then	budding	consultancy	business.	There	was	no	follow‐
up	evaluation	the	effectiveness	of	the	various	projects	undertaken	and	their	outcomes	
after	the	implementation	process.	This	is	partly	because	of	the	peculiar	situation	of	an	
absence	of	feedback	loops	between	aid	beneficiaries	and	aid	agencies	as	well	as	their	
consultants.	Urban	Solutions	BV	could	afford	to	lose	interest	in	the	project	once	the	
external	funding	was	running	out.	The	Elmina	community	could	not	hold	Urban	
Solutions	BV	accountable	nor	could	the	citizens	in	the	Netherlands	who	contribute	to	
Dutch	aid.		
Urban	Solutions	BV	is	now	based	mostly	in	Asia	working	on	urban	housing	and	heritage	
projects	across	different	countries.	There	is	very	little	trace	left	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	on	their	current	website	although	it	is	clear	that	it	was	the	experience	of	the	
Elmina	project	that	kick‐started	their	consultancy	business.		It	is	under	the	
‘Publications’	section	of	the	website	that	they	say	this	about	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy;	
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Elmina	–	Building	on	the	Past	to	Create	a	Better	Future	
Old	Dutch	slave	fortresses	in	Elmina	were	restored	and	alongside	the	restoration	
some	sustainable	developments	took	place:	the	set	up	of	a	tourist	office	in	Elmina	
in	one	of	the	buildings,	plus	an	employment	project	in	order	to	keep	the	buildings	
well	maintained.	This	meant	an	increase	in	tourism,	a	revival	of	traditional	
culture	and	skills,	an	increasing	demand	for	local	products	and	thus	improved	
living	conditions.	
The	publication	is	highly	illustrated	with	beautiful	pictures	by	Nana	Kofi	Acqua.	
Published	in	co‐operation	with	KIT	Publishers	with	support	by	the	European	
Commission.	
Contact	KIT	Publishers	to	order	a	copy120	
This	website	content	can	be	seen	as	simply	a	repetition	of	the	original	objectives	of	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy.	This	is	because	the	evidence	on	the	ground	in	the	Elmina	
portrays	a	contrary	reality	than	the	one	stated	on	the	website	in	terms	of	tourism	
development,	revival	of	traditional	culture	and	skills,	increasing	demand	for	local	
products	and	improved	living	conditions.	These	objectives	were	not	achieved	as	
expected.	
The	role	of	Urban	Solutions	BV	and	the	other	external	funding	agencies	points	to	the	
issue	of	power	differentials	between	aid	donors	and	recipient	countries.	The	
relationship	between	the	Urban	Solutions	BV	and	KEEA	was	to	a	large	extent	
characterised	by	an	imbalance	of	power	and	accountability.	The	findings	suggest	that	in	
the	preconditions	attached	to	the	funding	for	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	it	was	the	
Dutch	government	through	Urban	Solutions	BV	who	had	a	stronger	say	in	how	the	
project	was	designed	and	implemented.	Indeed	an	enduring	perception	among	local	
stakeholders	was	that	the	KEEA	had	a	weak	influence	on	the	pace	and	trajectory	of	the	
project	compared	to	the	donors	and	Urban	Solutions	BV.	Given	its	low	internally	
generated	funds	(IGF),	the	KEEA	was	dependent	on	the	financial	support	of	its	donors	
in	making	the	project	successful.	In	a	sense,	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	done	to	the	
KEEA	and	not	with	them.	This	is	partly	because	donor	bodies	saw	tourism‐led	local	
economic	development	initiatives	in	purely	technical	terms.	There	is	also	a	perception,	
especially	within	the	GMMB	that	the	project	was	hijacked	by	international	donor	
interests.	As	one	interviewee	puts	it,		
																																																								
120	http://www.urban‐solutions.nl/toolkits‐publications/	
	
	
239	
	
“You	see,	the	project	itself,	I	had	a	document	here	that	showed	that	it	was	not	fully	
in	the	hands	of	the	assembly	directly.	It	was	a	joint	venture	between	Urban	
Solutions	and	KEEA	and	the	EU	so	the	influence	of	the	assembly	was	not	all	that	
great	but	the	major	role	was	played	by	KEEA”121		
This	meant	that	once	the	EU	and	Dutch	funding	for	the	project	had	been	expended	the	
KEEA	had	to	look	for	new	sources	of	funding	to	further	its	development	projects.	Urban	
Solutions	BV	as	the	consultancy	part	lost	interest	and	hence	the	enthusiasm	around	the	
project	died	down.		
Swapping Dutch-funded projects for German-funded projects 
International	development	organisations	are	not	commonly	known	for	joined	up	efforts	
in	project	delivery.	In	many	cases,	this	lack	of	joined‐up	efforts	result	in	a	duplication	of	
development	projects	strewn	across	many	communities	that	are	left	in	various	stages	
of	completion	because	of	funding	challenges	(Ferguson,	1994;	Mosse,	2004;	Hout,	
2012).	There	are	two	main	related	reasons	for	this	situation.	First,	there	is	the	cyclical	
changes	in	the	‘pet’	projects	supported	by	international	donor	funding	agencies.	This	
relates	to	the	second	cause	being	regular	changes	in	international	development	policy	
directions.	At	the	community	level,	this	is	compounded	by	changes	in	local	politics	and	
the	composition	of	vested	interests.	As	discussed	in	detail	below	in	section	7.2,	changes	
in	the	political	governance	of	Ghana	offer	different	sets	of	incentives	for	politicians	in	
terms	of	whether	to	continue	with	existing	projects	or	to	begin	new	ones.	It	is	the	
interplay	of	these	two	reasons	that	partly	account	for	the	how	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	played	out.		
When	in	2009	a	new	political	party	–	the	National	Democratic	Congress	–	came	into	
power	at	the	KEEA,	they	showed	an	indifference	towards	continuing	with	the	
implementation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	and	instead	sought	for	funding	to	begin	a	
new	local	economic	development	project	in	the	municipality.	When	a	German‐funded	
project	was	brought	to	the	KEEA,	paper	traces	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	appear	to	
have	been	wiped	out.	The	room	within	the	assembly	building	that	was	first	given	out	to	
the	ECHMP	was	cleared	out	to	make	way	for	the	new	German	funded	project	that	
focused	on	different	aspects	of	development	in	Elmina.	All	the	project	documentation	
																																																								
121	Interview	with	Michael	Bentil‐Arthur,	Assemblyman/Head	of	Development	Planning	
Subcommittee/Head	of	Elmina	Zonal	Council,	KEEA,	01.10.2014	
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relating	to	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	discarded.	It	took	the	intervention	of	the	Head	
of	the	tourism	sub‐committee	of	the	assembly	and	the	former	local	implementation	
officer	to	salvage	some	of	the	documents	that	were	being	sent	to	the	dump.	As	it	
happened,	“…documents	were	just	left	at	the	mercy	of	the	weather.	It	was	Dr.	Annah	Prah	
who	came	for	all	these	documents	and	it	is	in	his	custody”122.	During	the	interview	with	
Dr.	Annah	Prah	at	his	residence,	he	showed	me	the	pile	of	documents	and	explained	
how	he	came	about	them.	
“So	it	is	the	government	to	follow,	after	all	the	office	was	in	the	KEEA	not	in	the	
chief’s	palace	so	why	do	you	throw	away	the	documents	in	the	first	place.	If	you	
walk	with	me	here,	they	are	in,	some	of	them	are	in	my	daughter’s	boy’s	quarters.	
This	was	there	when	I	was	visiting	the	assembly,	all	the	plans	for	the	Castle,	for	
the	forts	etc,	they	were	thrown	away,	I	collected	them	here,	come	and	see…”123	
This	process	of	intentional	institutional	knowledge	and	memory	cleaning	–	institutional	
amnesia	(Pollitt,	2000)	–	breeds	a	cycle	of	dependency	on	international	donor	
assistance.	This	means	that	traces	of	previous	projects	tend	to	be	scraped	clean	in	
order	to	attract	new	donors.	Municipal	assemblies	like	the	KEEA	do	not	have	to	commit	
to	devising	strategies	to	raise	additional	funds	to	support	project	continuity.	The	
responsibility	for	proper	record	keeping	of	projects	to	ensure	continuity	is	a	big	
challenge	facing	the	KEEA.	The	issue	of	improper	keeping	of	records	means	that	
knowledge	of	existing	projects	are	not	passed	on	to	new	staff	when	there	are	staff	
transfers.124	The	Municipal	Coordinating	Director	at	the	KEEA	during	the	interview	did	
confirm	that	“proper	handing	over	has	always	been	an	issue	and	record	keeping	I	have	
also	noted	is	a	problem...[due	to]a	lot	of	misfiling,	a	lot	of	just	placing	records	in	certain	
places	that	if	care	is	not	taken	even	to	retrieve	them	becomes	a	problem.”125	
The	cycle	of	international	donor	funding	changes	interact	with	cycles	of	political	party	
governments	to	create	negative	incentive	towards	project	continuity.	Each	donor	wants	
to	focus	on	discrete	projects	even	if	a	similar	project	is	ongoing.	This	is	what	partly	
																																																								
122	Interview	with	Ebo	Dadzie,	Head	of	Tourism	Sub‐Committee,	KEEA,	31.10.2014	
123	Interview	with	Dr.	Anthony	Annah‐Prah,	Head	of	Implementation	of	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	
Management	Programme,	03.11.2014.	
124	Interview	with	Michael	Bentil‐Arthur,	Assemblyman/Head	of	Development	Planning	
Subcommittee/Head	of	Elmina	Zonal	Council,	KEEA,	01.10.2014;	Interview	with	Alhaji	Musah,	
Municipal	Coordinating	Director,	KEEA,	Elmina	04.11.2014	
125	Interview	with	Alhaji	Musah,	Municipal	Coordinating	Director,	KEEA,	Elmina	04.11.2014	
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happened	to	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	once	a	new	funded	project	arrived	at	the	KEEA.	
As	a	former	municipal	planning	officer	at	the	KEEA	explained,		
“But	the	assemblies	do	not	want	to	commit	themselves	as	far	as	monies	are	
concerned.	They	think	that	if	somebody	brought	the	project	they	call,	they	always	
call	for	continuous	support	from	donors,	I	mean	that’s	the	way	the	Ghanaian,	even	
Ghana	government	thinks.	Every	project	if	you	go	through	the	books	there	are,	I	
keep	on	asking	why	would,	when	would	the	pilot	land	in	Ghana?	Any	project	that	
comes	they	say	pilot	project	and	the	pilot	never	lands,	the	pilot	is	always	in	the	sky	
waiting	for	green	light	to	land.	So	all	the	projects	are	pilots.	The	moment	donors’	
monies	end	that’s	it.”126		
This	quotation	paints	the	picture	of	how	development	projects	such	as	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	tend	to	be	perceived.	Indeed	the	existence	of	this	cycle	of	waiting	on	donor	
funding	for	another	‘pilot’	project	of	the	same	nature	was	given	further	credence	in	my	
interview	with	the	then	Municipal	Chief	Executive	under	whose	reign	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	took	off.	He	explained	that	(as	the	current	Member	of	Parliament	for	the	KEEA	
Constituency)	he	has	an	appointment	at	the	Dutch	Embassy	in	relation	to	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	because	“…we	want	to	sit	down,	look	at,	we	need	to	you	see,	we	are	just	
around	2015,	how	far	have	we	gone	with	this	strategy,	what	next,	what	is	the	way	
forward.	That	is	what	I	am	talking	about”.127	What	is	clear	from	the	ongoing	is	that	one	
cannot	talk	about	the	governance	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	–	or	
indeed	of	the	governance	of	any	development	intervention	–	without	a	closer	look	at	
the	(dis)incentives	to	project	implementation	presented	by	international	donor	funding	
cycles.		
		
	
	
	
																																																								
126	Interview	with	Justice	Amoah,	Former	Municipal	Planning	Officer	of	KEEA/Former	National	
Project	Coordinator	of	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	17.07.2015	
127	Interview	with	Nana	Ato	Arthur,	MP	and	former	Municipal	Chief	Executive	of	KEEA,	
07.11.2014	
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7.2 The formative influence of national and local electoral 
cycles 
In	this	section	I	provide	an	analysis	of	the	evolution	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	vis‐à‐
vis	national	and	local	electoral	cycles.	In	particular	I	look	at	the	impacts	of	succeeding	
political	party	control	of	the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo	Municipal	Assembly	(KEEA)	in	the	
form	of	District/Municipal	Chief	Executives	and	the	direction	in	which	they	took	the	
project	upon	assumption	of	office.	Research	in	the	political	economy	of	public	goods	
provision	have	shown	a	relationship	between	the	national	electoral	cycles	and	
probability	of	development	project	being	seen	to	full	completion	(Williams,	2016;	
Batley	et	al.,	2012).	There	is	an	overlap	between	electoral	cycles	and	the	time	it	takes	
for	many	development	projects	like	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	to	be	fully	implemented.	
Within	this	overlap	are	both	positive	and	negative	incentives	for	politicians	coming	into	
power	to	either	continue	or	not	to	continue	with	project	implementation.	These	are	the	
key	issues	analysed	in	this	section	which	is	structured	around	the	electoral	cycles	in	
Ghana	and	the	political	party	in	charge.		
Era of the National Democratic Congress Party: 1992 - 2000 
The	Provisional	National	Defence	Council	(PNDC)	military	government	was	in	charge	
before	the	transition	back	to	democratic	elections	in	1992.	Prior	to	this,	in	the	very	late	
1980s,	Ato	Austin	who	hailed	from	Elmina	was	appointed	as	the	PNDC	Regional	
Secretary	(Regional	Minister)	for	the	Central	Region.	At	this	point	the	Central	Region	
was	in	socio‐economic	decline	‐	a	process	that	started	once	the	British	colonial	
government	moved	the	national	capital	from	Cape	Coast	to	Accra	in	1877.	Thus	the	
Central	Region	was	one	of	the	poorest	regions	in	the	country	until	the	late	1980s.	This	
perception	of	poverty	in	the	region	still	persists	until	now,	even	though	the	latest	
figures	from	the	Ghana	Statistical	Service	shows	a	remarkable	decline	in	poverty	
incidence	(see	discussion	in	Chapter	4,	section	4.1).	In	order	to	reverse	the	economic	
decline,	Ato	Austin	saw	tourism	as	a	potential	catalyst	for	local	economic	development	
and	poverty	reduction.128	The	key	attractions	on	which	this	tourism‐led	local	economic	
development	strategy	was	to	be	based	were	the	Cape	Coast	Castle	and	the	Elmina	
Castle.	Both	of	these	Castles	were	in	a	deplorable	state.	The	plan	was	therefore	to	
																																																								
128	Interview	with	Nkunu	Akyea,	Former	Executive	Director	of	Ghana	Heritage	Conservation	
Trust,	08.09.2014	
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restore	these	Castles	and	to	then	market	them	to	African	Americans,	Afro	Caribbean	
and	other	Africans	in	the	Diaspora	who	want	to	reconnect	with	their	roots.	It	was	thus	
from	this	period	that	a	concerted	planning	and	development	effort	turned	the	Central	
Region	into	the	hub	of	tourism	in	Ghana.	As	one	interviewee	noted,		
“…he	[Ato	Austin]	was	looking	for	a	strategy	that	will	stem	the	economic	decline,	
reverse	it	and	he	choose	tourism	as	a	catalyst	and	the	proposal,	that	proposal	was	
to	enhance	these	two	Castles,	Cape	Coast	and	Elmina,	bring	them	up	because	they	
were	decaying	very	fast.	So	the	proposal’s	main	aim	was	to	restore	so	that	they	
could	be	catalyst,	important	catalyst	for	African	American	heritage	tourists…”129	
At	the	1992	national	elections,	the	National	Democratic	Congress	(NDC)	party	which	
mutated	from	the	PNDC	won	the	elections	and	retained	control	of	all	Metropolitan,	
Municipal	and	District	Assemblies	(MMDAs).	At	the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	
District	Assembly	(KEEA),	one	Austin	Ankumah	was	appointed	as	the	District	Chief	
Executive	(DCE).	He	was	also	keen	on	seeing	to	the	restoration	of	the	Elmina	Castle	for	
tourism	development.	Around	this	time,	the	proposal	from	the	Regional	Minister	‐	Ato	
Austin	–	known	as	the	Tourism	Development	Scheme	for	the	Central	Region	received	
funding	support	from	UNDP	and	USAID.	The	proposal	looked	into	how	tourism	could	
bring	more	development	benefits	to	the	region	–	this	objective	is	similar	to	the	Dutch	
funded	Elmina	2015	Strategy	that	came	a	decade	later	and	points	to	the	nature	of	the	
cycle	of	international	funding	discussed	under	section	7.1	above.		
The	USAID	funding	for	this	programme	was	provided	through	a	so	called	Natural	
Resource	Conservation	and	Historic	Preservation	Project	(NRCHP).	The	funding	
enabled	the	restoration	of	the	Cape	Coast	Castle,	the	Elmina	Castle	as	well	as	works	to	
stablish	Fort	St.	Jago	also	in	Elmina.	In	a	bid	to	diversify	the	tourism	products	away	
from	only	heritage,	a	visitor	reception	centre	and	a	canopy	walkway	was	built	in	the	
nearby	Kakum	National	Park.	It	was	also	realised	that	this	bricks	and	mortar	approach	
to	tourism	development	in	the	regional	was	not	enough	to	tap	into	tourism’s	full	
potential	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	To	this	end,	part	of	
the	funding	was	used	to	develop	an	integrated	tourism‐led	town	planning	and	
development	plan	for	the	Cape	Coast	metropolis	as	well	as	providing	homeowner	
grants	for	the	renovation	of	old	merchant	and	colonial	buildings	with	historic	value.	
																																																								
129	Interview	with	Nkunu	Akyea,	Former	Executive	Director	of	Ghana	Heritage	Conservation	
Trust,	08.09.2014	
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These	buildings	were	then	to	be	used	for	commercial	activities	that	would	generate	
income	for	those	involved.		This	initial	effort	at	tourism‐led	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction	did	not	include	Elmina.		
Up	to	the	next	national	electoral	cycle	in	1996	that	was	again	won	by	the	NDC	party,	the	
then	DCE	for	Elmina	–	Thomas	Austen	Ankumah	–	was	very	keen	to	replicate	in	Elmina	
the	integrated	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	plan	that	was	developed	for	
Cape	Coast.	The	NDC	government	at	this	period	showed	strong	political	will	and	
support	to	utilise	tourism	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	
Indeed,	after	their	restoration,	the	Cape	Coast	and	Elmina	Castles	became	the	
centrepiece	for	Emancipation	Day	celebrations.	The	first	Emancipation	Day	celebration	
in	Ghana	was	introduced	in	1998,	a	year	after	the	NDC’s	former	President	Rawlings	had	
attended	Jamaica’s	national	commemoration	of	the	end	of	slavery.	Emancipation	Day	is	
currently	a	yearly	celebration	in	Ghana	that	attracts	a	large	number	of	tourists	–	
especially	African	Americans	and	Afro‐Caribbean.	It	was	this	regular	boom	in	tourist	
visitation	to	Elmina	that	the	DCE	sought	to	tap	into	as	a	catalyst	for	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction.	The	key	issue	at	this	point	in	the	late	1990s	was	
the	issue	of	financing.	The	NDC	government	was	at	this	time	crippled	with	financial	
difficulties.	Briggs	(2012)	notes	that	between	1998	‐1999,	the	NDC	government	faced	a	
sharp	decline	in	international	aid.	This	limited	the	government’s	ability	to	allocate	
resources	to	places	like	Elmina.	
Notwithstanding	limited	government	resources,	the	DCE	in	Elmina	encouraged	and	was	
supportive	of	private	initiatives	that	sought	to	attract	investments	for	renovating	some	
of	the	historic	building	for	tourism	purposes.	In	fact	the	DCE	wrote	the	preface	of	the	
first	magazine	of	the	Save	Elmina	Association	which	sought	to	increase	awareness	of	
the	other	heritage	tourism	assets	in	Elmina	beyond	the	Elmina	Castle	(see	discussion	in	
Chapter	5,	section	5.2	for	more	detail).	The	point	to	be	made	here	is	that	up	the	year	
2000,	there	was	a	lot	of	political	support	for	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	
planning	initiatives	Elmina.	When	the	NDC	party	lost	the	December,	2000	national	polls	
to	the	New	Patriotic	Party	(NPP)	party,	much	of	the	ideas	that	were	later	to	become	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	were	already	on	the	ground	being	discussed.		
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Era of the New Patriotic Party: 2001 – 2008 
When	the	NPP	government	assumed	office	in	2001,	one	Nana	Ato	Arthur	who	hails	
from	Elmina	was	appointed	as	the	DCE	for	the	KEEA.	The	government	was	keen	to	get	
as	many	high‐visibility	projects	as	possible	running	having	campaigned	on	the	promise	
of	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	It	is	within	this	context	that	the	
Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	Management	Programme	(ECHMP)	took	off.	There	was	strong	
political	support	for	and	backing	of	the	project	through	the	allocation	of	resources.	The	
ECHMP	was	very	much	in	line	with	the	NPP	government’s	economic	development	
strategy	–	the	Ghana	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	–	which	focused	on	redistributive	
polices	and	poverty‐related	spending	(see	discussion	in	Chapter	4,	section	4.2	and	
Chapter	6,	section	6.1).	There	was	also	the	positive	political	incentive	for	the	NPP	
government	to	fully	back	this	project	since	it	could	place	its	stamp	on	the	project.	Thus	
the	continuity	of	the	project	was	shaped	by	the	fact	that	the	NPP	government	could	lay	
full	claim	to	and	gain	political	credit	to	having	implemented	the	project	even	if	the	
original	ideas	were	already	afloat	during	the	era	of	the	NDC	government.	As	one	of	the	
interviewees	explained,		
“…this	project	was	started	by	Nana,	former	MCE,	he	is	now	died	and	gone,	Nana	
Ankumah	[from	the	NDC	government].	He	initiated	this	2015	strategy	but	they	
were	passing	through	some	challenges.	It	was	Nana	Ato	Arthur’s	time	that	we	had	
the	funds	coming	down…”130	
The	fact	that	the	benefits	of	the	project	were	realised	during	the	period	of	the	NPP	
government	had	a	positive	impact	on	the	standing	of	the	NPP	government	in	general	
and	on	the	political	career	of	the	DCE	–	Nana	Ato	Arthur	–	in	particular.	The	DCE	was	
very	committed	to	the	project	and	endeared	himself	to	both	the	national	government	
and	the	people	in	KEEA.	He	explains	his	commitment	and	dedication	to	the	project	as	
this;	
“How	we	sat	day	and	night	to	develop	this	document.	I	will	be	here	in	the	
afternoon	and	then	J.H.	Mensah,	the	then	senior	minister	will	call	me	to	his	office	
in	Accra	that	look,	I	have	been	able	to	get	some	Ambassadors	together	and	I	want	
you	to	come	and	speak	with	them.	It’ll	be	12midday	here,	he	will	tell	me	I	need	to	
be	there	at	4pm.	I	need	to	pick	my	car	and	even	whether	I	have	said	goodbye	to	
																																																								
130	Interview	with	Ebo	Dadzie,	Head	of	Tourism	Sub‐Committee,	KEEA,	31.10.2014	
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my	wife	or	family	or	not,	I	will	go	because	I	needed	to	do	something	for	my	people.	
That	was	the	zeal	then.”131	
At	the	next	national	elections	in	December	2004	the	NPP	government	was	re‐elected	in	
office.	For	his	good	work,	Nana	Ato	Arthur	from	the	KEEA	was	promoted	to	the	role	of	
Deputy	Regional	Minster	and	subsequently	as	the	substantive	Regional	Minister	for	the	
Central	Region.132	Figure	25	below	is	a	timeline	of	some	of	the	key	political	events	that	
has	taken	place	over	the	years	at	the	KEEA.
																																																								
131	Interview	with	Nana	Ato	Arthur,	MP	for	KEEA/Former	KEEA	MCE/Former	Regional	Minister,	
07.11.2014	
132	Currently,	Nana	Ato	Arthur	is	the	Member	of	Parliament	for	KEEA	even	though	the	NDC	
government	is	back	in	power	since	2009.	
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Figure	25	Timeline	of	key	political	cycles	and	events	at	the	KEEA,	2000‐2016	
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In	2005,	the	re‐elected	NPP	government	appointed	one	Frank	Asmah	as	the	DCE	for	the	
KEEA	to	replace	the	promoted	Nana	Ato	Arthur.	In	fact	the	initial	nomination	of	Frank	
Asmah	was	strongly	contested	by	local	party	members	of	the	NPP.	As	discussed	in	
Chapter	4,	section	4.1,	DCEs	are	nominated	by	the	President	but	need	the	approval	of	
two‐thirds	of	assembly	members	through	voting.	In	the	case	of	Frank	Asmah,	a	number	
of	the	assembly	members	who	were	themselves	government	appointees	planned	to	
stage	a	demonstration	and	to	vote	against	the	newly	nominated	DCE.	When	word	of	
this	reached	Nana	Ato	Arthur	who	was	then	the	Deputy	Central	Regional	Minister,	he	in	
consultation	with	the	Regional	Minister	and	the	Minister	for	Local	Government	
postponed	the	voting.	The	troublesome	government	appointees	at	the	assembly	were	
then	suspended	with	immediate	effect	after	the	President	through	the	Minister	for	
Local	Government	sent	a	fax	of	their	dismissal	letters	on	Friday	3rd	June,	2005.	Thus	15	
out	of	the	16	appointees	were	dismissed	and	replaced	by	new	appointees	the	following	
Monday133.	When	the	voting	was	held	again	on	the	7th	of	June,	2005,	Frank	Asmah	
polled	40	out	of	the	52	votes	(77%)	and	was	sworn	into	office	together	with	the	15	new	
government	appointees134.	The	point	of	this	backstory	is	to	highlight	the	political	
nature	of	DCE	appointments	and	the	resulting	upward	accountability	of	DCEs	to	the	
President	rather	than	to	the	local	community.		
At	the	time	that	Frank	Asmah	became	the	DCE,	a	lot	of	the	physical	projects	were	
ongoing	and	near	completion.	Preparations	were	also	being	made	to	hand	over	the	
completed	projects	to	the	responsible	bodies.	Thus	the	second	term	of	the	NPP	
government	coincided	with	the	later	part	of	Phase	III	and	beginning	of	Phase	IV	of	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	–	project	implementation	and	institutionalisation	phases	
respectively.	However,	it	is	also	at	this	point	that	the	zeal	and	political	commitment	
shown	during	the	first	term	of	the	NPP	government	began	to	wane.	Within	the	political	
environment	of	Ghana,	political	credits	are	assigned	to	the	politician	or	political	party	
who	initiates	a	project.	Incoming	politicians	or	party	are	therefore	unable	to	claim	
much	credits	even	if	they	are	the	ones	to	see	the	project	through	to	full	completion.	
Consequently,	for	the	new	DCE,	there	was	little	positive	incentive	to	show	the	same	zeal	
towards	the	project	because	the	political	credits	had	already	being	assigned	to	the	
																																																								
133	Lecture	presented	by	Nana	Ato	Arthur,	KEEA	MP/Former	KEEA	MCE/Former	Regional	
Minister	at	the	School	of	Law,	University	of	Cape	Coast,	titled	‘The	road	to	decentralisation:	the	
present	and	the	way	forward’,	07.11.2014	
134	Ghana	News	Agency	‐	
http://www.ghanaweb.com/GhanaHomePage/SportsArchive/artikel.php?ID=83193		
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previous	DCE.	Available	evidence	from	the	interviews	suggest	that	the	new	DCE	began	
to	privatise	certain	aspects	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	projects	and	spin‐offs	like	the	
waste	management	component.	Thus	interviewees	noted	that	“It	was	Frank’s	time	the	
whole	project	went	off	to	a	private	entity.	It	was	Ato	Arthur’s	time	we	started	benefiting.	It	
was	Frank	Asmah’s	time	this	project	went	off.”135	
The	point	here	is	that	each	political	cycle	of	national	elections	presents	different	sets	of	
incentives	to	politicians	that	shape	the	extent	to	which	they	continue	existing	projects.	
Thus	after	the	NPP	government	had	been	re‐elected,	the	political	commitment	and	zeal	
that	was	associated	with	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	began	to	wane.	Certain	aspects	of	
the	project	did	not	get	the	needed	attention	while	other	aspects	came	into	private	
hands.	The	new	DCE	did	not	share	the	same	focus	for	the	project	as	the	predecessor.136		
Thus	the	phase	of	institutionalising	the	projects	and	objectives	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	within	existing	governance	structures	of	the	KEEA	could	not	begin	in	earnest	
due	to	the	low	level	of	political	commitment.	
Era of the National Democratic Congress: 2009 – 2016 
Electoral	and	party	politics	in	Ghana	are	highly	competitive	and	intense.	This	intensive	
political	competition	generates	negative	incentives	for	politics	in	ways	that	constrain	
economic	progress	(Kelsall,	2012;	Whitfield,	2011,	2009).	This	is	especially	the	case	
when	it	comes	to	project	and	programme	continuity.	When	a	new	political	party	comes	
into	power,	they	are	faced	with	both	positive	and	negative	incentives	and	often	tend	
not	to	continue	with	certain	projects	already	began	by	the	previous	government	from	a	
different	party137.		At	the	December	2008	national	polls,	the	National	Democratic	
Congress	(NDC)	party	was	elected	into	power	to	replace	the	New	Patriotic	Party	(NPP)	
government	that	had	been	in	power	from	2001.	This	was	a	keenly	contested	election	
that	went	to	a	run‐off	second	voting	and	a	third	voting	in	one	constituency	before	the	
NDC	was	able	to	secure	the	required	minimum	of	50%	+	1	of	total	votes.	Thus	when	the	
NDC	came	into	office,	the	positive	incentive	for	them	was	to	initiate	and	start	up	their	
																																																								
135	Interview	with	Ebo	Dadzie,	Head	of	Tourism	Sub‐Committee,	KEEA	and	founding	member	of	
SEA,	16.07.2015	
136	Interview	with	Justice	Amoah,	Former	Municipal	Planning	Officer	of	KEEA/Former	National	
Project	Coordinator	of	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	17.07.2015	
137	Interview	with	Nana	Ato	Arthur,	MP	and	former	Municipal	Chief	Executive	of	KEEA,	
07.11.2014;	Interview	with	Dr.	Anthony	Annah‐Prah,	Head	of	Implementation	of	Elmina	
Cultural	Heritage	Management	Programme,	03.11.2014.	
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own	development	projects	and	programmes	even	though	there	were	uncompleted	
programmes	and	projects	of	the	NPP	government.	This	is	simply	because	the	political	
credits	of	completing	existing	projects	will	be	claimed	by	the	NPP	party	in	opposition.	
While	political	credits	are	not	fixed	entities	but	open	to	claims,	the	party	that	initiates	a	
project	appears	to	be	able	to	easily	lay	full	claims	even	if	a	different	party	completed	
the	project.	Thus	by	beginning	their	own	projects,	the	new	government	can	claim	all	the	
political	credits	available	which	it	is	hoped	will	translate	into	electoral	votes	at	the	next	
elections.	This	is	exactly	what	happened	in	terms	of	the	continuation	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	once	the	NDC	party	came	into	power.		
The	NDC	government	appointed	one	Rev.	Veronica	Essuman	Nelson	in	2009	to	the	
position	of	the	Municipal	Chief	Executive	(MCE)138	for	KEEA.	This	change	had	a	strong	
shaping	role	on	the	trajectory	of	the	final	phase	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	This	was	
the	institutionalisation	phase	where	the	municipality	had	to	ensure,	through	effective	
communication,	collaboration	and	coordination	between	stakeholders,	that	tourism	
was	generating	the	momentum	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	
It	appears	that	there	was	not	much	political	commitment	to	see	to	this	phase	of	the	
project.	The	following	quotes	from	some	of	the	interviewees	provide	a	sense	of	this	
situation;	
“KEEA,	and	KEEA	keeps	on	changing	with	the	personnel.	Today	is	party	A,	
tomorrow	is	party	B.	Party	A	does	not	see	anything	right	with	the	work	started	by	
party	A	or	party	B,	that	itself	creates	a	problem.”139	
“…paradoxically	when	this	thing	started	it	started	with	an	NDC	government,	the	
actual	execution	was	done	by	an	NPP	government,	an	NPP	government	was	
succeeded	by	an	NDC	government	who	also	wanted	to	make	a	niche	and	did	
not…now	when	one	party	leaves	and	another	party	comes,	the	way	it	looks	at	the	
project	differs….”140	
“…every	government,	local	etc.	want	to	start	something	that	they	will	be	called	an	
initiator	and	not	a	person	who	built	upon	what	the	previous	person	has	done	and	
so	the	Elmina	2015	strategy	was	unfortunately	seen	as	an	NPP	achievement,	you	
see	and	so	the	NDC	had	to	start	on	its	own”141	
																																																								
138	The	KEEA	was	declared	as	a	municipality	in	2007	by	the	NPP	government	
139	Interview	with	Francis	Cobbinah,	Executive	Director,	Ghana	Heritage	Conservation	Trust,	
Cape	Coast,	29.09.2014	
140	Interview	with	Dr.	Anthony	Annah‐Prah,	Head	of	Implementation	of	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	
Management	Programme,	03.11.2014.	
141	Interview	with	Dr.	Anthony	Annah‐Prah,	Head	of	Implementation	of	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	
Management	Programme,	03.11.2014.	
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The	implementation	and	institutionalisation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	from	2009	
onwards	began	to	take	a	downward	turn	even	as	a	new	political	party	came	into	office.	
As	the	quotes	above	make	clear,	there	was	not	enough	incentive	for	the	new	party	to	
continue	and	make	sure	that	the	strategy	was	fully	institutionalised	within	the	
governance	structures	of	the	KEEA.	While	the	negative	political	incentives	as	discussed	
above	played	a	role	in	this	downward	direction,	part	of	the	reason	is	also	closely	
related	to	the	loss	of	institutional	memory	and	institutional	capacity.	For	instance,	the	
office	room	in	which	the	documentations	for	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	were	kept	at	the	
KEEA	were	emptied	to	make	room	for	a	German	funded	project	secured	by	the	NDC	
government142	(see	also	discussion	in	section	7.1	above).	The	desire	to	start	from	
scratch	therefore	meant	that	there	was	no	incentive	to	retain	institutional	memory	
about	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	Moreover,	with	change	in	party	governments	comes	a	
high	rate	of	municipal	staff	transfers	based	on	the	perception	that	existing	staff	may	
have	become	too	loyal	to	the	previous	party	government	and	might	therefore	be	a	
hindrance	to	the	agenda	of	the	new	government	(this	is	discussed	in	more	detail	in	the	
next	section).			
In	this	section	I	have	analysed	how	the	temporal	dimension	of	implementing	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	interacted	with	and	was	shaped	by	the	governmental	time	
inconsistency	problems	that	arise	from	change	of	political	party	governments.	The	
political	commitment	of	successive	governments	towards	the	institutionalisation	phase	
of	the	project	declined	over	the	years.	As	the	first	DCE	under	whose	watch	the	project	
began	mentioned,	“[h]owever	as	I	alluded	to	earlier,	when	government	changed,	those	
who	followed	us,	the	zeal,	the	commitment,	I	don’t	see	it	the	way	that	we	started”143	This	
lack	of	commitment	is	due	to	the	negative	incentives	faced	by	politicians	who	decide	to	
continue	project	implementation	rather	than	starting	one	from	scratch.	Thus	when	the	
NDC	government	came	into	power,	it	was	keen	on	starting	its	own	new	projects	rather	
than	continuing	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	This	is	because	the	political	credit	for	it	had	
already	been	claimed	by	the	opposition	NPP	government.	The	point	of	this	section	has	
been	to	show	that	an	understanding	of	the	implementation	trajectory	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	must	take	into	account	the	effects	of	electoral	cycles.	Changes	in	
government	in	a	highly	competitive	political	environment	like	Ghana	present	both	
																																																								
142	Interview	with	Dr.	Anthony	Annah‐Prah,	Head	of	Implementation	of	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	
Management	Programme,	03.11.2014.	
143	Interview	with	Nana	Ato	Arthur,	MP	for	KEEA/Former	KEEA	MCE/Former	Regional	Minister,	
07.11.2014;	Interview	with	Ebo	Dadzie,	Head	of	Tourism	Sub‐Committee,	KEEA	and	founding	
member	of	SEA,	31.10.2014	and	16.07.2015	
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positive	and	negative	incentives	for	the	level	of	commitment	politicians	can	make	
towards	existing	development	projects.	An	account	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	
development	initiatives	and	their	implementation	needs	to	be	aware	of	and	appreciate	
the	shaping	role	of	underlying	electoral	cycles	and	the	incentives	presented	to	
politicians.		
 
7.3 Changing personnel through local government service 
transfer cycles 
As	part	of	ongoing	implementation	of	the	decentralization	policy	in	Ghana,	the	Local	
Government	Service	(LGS)	is	the	national	institution	responsible	for	meeting	the	staff	
needs	of	Metropolitan,	Municipal	and	District	Assemblies	(MMDAs).	This	is	done	
through	staff	postings	and	transfer	from	one	MMDA	to	the	other.	This	process	is	often	
fraught	with	complications	and	open	to	political	influence	and	abuse.	In	some	cases	
staff	are	posted	to	places	where	there	is	no	need	for	their	services	while	sometimes	
staff	are	transferred	from	one	place	to	another	at	very	short	notice.	Such	situations	lead	
to	a	lack	of	continuity	in	the	projects	and	programmes	of	MMDAs.		This	is	often	because	
there	is	not	enough	institutional	memory	or	capacity	left	when	trained	staff	are	
transferred	and	replaced	with	new	ones	in	the	middle	of	project	implementation.		
In	this	section	I	analyse	the	impact	of	the	process	of	LGS	transfer	of	KEEA	staff	on	the	
implementation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	In	particular,	I	consider	how	the	transfer	
process	around	Municipal	Development	Planning	Officers	(MDPOs)	got	manipulated	
through	local	government	politics	and	political	party	interference	–	especially	on	that	
of	Municipal	Chief	Executives.	I	assess	the	role	played	by	MDPOs	in	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	and	how	their	subsequent	transfer	shaped	the	trajectory	of	the	project.	MDPOs	
are	a	critical	piece	of	the	jigsaw	when	it	comes	to	the	overall	goal	of	MMDAs	in	bringing	
about	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	This	is	because	they	are	the	
ones	who	lead	the	planning	process	that	culminate	in	the	Medium	Term	Development	
Plans	that	are	supposed	to	guide	development	at	the	local	level.	Consequently,	the	
transfers	and	postings	of	MDPOs	when	not	handled	well	can	lead	to	a	loss	of	
institutional	memory	and	a	loss	of	institutional	capacity	required	to	guide	and	complete	
projects.	
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Municipal Development Planning Officer I – Justice Amoah 
Municipal	Development	Planning	Officers	are	key	actors	when	it	comes	to	the	
preparation	of	Medium	Term	Development	Plans	of	MMDAs.	In	addition,	they	play	a	
crucial	role	in	making	sure	that	project	plans	and	action	plans	in	MTDPs	are	seen	
through	to	full	completion	towards	the	goal	of	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction.	In	the	specific	case	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	which	is	an	area	level	MTDP,	
one	Justice	Amoah	was	the	MDPO	at	the	KEEA	at	the	start.	He	played	a	significant	role	
in	shaping	the	initial	trajectory	of	the	project.	As	explained	earlier,	MMDAs	are	planning	
authorities	tasked	with	the	management	and	governance	of	overall	local	economic	
development	of	the	communities	within	their	boundaries.	This	mandate	is	exercised	by	
MMDAs	through	their	preparation	of	MTDP	which	is	led	by	the	MDPO	(see	discussion	in	
Chapter	4,	section	4.2).		Prior	to	the	formal	start	of	the	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	
Management	Programme,	Justice	Amoah	as	the	MDPO	of	the	KEEA	was	sent	to	the	
Netherlands	for	a	training	course.144	This	was	arranged	by	Urban	Solutions	through	the	
Dutch	NUFFIC	grant.	The	goal	was	to	build	up	the	capacity	of	the	MDPO	to	oversee	the	
project.	Upon	return	he	was	made	the	coordinator	of	the	project	in	addition	to	fulfilling	
his	other	duties	as	a	MDPO	of	the	KEEA.	He	was	subsequently	sent	to	the	Netherlands	
with	a	number	of	other	stakeholders	for	further	training	once	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	
had	been	developed	and	the	implementation	phase	was	about	to	begin.	
As	a	coordinator	for	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	Justice	Amoah	had	his	knowledge	and	
capacity	fully	developed	in	how	to	utilise	tourism	for	local	economic	development	and	
poverty	reduction.	He	was	thus	in	a	good	position	to	guide	the	trajectory	of	project	
implementation	and	institutionalisation.	He	also	had	to	put	in	a	lot	of	personal	
commitment	and	zeal	that	went	beyond	the	call	of	duty.	In	his	own	words	he	explained	
the	form	of	such	commitment;	
“The	way	I	suffered	for	this	particular	project,	sleepless	nights.	There	was	one	day	
I	left	the	office	2am,	sent	a	friend	to	Cape	Coast,	came	back	to	Elmina	to	sleep,	
woke	up	5am	so	I	had	2	hours	sleep	because	we	were	supposed,	we	were,	that	was	
the	day	we	were	launching	the	project	and	we	had	to	stay	in	the	office	and	make	
sure	things	were	in	order,	early	morning	we	had	to	go	and	do	the	set	up	for	all	the,	
																																																								
144	Interview	with	Justice	Amoah,	Former	Municipal	Planning	Officer	of	KEEA/Former	National	
Project	Coordinator	of	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	13.11.2014;	Interview	with	Ebo	Dadzie,	Head	of	
Tourism	Sub‐Committee,	KEEA,	16.07.2015	
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there	was	when	the	Prince	and	Princess	(of	the	Netherlands)	came.	We	had	to	
make	sure	that	everything	was	in	order”145	
From	the	beginning	of	the	project	in	2001	up	to	the	first	national	electoral	cycle	in	
December,	2004	there	was	a	positive	upward	trajectory	to	project	implementation.	
Shortly	after	the	NPP	government	had	been	retained	and	a	new	DCE	had	been	
appointed	to	the	KEEA	in	2005,	Justice	Amoah	was	transferred.		Even	after	he	was	
transferred	from	the	KEEA	to	the	Cape	Coast	Metropolitan	Assembly	(CCMA),	he	was	
committed	to	come	back	and	attend	some	of	the	project	meetings.	He	explained	in	the	
interview	that	Urban	Solutions	as	the	international	consultancy	body	retained	him	on	
the	committee	after	his	transfer	in	order	to	benefit	from	the	training	given	to	him.	
However,	this	was	met	with	distrust	from	others	at	the	KEEA	“…so	even	though	I	was	in	
Cape	Coast,	I	was	a	member	of	the	committee.	At	a	point	then	I	decided	not	to	go	again	
because	anytime	I	go	for	meeting,	it	was	as	if	I	have	been	transferred	and	I	don’t	want	to	
go	that	kind	of	thing	so	I	decided	not	to	participate	in	the	meetings	again”.146	Thus	the	
capacity	that	was	provided	for	Justice	Amoah	for	project	implementation	was	lost.	It	
appears	that	Urban	Solutions	in	the	design	of	the	project	failed	to	anticipate	the	
possibility	of	this	situation	happening.	The	subsequent	efforts	at	getting	the	transfer	
request	revoked	were	however	unsuccessful.		
It	is	plausible	to	argue	here	that	the	transfer	of	the	MDPO	is	directly	related	to	the	
influence	of	new	DCE.	As	one	interviewee	explained,	“[y]eah	so	in	the	middle	of	the	
project,	they	just	sent	him	to,	to	create	space	and	you	know	there	are	and	I,	if	you	talk	to	
him	you	will	see	that	he’s	kicked	away…so	during	the	project	in	the	middle	of	it	they	just	
transfer	him,	you	know.	There	are,	there	were	a	lot	of	you	know	a	lot	of	inside	politics.”147	
As	explained	earlier	in	this	Chapter	local	government	staff	are	supposed	to	be	
(re)allocated	on	an	arbitrary	basis.	However	it	is	also	well	known	that	the	process	is	
open	to	interference	by	political	actors.	Thus	new	DCEs	are	known	to	seek	for	the	
transfer	of	the	key	staff	such	as	MDPOs	whom	they	feel	may	have	become	too	loyal	to	
their	predecessors.	There	is	the	perception	that	staff	may	have	developed	personal	
loyalty,	an	alliance	and/or	even	corrupt	relationships	with	former	political	heads.		In	
																																																								
145	Interview	with	Justice	Amoah,	Former	Municipal	Planning	Officer	of	KEEA/Former	National	
Project	Coordinator	of	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	13.11.2014	
146	Interview	with	Justice	Amoah,	Former	Municipal	Planning	Officer	of	KEEA/Former	National	
Project	Coordinator	of	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	17.07.2015	
147	Interview	with	Felix	Nguah,	Manager	of	Elmina	Ecotours	Ltd/Interim	Chair	of	Tour	Guides	
Association	Central	Region,	09.09.2014	
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the	case	of	Justice	Amoah	for	example,	after	his	transfer	from	KEEA	to	the	Cape	Coast	
Metropolitan	Assembly	(CCMA)	another	electoral	cycle	ushered	in	his	further	transfer	
in	the	middle	of	another	project.	He	explains	that	although	he	cannot	tell	who	was	
behind	his	transfer	from	the	KEEA,	he	does	know	how	his	subsequent	transfer	from	the	
CCMA	came	about;	
“But	for	the	Cape	Coast	one	[transfer]	I	know	for	sure	and	I	was	told	even	when	I	
went	to	where	the	transfer	came	I	was	told	that	people	orchestrated	it	but	the	
Elmina	one	I	don’t	have	what	do	you	call	it,	evidence	to	show	that	somebody	did	it	
but	the	Cape	Coast	one	somebody	did	it”148	
The	failure	to	retain	the	trained	MDPO	at	the	KEEA	greatly	affected	the	trajectory	of	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy.	This	is	because	the	project	was	entering	a	critical	stage	at	the	
time	of	his	‘forced’	transfer.	This	was	the	stage	when	the	physical	projects	were	being	
wound	down	and	being	handed	over	and	the	KEEA	was	supposed	to	come	to	the	fore	in	
institutionalizing	the	gains	within	its	governance	system.	It	was	therefore	a	critical	time	
to	have	the	specifically	trained	personnel	with	the	right	capacity	to	be	there	to	
coordinate	activities.	With	the	MDPO	being	transferred,	there	was	not	enough	capacity	
and	institutional	memory	to	keep	these	issues	high	on	the	agenda.	Had	Justice	Amoah	
been	retained,	things	might	have	turned	out	differently.	Asked	if	he	had	wanted	to	
remain	at	the	KEEA,	he	answered	that;	
“That,	that	was	my,	my	what	do	you	call	it,	my	wish,	that	to	see	the	project	
through	to	at	least	so	that	at	the	end	of	it	you	can	see	that	you	have	done	A,	B,	C	
and	it	didn’t	happen	and	I	left.	And	those	who	were	left	behind	and	I	think	the	
MCE	may	not,	might	not	have	been	the	way	as	Ato	Arthur	did	because	Ato	Arthur	
had	more	interest	in	the	project	than	the	one	who	came	after”149	
	
Municipal Development Planning Officer II – Abu Mohammed 
In	the	aftermath	of	the	transfer	of	Justice	Amoah	from	the	KEEA	to	the	Cape	Coast	
Metropolitan	Assembly	(CCMA),	one	Abu	Mohammed	was	allocated	to	the	KEEA	as	the	
new	Municipal	Development	Planning	Officer	in	2007.	This	was	the	period	in	which	
																																																								
148	Interview	with	Justice	Amoah,	Former	Municipal	Planning	Officer	of	KEEA/Former	National	
Project	Coordinator	of	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	17.07.2015	
149	Interview	with	Justice	Amoah,	Former	Municipal	Planning	Officer	of	KEEA/Former	National	
Project	Coordinator	of	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	17.07.2015	
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many	of	the	projects	had	been	completed	and	handed	over	to	the	respective	owners	
and	managers.	Urban	Solutions	as	the	international	consultant	for	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	was	also	formally	ending	their	work	and	prepared	their	final	report	for	the	
KEEA	and	other	donor	agencies	in	the	last	quarter	of	2007150.	The	project	and	
associated	final	report	documents	were	formally	handed	over	to	the	KEEA	in	early	
2008.	The	KEEA	was	to	assume	its	place	as	the	institution	with	responsibility	for	the	
governance	and	management	of	this	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	initiative.	
This	was	a	process	that	was	to	be	spearheaded	by	the	recently	arrived	MDPO	–	Abu	
Mohammed.	
It	appears	that	at	the	time	that	Abu	Mohammed	assumed	the	role	of	MDPO	at	the	KEEA	
much	of	the	project	documents	were	available.	Thus	he	would	have	spent	the	initial	
period	trying	to	get	to	grips	with	what	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	and	how	to	continue	
with	the	implementation	and	institutionalisation	phase.151	As	the	physical	projects	got	
completed	and	handed	over,	the	level	of	communication,	collaboration	and	
coordination	between	stakeholders	began	to	decline	even	as	the	new	MDPO	worked	to	
keep	abreast	with	the	demands	of	his	role.	Since	he	had	not	been	specifically	trained	for	
the	project	there	were	issues	with	regards	to	overseeing	the	implementation	of	the	
project.	Moreover,	he	faced	challenges	in	getting	the	MCE	and	other	members	of	the	
KEEA	to	give	full	commitment	to	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	It	is	pertinent	to	note	here	
that	the	year	2008	was	also	an	election	year	and	so	for	the	DCE	and	his	political	party,	
the	focus	would	have	been	on	a	“pork	barrel”	or	targeted	spending	approach	that	
would	gain	them	electoral	votes.	The	political	incentive	was	to	move	resources	away	
from	implementing	the	‘soft’	components	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	which	were	
difficult	to	gain	political	credit	for.	In	an	election	year,	MDPOs	have	to	suspend	a	
number	of	ongoing	projects	in	order	to	focus	on	physical	infrastructure	projects	with	
high	visibility.		
At	the	December,	2008	national	elections,	the	New	Patriotic	Party	(NPP)	lost	and	was	
replaced	by	the	National	Democratic	Congress	(NDC)	party.	This	was	despite	the	
attempt	at	targeted	spending	by	the	NPP	to	win	over	voters.	With	the	coming	into	
power	of	the	NDC	government,	a	new	MCE	was	appointed	to	the	KEEA	(see	earlier	
																																																								
150	A	copy	of	their	Draft	Final	Report	is	dated	as	25th	October,	2007	
151	It	was	impossible	to	trace	his	whereabouts	and	interview	him	during	the	two	fieldwork	
visits.	However	information	from	other	interviewees	and	especially	the	current	Municipal	
Development	Planning	Officer	helped	to	fill	in	the	information	gap.	
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discussion	under	section	7.3	of	this	chapter).	It	was	the	commencement	of	this	
appointment	in	2009	that	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	appears	to	have	taken	a	turn	for	
the	worse	in	terms	of	implementing	the	final	phase	of	it.	This	is	also	related	to	the	
treatment	of	the	MDPO	at	that	time.	As	explained	earlier,	the	end	and	start	of	each	
electoral	cycle	presents	incentives	to	politicians	who	win	power.	With	the	NDC	party	
coming	into	power	in	2009,	civil	servants	and	local	government	staff	at	many	levels	but	
especially	at	the	Metropolitan,	Municipal	and	District	Assemblies	(MMDAs)	level	were	
seen	as	having	become	too	loyal	to	the	previous	party	which	was	in	government.	
Consequently,	this	period	is	the	time	that	most	staff	transfers	took	place.	Staff	who	are	
not	transferred	tend	to	face	antagonism	from	the	new	MCE’s	if	they	are	seen	as	not	
being	agreeable	to	the	agenda	of	the	new	political	party	government.	This	makes	it	
difficult	for	MDPOs	to	be	able	to	do	their	work	effectively	when	it	comes	to	making	sure	
that	existing	development	plans	are	being	followed	through.	This	is	what	happened	to	
Abu	Mohammed	after	the	NDC	came	into	power.	In	the	end	he	left	because	he	became	
frustrated	with	the	system.	The	current	MDPO	explains	that,		
“The	system	beat	him	[Abu	Mohammed,	the	former	Municipal	Development	
Planning	Officer]	harder	until	he	left.	There	was	no	officer	here	for	more	than	one	
year	before	I	came	because	he	had	served	in	the	assembly	during	the	time	of	the	
New	Patriotic	Party	(NPP)	so	when	the	National	Democratic	Congress	(NDC)	
came,	the	first	Chief	Executive	under	the	government	said	I	wouldn’t	work	with	
you	because	you	worked	with	the	previous	government.	So	he	had	to	leave	so	he	
didn’t	prepare	any	handing	over	notes,	there	was	nothing”152	
This	situation	of	Abu	Mohammed	leaving	abruptly	meant	that	there	was	no	
replacement	MDPO	for	the	KEEA.	Thus	there	was	no	formal	and	proper	writing	of	
handing	over	notes	for	the	next	MDPO	to	be	able	to	carry	on	the	work.	This	affected	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	because	it	meant	that	the	institutional	memory	was	also	almost	
totally	wiped	out.	For	over	a	year	and	half	after	Abu	Mohammed	left	the	KEEA	as	the	
MDPO	there	was	no	replacement	because	no	one	wanted	to	accept	a	posting	to	the	
KEEA.	This	was	in	part	a	protest	against	the	mistreatment	of	their	colleague	and	also	a	
perception	that	the	KEEA	might	be	a	difficult	place	to	work.	As	a	consequence	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	did	not	get	institutionalised	nor	embedded	with	the	subsequent	
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Medium	Term	Development	Plans	of	the	KEEA.	The	negative	downward	trajectory	of	
the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	therefore	continued.	
Municipal Development Planning Officer III – Labaran Fuseini 
In	November,	2011	a	new	MCE	–	Isaac	Kwaku	Sam	–	was	appointed	to	replace	Rev.	
Veronica	Esumah	Nelson.	It	was	after	this	new	MCE	had	taken	office	that	a	new	MDPO	–	
Labaran	Fuseini	–accepted	posting	to	the	KEEA.	For	over	a	year	and	a	half	prior	to	this,	
there	was	no	MDPO	at	the	KEEA	because	of	the	way	the	previous	MDPO	had	been	
treated.	Thus	“…	for	a	very	long	time	no	officer	was	ready	to	come	here	because	if	our	
colleague	was	treated	this	way…and	all	that”153.	When	asked	about	the	reception	he	
received	once	he	came	as	the	MDPO,	Labaran	Fuseini	responded	that		
“It	was	as	bad	as	it	is	up	to	date.	Because	they	[MCEs]	actually	don’t	see	why	your	
office	exist,	he	doesn’t	know	why	it	exist,	he	doesn’t	care	to	know	because	
(laughing)…	seriously	we	have	a	lot	of	challenges	so	we	also,	it’s	like	the	
authorities	pretend	not	to	know	our	challenges,	we	also	pretend	to	exist	
(laughter)”.154	
This	apparent	hostility	towards	the	office	of	MDPO	is	because	in	many	cases,	MCEs	can	
decide	by	themselves	and	based	on	political	interests	which	communities	receive	which	
development	projects,	regardless	of	what	is	in	the	MTDP.	Thus	the	relationship	
between	MDPOs	and	MCEs	plays	a	key	role	in	shaping	the	continuity	or	otherwise	of	
development	projects	at	the	local	level.	MDPOs	have	very	little	leverage	in	reining	in	
the	use	and	abuse	of	the	personal	power	of	MCEs.	When	asked	what	options	are	
available	to	him	if	an	MCE	initiates	a	project	that	is	outside	the	MTDP,	the	KEEA	MDPO	
explained	that;	“I	don’t	have	any	option.	I	have	to	do	it	the	way	he	[MCE]	wants	it	
done…[projects]	will	be	started	and	when	its	time,	when	it	comes	to	payment	I	will	be	
required	to	go	and	see,	verify	what	is	done	and	prepare	a	report	before	it	is	paid”155	
In	terms	of	the	continuity	of	projects	at	the	assembly,	the	current	MDPO	explained	that	
there	were	no	handing	over	notes	when	he	first	came	to	the	assembly.	Thus	all	work	
with	regards	to	the	making	of	MTDP	had	to	be	started	from	scratch.	With	specific	
reference	to	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	what	he	found	among	a	pile	of	old	papers	was	a	
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single	document	that	outlined	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	project	in	broad	policy	terms.	
That	there	was	only	a	single	document	available	is	attributable	to	the	poor	culture	of	
record	keeping	and	the	clearing	out	of	the	documents	in	order	to	make	room	for	the	
new	German	project	that	was	secured	by	the	NDC	government	after	the	NPP	
government	left	power	(see	discussion	in	section	7.1	of	this	Chapter).	Although	the	loss	
of	physical	evidence	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	could	have	been	compensated	for	by	
relying	on	the	memory	held	by	individuals,	this	was	rather	dispersed	across	multiple	
stakeholders.	This	made	it	difficult	to	access	and	be	able	to	develop	a	coherent	
narrative	of	the	project.	Thus	local	government	politics	contributed	to	shaping	the	
trajectory	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	because	there	was	little	information	available	to	
the	MDPO	to	build	on.	Moreover,	the	unfinished	business	of	decentralisation	in	Ghana	
[Arthur,	2012)	also	played	a	part	in	the	sense	that	MDPOs	have	to	follow	the	line	set	by	
the	MCE	–	even	if	this	is	not	in	the	interest	of	integrated	community	development	
efforts.	If	MDPOs	decide	to	stick	to	the	rules	rather	than	towing	the	line	of	the	MCE	they	
are	then	considered	as	undermining	the	authority	of	the	MCE	and	the	political	party.		
A	related	issue	is	that	at	the	local	level	there	is	upward	rather	than	downward	
accountability.	Thus	since	MCEs	are	political	appointees	answerable	first	to	the	central	
government	(National	President),	their	actions	are	guided	by	the	imperative	of	building	
up	political	support	for	their	party.	This	is	to	ensure	that	the	incumbent	party	gets	
votes	at	election	time.	If	discontinuing	projects	in	order	to	start	new	and	even	a	similar	
one	is	deemed	preferable,	this	is	done.	This	negative	incentive,	which	has	also	been	
explained	above,	kept	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	from	the	agenda	of	the	KEEA.	The	
efforts	of	the	MDPO	–	Labaran	Fuseini	–	to	embed	it	within	the	municipality’s	Medium	
Term	Development	Plan	was	met	with	resistance	(see	Chapter	6,	section	6.2	for	more	
discussion).	His	explanation	of	this,	which	has	already	been	quoted	once	in	this	thesis,	
is	worth	repeating	here;		
“When	you	look	at	this	document,	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	It	was	a	beautiful	
document	prepared	to	address	the	key	issues	in	these	areas,	drainage	and	waste	
management,	fishing	and	fishing	harbour,	tourism	and	local	economic	
development,	education	and	health.	I	came	here	met	this	document,	I	went	
through,	I	realised	it	was	a	very	useful	document	that	was	prepared	and	before	
they	could	start	implementation	the	government	under	which	they	prepared	this	
thing	went	out	of	office.	So	I	made	frantic	efforts	to	get	this	document	reviewed	so	
that	we	could	still	follow	through	the	objectives	of	the	document.	But	it	was	like	
this	was	prepared	by	the	NPP	government	and	I	don’t	want	to	have	anything	to	do	
with	it.	So	we	had	to	put	it	back	where	I	just	brought	it	out	from.	So	it	is	like	the	
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issue	of	continuity	is,	its	partisan	political	consideration	of	issues	is	affecting	a	lot	
of	things	everywhere	especially	in	the	assemblies”.156	
The	foregoing	discussion	points	out	the	fact	that	what	is	on	paper	differs	dramatically	
from	the	actions	on	the	ground.	Although	the	MDPO	of	KEEA	was	to	play	a	key	role	in	
the	implementation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	the	ability	to	do	that	was	constrained	
by	the	actions	of	MCEs	and	the	existing	politics	of	local	governments.	Thus	the	transfer	
of	MDPO	over	the	course	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	negatively	affected	the	trajectory	
and	outcomes	that	were	expected	from	the	project.	This	was	the	result	of	the	loss	of	
institutional	memory	and	institutional	capacity	to	oversee	the	implementation	and	
institutionalisation	phase	of	the	project.	Moreover,	since	tourism	related	institutions	
are	yet	to	be	decentralised	to	the	district	levels,	the	issue	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	
development	remains	outside	of	the	agenda	of	MMDAs	such	as	the	KEEA.		
	
	
Conclusions 
The	organising	logic	in	this	chapter	has	been	the	idea	of	cycles	while	the	analytic	focus	
has	been	on	the	politics	and	political	contestations	that	underline	these	cycles.	
International	development	policy	and	funding	cycles,	national	and	local	electoral	cycles	
and	local	government	service	staff	transfer	cycles	have	all	been	examined	in	relation	to	
their	shaping	role	in	the	implementation	and	sustainability	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy.	The	analysis	opened	up	what	had	so	far	in	the	thesis	appeared	as	‘black	boxes’	
–	Urban	Solutions,	international	donor	funding	and	the	KEEA.	The	examination	
highlighted	the	internal	cyclical	dynamics	of	these	‘black	boxes’	and	the	political	
contestations	that	surrounded	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	
would	not	have	been	possible	without	the	key	role	of	Urban	Solutions	and	the	funding	
secured	from	the	Dutch	government	and	European	Union.	This	arrangement	had	an	
implication	on	the	pace	and	trajectory	of	the	project	as	the	funding	came	with	
requirements	about	outsourcing	and	contracting	for	services.	A	key	outcome	of	this	
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was	that	much	of	the	funding	was	assigned	to	the	‘hardware’	aspects	involving	physical	
building	projects.	While	these	were	important	in	enhancing	the	tourism	assets	in	
Elmina,	it	meant	that	there	was	an	inadequate	attention	paid	to	the	‘software’	aspects	
of	skills	training	and	building	up	the	capacity	of	local	stakeholders	to	be	able	to	
continue	with	the	objectives	of	the	project.	This	situation	was	further	worsened	when	a	
new	German	sponsored	project	came	to	the	KEEA	leading	to	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	
being	put	aside.	Thus	the	changing	cycles	of	international	donor	funding	tend	to	affect	
not	only	stakeholder	governance	capacity	but	also	the	development	of	institutional	
thickness	due	to	a	lack	of	a	shared	vision	of	development	among	stakeholders.		
The	planning	process	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	appears	to	not	have	adequately	
considered	how	the	tourism	system	operates	(Cornelissen,	2005)	nor	an	understanding	
of	some	of	the	socio‐political	challenges	involved	in	tourism	development.		In	a	sense,	
the	issue	of	how	best	to	leverage	tourism	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction	became	rendered	into	primarily	technical	terms	(Ferguson,	1994).	This	left	
the	project	exposed	to	changes	in	international	donor	policy	and	funding	focus.	
Moreover,	the	internal	incentive	structures	of	international	aid	and	donor	funding	
delivery	processes	played	a	key	role	in	shaping	outcomes.	The	analysis	of	the	role	of	
Urban	Solutions	BV	shows	that	the	aid	delivery	process	resulted	in	Dutch	aid	money	
flowing	back	to	Dutch	consultants.	Not	only	was	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	rendered	
into	primarily	a	technical	project	of	fixing	buildings	and	setting	up	offices,		Urban	
Solutions	BV	appears	to	have	used	the	project	as	their	first	practice	run	of	their	
consultancy	business	after	spinning	off	from	the	Institute	of	Housing	Studies	and	Urban	
Development	(IHS)	of	the	Erasmus	University	of	Rotterdam	in	the	Netherlands.	The	
failure	of	Urban	Solutions	BV	and	the	other	international	donor	funding	agencies	to	
undertake	a	proper	evaluation	of	the	project	after	completion	raises	questions	about	
the	absence	of	feedback	loops	between	aid	donors	and	aid	recipients	(Martens	et	al.,	
2002).			
The	analysis	shows	that	SNV	–	the	Dutch	international	development	organisation	–	
which	was	contracted	to	carry	out	some	of	the	‘software’	aspects	of	integrating	tourism	
as	an	economic	activity	into	the	daily	lives	of	residents,	underwent	an	organisational	
transformation	in	its	operation	over	the	course	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	On	the	
balance	of	available	evidence,	the	change	in	SNV’s	development	policy	to	cease	its	
involvement	in	tourism	projects	had	an	effect	on	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	Insights	
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from	the	literature	on	implementation	theory	suggest	that	one	needs	to	consider	
counterfactuals	in	assessing	the	gap	between	policy	objectives	and	outcomes	(Bovens	
and	t’Hart,	1996).	This	helps	to	avoid	oversimplification	of	the	accounts	of	projects	
such	as	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	In	this	case,	the	counterfactual	question	to	ask	is	
whether	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	would	have	still	met	its	objectives	if	SNV	had	
continued	its	involvement	in	tourism	projects.	It	appears	that	even	if	the	SNV	had	not	
made	the	policy	switch	away	from	tourism	projects,	the	odds	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	fully	meeting	its	objectives	were	limited	due	to	other	political	cycles	that	were	
taking	place	in	the	internal	conditions	of	Ghana	and	within	the	international	
development	policy	environment.		
The	analysis	here	supports	an	emerging	literature	on	aidnography	of	international	
development	organisation	in	relation	to	their	involvement	in	tourism	and	development	
(Hummel	and	van	der	Duim,	2016,	2012).	It	also	points	to	the	issue	of	power	
imbalances	in	the	relationship	between	donor	countries,	their	experts	and	consultants,	
and	the	recipient	countries.	The	power	tends	to	lie	with	the	donor	countries	as	often	
aid	is	tied	to	certain	preconditions	such	as	the	use	of	consultants	and	NGOs	who	
originate	from	the	donor	countries	in	carrying	out	projects	and	programmes	in	
recipient	countries.	Indeed,	the	(non‐)decision	of	Urban	Solutions	BV	to	not	carry	out	
post‐implementation	evaluation	can	be	understood	as	the	‘second	face’	of	power	
(Bachrach	and	Baratz,	1962).	Thus	the	decisions	and	non‐decisions	of	aid	donors	in	
project	development,	implementation	and	evaluation	is	based	on	the	power	they	have	
in	the	process	–	over	the	beneficiaries	in	recipient	countries.	These	cyclical	changes	in	
the	policy,	strategy	and	practices	of	international	(tourism)	development	organisations	
therefore	need	to	be	understood	as	these	affect	how	local	development	outcomes	are	
defined	and	measured.		
The	analysis	in	this	chapter	shows	how	the	process	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	
shaped	by	cycles	of	national	and	local	electoral	outcomes.	The	findings	affirm	the	
literature	on	the	political	economy	of	public	good	provision	(Hirvi	and	Whitfield,	2015;	
Batley	et	al.,	2012;	Kelsall,	2012;	Whitfield,	2009).	While	the	idea	for	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	started	during	the	reign	of	the	National	Democratic	Congress	(NDC)	party,	it	
was	under	the	New	Patriotic	Party	(NPP)	government	that	the	project	began	in	earnest.	
Tracing	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	vis‐à‐vis	the	four	cycles	of	national	elections	shows	
increasing	progress	from	when	the	NPP	came	into	power	and	then	a	decline	
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immediately	prior	to	and	after	the	NDC	came	back	into	power	in	2009.	The	reason	for	
this	is	partly	due	to	what	Williams	(2016)	identifies	as	the	interaction	between	the	
temporal	dimension	of	project	implementation	and	governmental	time	consistency	
problems.	This	means	that	the	time	duration	for	the	implementation	of	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	extended	beyond	the	electoral	time	limit	of	a	single	political	party	in	
power.	This	created	both	positive	and	negative	incentives	for	political	parties	regarding	
whether	to	continue	project	implementation	or	to	begin	new	ones.	Given	alternating	
political	party	governments	amidst	a	highly	competitive	political	environment,	the	
analysis	in	this	chapter	raises	questions	about	the	credibility	of	policy	commitments	of	
political	parties	in	public	good	provisions.	Indeed,	there	is	a	related	question	of	how	
efforts	at	developing	institutional	thickness	are	constrained	by	national	and	local	
electoral	cycles.	The	analysis	in	this	chapter	therefore	supports	the	view	that	an	
account	of	institutional	thickness	will	need	to	consider	the	shaping	role	of	underlying	
electoral	cycles	and	the	incentives	presented	to	political	actors	(Raco,	1998).	
Local	governments	are	considered	as	playing	a	key	role	in	tourism	planning	and	
development	(McKercher	and	Ritchie,	1997;	Ruhanen,	2013).	The	analysis	in	this	
chapter	has	opened	up	the	‘black	box’	of	local	governments	and	their	role	in	tourism	
planning	and	development.	The	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	(KEEA)	Municipal	
Assembly	as	the	local	government	body	was	vested	with	the	responsibility	of	leading	
the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	The	analysis	has	highlighted	the	process	and	politics	of	local	
government	staff	transfer	cycles	and	its	effects	on	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.		The	
politically	influenced	transfer	of	the	first	Municipal	Development	Planning	Officer	
(MDPO)	under	whom	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	began,	lead	to	a	loss	of	institutional	
memory	and	capacity	within	the	KEEA.	This	finding	is	in	line	with	the	assertion	of	
Pollitt	(2000)	that	organisational	learning	and	the	memory	needed	to	achieve	desired	
outcomes	reside	in	staff	members.	The	sudden	transfer	of	the	MDPO	who	had	been	
specifically	trained	to	guide	implementation	meant	a	loss	of	organisation	memory	and	
consequently	a	negative	effect	on	the	progress	of	the	project.	The	tensions	between	
politicians	and	civil	servants	in	local	government	(Stocker	and	Thompson‐Fawcett,	
2014)	also	meant	that	the	subsequent	MDPO	assigned	to	the	KEEA	experienced	
interference	in	his	work.	Indeed,	for	a	period	of	close	to	two	years,	there	was	no	MDPO	
stationed	at	the	KEEA	to	guide	the	implementation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	These	
findings	shows	that	while	local	governments	do	indeed	play	a	key	role	in	tourism	
planning	and	development,	it	is	important	to	go	one	step	further	and	analyse	their	
internal	political	dynamics.	An	understanding	of	their	internal	political	dynamics	can	
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provide	insights	into	the	specific	ways	local	governments	can	enable	and/or	constrain	
the	use	of	tourism	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	This	is	
especially	critical	in	destinations	where	tourism	related	institutions	are	yet	to	be	
decentralised	to	the	district	level	and	brought	under	the	direct	authority	of	local	
governments.		
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Chapter 8 
	
Beyond the Elmina 2015 Strategy: governing tourism-
led local economic development  
	
This	thesis	set	out	to	understand,	explain	and	analyse	how	governance	interactions	
shape	the	planning	and	use	of	tourism	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction	through	the	empirical	case	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	in	Ghana.	Addressing	
this	aim	of	the	thesis	has	involved	first	conceptualising	interactive	tourism	governance	
in	terms	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity,	institutional	thickening	and	political	
cycles.	The	three	immediate	preceding	chapters	have	examined	the	Elmina	2015	in	
detail,	tracing	its	beginnings	and	how	things	unfolded	within	the	shaping	context	of	
governance	interactions.	The	purpose	of	this	last	chapter	of	the	thesis	is	to	review	the	
key	research	findings	and	show	their	wider	significance	and	implications	for	both	the	
theory	and	practice	of	planning	for	tourism’s	role	as	a	catalyst	for	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction	in	destinations	around	the	world.		
This	chapter	is	structured	into	three	main	sections.	The	first	section	highlights	the	key	
research	findings	by	addressing	and	providing	clear	answers	to	the	research	questions	
that	were	set	out	in	Chapter	1.	In	the	second	section,	I	set	the	theoretical,	conceptual	
and	empirical	findings	of	this	thesis	in	the	context	of	existing	knowledge.	I	also	make	
claims	about	why	the	answers	to	my	research	questions	resonate	beyond	the	case	of	
the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	The	third	section	offers	a	reflection	on	the	research	process	
before	outlining	avenues	for	further	research	that	can	extend	and	consolidate	the	
contributions	of	this	thesis.	
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8.1 Addressing the research questions 
In	meeting	the	overall	research	objective,	this	section	of	the	chapter	summarises	the	
key	findings	and	arguments	made	within	the	empirical	chapters,	and	shows	how	they	
provide	plausible	answers	to	the	research	questions	set	out	in	Chapter	One.	The	
questions	that	framed	the	design	and	execution	of	the	research	for	this	thesis	were	as	
follows:	
1. How	did	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	conceptualise	the	relationship	between	
tourism,	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction?	
2. To	what	extent	did	the	level	of	governance	capacity	held	by	key	stakeholders	
shape	the	planning	process	and	outcomes	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy?	
3. To	what	extent	was	the	Elmina	2015	strategy	embedded	within	the	institutional	
arrangements	for	local	economic	development	planning	of	the	Komenda‐Edina‐
Eguafo	Abrem	Municipal	Assembly?	
4. How	did	local	government	politics	and	cycles	of	national	elections	shape	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy?	
5. To	what	extent	does	an	interactive	tourism	governance	framework	allow	for	a	
nuanced	understanding	of	the	governing	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	
development	planning?	
These	questions	will	now	be	addressed	in	turn	in	order	to	provide	a	basis	for	drawing	
out	a	more	general	set	of	wider	significance,	implications	and	conclusions.		
How did the Elmina 2015 Strategy conceptualise the relationship between 
tourism, local economic development and poverty reduction? 
In	Chapter	1	of	the	thesis,	I	outlined	that	I	use	the	term	tourism‐poverty	nexus	as	
shorthand	to	refer	to	the	idea	of	tourism’s	potential	positive	impact	on	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction.	The	tourism‐poverty	nexus	is	also	used	in	this	
thesis	to	refer	to	the	projects,	programmes,	plans	and	policies	that	are	based	on	and/or	
geared	towards	leveraging	tourism’s	potential	for	local	economic	development	and	
poverty	reduction.	This	research	has	shown	that	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	is	an	
epitome	prime	example	of	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus.	The	conceptualisation	of	the	
tourism‐poverty	nexus	within	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	while	centred	on	tourism	also	
depended	on	simultaneous	improvements	in	other	sectors.	In	all	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	identified	five	priority	areas	–	1)	drainage	and	waste	management;	2)	fishing	
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and	fishing	harbour;	3)	tourism	and	local	economic	development;	4)	health	and;	5)	
education.	Tourism	and	local	economic	development	was	to	be	an	entry	point	for	an	
integrated	approach	towards	the	sustainable	development	of	the	Elmina	Township.		In	
the	Strategy	document,	the	argument	is	that	by	restoring	monuments,	improving	
tourist	infrastructure,	revitalising	existing	monuments	and	developing	other	important	
cultural	sites,	tourism	could	become	a	major	economic	activity	in	Elmina	that	will	help	
to	improve	the	general	standard	of	living	in	the	town.		
The	essence	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	to	improve	cultural	heritage	assets	in	
order	to	increase	the	number	and	length	of	stay	of	tourists	coming	into	Elmina.	The	
assumption	was	that	this	increase	in	tourists	would	serve	as	a	catalyst	for	local	
economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	Within	the	policy	and	planning	
documents	that	guided	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	the	relationship	between	tourism,	
local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	was	conceptualised	in	an	almost	
linear	way:	once	the	cultural	heritage	assets	had	been	renovated	and	given	a	facelift,	
tourists	would	come	and	would	then	spend	more	time	and	money	in	Elmina	on	
accommodation	and	food.	In	addition	they	would	also	buy	souvenirs	from	the	
established	Elmina	Arts	and	Craft	Market.	It	was	envisaged	that	increased	tourism	
would	lead	to	increased	income	and	revenue	for	businesses	in	the	community,	thereby	
catalysing	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	Interviewees	also	
articulated	a	similar	conceptualisation	of	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	found	in	the	policy	
documents.	Their	view	was	that	by	renovating	cultural	heritage	assets	in	the	
community,	tourists	would	spend	more	time	in	Elmina	thereby	increasing	the	amount	
of	money	they	spent	and	left	behind	in	the	local	economy.	On	the	basis	of	the	tourism	
multiplier	effect,	it	was	considered	that	the	increased	tourist	spending	to	come	would	
have	a	ripple	effect	and	then	trickle	down	to	various	segments	of	the	community.	The	
conceptualisation	of	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	was	therefore	founded	upon	a	number	
of	assumptions	regarding	tourist	behaviour	and	the	tourism	multiplier	effect.			
The	Elmina	2015	Strategy’s	conceptualisation	of	the	relationship	between	tourism,	
local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction,	while	linear	on	the	surface	had	a	
level	of	sophistication.	Tourism	was	seen	not	in	solitary	terms	but	as	an	avenue	
through	which	an	integrated	approach	to	local	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction	could	be	developed	in	tandem.	Tourism	was	to	serve	as	the	initial	spark	that	
would	kick‐start	local	economic	development	processes	through	a	mutually	reinforcing	
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relationship	with	other	sectors	of	the	economy	such	as	waste	management,	health	and	
education.	This	integrated	approach	notwithstanding,	there	appears	to	have	been	a	
conceptual	leap	in	how	the	Strategy	outlined	the	specific	process	through	which	
tourism	was	to	contribute	to	and	bring	about	local	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction.	There	was	an	inherent	assumption	within	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	that	
with	properly	renovated	heritage	assets,	tourism	in	Elmina	would	provide	a	number	of	
benefits	that	would	feed	into	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	
efforts.	Consequently	a	number	of	important	issues	such	as	continuity,	sustainability	
and	governance	challenges	appear	to	have	been	overlooked	in	the	planning	and	
implementation	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.		
A	number	of	key	issues	were	overlooked	including	an	understanding	of	the	processes	
and	the	socio‐economic	and	political	conditions	under	which	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction	is	achieved	and	how	these	might	shape	the	role	of	
tourism.	As	the	public	policy	analysis	and	policy	implementation	literature	has	shown,	
one	cannot	think	of	the	policymaking	process	in	a	linear	fashion.	Moving	from	decision	
making	into	translated	outcomes	involved	a	number	of	circular	interactions	among	
stakeholders	that	shape	the	pace	and	eventual	outcomes	of	policy	objectives.	The	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	planning	process	failed	to	incorporate	this	non‐linear	
understanding	of	the	policy	making	process.	Lastly,	the	conceptualisation	of	the	
tourism‐poverty	nexus	in	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	failed	to	understand	and	appreciate	
how	tourism	in	Elmina	was	a	part	of	and	fitted	within	a	regional	tourism	product.	Thus	
a	large	number	of	tourists	visited	Elmina	as	part	of	a	day’s	itinerary	that	also	included	
visits	to	the	Cape	Coast	Castle	and	the	Kakum	National	Park	all	lying	within	about	30km	
of	each	other.	In	a	sense,	the	vision	of	using	tourism	for	economic	development	and	
poverty	reduction	in	Elmina	was	not	situated	within	the	realities	of	the	tourism	sector	
in	Ghana	and	the	linkages	between	attractions	and	the	tourism	product	offered	to	
tourists.		
In	summary,	this	research	found	that	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	conceptualised	the	
relationship	between	tourism,	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	in	a	
linear	fashion	underlined	with	unexamined	assumptions	about	tourist	behaviour	and	
tourism	multiplier	effects.	The	conceptualisation	also	had	a	sophisticated	focus	on	
incorporating	other	sectors	of	the	economy	towards	an	integrated	development	
approach	of	which	tourism	was	to	be	an	entry	point.		
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To what extent did the level of governance capacity held by key stakeholders 
shape the planning process and outcomes of the Elmina 2015 Strategy? 
The	concept	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity	as	explained	in	Chapter	2	refers	to	the	
alignment	between	the	images	held	by	stakeholders	about	current	conditions	and	
future	change,	the	instruments	available	to	them	to	translate	this	image	into	reality	and	
the	socio‐political	room	for	action	within	which	images	get	aggregated	and	instruments	
chosen	and	deployed.	Within	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	the	key	stakeholders	who	had	a	
strong	shaping	role	in	the	process	included	the	Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	(KEEA)	
Municipal	Assembly,	the	Ghana	Museums	and	Monuments	Board	(GMMB),	the	Elmina	
Traditional	Authority,	Urban	Solutions	BV,	the	Dutch	government,	and	the	European	
Union.	These	key	stakeholders	held	a	broadly	shared	consensus	and	image	about	
cultural	heritage	and	tourism	development	in	Elmina	and	its	potential	to	contribute	to	
local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	Urban	Solutions	BV,	the	Dutch	
government,	and	the	European	Union	had	more	power	in	the	process	through	which	
the	consensus	was	reached.	This	shared	imaged	was	that	by	restoring	and	managing	
the	heritage	assets	and	monuments	in	Elmina,	an	avenue	would	be	created	for	an	
integrated	programme	that	would	improve	the	tourism,	social	and	economic	conditions	
of	Elmina.	It	is	this	broadly	shared	image	that	formed	the	basis	upon	which	the	
relationship	between	tourism,	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	was	
conceptualised	–	as	discussed	in	the	previous	subsection	above.	
The	instruments	that	stakeholders	made	use	of	in	the	planning	and	implementation	of	
the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	came	in	three	forms	–	politico‐legal	and	legislative	
instruments,	communicative	instruments	and	financial	instruments.	The	research	
findings	show	that	these	instruments	were	unevenly	spread	across	the	key	
stakeholders.	The	bulk	of	the	financing	for	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	came	through	the	
Dutch	government	and	the	European	Union’s	Development	Fund.	These	funds	were	
overseen	by	Urban	Solutions	BV	which	is	a	Dutch	consulting	company	that	was	set	up	
for	that	purpose.	This	situation	meant	that	‘faces	of	power’	in	the	planning	process	
were	held	by	external	actors.	While	Urban	Solutions	BV	could	hold	local	stakeholders	to	
account,	they	themselves	were	not	held	to	account	for	the	eventual	outcomes	of	the	
project.	The	financial	contribution	of	the	KEEA	and	the	GMMB	came	in	the	form	of	staff	
time	that	was	allocated	to	working	on	the	project.	The	KEEA	moreover	provided	the	
needed	politico‐legal	and	legislative	instruments	needed	to	embark	on	the	project	in	
the	first	place.	As	a	planning	authority,	the	KEEA	has	the	constitutional	and	
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administrative	monopoly	over	development	plan	making	and	implementation	at	the	
local	level.	Thus	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	as	a	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	
planning	process	could	only	proceed	under	the	auspices	of	the	KEEA.	Further	
instrumental	capacity	was	provided	by	the	GMMB	which	held	management	
responsibility	for	and	authority	over	the	Elmina	Castle.	These	instruments	were	then	
complemented	through	communicative	instruments	of	community	and	interest	group	
consultation	and	increased	level	of	communication,	collaboration	and	coordination	
between	state	institutions.	The	politico‐legal,	communicative	and	financial	instruments	
were	utilised	strongly	in	the	planning	phase	and	initial	phase	of	implementation	of	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	in	comparison	to	the	mid	to	later	phases	of	implementation.	
The	research	findings	point	out	that	there	were	two	distinct	periods	of	socio‐political	
room	for	action	available	to	stakeholders.		The	initial	planning	stage	took	place	in	a	
context	that	offered	a	strong	socio‐political	room	for	action	as	stakeholders	were	
encouraged	to	communicate,	collaborate	and	coordinate	their	activities.	This	period	
was	underlined	by	a	strong	state	commitment	to	utilising	tourism	for	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction.	This	commitment	was	felt	at	the	national,	regional	
and	district	level	of	the	then	New	Patriotic	Party	(NPP)	government	which	was	in	
power	from	2001‐2008.	The	commitment	towards	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	resulted	
in	the	setting	up	of	a	revenue	sharing	mechanism	between	the	GMMB,	the	KEEA	and	the	
Elmina	Traditional	Authority	over	the	proceeds	from	the	Elmina	Castle.	This	was	
through	a	directive	from	Cabinet	after	the	President	was	lobbied	on	the	issue	through	
the	then	senior	minister	–	J.	H.	Mensah	who	hails	from	Elmina	–	the	then	Minister	for	
Tourism	–	the	late	Jake	Obetsebi‐Lamptey.	These	two	were	the	figurehead	of	lobbying	
efforts	by	the	KEEA	and	the	Traditional	Authority.	The	sharing	of	revenue	was	an	
incentive	that	boosted	the	capacity	of	stakeholders	and	oiled	the	wheels	of	
communication,	collaboration	and	coordination	between	them	in	the	preparation	of	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy.		
The	second	period	of	action	potential	was	not	as	positive	and	encouraging	as	the	first.	
This	was	during	the	time	of	the	expected	implementation	and	institutionalisation	of	the	
projects	outlined	in	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	There	was	a	change	of	political	party	
government	from	the	NPP	to	the	National	Democratic	Congress	(NDC)	party	
government	in	2009	at	the	national	level.	The	revenue	sharing	arrangement	that	had	
served	stakeholders	so	well	in	their	earlier	efforts	was	abrogated	by	the	new	NDC	
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government	leading	to	a	more	restrictive	socio‐political	room	for	action	for	
stakeholders.	The	research	findings	suggest	that	this	change	in	socio‐political	room	for	
action	negatively	impacted	upon	stakeholder	governance	capacity	in	overseeing	the	
implementation	of	the	Strategy.	This	is	because	the	KEEA	and	traditional	authority,	as	
key	stakeholders,	became	less	incentivised	to	continue	with	the	same	zeal	and	efforts	in	
driving	forward	the	Strategy.		
In	summary,	the	research	found	that	the	level	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity	was	
conditioned	by	the	images	of	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	held,	the	form	of	instruments	
available	and	used	by	stakeholders	and	the	socio‐economic	room	for	action	within	
which	they	had	to	operate	to	translate	images	into	reality.	It	was	established	through	
the	research	that	high	level	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity	experienced	in	the	
beginning	had	a	positive	shaping	effect	on	the	planning	phase	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy.	However,	for	much	of	the	period	there	was	an	inadequate	(and	sometimes	a	
total	lack	of)	alignment	between	the	images,	instruments	and	action	potential	held	and	
exercised	by	stakeholders.	This	meant	low	stakeholder	governance	capacity	which	in	
turn	negatively	affected	the	implementation	and	institutionalisation	phase	of	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy.	
To what extent was the Elmina 2015 strategy embedded into the institutional 
arrangements for local economic development planning of the Komenda-
Edina-Eguafo Abrem Municipal Assembly? 
This	research	has	established	that	the	planning	process	which	produced	the	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	was	embedded	in	the	structures	of	the	KEEA	Municipal	Assembly.	The	
KEEA	has	legislative	standing	as	a	planning	authority	and	is	charged	with	the	
responsibility	of	overseeing	to	the	overall	development	of	the	locality	under	its	
jurisdiction	and	boundaries.	Thus	it	was	impossible	for	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	to	
have	been	developed	without	the	central	role	played	by	the	KEEA.	The	interesting	
analytic	puzzle	therefore	was	to	find	out	the	extent	to	which	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	
after	it	was	developed	became	embedded	within	the	policy	and	planning	structures	of	
the	KEEA.	Following	the	development	of	the	Strategy,	did	the	KEEA	whose	mandate	it	is	
to	ensure	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction	incorporate	the	ideas	and	
projects	outlined	in	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	in	its	efforts?	A	key	development	policy	
document	which	guides	the	development	efforts	of	the	KEEA	is	the	District	Medium	
Term	Development	Plan	(MTDP)	which	is	developed	on	a	3‐4	year	cycle.	This	
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constitutes	an	aggregation	of	the	development	needs	of	communities	and	includes	
budgeted	action	plans	to	meet	those	needs.	Much	of	the	information	and	development	
needs	found	in	MTDPs	tend	to	remain	the	same	from	cycle	to	cycle.	This	is	because	
many	of	the	development	needs	faced	by	communities	remain	unmet.	Thus	the	MTDPs	
of	the	KEEA	were	a	primary	source	of	answering	the	question	of	the	extent	of	
embeddedness.		
The	research	findings	suggest	that	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	not	embedded	in	the	
MTDPs	of	the	KEEA.	The	2010‐2013	MTDP	for	instance	notes	that	Elmina	has	a	good	
tourism	potential	that	can	be	tapped	for	local	economic	development.	However,	the	
MTDP	does	not	even	once	make	a	mention	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	which	was	
meant	to	do	exactly	that	–	leverage	tourism	for	local	economic	development	and	
poverty	reduction.	Moreover,	the	current	MDTP	for	2013‐2017	had	just	a	single	
mention	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	This	single	instance	turns	out	to	be	as	that	of	the	
source	for	one	of	the	pictures	which	was	used	to	depict	the	outstanding	issue	of	
sanitation	and	waste	management	facing	the	community.		By	inference,	the	research	
found	that	once	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	finalised	in	2003,	it	was	not	embedded	
within	the	two	MTDPs	between	2003	and	2010.		While	the	idea	of	tourism‐led	local	
economic	development	planning	could	have	been	embedded	without	subsequent	
MTDPs	mentioning	it,	the	total	absence	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	points	to	a	lack	of	
embeddedness.	There	were	two	main	reasons	for	this	lack	of	embeddedness	of	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy.		
Firstly,	although	the	KEEA	was	the	lead	institution	for	the	planning	process	that	
culminated	in	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	the	funding	for	this	was	external,	coming	from	
the	Dutch	government	and	the	European	Union.	This	meant	that	on	some	level,	there	
was	not	a	strong	sense	of	local	ownership.	Consequently	once	the	Strategy	had	been	
developed	it	became	viewed	as	an	aside	instead	of	becoming	a	part	of	the	KEEA’s	
overall	development	intervention	efforts.	At	its	core,	the	KEEA	is	faced	with	the	
pressure	of	meeting	day‐to‐day	basic	service	provision	for	communities.	In	the	face	of	
such	pressures,	the	goal	of	institutionalising	tourism’s	role	in	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction	fell	off	the	agenda.	This	was	especially	so	after	the	
revenue	sharing	arrangement	had	been	cancelled	and	the	assembly	saw	no	financial	
incentive	in	deploying	its	limited	resources	to	the	goals	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.		
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The	second	reason	for	the	lack	of	embeddedness	had	to	do	with	the	undue	political	
interference	in	the	work	of	the	Municipal	Development	Planning	Officers	(MDPOs)	
within	the	KEEA.	This	is	linked	to	the	issues	of	political	cycles	discussed	in	the	next	
section.	MDPOs	are	responsible	for	coordinating	the	development	of	MTDPs	at	the	
assembly	level.	Between	2009	and	2011	there	was	no	MDPO	at	the	KEEA	after	a	former	
MDPO	was	mistreated	by	a	new	political	head	of	the	assembly.	Consequently	the	
MDPOs	who	were	posted	to	the	KEEA	refused	to	accept	the	postings.	This	meant	that	
the	institutional	knowledge,	capacity	and	memory	about	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	
lost.	Moreover,	the	current	MDPO	of	the	KEEA	explained	that	in	preparing	the	2014‐
2017	MTDP,	he	was	discouraged	by	the	political	head	of	the	assembly	from	including	
things	from	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	since	the	project	was	seen	as	belonging	to	the	
opposition	NPP	party.		
To	summarise,	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	insufficiently	embedded	within	the	
institutional	structures	of	the	KEEA	for	local	economic	development.	While	the	
planning	phase	was	embedded	in	the	planning	structures	of	the	KEEA	through	its	
technocratic	resources,	the	implementation	and	institutionalisation	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	was	not	embedded	in	the	KEEA.	This	is	evident	in	the	lack	of	mention	or	
building	upon	of	the	Strategy	in	the	subsequent	MTDPs	developed	by	the	KEEA.		
How did local government politics and cycles of national elections shape the 
Elmina 2015 Strategy? 
The	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	much	like	any	development	intervention,	was	underlined	by	
a	number	of	political	contestations	from	the	international	level	through	to	the	national,	
regional	and	local	levels.	The	planning	and	implementation	process	of	the	Elmina	2015	
Strategy	involved	a	number	of	stakeholders	and	actors	who	did	not	always	share	the	
same	interests	or	commitment.	It	is	within	this	context	that	the	political	nature	of	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	is	made	evident.	The	research	findings	indicate	that	the	undoing	
of	the	vision	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	is	largely	down	to	the	effects	of	local	
government	politics	and	the	cycles	of	national	elections	through	which	new	political	
parties	come	into	power.		
The	research	findings	seem	to	support	the	view	the	political	cycles	through	which	one	
political	party	replaces	another	in	government	have	profound	effect	on	the	continuity	
and	sustainability	of	project	preparation	and	implementation.	In	the	course	of	the	
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Elmina	2015	Strategy	there	were	three	instances	of	electoral	cycles	–	in	2004,	2008	and	
2012.	The	findings	show	that	each	electoral	cycle	brought	about	a	downward	trend	in	
the	implementation	of	the	project,	and	also	in	the	prospects	for	the	project’s	
sustainability.		This	is	due	to	among	other	things	the	fact	that	the	National	Democratic	
Congress	(NDC)	party	government	that	came	into	power	after	the	2008	elections	did	
not	want	to	continue	with	the	visible	projects	like	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	that	was	
initiated	by	the	departing	New	Patriotic	Party	(NPP)	government.	The	perception	was	
that	whatever	political	credits	that	could	be	gained	from	project	completion	would	
accrue	to	the	opposition	NPP	rather	than	to	the	incumbent	NDC	who	would	continue	
with	implementation.	At	the	local	level,	new	Municipal	Chief	Executives	at	the	KEEA	
were	more	predisposed	to	start	their	own	projects	rather	than	ensuring	the	full	
completion	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	The	findings	indicate	that	there	was	both	a	
passive	attitude	of	letting	things	peter	out	and	an	active	attitude	of	interfering	with	the	
work	of	Municipal	Development	Planning	Officers	who	wanted	to	resurrect	the	project	
and	continue	with	implementation	(see	discussion	in	the	previous	subsection).		
In	terms	of	local	government	politics,	the	research	identified	that	the	incomplete	nature	
of	the	decentralisation	process	in	Ghana	complicates	the	relationship	between	civil	
servants	and	political	heads	of	the	Metropolitan,	Municipal	and	District	Assemblies.	The	
system	is	also	open	to	abuse	and	political	interference	when	it	comes	to	the	transfer	of	
technical	staff	such	as	the	Municipal	Development	Planning	Officers	(MDPOs).	MDPOs	
are	key	cogs	in	the	machinery	of	national	and	local	economic	development	planning	
system.	They	are	tasked	with	the	responsibility	of	leading	the	process	for	drawing	up	
and	implementing	the	MTDPs	that	guide	development	and	poverty	reduction	efforts	at	
the	local	level.	The	research	findings	identify	three	MDPOs	who	came	through	the	KEEA	
over	the	course	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	The	first	MDPO,	under	whose	tenure	the	
whole	project	began,	and	the	third	and	current	MDPO	were	interviewed	for	this	
research.	The	findings	point	to	the	fact	that	the	first	MDPO	was	twice	sent	to	the	
Netherlands	to	undertake	training	courses	and	gain	knowledge	that	equipped	him	to	
play	a	crucial	role	in	the	preparation	and	implementation	of	the	project.	Shortly	after	
implementation	began	and	a	new	MCE	was	appointed	to	head	the	KEEA,	the	first	MDPO	
was	transferred	away.	The	evidence	suggests	that	this	transfer	was	politically	
influenced	by	the	new	MCE	who	perceived	the	loyalty	of	the	MDPO	to	be	tied	to	the	
former	MCE	even	though	this	new	MCE	was	from	the	same	political	party.	The	findings	
also	point	out	that	the	second	MDPO	faced	hostility	and	mistreatment	when	the	NDC	
party	government	was	elected	into	office	in	2008	to	replace	the	NPP	government.	The	
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second	MDPO	therefore	left	his	office	without	preparing	handing	over	notes.	
Consequently,	for	over	a	year	and	a	half	no	new	MDPO	accepted	posting	to	the	KEEA.	
The	effect	of	this	on	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	was	that	there	was	a	loss	of	institutional	
knowledge,	capacity	and	memory	that	was	required	to	continue	with	the	
implementation	of	the	project.	
To	summarise,	the	cycle	of	national	elections	and	local	government	politics	shaped	the	
outcomes	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	through	the	failure	of	incoming	political	party	
governments	to	continue	with	projects	started	by	opposition	political	parties.	
Moreover,	the	political	power	of	new	MCEs	at	the	KEEA	was	used	to	interfere	in	local	
government	service	transfer	to	force	MDPOs	who	had	been	specifically	trained	for	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy	to	be	transferred.	The	cumulative	effect	of	local	government	
politics	and	cycles	of	national	elections	was	the	loss	of	institutional	knowledge,	capacity	
and	memory	needed	to	ensure	full	implementation,	continuity	and	sustainability	of	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy.		
To what extent does an interactive tourism governance framework allow for a 
nuanced understanding of the governing of tourism-led local economic 
development planning? 
In	much	of	the	current	research	on	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus,	the	importance	of	
governance	variables	has	been	readily	acknowledged.	However,	there	have	been	few	
detailed	studies	to	identify	the	essential	governance	variables	and	the	causal	
mechanisms	through	which	they	shape	outcomes.	Research	on	governance	in	tourism	
studies	in	general	has,	on	the	other	hand,	redefined	the	state	and	hence	politics	out	of	
the	governing	process	with	emphasis	now	being	placed	on	markets,	networks	and	
communities.	This	research	and	the	interactive	tourism	governance	framework	that	
was	developed	and	applied	to	the	case	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	straddles	these	two	
areas	and	fills	a	critical	gap	in	the	literature.	The	interactive	tourism	governance	
framework	as	applied	to	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	offers	a	number	of	important	
insights	about	the	governing	process	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	
planning	initiatives.	This	is	achieved	through	an	identification	and	disaggregation	of	the	
key	governance	variables	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity,	institutional	thickness	
and	political	cycles.	The	framework	allowed	for	tracing	the	specific	mechanisms	
through	which	each	variable	affected	the	planning,	implementation	and	ultimately	the	
outcomes	of	the	tourism‐led	local	economic	development.	
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In	the	next	section	I	discuss	in	detail	the	significance	of	the	interactive	tourism	
governance	framework	and	the	theoretical	and	empirical	contribution	of	this	research	
thesis	to	existing	knowledge	about	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus.	
	
8.2 Theoretical significance and implications  
This	research	was	conceived	through	an	interdisciplinary	approach	to	conceptualizing	
the	governance	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	initiatives.	As	
noted	at	the	start	of	this	chapter,	the	thesis	set	out	to	understand,	explain	and	analyze	
how	governance	interactions	shape	the	planning	and	use	of	tourism	for	local	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction	in	the	context	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	To	this	
end,	the	interactive	tourism	governance	framework	was	developed	as	an	analytical	
framework	with	which	to	examine	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy.	This	framework	was	
developed	based	on	ideas	from	diverse	fields	such	as	tourism	studies,	international	
development	studies,	political	science,	governance	studies,	local	government	studies,	
public	administration,	and	regional	and	local	economic	development	studies.	This	
allowed	for	an	integrated	approach	to	understanding	tourism’s	role	in	national,	
regional,	and	local	economic	development	planning	and	how	this	role	shapes	and	is	
shaped	by	state	governance	institutions	and	processes.	In	this	section,	I	address	the	
question	of	the	significance	of	the	research	findings	and	what	this	thesis	contributes	to	
the	existing	knowledge	about	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus.		
This	thesis	makes	both	theoretical	and	empirical	contributions	to	existing	knowledge	
about	the	governance	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	initiatives.	
Empirically,	this	thesis	provides	fresh	data	on	local	economic	development	and	tourism	
planning	in	Ghana.	In	particular,	the	thesis	provides	primary	information	regarding	the	
governance	processes	in	the	pre‐planning,	planning,	implementation	and	post‐
implementation	stages	of	key	aspects	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	as	a	tourism‐led	local	
economic	development	initiative.	It	provides	empirical	evidence	on	the	governance,	
politics	and	administration	of	local	economic	development	planning	in	Ghana.	
Specifically,	I	provide	a	detailed	empirical	analysis	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	
highlighting	how	the	policies	were	understood	by	various	actors	and	the	contestations	
at	different	levels	of	state	hierarchy	and	between	state	and	societal	actors.	
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Original theoretical and conceptual contributions to knowledge 
The	overall	original	contribution	of	this	thesis	is	twofold.	Firstly,	I	identify	a	conceptual	
gap	in	the	tourism	literature	with	regards	to	governance	and	the	outcomes	of	the	
tourism‐poverty	nexus.	Secondly,	through	the	development	of	the	interactive	tourism	
governance	framework	and	the	empirical	research	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	I	
contribute	to	academic	efforts	at	bridging	this	conceptual	gap.	An	integrated	approach	
to	understanding	and	analyzing	tourism	governance	in	the	context	of	the	tourism‐
poverty	nexus	tends	to	fall	into	the	cracks	between	tourism	studies,	urban	studies	and	
international	development.	My	thesis,	which	takes	insight	from	each	of	these	fields,	
therefore	makes	a	significant	contribution	to	knowledge	by	issuing	a	reminder	that	
tourism	governance	ought	to	be	placed	squarely	on	the	table.	At	the	turn	of	the	
millennium,	Sharpley	and	Telfer	(2002)	first	noted	a	conceptual	leap	in	the	tourism	and	
development	literature	in	the	sense	that	much	of	the	work	at	that	point	discussed	the	
benefits	of	tourism	for	economic	development	in	isolation	from	the	inherent	process	of	
other	socioeconomic	sectors	that	drive	overall	development	in	a	given	country.		
Since	then,	attempts	have	been	made	to	address	this	gap	through	research	that	situates	
tourism	within	the	wider	context	of	theories,	thoughts	and	practices	that	shape	overall	
national	development	(Schilcher,	2007;	Scheyvens,	2007,	2011;	Harrison,	2008;	
Mowforth	and	Munt,	2009).	This	new	stream	of	research	helped	to	problematise	the	
relationship	between	tourism	and	development.	They	also	identified	some	of	the	
variables	that	shaped	tourism’s	contribution	to	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction,	one	of	which	was	governance	structures.	These	developments	in	turn	
however	require	further	research	on	how	governance	shapes	outcomes	of	the	tourism‐
poverty	nexus.	Thus	much	of	current	discussion	on	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	reach	
conceptual	conclusions	about	governance	structures	being	important	for	the	tourism‐
poverty	nexus	without	specifying	how	and	in	which	ways	(for	examples	see	Rogerson	
(2014),	Spenceley	and	Meyer	(2012)	and	Harrison	(2008)).	My	thesis	contributes	to	
knowledge	by	taking	a	first	step	in	bridging	this	gap.		
In	developing	the	interactive	tourism	governance	framework	as	a	conceptual	
framework	and	then	applying	it	empirically,	this	thesis	makes	further	contribution	to	
knowledge.	I	combine,	what	on	the	surface	appear,	disparate	concepts	in	new	ways	by	
integrating	them	into	a	coherent	framework.	This	integrated	framework	(see	figure	5	–	
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the	interactive	tourism	governance	framework	–	in	Chapter	2)	then	allows	me	to	
disaggregate	key	governance	variables	and	then	to	analyse	the	specific	ways	in	which	
these	shape	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus.		In	this	regard	I	make	a	specific	contribution	to	
knowledge	by	re‐emphasising	the	role	of	the	state	and	its	importance	within	tourism	
studies.	This	point	is	supported	by	the	recent	work	by	Amore	and	Hall	(2016)	who	
assert	that	the	state	has	been	redefined	out	of	current	conceptualisations	of	governance	
in	tourism	studies	to	be	replaced	by	an	emphasis	on	markets	(business),	network	
(voluntary	self‐organisation)	or	community	(local)	approaches.	Moreover,	current	
work	on	governance	in	public	policy	and	public	administration	has	noted	the	continual	
centrality	of	the	state	in	the	variety	of	governing	arrangements	that	are	emerging	
(Peters	and	Pierre,	2006;	Bell	and	Hindmoor,	2009;	Peters	and	Pierre,	2016).		My	thesis	
shows	that	the	state	and	the	internal	power	dynamics	between	key	players	within	it	
remains	crucial	in	setting	the	policy	agenda	and	thus	must	be	brought	back	into	how	
we	conceptualise	tourism	governance.	This	is	especially	so	when	it	comes	to	the	
tourism‐poverty	nexus	(see	also	Adu‐Ampong,	2015).		
In	emphasising	the	state’s	centrality	to	tourism	governance,	a	related	contribution	of	
this	thesis	is	to	highlight	how	a	focus	on	politics	and	political	cycles	provide	a	rich	
context	in	which	to	trace	how	governance	affects	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus.	My	thesis	
therefore	builds	on	earlier	works	such	as	Slocum	and	Backman	(2011)	and	Sharpley	
and	Ussi	(2012).	In	their	study	of	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	in	Zanzibar,	Sharpley	and	
Ussi	for	instance	identify	four	broad	areas	of	governance	failures	within	tourism.	What	
is	missing	from	their	account	and	what	my	thesis	therefore	contributes	is	a	central	
focus	on	underlying	political	interactions	–	electoral	and	political	party	competition	
and	local	government	service	politics	–	that	helps	to	offer	a	greater	depth	of	
explanation	as	to	what	is	observed	as	a	first‐order	governance	failure	in	investment,	
policy	implementation,	institutional	confusion	and	patronage.		
A	further	conceptual	contribution	of	this	thesis	lies	in	highlighting	new	understandings	
of	the	existing	issues	around	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	by	placing	this	within	the	
wider	context	of	the	governing	processes	that	shape	local	economic	development	
planning.	In	this	regard,	my	research	empirically	assess	the	assertion	of	Rogerson	
(2014:607)	about	the	positive	prospects	for	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	when	tourism	
planning	is	embedded	as	part	of	wider	strategic	initiatives	of	local	economic	
development	planning.	The	Elmina	2015	Strategy	provided	a	perfect	case	study	of	
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looking	at	the	tourism‐poverty	nexus	in	the	wider	context	of	local	economic	
development	planning.	The	findings	are	however	inconclusive	but	throw	up	a	number	
of	questions	where	further	research	is	needed.	In	effect	the	evidence	shows	a	paradox	
in	terms	of	embedding	tourism	planning	within	local	economic	development	planning.	
While	in	theory	the	prospects	for	poverty	alleviation	might	be	enhanced	when	tourism	
development	is	embedded	in	local	economic	development	planning,	in	practice	the	
embedding	process	at	the	same	time	exposes	tourism	planning	to	local	government	
politics	and	planning	challenges	as	detailed	in	Chapter	7.		
To	this	end,	a	related	contribution	of	my	thesis	has	been	extending	the	concept	of	
institutional	thickness	into	tourism	studies	from	its	traditional	home	in	the	regional	
and	local	economic	development	studies	literature	(Helmsing,	2003;	Pike	et	al.,	2006;	
Rodriguez‐Pose	and	Tijmstra,	2007).	This	allows	me	to	specify	the	presence	of	
institutions,	their	levels	of	mutual	interaction	and	the	domination	structures	in	which	
such	interactions	take	place	as	well	as	the	existence	of	a	shared	vision	within	the	
Elmina	2015	Strategy.	While	the	concept	of	institutional	thickness	tend	to	be	critiqued	
for	the	danger	of	conflating	institutions	and	organisations,	it	was	useful	in	isolating	the	
form	and	extent	to	which	tourism	planning	was	embedded	in	the	institutional	
structures	of	local	economic	development	planning	and	governance	to	ensure	the	
continuity.	Institutional	thickness	as	a	concept	provides	an	avenue	to	explore	how	the	
many	direct	and	indirect	institutions	in	tourism	planning	and	local	economic	
development	planning	mesh	together	to	create	a	durable	institutional	ecosystem	to	
ensure	continuity	of	tourism‐led	local	economic	development	planning	initiatives.	In	
the	case	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	the	envisioned	meshing	together	to	form	
institutional	thickness	failed	to	materialise	due	to	a	number	of	issues	as	outlined	in	
Chapters	5,	6	and	7.	Nonetheless,	insights	from	this	concept	can	complement	emerging	
lines	of	research	in	the	literature	on	destination	governance	that	focus	on	leadership	
such	as	Pechlaner	et	al.	(2014),	Valente	et	al.	(2014)	and	Valente	et	al.	(2015).	This	
thesis’	contribution	therefore	lies	in	extending	the	analysis	of	destination	governance	
beyond	the	qualities	of	a	single	individual	leader	by	showing	that	the	extent	of	
institutional	thickness	matters	for	how	well	leadership	functions.		
Finally	this	thesis	contributes	to	knowledge	by	providing	nuanced	insights	about	the	
concept	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity	with	a	particular	emphasis	on	the	capacity	
of	local	governments.	While	it	is	acknowledged	that	local	governments	have	a	key	role	
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to	play	in	leveraging	tourism	benefits	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction	(Dredge,	2001;	Ruhanen,	2013),	there	have	been	few	studies	on	local	
government	capacity	to	fulfil	this	expectation	(Churugsa	et	al.,	2007;	Slocum	and	
Backman,	2011).	Given	that	the	spread	of	decentralisation	and	other	public	sector	
reforms	in	many	countries	has	led	to	a	number	of	socioeconomic	development	
responsibilities	being	relocated	at	the	local	level,	it	is	important	to	fully	understand	the	
capacity	of	local	governments	and	the	political	processes,	public	administration	and	
management	at	the	local	level.		Consequently,	this	thesis	contributes	by	conceptualising	
governance	capacity	in	terms	of	images,	instruments	and	action	potential.	Through	this,	
questions	can	be	asked	about	how	local	governments	view	tourism’s	role	in	economic	
development	and	poverty	reduction,	the	instruments	(legal,	financial	and	legislative)	
available	to	them	to	leverage	tourism,	and	the	socio‐political	room	for	action	within	
which	they	can	act.	The	increasing	calls	for	local	governments	to	take	a	more	active	role	
in	tourism	development	need	to	go	hand	in	hand	with	attention	paid	to	how	local	
governments	are	being	equipped	to	engage	in	tourism	development.	
	
8.3 Avenues for further research 
The	findings	and	implications	of	this	thesis	suggest	a	number	of	potential	avenues	for	
further	research.	The	finding	that	embedding	tourism	planning	within	wider	place‐
based	local	and	regional	economic	development	planning	exposes	tourism	planning	to	
the	vagaries	of	local	government	politics	throws	up	a	challenge	as	to	how	best	to	utilise	
tourism	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	This	represent	an	
avenue	for	further	research	which	can	focus	on	comparative	study	of	destinations	that	
are	making	efforts	at	planning	tourism	development	with	a	specific	focus	on	local	
economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	Perhaps,	what	is	first	needed	is	a	
questioning	of	the	viability	of	tourism	as	a	tool	for	local	economic	development	and	
poverty	reduction.	Such	studies	could	examine	whether	tourism’s	potential	tends	to	be	
overstated,	and	then	identify	the	other	factors	that	enable	and/or	constrain	the	use	of	
tourism	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	Insights	from	future	
research	will	therefore	complement	the	findings	of	this	thesis	in	providing	a	broader	
view	about	embedding	tourism	planning	within	systems	of	local	and	regional	economic	
development	planning.		
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A	second	potential	research	avenue	would	be	to	further	explore	the	nature	of	
institutional	thickness	that	exists	in	the	Central	Region	of	Ghana	with	respect	to	
tourism	planning.	This	thesis	suggest	that	the	Central	Region	is	considered	as	the	
heartbeat	of	tourism	in	Ghana	due	to	its	many	developed	and	varied	tourist	attractions.	
The	region	is	also	considered	as	one	of	the	poorest	regions	in	the	country.	
Consequently,	it	will	be	useful	to	examine	the	existing	local	institutional	conditions	and	
how	their	arrangements	influence	the	possibility	to	leverage	tourism	for	regional	
development.	Earlier	research	for	instance	has	noted	that	a	clearly	defined	policy	
framework	on	tourism	development	is	missing	in	the	Central	Region	(Adu‐Ampong,	
2014).	An	application	of	the	concept	of	institutional	thickness	in	studying	the	Central	
Region	will	therefore	add	much	needed	insights	into	identifying	what	else	is	missing	
and	how	best	to	develop	these	in	order	to	maximise	tourism’s	potential	for	local	
economic	development	and	poverty	reduction.	
Another	potential	avenue	for	future	research	can	be	found	in	a	detailed	examination	of	
the	role	and	capacity	of	local	governments	in	the	planning	and	governance	of	tourism	
development.	The	concept	of	stakeholder	governance	capacity	as	developed	and	
applied	in	this	thesis	can	be	extended	to	focus	specifically	on	local	government	
authorities.	This	could	potentially	generate	further	insights	into	the	challenges	faced	by	
local	governments	in	governing	a	sector	as	highly	complex	and	dynamic	as	tourism.	As	
local	governments	are	increasingly	being	asked	to	take	up	more	responsibilities	in	
shaping	development,	there	is	a	need	to	also	consider	their	governance	capacity	in	
meeting	these	responsibilities.	It	will	therefore	be	useful	to	explore	how	local	
governments	approach	tourism	development	and	how	they	build	up	their	capacity	to	
be	able	to	effectively	manage	the	process.	The	exploration	of	local	government	capacity	
in	tourism	planning	and	governance	will	be	further	enhanced	by	drawing	on	insights	
from	the	literature	on	decentralisation	and	public	administration.	
The	newly	emerging	literature	on	the	relationship	between	tourism	and	inclusive	
growth	(Hampton	and	Jeyacheya,	2015;	Lee	et	al.,	2015;	Adu‐Ampong,	2015;	Butler	and	
Rogerson,	2016;	Bakker	and	Messerli,	2016)	offers	a	final	avenue	for	future	research	
drawing	on	some	of	the	conclusions	of	this	thesis.	If	tourism	is	to	serve	as	a	driver	for	
inclusive	growth	then	questions	has	to	be	asked	with	regards	to	policy	formulation,	the	
time	frame	of	projects	and	the	extent	to	which	tourism‐inclusive	growth	ideas	become	
embedded	within	existing	institutional	structures	in	a	given	destinations.	As	one	of	the	
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key	findings	of	this	thesis	shows,	future	research	on	tourism‐inclusive	growth	nexus	
need	to	be	sensitive	to,	and	grounded	in	the	political	context	in	which	tourism	and	
economic	development	planning	takes	place.	
	
8.4 Reflections and final words 
“Oh,	so	you	are	a	planner?”,	“Will	you	go	and	work	as	a	planning	officer	when	you	
complete?”,	“Hurry	up	and	come	help	plan	our	country!”	These	were	some	of	the	most	
common	comments	I	received	during	fieldwork	in	Ghana	after	I	introduce	myself	as	a	
PhD	student	in	Urban	Studies	and	Planning.	At	an	academic	and	disciplinary	level,	I	
have	had	to	constantly	(re)negotiate	my	academic	identity	in	terms	of	where	I	position	
myself	and	the	contribution	of	this	thesis.	The	very	large	number	of	different	academic	
disciplines	I	draw	upon	in	this	thesis	is	a	reflection	of	my	broad	academic	training.	I	
completed	my	undergraduate	BA	(Hons)	Sociology	and	Social	Work	with	a	minor	in	
Geography	and	Rural	Development	in	the	Department	of	Sociology	at	the	Kwame	
Nkrumah	University	of	Science	and	Technology,	Ghana.	My	first	MSc	Tourism,	
Environment	and	Development	took	me	to	Department	of	Geography	at	King’s	College	
London,	UK.	I	studied	for	an	MA	Development	Studies	(Governance	and	Democracy)	at	
the	International	Institute	of	Social	Studies,	which	is	now	part	of	the	Erasmus	
University	of	Rotherham	in	the	Netherlands,	as	part	of	the	then	two	degree	Erasmus	
Mundus	Masters	Programme	in	Public	Policy.	The	other	degree	programme	was	an	MA	
International	Development	Policy	at	the	Institut	Barcelona	d'Estudis	Internacionals	
(IBEI)	in	Barcelona,	Spain.	Ending	up	in	a	Department	of	Urban	Studies	and	Planning	
for	my	PhD	only	served	to	confirm	my	affinity	for	interdisciplinary	research.	The	
interdisciplinary	approach	that	I	have	taken	inevitably	raises	questions	about	which	
disciplinary	home	I	position	the	contributions	of	this	thesis.	The	challenge,	throughout	
my	PhD	candidature	and	the	writing	of	this	thesis,	has	been	to	position	the	thesis	
contribution	as	straddled	between	international	development	planning	and	tourism	
studies157.	In	essence,	the	contribution	of	this	thesis	is	to	a	call	for	international	
																																																								
157	There	are	ongoing	debates	as	to	whether	development	studies,	and	tourism	studies	can	be	
considered	as	fully	fledged	academic	disciplines	–	compared	to	traditional	disciplines	such	as	
Sociology,	Economics,	and	Political	Science	among	others.	
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development	studies	to	“take	tourism	seriously”	and	for	tourism	studies	to	“take	the	
political	nature	of	tourism	seriously”.		
The	research	process	that	culminated	in	the	writing	of	this	thesis	has	offered	many	
highs	and	lows	for	me.	It	was	especially	during	the	fieldwork	period	in	Ghana	and	in	the	
first	phase	of	analysis	that	I	experienced	significant	low	periods.	On	paper	and	at	first	
approach,	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy	appeared	to	have	the	potential	to	offer	so	much	in	
terms	of	leveraging	tourism	development	for	local	economic	development	and	poverty	
reduction.	As	the	interviews	unfolded,	I	was	confronted	with	what	was	systemic	and	
structural	constraints	facing	planners	and	policymakers.	There	came	certain	moments	
of	the	research	process	that	I	felt	were	emotionally	draining.	As	a	Ghanaian	with	a	keen	
interest	in	the	development	of	my	country,	I	sometimes	found	myself	thinking	of	a	
‘meta	theory’	for	change	in	Ghana.	This	was	of	course	beyond	the	remit	of	my	PhD	
research	but	it	was	in	the	beginning	difficult	not	to	get	emotionally	tangled	up.	At	
various	points	in	time	I	was	torn	between	just	getting	on	with	the	PhD	research	and	
trying	to	conceptualise	a	way	out	of	the	deep	systemic	and	structural	constraints	facing	
development	aspirations	in	Ghana.	What	helped	me	at	this	point	was	to	write	a	series	of	
blog	posts	that	were	tangential	to	my	PhD	research	but	which	allowed	me	to	hang	up	
my	emotional	entanglements.	This	enabled	me	to	then	focus	squarely	on	meeting	the	
requirements	of	a	PhD	thesis	through	a	rigorous	analysis	of	the	data.	I	remember	the	
advice	given	to	me	by	a	senior	researcher	to	the	effect	that	I	should	focus	on	getting	the	
PhD	done	and	then	I	can	write	up	a	page	of	policy	proposals	for	each	institutional	
stakeholder	I	analysed.		
The	outcomes	of	the	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	as	shown	through	this	thesis	have	been	
below	expectations.	From	the	perspective	of	planning	one	of	the	key	issues	has	been	
the	failure	in	institutional	building	and	integration	to	ensure	the	continuity	and	long	
term	sustainability	of	the	project.	In	policy	terms,	setting	up	appropriate	governance	
structures	and	mechanisms	have	been	shown	to	be	crucial	in	achieving	planning	goals.	
Where	this	thesis	might	finally	end	then	is	with	a	challenge	of	some	sort	relating	to	how	
planning	research	could	make	way	for	reconciling	emotional	disappointments	and	
academic	excitement.	How	does	one	reconcile	the	recognition	that	the	research	data	
while	being	‘very	good’	for	writing	the	thesis	at	the	same	time	points	to	how	the	
planning	system	is	far	from	working	as	it	ought	to	and	there	appears	to	be	little	
progress	at	making	it	work.	Is	there	room	for	more	researchers	to	become	‘activist	
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researchers’	in	order	to	help	make	systems	work?	Do	we	just	study,	understand,	
explain	and	make	recommendations	leaving	the	messy	details	of	implementation	to	the	
political	and	bureaucratic	machineries?	Perhaps,	the	increasing	interest	in	public	
engagement,	co‐production	and	research	impact	that	goes	beyond	citations	offers	an	
opportunity	for	us	as	researcher	to	roll	up	our	sleeves	and	join	in	“making	better	
places”	
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Appendix A 
List of interviews with dates 
No.	 Interviewee	 Position/Role Organisation/Institution	 Date	of	
Interview	
1. 	 Dr.	Zagba	
Oyortey	
Executive
Director	
Ghana	Museums	and	
Monuments	Board	
11.08.2014
2. 	 Mr.	Gideon	
Aryeequaye	
Deputy	
Executive	
Director	
Ghana	Tourism	
Development	Company	
12.08.2014
3. 	 Mr.	Herbet	
Acquaye	
National	
President	
Ghana	Hotels	Association	 12.08.2014
4. 	 Mr.	Raymond	
Agbo	
Deputy	Director	
(Museums)		
Ghana	Museums	and	
Monuments	Board	
13.08.2014
5. 	 Mr.	Fred	K.	
Amekudi	
Deputy	Director	
(Monuments)	
Ghana	Museums	and	
Monuments	Board	
13.08.2014
6. 	 Nana	Opei	IV	 President Ghana	Progressive	Hotels	
Association	
13.08.2014
7. 	 Mr.	Spencer	
Doku	
Manager	for	
Planning	and	
Business	
Development	
Ghana	Tourism	Authority	 14.08.2014
8. 	 Mr.	Daniel	Nana	
Anim	
President Ghana	Tourism	Federation	 14.08.2014
9. 	 Mr.	Michael	H.	
Attipoe	
Director	
(Finance	and	
Administration)	
Ghana	National	
Commission	on	Culture	
14.08.2014
10. 	 Mr.	Sampson		
Donkoh	
Deputy	Director Ghana	Tourism	Authority	 18.08.2014
11. 	 Mr.	Humphrey	
Kuma	
Director	of	
Policy,	Planning,	
Monitoring	and	
Evaluation	
Ministry	of	Tourism,	
Culture	and	Creative	Arts	
18.08.2014
12. 	 Mr.	Leni	Kanton	 Operations	
Manager	
Wildlife	Division,	Forestry	
Commission	
19.08.2014
13. 	 Mr.	Raymond	
Agbo	
Deputy	Director	
(Museums)		
Ghana	Museums	and	
Monuments	Board	
20.08.2014
14. 	 Nana	Twum	
Barima	I	
Manager	for	
Research,	
Statistics	and	
Information	
Ghana	Tourism	Authority	 20.08.2014
15. 	 Mrs.	Abigail	
Tagoe	
Acting	Deputy	
Executive	
Director	
Ghana	Tourism	Authority	 20.08.2014
16. 	 Mr.	Kwaku	
Passah	
President Tour	Guides	Association	of	
Ghana	
21.08.2014
17. 	 Mr.	William	
Boateng	
Director	of	
Planning,	
Monitoring	and	
Evaluation	
Ghana	National	
Commission	on	Culture	
21.08.2014
18. 	 Mrs.	Georgina	
Bentum	
Assistant	Head	
of	Integrated	
Central	Region	
Development	Commission	
03.09.2014
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Tourism	
Development	
Department	
19. 	 Mr.	Eric	Ohene‐
Larbi	
Deputy	
Director/Admini
strator	
Centre	for	National	Culture,	
Central	Region	
05.09.2014
20. 	 Mr.	Christiana	C.	
Oparebea	
Regional	
Director	
Centre	for	National	Culture,	
Central	Region	
05.09.2014
21. 	 Mr.	Essel	
Blankson	
Senior	Museums	
and	Monuments	
Officer	(Head	of	
Education)	
Ghana	Museums	and	
Monuments	Board,	Cape	
Coast	Castle	
08.09.2014
22. 	 Mr.	Nkunu	Akyea	 Former	
Director/Senior	
Tour	Guide	
Ghana	Heritage	
Conservation	Trust	
08.09.2014
23. 	 Mr.	Frederick	
Nyame	
Planning	Officer	
of	Regional	
Economic	
Planning	Unit	
Regional	Coordination	
Council,	Central	Region	
08.09.2014
24. 	 Mr.	Felix	Nguah	 Interim	
Chairman/Elmin
a	Cell	Head	
Tour	Guides	Association,	
Central	Region	
09.09.2014
25. 	 Mr.	Clifford	Ato	
Eshun	
Officer‐in‐Charge Ghana	Museums	and	
Monuments	Board,	Elmina	
Castle	
09.09.2014
26. 	 Mr.	Alex	Boakye	 Regional	
Director	
Ghana	Tourism	Authority,	
Central	Region	
10.09.2014
27. 	 Mr.	Spencer	
Taylor	
Executive	
Director	
Central	Region	
Development	Commission	
10.09.2014
28. 	 Mr.	Jonathan	
Nyaaba	
Programmes	
Manager	
Ghana	Heritage	
Conservation	Trust	
11.09.2014
29. 	 Mr.	Enoch	Ashie	 Park	Manager,	
Kakum	National	
Park	
Wildlife	Division,	Forestry	
Commission	
11.09.2014
30. 	 Dr.	Joel	Sonne	 Director	of	
Projects	
Ministry	of	Tourism,	
Culture	and	Creative	Arts	
16.09.2014
31. 	 Mr.	David	Gray	 Vice	National	
President	
Ghana	Association	of	Travel	
and	Tour	Agents	
16.09.2014
32. 	 Mr.	Charles	Osei	
Bonsu	
Acting	Chief	
Executive	
Director	
Ghana	Tourism	Authority	 17.09.2014
33. 	 Mrs.	Judith	
Abase	
Acting	Director Hotel	Catering	and	Tourism	
Training	Institute	
17.09.2014
34. 	 Dr.	Joseph	
Mensah‐Ansah	
Lecturer	of	
Hospitality	
	
	
Policy	Officer	
Ghana	Institute	of	
Management	and	Public	
Administration	
Ghana	Tourism	Federation	
18.09.2014
35. 	 Mr.	David	Kpelle	 Tourism	and	
Commercial	
Officer	
Wildlife	Division,	Forestry	
Commission	
19.09.2014
36. 	 Dr.	Zagba	
Oyortey	
Executive	
Director	
Ghana	Museums	and	
Monuments	Board	
23.09.2014
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37. 	 Mr.	Francis	
Cobbinah	
Executive	
Director	
Ghana	Heritage	
Conservation	Trust	
29.09.2014
38. 	 Mrs.	Lucy	
Owusu‐Ansah	
Acting	
Coordinating	
Director/Region
al	Economic	
Planning	Unit	
Regional	Coordinating	
Council,	Central	Region	
29.09.2014
39. 	 Mr.	Michael	
Bentil‐Arthur	
Assemblyman/	
Head	of	Elmina	
Zonal	
Office/Tourism	
Information	
Office	
Komenda‐Edina‐Eguago‐
Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	
01.10.2014
40. 	 Mrs.	Olivia	
Opoku‐Adomah	
Director	of	
Research,	
Statistics	and	
Information	
Ministry	of	Tourism,	
Culture	and	Creative	Arts	
20.10.2014
41. 	 Mr.	Douglas	
Nanka	Bruce	
Director Ghana	Rural	Ecotourism	
and	Travel	Office	
22.10.2014
42. 	 Nana	Bright	
Oduro‐Kwarteng	
Chief	Director Ministry	of	Tourism,	
Culture	and	Creative	Arts	
23.10.2014
43. 	 Mr.	Nicholas	Ivor		 Regional	
Director	
Ghana	Museums	and	
Monuments	Board,	Central	
and	Western	Regions,	Cape	
Coast	Castle	
30.10.2014
44. 	 Mr.	Ebo	Kow	
Amoasi	Dadzie	
Head,	Tourism	
Sub‐committee	
Komenda‐Edina‐Eguago‐
Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	
31.10.2014
45. 	 Mrs.	Nichole	
Ama	Abraham	
Head	of	
Integrated	
Tourism	
Development	
Department	
Central Region	
Development	Commission	
03.11.2014
46. 	 Mr.	Ben	Aidoo	 Regional	
President	
Ghana	Hotels	Association,	
Central	Region	
03.11.2014
47. 	 Dr.	Anthony	
Annah‐Prah	
Local	
consultant/Impl
ementation	
Officer,	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	
Komenda‐Edina‐Eguago‐
Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	
03.11.2014
48. 	 Alhaji	Musah	
Issah	
Municipal	
Coordinating	
Director	
Komenda‐Edina‐Eguago‐
Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	
04.11.2014
49. 	 Mr.	Isaac	K.	Sam	 Municipal	Chief	
Executive	
Komenda‐Edina‐Eguago‐
Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	
05.11.2014
50. 	 Dr.	Stephen	
Nana	Ato	Arthur	
Member	of	
Parliament	
Former	
Municipal	Chief	
Executive	
Former	Deputy	
Central	Regional	
Minister	
Komenda‐Edina‐Eguago‐
Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	
07.11.2014
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51. 	 Mr.	Justice	
Amoah	
Planning	Officer	
at	Upper	
Denkyira	East	
Municipal	
Assembly	
Former	Planning	
Officer	(Cape	
Coast	
Metropolitan	
Assembly)	
Former	Planning	
Officer	
Former	Project	
Coordinator,	
Elmina	2015	
Strategy	
Komenda‐Edina‐Eguago‐
Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	
13.11.2014
52. 	 Mr.	Jonathan	
Nyaaba	
Programmes	
Manager	
Ghana	Heritage	
Conservation	Trust	
14.07.2015
53. 	 Mr.	Ebo	Kow	
Amoasi	Dadzie	
Head,	Tourism	
Sub‐committee	
Komenda‐Edina‐Eguago‐
Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	
16.07.2015
54. 	 Mr.	Justice	
Amoah	
Planning	Officer	
at	Upper	
Denkyira	East	
Municipal	
Assembly	
Former	Planning	
Officer	(Cape	
Coast	
Metropolitan	
Assembly)	
Former	Planning	
Officer	
Former	Project	
Coordinator,	
Elmina	2015	
Strategy	
Komenda‐Edina‐Eguago‐
Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	
17.07.2015
55. 	 Dr.	Anthony	
Annah‐Prah	
Local	
consultant/Impl
ementation	
Officer,	Elmina	
2015	Strategy	
Komenda‐Edina‐Eguago‐
Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	
22.07.2015
56. 	 Mrs.	Irene	
Rafiatu	Hudu	
Assistant	
Planning	Officer	
Komenda‐Edina‐Eguago‐
Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	
23.07.2015
57. 	 Mr.	Labaran	
Fuseini	
Municipal	
Planning	Officer	
Komenda‐Edina‐Eguago‐
Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	
23.07.2015
58. 	 Mr.	Clifford	Ato	
Eshun	
Officer‐in‐Charge Ghana	Museums	and	
Monuments	Board,	Elmina	
Castle	
10.08.2015
59. 	 Mr.	Justice	
Amoah	
Municipal	
Coordinating	
Director,	Wa;	
Former	Planning	
Officer	(Cape	
Komenda‐Edina‐Eguago‐
Abrem	Municipal	Assembly	
20.10.2016
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Coast	
Metropolitan	
Assembly)	
Former	Planning	
Officer	
Former	Project	
Coordinator,	
Elmina	2015	
Strategy	
	
	
	
Community	Interviews	
Interviewee	 Position/Role/Place Date	of	Interview
Store	Owner Plange	House 15.07.2015
Elderly	man	 Lottery	kiosk	next	to	Craft	Market 15.07.2015
Street	Vendor	
selling	fruits	
	 15.07.2015
Chemical	Drug	
Store	Keeper	
	 15.07.2015
Chief	Fisherman	 Elmina	Fishermen	Association 15.07.2015
5	Elderly	men	 Newspaper	stand	opposite	Nana	Kobina	Gyan	
Square	
16.07.2015
2	Elderly	women	 Tursmark	House 23.07.2015
Elderly	woman	+	
daughter	
Abrahams	House 23.07.2015
Home	Overseer	 Alfred	Mensah	House 10.08.2015
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Appendix B 
List of key policy documents reviewed 
	
 Ghana	National	Tourism	Development	Plan	2013‐2027	
 Ghana	National	Tourism	Development	Plan	1996‐2010	
 Ghana	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	Paper	(Ghana	Shared	Growth	and	
Development	Agenda)	2010‐2013	
 Ghana	Ministry	of	Tourism	Pilot	Programme	Based	Project	Budget	2013‐2015	
 Ghana	National	Cultural	Policy	2004	
 Ghana	National	Tourism	Policy	(7th	draft)	2006	
 Ghana	National	Tourism	Marketing	Strategy	2009‐2012	
 Bank	of	Ghana	Research	Report	(2007)	on	‘The	Tourism	Industry	and	the	
Ghanaian	Economy’	
 Ghana	Tourist	Control	Authority	Act,	1973	(Act	224)	
 Ghana	Tourism	Act,	2011	(Act	817)	
 2010	Ghana	Millennium	Development	Goals	Report	
 1992	Republic	of	Ghana	Constitution	
 Local	Government	Law	(Act	462)	
 7‐year	Development	Plan	for	National	Reconstruction	and	Development	
(including	a	National	Physical	Development	Plan),	1963/64	–	1969/70	
 5‐year	Development	Plan,	1975/76	–	1979/80	
 Ghana	–Vision	2020	(The	First	Step:	1996	–	2000)	
 Ghana	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	(GPRS)	I,	2003‐2005	
 Growth	and	Poverty	Reduction	Strategy	(GPRS)	II,	2006‐2009	
 Ghana	Shared	Growth	and	Development	Agenda	(GSGDA)	I,	2010‐2013	
 Ghana	Shared	Growth	and	Development	Agenda	(GSGDA)	II,	2014‐2017	
 Ghana	Population	and	Housing	Census	2010	Report	
 Ghana	Living	Standards	Survey	6th	Round	Main	Report	
 Ghana	Poverty	Profile	based	on	the	Ghana	Living	Standards	Survey	6th	Round	
 2010	Population	and	Housing	Census	District	Analytical	Report	for	the	
Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	Municipality	
 The	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	Part	I:	Sector	Strategy	&	Vision	
 The	Elmina	2015	Strategy,	Part	III:	Priority	area	3:	Tourism	and	Local	Economic	
Development	–	Project	descriptions	
 Elmina	Tourism	Option	Plan/Elmina	Tourism	Management	Plan	
 Draft	Final	Report	of	Elmina	Cultural	Heritage	and	Management	Programme	
 Save	Elmina	Magazine	of	June,	1995	
 Elmina	Profile	Executive	Summary,	final	draft	of	April,	2002	
 Elmina	Profile,	main	report	
 Cultural	Heritage	and	Local	Development	in	Elmina	Programme	Progress	
Report	11	–	September,	2006	–	October,	2006	
 Cultural	Heritage	and	Local	Development	in	Elmina	Programme	Progress	
Report	12	–	November	1st,	2006	–	November30th,	2006	
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Appendix C 
Key Tourism Resources in Ghana 
National	Level	
National	Parks	and	Reserves
‐ Mole	National	Park	
‐ Gbele	Resource	Reserve	
‐ Bui	National	Park	
‐ Kakum	National	Park	&	Assin	Attandanso	Resource	Reserve	
‐ Shai	Hills	Resource	Reserve	
‐ Boabeng‐Fiema	Wildlife	Sanctuary	
‐ Kogyae	Strict	Nature	Reserve	
‐ Diagya	National	Park	
‐ Bomfobiri	Wildlife	Sanctuary	
‐ Owabi	Wildlife	Sanctuary	
‐ Nini‐Suhien	National	Park	&	Ankasa	Resource	Reserve	
‐ Agumatsa	Wildlife	Sanctuary	
‐ Aburi	Botanical	Gardens	
‐ Kyabobo	National	Park	
‐ Bia	National	Park	&	Resource	Reserve	
‐ Kalakpa	Resource	Reserve	
	
o Wetlands,	Lakes,	Rivers	&	Others	
‐ Keta	lagoon	 	
‐ Songhor	lagoon	
‐ Muni	Pomadze	lagoon	
‐ Densu	delta	
‐ Lake	Volta	
‐ Lake	Bosomtwe	
‐ Wli	Water	falls	
‐ Boti	Water	falls	
‐ Kintampo	Waterfalls	
‐ Paga	Crocodile	Pond	
‐ Beaches;	Busua,	Kokrobite,	Brenu‐Akyinim,	Half	Assini	
	
Histo‐Heritage	
‐ Cape	Coast	Castle	
‐ Elimina	(St.	George’s	)	Castle	
‐ Fort	St.	Jago	
‐ Osu	(Christianborg)	Castle	
‐ Manhyia	Palace	
‐ Kumasi	Military	Museum	
‐ Larabanga	Mosque	
‐ Kwame	Nkrumah	Mausoleum	
‐ W.E.B.	Dubios	Centre	
‐ George	Padmore	Library	
‐ Dutch	Cemetry,	Elmina	
	 	 	
	
Festivals	
‐ Pan‐African	Historical	Theatre	Festival	(PANAFEST)	
‐ Homowo	festival	
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‐ Odwira	festival	
‐ Hogbetsotso	festival	
‐ Adae	Kese	festival	
‐ Aboakyre	festival	
‐ Damba	festival	
‐ Funeral	celebrations	
	
Crafts	&	Arts	
‐ Arst	Centre,	Accra	
‐ Kumasi	Cultural	Centre	
‐ Bonwire	Kente‐weaving	village	
‐ Metal	and	woodwork	villages	
	
(In)Tangible	cultural	&	economic	practices	
‐ Traditional	music	and	dance	forms	
‐ Traditional	cuisines	
‐ Nzulezu	Stilt	village	
‐ Kumasi	Kejetia	open‐air	market	
‐ Shrines	
‐ Languages	
‐ National	Football	Passion	
‐ Proverbial	Ghanaian	hospitality	
	
	
Regional	Level	–	Central	Region	
Natural	&	Histo‐Heritage	
o National	Parks	and	Reserves	
‐ Kakum	National	Park	&	Assin	Attandanso	Resource	Reserve	
‐ Nini‐Suhien	National	Park	&	Ankasa	Resource	Reserve	
	
o Histo‐Heritage	
‐ Cape	Coast	Castle	
‐ Elimina	(St.	George’s	)	Castle	
‐ Fort	St.	Jago	
‐ Dutch	Cemetry,	Elmina	
‐ Colonial	&	historic	buildings	
	
o Wetlands,	Lakes,	Rivers	&	Others	
‐ Beaches;	Busua,	Brenu‐Akyinim,	Gomoa	Fetteh	
	
Socio‐cultural	&	Economic	
‐ Pan‐African	Historical	Theatre	Festival	(PANAFEST)	
‐ Odwira	festival	
‐ Aboakyre	festival	
‐ Edina	Bronya	
‐ Akwabo	festival	
‐ Edina	Bakatue	festival	
‐ Fetu	Afahye	(carnival)	
‐ Masquerading	festival	
‐ Elmina	fishing	village	
‐ Winneba	fishing	and	ceramic	village	
‐ Gomoa‐Otsew‐Jukwa	pottery	villages	
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‐ Mankessim	Posuban	shrine	
‐ Local	cuisne	
‐ Traditional	music	and	dance	forms	
‐ Heritage	of	being	former	colonial	capital	
‐ Funeral	celebrations	
‐ Proverbial	Ghanaian	hospitality		
	
District	Level	–	Elimina	(Komenda‐Edina‐Eguafo‐Abrem	Municipality)	
Natural	&	Histo‐Heritage	
‐ Elimina	(St.	George’s	)	Castle	
‐ Fort	St.	Jago	
‐ Dutch	Cemetry,	Elmina	
‐ Colonial	&	historic	buildings	
‐ Beaches;	Elmina,	Busua	
	
Socio‐cultural	&	Economic	
‐ Pan‐African	Historical	Theatre	Festival	(PANAFEST)	
‐ Edina	Bronya	
‐ Edina	Bakatue	festival	
‐ Masquerading	festival	
‐ Elmina	fishing	village	
‐ Local	cuisine	
‐ Traditional	music	and	dance	forms	
‐ Heritage	of	being	former	colonial	trading	post	
‐ Funeral	celebrations	
‐ Proverbial	Ghanaian	hospitality	
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Appendix D 
Sample Interview Transcript  
	
Interview	with	current	KEEA	Member	of	Parliament	who	is	also	the	former	KEEA	
District	Chief	Executive	and	a	former	Deputy	and	later	substantive	Regional	
Minister	of	the	Central	Region	
	
[Thank	you	very	much	once	again.	I	think	you	are	the	most	ideal	person	to	
talk	to	with	regards	to	this	one	–	Elmina	2015.	But	before	then,	what	is	your	
general	view	of	the	economic	development	state	of	KEEA]	
It’s	not	in	bare	shape	as,	as	I	should	say…We’ve	had	some	improvements	
particularly	when	we	started	the	2015	strategy.	But	I	must	be	quick	to	point	out	
that	we	are	almost	at	the	tail	end	of	the	implementation	of	the	strategy.		But	the	
last	5	years,	it	hasn’t	gone	the	way	that	it	has	to	go.	Why	am	I	saying	this?	The	
effort	that	we	put	in,	in	doing	this	thing,	we	were	looking	at	in	line	with	the	
MDGS	–Millennium	Development	Goals.	We	started	in	2001	so	we	said	look,	in	
the	next	15	years	where	do	we	see	KEEA.	And	so	we	brought	actors	together.	
Local	actors	I	mean,	together.	What	do	you	want	to	see	in	the	next	15	years?	
That	led	to	the	5	thematic	areas	that	we	have	here.	First	of	all	the	waste	
management	and	drainage.	The	second	one	had	to	do	with	local	economic	
development	and	tourism.	The	third	one	had	to	do	with	fishing	and	the	fishing	
harbour	and	then	education	and	health.	These	are	the	5	thematic	areas.	They	
are	as	important	today	as	it	was.	We	did	quite	well	when	it	came	to	the	fishing	
and	the	fishing	harbour.	As	a	result	of	this	we	had	the	Elmina	lagoon	dredged.	It	
was	a	response	to	this.	When	it	comes	to	education,	we	had	the	Edinaman	
Secondary	School	a	new	face	lift.	When	it	came	to	health,	we	had	support	from	
Gouda	Municipality	and	then	they	worked	on	the	infrastructure	in	Elmina.	Apart	
from	that	linking	that	to	sanitation	and	local	economic	development	we	had	to	
solicit	for	waste	bins	at	the	time	to	be	able	to	strategically	point	at	very	many	
areas	so	that	if	you	pick	waste	you	will	be…and	then	as	a	very	consequences	of	
this,	we	had	what	we	call	the	Elmina‐Gouda	waste	–	Cyclus	–	processing	plant	at	
Abraza.	And	now	at	the	time,	nobody	will	put	a	sachet	bag	in	the	street.	People	
will	be	picking	them	because	they	know	people	will	buy	from	them	to	take	to	
the	site	[and	there	were	bins	available]	and	there	were	bins	available	to	do	that.	
And	people	will	buy,	so	if	someone	will	buy	from	you	even	after	drinking	the	
sachet	water	you	can	even	put	it	in	your	pocket	because	when	you	go	home,	
dump	them,	put	them	there,	gather	them,	somebody	will	come	to	purchase	from	
you.	Even	if	for	1	cedi	you	can	give	that	to	your	son	or	daughter	to	take	to	school	
in	the	morning.	You	see,	so	that	is	how	it	started.		
However	as	I	alluded	to	earlier,	when	government	changed,	those	who	followed	
us,	the	zeal,	the	commitment,	I	don’t	see	it	the	way	that	we	started.	
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[Why	is	that,	why	did	the	commitment	go	down?]	
No,	because	the	way	you’ve	struggled	to	get	to	where	you	are,	if	you	didn’t	get	to	
that	through	sweat	you	didn’t	appreciate	it.	How	we	sat	day	and	night	to	
develop	this	document.	I	will	be	here	in	the	afternoon	and	then	J.H.	Mensah,	the	
then	senior	minister	will	call	me	to	his	office	in	Accra	that	look,	I	have	been	able	
to	get	some	Ambassadors	together	and	I	want	you	to	come	and	speak	with	them.	
It’ll	be	12midday	here,	he	will	tell	me,	I	need	to	be	there	at	4pm.	I	need	to	pick	
my	car	and	even	whether	I	have	said	goodbye	to	my	wife	or	family	or	not,	I	will	
go	because	I	needed	to	do	something	for	my	people,	that	was	the	zeal	then.	
When	Kuffour’s	second	term,	I	became	the	(Regional)	Minister	and	then	
someone	else	took	over	as	DCE,	the	coordinating	director	that	I	was	working	
with	at	the	time	had	been	transferred	to	Tema,	the	planning	officer	that	I	was	
working	with	at	the	time	had	been	transferred	to	Cape	Coast.	So	the…	
[Why,	why	did	you	allow	or	maybe	you	were	not	there	but	why	were	they	
allowed	to	be	transferred,	because	they	had…]	
No,	we	don’t	control	transfer.	
[But	then	the	DCE/MCE	can	also	have	a	say	because	you	can	also	ask	
someone	to	be	transferred	so	you	could	have	some	say	in	retaining	the	
capacity]	
Either	the	DCE	will	say,	I	do	not	want	to	work	with	this	person	but	the	DCE	
hasn’t	even	got	much	control.	If	Local	Government	Minister,	today	it	is	Local	
Government	Services	but	that	time	Local	Government	Minister,	
notwithstanding,	even	one	of	them	I	was	a	(Regional)	Minister,	one	of	the	guys	
when	he	was	been	transferred,	I	put	in	a	letter	that	look,	KEEA	has	trained	this	
person	in	this	and	that,	the	capacities	that	that	person	has	gained,	please.	They	
said	no.	the	capacities	that	he	has	gained,	he	should	also	go	and	share	with	other	
places.	So	before	we	realised,	new	officers	had	come	to	KEEA	and	so	the	
institutional	memory	was	lost	on	us	
[But	then,	well	that	is	what	the	immediate	past	Chief	Director	at	the	Local	
Government	ministry	told	me	that	you	can’t	stay	at	one	place	for	10	years	
but	then	that	is	why	you	have	handing	over	notes.	Were	there	enough	
information	for	the	new	guys	to	pick	up	from]	
We	had	the	like	you	just	had	a	copy	and	most	of	the	projects	that	I	did;	most	of	
the	projects	we	did,	reports	were	available.	As	for	reports,	they	were	there		
[When	you	left	the	reports	were	there?]		
They	were	there,	I	mean	DCE’s	office	and	then	when	consultants	also	print	and	
came	with	the	report,	there	were	also	there.	So	as	for	reports,	institutional	
memory	by	way	of	report,	fine.	But	having	at	least	one	or	two	of	the	members	
trained,	you	know	to	actually	continue	with	the	mantle	that	wasn’t	there.	
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[Because	as	at	now,	there	is	no	document	at	the	Municipal	assembly	with	
regards	to	this.	I	have	been	there.	It	was	not	even	in	the	handing	over	notes	
of	the	current	coordinating	director]	
Because	the	current	coordinating	director	didn’t	do	anything	about	this	so	that	
is	the	reason	why	he	might	not	find	anything.	But	I	tell	you	from	my	time	to	the	
new	DCE	who	continued,	you	will	find	documentation	on	what	we’ve	done.	But	
from	there	coming,	I	wouldn’t	know.	
[Yeah,	well	that	is	what	I	mean.	So	it	is	like	with	every	successive	
administration	there	is	less	and	less	information	available]	
That	one	I	agree	with	you	because	they	themselves	are	not	doing	much	in	the	
implementation.	Some	DCE	might	not	even	know	of	the	Elmina	2015	strategy.	
[Yeah	that’s	maybe	because	there	is	no	information	on	it	in	the	handing	over	
notes	that	he	came	to	me.	Because	that	is	what	the	current	DCE	is	saying]	
I	agree	with	you	but	I	am	telling	you,	current	MCE	while	doing	this	project,	he	
lived	in	KEEA.	He	knew	about	this.	If	I	tomorrow	find	myself	in	a	ministry,	if	
there	is	no	document	even	there	but	I	have	learnt	that	look	when	this	man	was	a	
minister,	I	overheard	him	talk	about	this	and	that,	I	will	fish	for	where	I	can	find	
the	information.	Because	I	tell	you,	if	ask	the	current	MCE,	he	might	not	even	
remember	one	thematic	area	of	this	document.	He	might	not	even	remember	
and	that	will	be	sad.	
[It	is	(sad),	well	that	is	the	case,	it	is	sad.	At	least	if,		I	don’t	come	from	
Elmina	but	I	have	been	studying	about	Elmina	for	quite	some	time	now	and	I	
have	become	invested	in	it	so…will	this	be	achieved,	will	the	strategy,	the	
vision	be	achieved?]	
I	actually,	just	last	month	I	had	a	meeting	the	the	Embassy	of	the	Netherlands.	I	
want	to	look	for	funding	and	then	we	all	as	stakeholders	sit	down	and	look	at	
the	2015	strategy	where	we	are.	Because	just	recently	I	was	invited	to	a	
programme	in	Bonne,	Germany.	We	are	looking	at	re‐localisation	of	MDGS.	
Because	2015	is	almost	with	us	so	now	we	are	looking	at	2030.	So	we	this,	
where	are	we,	where	have	we	gotten	to,	what	can	we	do,	what	is	the	next	line.	
That	is	what	I	want	to	do	and	then	I	have	another	appointment	to	meet	the	
Netherlands	Embassy	again.	They	are	waiting	for	my	proposal	to	see	
how…because	I	need	local	actors	to	sit	down.	How	many	people	are	even	aware	
of	this	project	and	then	where	we	are	now,	what	we	have	been	able	to	achieve	
and	then	where	do	we	go	from	here.	That	is	something	I	want	to	do.	
[Were	you	still	the	MCE	or	were	you	are	the	regional	office	when	the	
consultants	finished	their	work?]	
I	had	just	moved	to	the	regional	coordination	council	as	the	deputy	regional	
minister.	So	that	time	when	the	consultants	finalised,	I	was	at	the	regional	office,	
I	had	left	KEEA.	
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[Well	because	it	seems	like	at	the	point	where	the	Urban	Solutions	moved	
out,	that	is	when	the	project	went	like	this…downwards]	
That	is	true.	It	was	when	they	moved	out	because	they	were	the	consultants,	
both	the	consultants	and	in	a	way	part	of	the	implementers.	Yes,	so	Urban	
Solutions	when	they	finished	their	job,	their	report	written,	I	had	the	hard	copy	
not	this	one.	They’ve	come	with	[the	final	report]	yes,	I	have	a	copy	of	that	
report.	
[And	there	was	supposed	to	be	Elmina	Development	Fund]	
Exactly,	there	was	supposed	to	be	Elmina	Development	Fund.	Even	on	this	
heritage	houses,	I	don’t	know	whether	you’ve	gone	there….when	we	were	
actually	restructuring	those	buildings,	there	was	this	plan	that	they	were	to	
contribute,	in	fact	part	came	from,	20%	of	the	fund.	It	is	still	sitting	in	the	
account.	If	you	ask	me	if	somebody	has	even	redrawn,	I	wouldn’t	know	but	I	
don’t	think	anybody	has	redrawn.	They	have	an	account	there	which	is	
supposed	to	be	used	to	rehabilitate	the	house.	But	the	houses,	we	didn’t	actually	
achieve	our	aim	because	we	were	to	use	as	home‐stays	[or	to	use	as	business	so	
it	generates	money]	Yes,	business	in	the	form	of	home‐stay	in	the	sense	like	
this…when	students	for	instance	visit	the	castle,	how	many	students	will	be	able	
to	afford	Elmina	Beach	Resort?	So	when	we	say	Elmina	Beach	Resort	is	taking	
200‐300	Ghana	cedis	a	night,	we	can	get	a	place	there	say	20‐30	Ghana	(cedis)	a	
night	as	a	bed.	Students	from	the	UK,	US,	you	can	stay	there;	you	know	about	the	
heritage	of	the	area	and	also	use	that	to	visit	the	castle.	Even	if	one	night,	two	
nights,	it’s	far	cheaper	than.	How	can	you	afford	300‐400	Ghana	(cedis).		The	
hotel	I	stayed	in	Accra	last	night,	it	is	not	any	hotel	but	Parliament	organised	it.	
Before	I	realised	that	hotel	is	700	Ghana	(cedis)	per	night	and	then	I	said,	what,	
how	can	I	pay	700	Ghana	(cedis)	to	stay	here.	You	see	so	that	was	what	was	
supposed	to	generate	some	funds	to	the	housing	scheme.	But	because	we	were	
unable	to	actually	get	people	to	stay	there	in	the	rooms,	it	has	now	become	
normal	houses.	
[So	who	is	in	charge	of	that	money	because	I	have	also	been	told	that	not	
everyone	paid	the	full	20%,	some	did	like	10%	part	payment	and	after	the	
renovation	was	done…]	
They	themselves	had	executives.	They	had	the	executives.	I	don’t	think	I	will	
remember	who	was	the	chairman	and	others	but	they	themselves	had	
executives.	You	also	had	someone	from	Elmina	here,	in	fact	he	just	retired	from	
UCC	–	[Dr	Annah	Prah]	–	Annah	Prah.	He	is	a	Prof	now,	Prof	Annah	Prah.	So	he	
was	actually	in	close	links	with	them	so	I	think	he	will	know	the	executives	and	
the...	I	don’t	even	know	the	account	number,	I	have	to	admit	but	they	had	funds.	
[So	when	it	comes	to	accountability,	who	should	be	held	accountable	for	
such	a	project?	Because	I	don’t	know	it	just	beats	my	mind	that	such	an	
interesting	project	like	this	can	just	disappear.	Currently	in	the	assembly	
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very	few	people,	Mr	Ebo	Dadzie	have	an	idea	about	what	the	project	was	
about	and	no	one	else]	
Ebo	Dadzie	was	very	key,	an	assembly	man	at	the	time	and	the	fact	that	he	also	
work	with	the	NCCE,	any	function,	he	was	the	MC	and	so	he	will	know	much	
about	this	project.	But	if	you	talk	about	the	accountability,	I	think	that	first	of	all	
the	assembly	must	be	able	to	be	accountable	to	the	people	about	the	project.	
When	I	talk	of	the	assembly,	it	is	in	the	hands	of	the	DCE/DCD.	They	should	be,	
you	know	but	that	is,	they	cannot	say	because	they	were	not	there	because	I	tell	
you	when	you	inherit,	in	both	assets	and	liabilities.	So	if	they’re	committed	to	
this	project,	they	would’ve	learnt	about	this	project,	read	about	it	and	even	
know	about	who	and	who	have	the,	that	executives	who	have	the	account	and	
those	things.	It	should	be	the	assembly	and	the	committee,	they	had	a	
committee	–	the	housing	scheme	ownership	project,	they	had	a	committee.	
[Which	sector	of	the	economy	in	KEEA	do	you	think	should	be	the	driving	
force	for	economic	development?]	
Tourism	must	be	our	driving	force.	It	is	the	tourism	hub	of	Ghana.	You	talk	
about	central	region	here,	the	most	visited	castle	is	St.	George’s	Castle	until	
recently	when	we	had	a	problem	with	our	bridge	and	it	is	even	now	under	
construction.	So	if	we	are	able	to	promote	tourism,	I	think	that	should	be	our	
driving	force	for	our	economy.	
[Then	who	should	take	the	lead	in	that?]	
It	is	the	assembly.	Assembly,	you	listen	to	my	presentation	is	responsible	for	
overall	development	of	the	area,	you	see	so	it	is	the	assembly.	The	assembly	is	
responsible	for	overall	development.	
	
[So,	how	best	do	we,	how	best	can	knowledge	be	managed	in	such	a	way	that	
notwithstanding	the	administration	that	comes	in,	there	is	information	
available	to	carry	on	projects]	
Knowledge	can	be	managed	in	1)	documentation	–	where	are	they?,	2)	are	they	
properly	filed,	3)	are	they	accessible	to	whoever	wants	to	lay	hands	on	those	
documentation?	For	me	this	is	how	knowledge	can	be	managed.	If	they	are	not	
properly	filed,	if	somebody	comes	now,	we	even	had	a	number	of	softcopies,	
CDs.	We	had	the	number,	which	the	project	when	they	finished	gave	us	a	
number	of	CDs.	If	today,	regional	coordination	council	that	I	have	left,	today	as	I	
speak,	some	of	my	development	projects,	we	made	sure	that	we	had	today’s	
Member	of	Parliament	Fritz	Baffour,	Member	of	Parliament	for	Ablekuma	is	it	
central	or	south.	We	consulted	him	and	gave	him	a	project	and	today	when	you	
go	to	the	regional	coordinating	council	we	have	CDs	from	my	time.	I	also	have	
copies.	They	gave	us	copies.	They	were	all	left,	I	left	them	with	the	CDs	then,	the	
one	that	came	I	do	not	know	if	they	still	treasured	the	CDs.	
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[They	threw	them	way	and	Prof	Annah	Prah	had	to	go	and	claim,	because	he	
showed	me,	I	went	to	his	house	and	he	showed	me.	They	just	threw	them	out	
and	people	could	just	take	them	away.	I	don’t	know	when	it	comes	to	
development,	how	do	you	ensure	continuity?]	
How	do	you	ensure	continuity	is,	how	each	and	everybody	sees	development	
being	a	continuous	action.	If	you	all	see	it	that	way,	I	have	left	office,	somebody	
has	come,	does	he	really	sees	this	as	a	project	that	needs	to	continue.	No,	
somebody	comes	even	the	time	that	we	used	in	doing	this,	he	doesn’t	see	it.	He	
all	that	he	knows	is	that	I’ve	been	a	DCE,	why	don’t	I	put	up	3‐classroom	block	
here,	why	don’t	I	do	that…there	is	no	connectivity	you	understand.	But	
development	is	a	kind	of	a	cycle;	we	need	to	appreciate	it	that	way.	If	we	don’t	
that	fine	but	if	we	don’t	do	it	that	way	and	we	think	that	oh	how	many	schools	
should	I	build,	how	do	you	actually	link	health	to	education,	how	do	you	link	
local	economic	development	to	tourism,	how	do	you	link	our	infrastructure	
needs	to	our	fishing	and	then	agriculture.	In	fact	I	must	admit	that	in	this	our	
strategy,	agriculture	is	quite	silent	in	this	but	because	it	was	in	Elmina,	yes.	But	
at	a	point	in	time,	we	thought	that	we	were	using	the	naming	Elmina	just	
because	it	was	the	capital	but	that	is	was	truly	meant	for	the	municipality,	KEEA.	
Actually	much	of	the	work	that	we	did	was	in	Elmina.	
[So	in	the	end,	does	tourism	have	any	impact	on	poverty	reduction	you	
think?	If	you	say	that	tourism	should	be	the	centre	point	for	the	economic	
development,	will	it	have	any	impact	on	poverty	reduction?]	
I	think	that	it	will	only	have	impact	if	we	look	at	the	way	we	were	actually	
developing	this	strategy.	We	added	what	we	call	local	economic	development.	
Close	to	the	old	market	in	Elmina	if	you	pass	there,	nothing	is	going	on	there	
now	but	if	you	pass	there,	we	were	going	to	assemble	all	those	who	were	
developing	beads	to	stay	there	so	that	when	and	even	within	the	strategy	we	
had	in	mind	that	those	who	visit	the	castle,	they	would	even	drive	straight	to	the	
castle,	their	park	should	be	parked	at	Kobina	Gyan	Square.	They	will	be	walking,	
along	the	line	when	they	are	walking,	they	will	drop	to	buy	a	bottle	of	water,	
they	will	drop	to	buy	a	bottle	of	blue	skies,	where	would	they	do	that?	It	will	be	
along	the	route	going	to	the	castle.	How	people	are	going	to	benefit	from	this	
will	be,	somebody	from	Elmina	selling	his	or	her	bottle	of	water.	They	will	buy	
from	them.	It	is	a	way	of	making	money.	If	beads	and	these	that	these	people	
were	actually	developing,	tourists	buy	from	them;	we	will	be	promoting	local	
economic	development.	If	this	our	homestay,	these	houses	that	if	they	had	been	
able	to	work,	it’s	a	way	of	empowering	the	poor.	This	was	what	we	had	in	mind	
when	we	said	tourism	and	local	economic	development.		Yeah	but	then	today	if	
you	ask	me	how	tourism	has	really	impacted	positively	on	our	people,	I	guess	it	
still	needs	to	be	measured.	I,	a	word	I	will	find	it	very	difficult,	a	word	that	we’ve	
done	so	well	in	that	or	it	has	only	been	negative.		
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[Maybe	qualitative	evaluation]	
No,	qualitative	evaluation	I	think	we’ve	made	some	progress	but	I	don’t,	I	think	
we	still	need	to	do	more.	
[Is	the	fact	that	not	more	has	been	done,	is	it	due	to	governance?	Is	it	that	
failure	of	governance	that	is	why	not	much	has	been	done?]	
If	we	talk	about	how	these	various	assemblies,	MCE	have	not	been	followed	
adequately	the	way	we	wanted	to	do	it,	governance	issues	will	come	in.	I	think	
that	the,	another	aspect	has	do	with	that	of	the	institutional	capacity	of	those	
who	are	left	behind.	The	lawyers	just	told	me	the	wanton	transfer	of	actors	you	
know,	I	think	has	also	culminated	into	the	whole	thing.		
[Now	you	are	talking	about	going	for	a	new	project	with	the	Dutch	Embassy	
and	all]	
All	in	connection	with	this	one	(Elmina	2015	Strategy)	we	want	to	sit	down,	
look	at,	we	need	to	you	see,	we	are	just	around	2015,	how	far	have	we	gone	with	
this	strategy,	what	next	,	what	is	the	way	forward.	That	is	what	I	am	talking	
about.	
[Yeah,	I	know.	Then	it	makes	me	want	to	ask,	would	we	always	have	to	go	
back	for	more	funding	because	this	was	supposed	to	have	been	handed	over	
to	KEEA	to	implement.	But	then	it	is	in	the	implementation,	that	is	always	
the	lacking	point…it’s	a	cycle]	
I	agree	but	it	also	had	to	do	with	funding.	If	were	to	go	by	this,	the	assembly	has	
received	some	resources	along	the	line.	Were	they	committed	to	this	as	a	way	to	
fund	this	project?	That	for	me	is	an	issue.	Are	there	other	extra	resources	that	
we	need,	how	do	we	do	that.	We	don’t	sit	in	your	office	and	think	that	the	
resources	will	come	to	your	office.	You	go	for	it,	you	go	with	proposals,	you	
prepare	before	you	can	get	some	of	these	resources.	Those	are	the	areas	that	I	
think	we’ve	lacked.	
[And	that	is	because	there	is	not	enough	capacity	in	the	assembly?]	
Exactly,	it’s	two	things,	capacity	and	know‐how,	capacity	and	commitment.	You	
can	have	capacity	but	if	the	person	is	not	committed	to	that	thing,	you	will	not	
get	it.	So	capacity	and	commitment,	they	are	all	governance	issues.	
[Naa,	it’s	sad,	I	find	it	really	sad	because	at	a	point	the	whole	Ghana	it	was	
only	KEEA	that	has	a	strategy	for	economic	development]	
The	whole	Ghana,	everything	was	Elmina	strategy,	Elmina	2015,	the	whole	
Ghana	they	talk	about	Elmina	2015	strategy	that	was	what	they	were	talking	
about.	Hmm,	maybe	I	went	with	it	but	I	didn’t	go	with	it.	I	only	went	to	become	
the	regional	minister	but	I	left	everything	here.		
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[Maybe	you	should	have	stayed	to	finish	it]	
You	are	right,	yeah	but	everybody	also	want	to	move	forward.	A	dean	wants	to	
become	a	vice	chancellor.		
[But	then	you	ought	to	have	succession	planning	also]	
But	succession	planning	is	what	we	said	we	have	all	these	officers	but	local	
government	service	is	also	different,	you	see.	
[Yeah,	so	we	also	have	to	reform	the	local	government	service	also	to	make	
sure	that	at	least	some	key	personnel	are	employed]	
Maintained	or	employed	by	the	assembly.	
[Or	that	the	assembly	will	have	a	say	in	whether	the	person	is	transferred	or	
maintained]	
Oh,	that	one	will	be	difficult.	If	local	government	service	thinks	you’ve	been	
there	for	4	years	or	you’ve	been	there	for	this	number	of	years	and	then	another	
assembly	also	needs	your	expertise,	it	will	be	difficult	for	KEEA	to	say	that	no	
we	wouldn’t	allow	that	person	to	go.	
[Because	you’ve	just	trained	the	person	for	a	specific	project]	
Are	we	still	recording?	
*some	guy	talking	about	his	law	lecture	on	local	government	systems.	In	addition	there	seem	to	
be	a	lot	of	people	waiting	to	see	him*	
[If	that	is	okay]	
Are	we	done?	
[Yeah,	I	think	I	will	end	it	here]	
You’ve	gotten,	ok	you’ve	gotten	what	you	want	to	get.	
[Well,	we	could	talk	more	but	you	have	a	lot	of	people	waiting	for	you]	
Anytime,	you	have	my	number.	Anytime,	even	you	have	my	card,	let	me	give	you	
my	card.	My	email	if	it	is	something	you	want	me	to	drop,	even	one	or	two	lines	I	
will	find	time	to	do	that	for	you.	
[Thank	you.	You	can	have	my	card.	You	have	a	very	busy	schedule	so	I	will	
leave	you	to	it.	Thank	you	very	much	once	again	for	your	time]	
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